Abington Center Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Baltimore County

HOLLANDER, Judge. In this case, we must determine whether a taxpayer who has not paid a disputed Baltimore County transfer tax must pursue an administrative remedy before challenging in circuit court the transfer tax and imposition of a lien on its property. Abington Center Associates Limited Partnership (“Abing-ton”), appellant, instituted a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, claiming that Baltimore County (the “County”), appellee, improperly assessed a transfer tax in the amount of $83,840.00, and then unconstitutionally imposed a lien on Abington’s property when it refused to pay the tax. The circuit court concluded that appellant failed to exhaust its administrative remedies and dismissed the suit. ⁵⁸³ Appellant noted a timely appeal and presents a pentad of questions for our consideration, which we have rephrased slightly.

I. Does the Maryland Tax Court have jurisdiction over challenges to the Baltimore County transfer tax? If so, has such jurisdiction been implemented?

II

Does the Circuit Court for Baltimore County have jurisdiction over this dispute under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, without exhaustion of administrative remedies, because the constitutionality of the statute under which Appellee acted was challenged?

III

Does the Circuit Court for Baltimore County have jurisdiction over this dispute under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, without exhaustion of remedies, because there was no adequate administrative remedy available to Appellant? IY. Does Baltimore County Code § 33-137 violate Appellant’s right to due process of law pursuant to the provisions of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution? V. Did Appellee erroneously assess and/or calculate the local transfer tax?

For the reasons that follow, we conclude that appellant did not have an available administrative remedy, and therefore was entitled to litigate its claim in circuit court. Accordingly, we shall vacate the circuit court’s order granting appellee’s motion to dismiss, and remand for further proceedings. Factual Summary Abington is a limited partnership organized pursuant to the laws of Connecticut. Appellee is a body politic, organized and existing under the laws of the State of Maryland.

The case arises from a series of conveyances with respect to a parcel of land situated in Baltimore County, containing approximately 6.5 acres (the “Land”). Hechinger Company (“Hechinger”) acquired fee simple title to the unimproved ⁵⁸⁴ Land in 1981. The Land has since been improved by a shopping center (the “Improvements”). After Hechinger reserved to itself an estate for years to June 1, 2005 with respect to the Land, and fee simple title to the Improvements, it conveyed the fee simple remainder interest in the Land to Penmar Holdings Company, Inc. (“Penmar”), by Deed dated December 1, 1982, for the sum of $30,000.00.

Through an unrecorded deed dated December 1, 1982, Hechinger conveyed to Mary Penn Properties, Inc. (“Mary Penn”) its estate for years in the Land and its fee simple interest in the Improvements. Also on that date, through an unrecorded agreement, Hechinger agreed to hold title to the estate for years in the Land and the fee simple title to the Improvements, as agent and nominee for Mary Penn. In an unrecorded lease agreement, Mary Penn then leased the property back to Hechinger on the same date. Appellant acquired title to the estate for years in the Land and fee simple title to the Improvements by a deed from Hechinger dated April 1, 1983.

Abington paid a transfer tax to the County in connection with that transaction. Years later, on April 14, 1993,' Mary Penn, without consideration, executed a Confirmatory Deed to confirm the prior conveyance by Hechinger to appellant of the reserved interest in the Land and Improvements. When the Confirmatory Deed was recorded, appellee determined that no local transfer tax was due, and stamped the Confirmatory Deed in the manner then provided by Baltimore County Code § 33-140 (1988 & Supp. 2). 1 As a result of the above described transactions, appellant became the owner of an estate for years in the Land and the Improvements in fee simple. Penmar was the record owner of the fee simple remainder interest in the Land.

Thereafter, by Deed dated November 10, 1993 (the “Remainder Deed”), Penmar sought to convey its remainder interest in the Land to appellant. Appellee, however, refused to accept the Remain ⁵⁸⁵ der Deed for recordation, because of an unrelated transfer tax dispute that is not the subject of this proceeding. That matter, however, led to another review of the Confirmatory Deed, as a result of which the County determined that it erroneously concluded that no local transfer tax was due upon the earlier recording of the Confirmatory Deed. Appellee completed a “Revenue Division” form, dated November 30, 1993, which stated that papers submitted to appel-lee (presumably to record the Remainder Deed) were being returned for deficiencies.

The deficiencies noted were: TAXABLE CONVEYANCE, NOT EXEMPT. AMOUNT DUE $86,640.00 (SEE ATTACHED LIST OF EXEMPTIONS. Your check is short $83,840.00. OTHER 175,000.00 & 5,240,000.00 = 5,415,000.00 Total Consideration * Mortgages are consideration (per 33-130 Balto Co. Code) See also Council Bill 128-92.

PLEASE MAKE WHATEVER CORRECTIONS ARE CHECKED ABOVE AND RETURN ... WITH YOUR DEED. On February 14, 1994, appellee sent appellant a letter concerning its position with respect to the transfer tax in issue. The letter stated in pertinent part: You have presented for recordation a Deed (Deed) dated November 10, 1993 between Penmar, Grantor, and Abing-ton, Grantee, containing 6.4940 acres of land for the consideration of $175,000.00.

The Deed reflects the purchase by Abington, the owner of the present possessory estate, of a reversionary interest in the subject project. The Deed contains the following language: “AND SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDING FROM THE GRANT HEREUNDER (i) an estate for years to and including June 1, 2005, in and to the Land, including the exclusive right to the possession and use of the Land, (ii) ⁵⁸⁶ fee simple title to any buildings, building fixtures and improvements (“Improvements”) now or hereafter erected or located on the Land. “It is the intent of the Grantor by virtue of this Deed to convey to the Grantee a remainder interest in the Land and to exclude from the conveyance hereunder fee simple title to the Improvements.” % $ # # if! The Deed contains language that publicized or gave constructive notice of an unrecorded lease which saves and excepts an estate for years and fee simple title to improvements thereon relating to a transfer of property on which no transfer tax was paid. The recording of the Deed was denied and the County questioned the consideration of $175,000.00.

We stated that a transfer tax should be paid on the $175,000.00, plus the $5,240,000.00 mortgage, or $5,415,000.00, that transfer tax being $86,640.00. We advised you that consideration includes the amount of any outstanding principal balance of any mortgage or deed of trust assumed by the purchaser/grantee. Tax Property Article 12-103(a), 13-203(a) and Sec. 33-130 of the Baltimore County Code. * * * * * * In addition, the Confirmatory Deed from Mary Penn to Abington, confirming “prior unrecorded instruments” was subject to a transfer tax based on Tax Property Article Sec. 13-205(c)(2) and Baltimore County Code, Section 33-133: When any attornment agreement, memorandum of lease, assignment of lease, or other document publicizing or giving constructive notice of the existence of a lease which has not been recorded is presented for recording, the original lease must be presented and taxes paid thereon, if due, before the document may be recorded. Tax Property Articles 12-105(e)(2) and 13-205(c)(2).

If you want to record the Deed and the Agreement, a transfer tax on the leasehold and reversionary interest in 6.9490 acres and improvements thereon, based on the ⁵⁸⁷ amount of the indebtedness of $5,24.0,000.00, plus $175,-000.00 in the amount of $5,[15,000.00 must be paid. Should you not wish to record these two (2) instruments, I am further advising the Office of Finance to subject the property transferred by the Confirmatory Deed conveying an estate for years and fee simple title to improvements thereon, and recorded among the Land Records of Baltimore County, to a lien, based on the outstanding mortgage assumed by Abington in the amount of $5,2j0„000.00, [sic] pursuant to Section 33-137 of the Baltimore County Code . . [sic] (Emphasis added). On June 9, 1994, the County Office of Finance assessed a transfer tax in the amount of $88,840, 2 and imposed a lien for unpaid taxes on the Land and Improvements. See Baltimore County Code § 33-127; § 33-137 (1988 & Supp. 6).

Baltimore County Code, § 33-137 provides: Any property transferred, by operation of law or otherwise, evidenced by written instrument recorded among the land records of the county and subject to transfer tax under this article shall be subject to a lien for the amount of said unpaid taxes which shall be assessed against such property and collected in the same manner as ordinary real property taxes. (Emphasis added). If property taxes are not timely paid, the County Code requires that the County “shall proceed” to sell the property. Baltimore County Code, § 33-71 (1988).

Appellant filed a declaratory action on March 30, 1995, pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, Maryland Code (1957, 1995 Repl.Vol.), § 3-401 et seq. of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“C.J.”). Abington asserted that appellee unlawfully and erroneously assessed the transfer tax and unconstitutionally imposed the lien. At a hearing on ⁵⁸⁸ October 13, 1995, the court, sua sponte, questioned whether appellant should have first sought review of its claims in the Maryland Tax Court. This inquiry prompted appellee to move to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

The court permitted the parties to submit legal memoranda on the issue. Thereafter, without holding a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The following notation was entered on the docket: June 4, 1996 Motion to Dismiss, GRANTED. Constitutional issues: Exhibit # 7, Stipulation of facts satifies [sic] notice issue 313MD 484[sic]; Administeative [sic] remedies not exhausted for statutes provide remedies especially 3-103, (EAD,JR.) Notices sent [sic] We shall include additional facts in our discussion of the issues.

The Parties’ Contentions Appellant levels numerous contentions to support its claim that the trial court erred in dismissing its case. It argues that, under the circumstances present here, the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to resolve the dispute. It also claims that it has no available administrative remedies; Abington alleges that neither the State nor the County accords a right of appeal to the Tax Court in connection with the County’s transfer tax cases. In this regard, appellant essentially claims that, since it has not voluntarily paid the tax under protest, and therefore does not seek a refund, the statutory scheme does not authorize it to pursue its challenge in Tax Court.

It notes that no procedure exists in either the Tax-General Article or the Tax-Property Article of the Maryland Code, or in the Baltimore County Code, the Code of Maryland Regulations, or the Tax Court’s rules of procedure, which' enables Abington to litigate in the Tax Court the legality of an unpaid County transfer tax. Further, it contends that no provision required Abington to pay the transfer tax and then seek a refund in order to contest the tax. ⁵⁸⁹ Appellant also asserts that, even if it had paid the tax and then pursued a refund, it still would not have had a right of appeal to the Tax Court, because the County’s transfer tax was not imposed pursuant to the Tax-Property or Tax-General article. Moreover, it asserts that the tax was not collected either by the State Department of Assessments and Taxation (the “Department”) or a circuit court clerk, and thus a refund claim would not have been within the purview of the statutory provisions that govern refund claims in the Tax Court. Nevertheless, appellant’s property is at risk; it is saddled with a lien and is exposed to a tax sale, because appellant has not paid the disputed transfer tax.

Accordingly, it contends that it had no option but to initiate a suit in the circuit court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. For its part, the County does not claim that, as a prerequisite to any right to challenge the legality of the transfer tax or the imposition of the lien, Abington was obligated to pay the disputed transfer tax and then seek a refund. Nor has the County identified what path or procedures appellant should have followed to reach the Tax Court, since it did not pay the tax and does not seek a refund. Instead, appellee rather summarily counters that the Tax Court’s broad jurisdiction permits it to hear Abington’s claim.

In particular, the County argues that Maryland Code (1957,1988 Repl.Vol.), Tax-General Article (“T.G.”), § 3-103(a)(2), confers jurisdiction on the Tax Court to hear appeals from a final decision of a political subdivision “about any tax issue, including ... the imposition of a tax.” Since Abington has not proceeded administratively, the County claims that appellant failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, and its case was properly dismissed. Discussion I. Notwithstanding its name, the Maryland Tax Court “is an independent administrative unit of the State government.” T.G. § 3-102. See Prime George’s County v. Brown, 334 Md. 650 , 658 n. 1, 640 A.2d 1142 (1994); Shipp v. Bevard, 291 Md. 590 , 435 A.2d 1114 (1981). Although the Tax Court is an ⁵⁹⁰ administrative agency, it “functions in many respects as a court.” White v. Prince George’s County, 282 Md. 641, 658 , 387 A.2d 260 (1978); see Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor of Assessments, 276 Md. 36 , 343 A.2d 521 (1975).

Its jurisdiction is broadly stated in T.G. § 3-103: (a) In general. — The Tax Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from the final decision, final determination, or final order of a property tax assessment appeal board or any other unit of the State government or of a political subdivision of the State that is authorized to make the final decision or determination or issue the final order about any tax issue, including: (1) the valuation, assessment, or classification of property: (2) the imposition of a tax; (3) the determination of a claim for refund; (4) the application for an abatement, reduction, or revision of any assessment or tax; or (5) the application for an exemption from any assessment or tax. (Boldface added.) Judicial review of a final decision of the Tax Court is afforded by T.G. § 13-532, which permits “[a]ny party to the Tax Court proceeding ... [to] appeal a final order of the Tax Court to the circuit court.” Maryland Code (1957, 1994 Repl.Vol.), Tax-Property Article (“T.P.”), § 14-513 is to the same effect. Thereafter, T.P. § 14-515 permits review by this Court of the circuit court’s final decision. 3 It is a longstanding principle that a party ordinarily may not pursue a declaratory or injunctive action in circuit ⁵⁹¹ court until it has exhausted any available administrative remedies created by the Legislature. Indeed, the failure to exhaust administrative remedies is sometimes treated as a jurisdictional issue, and may be raised by an appellate court, sua sponte.

Maryland Comm’n on Human Relations v. Downey, 110 Md.App. 493 , 526 n. 11, 678 A.2d 55 (1996). We must resolve, then, whether T.G. § 3-103, which establishes the Tax Court’s jurisdiction, also creates an administrative remedy that must be exhausted prior to the commencement of litigation challenging the tax. The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act (the “Act”), C.J. § 3-401 et seq., provides a means “to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations.” C.J. § 3-402. Since the Act is “remedial,” it must “be liberally construed and administered,” id., so that the courts may “declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.” C.J. § 3-403(a).

Nevertheless, C.J. § 3-409(b) requires that when “a statute provides a special form of remedy for a specific type of case, that statutory remedy shall be followed in lieu of a proceeding under this subtitle.” See also Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Washington Nat’l Arena, 282 Md. 588, 596 , 386 A.2d 1216 (1978); Bancroft Information v. Comptroller, 91 Md.App. 100, 114 , 603 A.2d 1289 (1992); Boyd v. Supervisor of Assessments of Baltimore City, 57 Md.App. 603, 606 , 471 A.2d 749 (1984); Baltimore County v. Maryland Dep’t of Assessments and Taxation, 47 Md.App. 88, 91 , 421 A.2d 993 (1980). In Prince George’s County v. Blumberg, 288 Md. 275, 284 , 418 A.2d 1155 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083 , 101 S.Ct. 869 , 66 L.Ed.2d 808 (1981), the Court explained the rationale undergirding the exhaustion doctrine: The principal reasons for this exhaustion requirement with respect to administrative bodies are manifest — (i) the issues are largely within the expertise of the involved agency to hear the evidence and determine the propriety of the request; (ii) the courts would be undertaking functions the legislature thought could best be performed by an agency; ⁵⁹² and (iii) courts might be called upon to decide matters that would never arise if the prescribed administrative remedy was followed. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 , 89 S.Ct. 1657 , 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969) is to the same effect. There, the Supreme Court recognized that the exhaustion requirement prevents the possibility “that frequent and deliberate flouting of administrative processes could weaken the effectiveness of an agency by encouraging people to ignore its procedures.” Id. at 195 , 89 S.Ct. at 1663 . “Exhaustion” helps to prevent potentially unnecessary and premature disruption by the courts of the activities of administrative agencies.

Downey, 110 Md. App. at 528 , 678 A.2d 55 . See also State Dep’t of Assessments & Taxation v. Clark, 281 Md. 385, 401 , 380 A.2d 28 (1977) (acknowledging the “firmly established rule that ordinarily when an administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief provided under those statutory provisions must be exhausted before a litigant may resort to the courts. That is, such a remedy is exclusive, and the administrative body must not be by-passed by the pursuit of other remedies.”). Issues concerning taxation are not excepted.

In Washington Nat’l Arena , the Court made clear that taxpayers, too, must pursue their administrative remedies. The Court said: “[W]e have repeatedly held that where a specific statutory remedy is available, it is mandatory for the court to dismiss the suit for declaratory judgment and remit the plaintiff to the alternative forum.” Washington Nat’l Arena, 282 Md. at 595, 386 A.2d 1216 (emphasis added). When a taxpayer fails to exercise a statutory right of appeal from “allegedly illegal or erroneous tax assessments,” it may not launch a declaratory judgment action as a “collateral attack.” Id. at 598, 386 A.2d 1216 . Nevertheless, exhaustion is not an “absolute” doctrine barring “recourse” to the courts.

Poe v. City of Baltimore, 241 Md. 303, 308 , 216 A.2d 707 (1966). Limited exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine permit a party, in tax matters and other kinds of cases, to pursue alternative forms of relief in ⁵⁹³ court, even without exhausting administrative remedies. These include: (1) when the party attacks the statutory scheme as facially unconstitutional; (2) when there is no administrative remedy; or (3) when the administrative remedy provided by the statutory scheme is inadequate. See Blum-berg, 288 Md. at 284-85 , 418 A.2d 1155 ; Pressman v. State Tax Commission, 204 Md. 78, 84 , 102 A.2d 821 (1954); Baltimore County, 47 Md.App. at 91-92 , 421 A.2d 993 .

Exhaustion is required, however, if “the administrative remedy is adequate,” Poe, 241 Md. at 308 , 216 A.2d 707 , and when the constitutional challenge is based only on the application of a statute in a particular situation. The Court explained in Poe : “[T]he presence of constitutional questions, coupled with a sufficient showing of inadequacy of prescribed administrative relief and of threatened or impending irreparable injury flowing from delay incident to following the prescribed procedure, has been held sufficient to dispense with exhausting the administrative process before instituting judicial intervention. But ... this rule is not one of mere convenience.... Where the intent of [the Legislature] is clear to require administrative determination, either to the exclusion of judicial action or in advance of it, a strong showing is required, both of inadequacy of the prescribed procedure and of impending harm, to permit short-circuiting the administrative process. [The Legislature’s] commands for judicial restraint in this respect are not lightly to be disregarded.” Poe, 241 Md. at 310-11 , 216 A.2d 707 (quoting Aircraft & Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 773-74 , 67 S.Ct. 1493, 1503-04 , 91 L.Ed. 1796 (1947)).

II

Title 13 of the Tax-Property Article applies to State and county transfer taxes. See T.P. § 13-101 for definitions and general provisions. T.P. § 13-402(b) provides that Subtitle 4, which concerns a transfer tax imposed by a county, supple ⁵⁹⁴ ments a county’s public local laws relating to transfer taxes. Baltimore County is a charter county, pursuant to its adoption of a charter in 1956 under Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution.

See Hampton Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Baltimore County, 66 Md. App. 551, 566 , 505 A.2d 537 (1986). Appellee’s authority to impose transfer taxes arises from Baltimore County, Md., Public Local laws, Title 27, § 412A (1953), codified at 1953 Laws of Md. ch. 769. Section 13-402.1 of the Tax-Property Article expressly permits a county with home rule powers under Article XI-F of the Maryland Constitution to impose transfer taxes. Various statutory tax provisions expressly address a right of appeal to the Tax Court.

But those provisions are not applicable here. For example, T.G. § 13-510 permits appeals to the Tax Court for review of tax assessments, determinations, and refund requests in connection with taxes imposed under the Tax-General Article. It states: (a) In general. — Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and subject to § 13-514 of this subtitle, within 30 days after the date on which a notice is mailed, a person or governmental unit that is aggrieved by the action in the notice may appeal to the Tax Court from: (1) a final assessment of tax, interest, or penalty under this article; (2) a final determination on an application for revision or claim for refund under § 13-509 of this subtitle; (3) an inheritance tax determination by a register or by an orphans’ court other than a circuit court sitting as an orphans’ court; (4) a denial of an alternative payment schedule for inheritance tax or Maryland estate tax; (5) a final determination on a claim for return of seized property under § 13-839 or § 13-840 of this title; or (6) a disallowance of a claim for refund under § 13-904 of this title. ⁵⁹⁵ (Emphasis added). The County’s transfer taxes, however, are locally imposed; it is undisputed that they are not assessed pursuant to the Tax-General Article.

Therefore, T.G. § 13-510 does not apply here. In T.P. §§ 14-512(a) and (b), the Legislature enacted a mechanism to enable taxpayers to appeal tax “determinations” to the Tax Court. These provisions, however, only govern determinations made by the Department, not the County. The Tax Court is also expressly authorized to review on appeal a transfer tax refund dispute, pursuant to T.P. §§ 14-512(d), 14-908, and 14-911.

These sections establish a right of appeal to the Tax Court with respect to refund claims for transfer taxes collected or assessed by the Department, the clerk of a circuit court, or the Director of Finance for Prince George’s County. T.P. § 14-908 states: A person who submits a written refund claim for transfer tax that has been erroneously or mistakenly paid to or illegally or erroneously assessed or wrongfully collected by the clerk of a circuit court, the Director of Finance in Prince George’s County, or the Department, or paid on property exempt wholly or partly from the transfer tax is eligible for a refund from the Department, clerk, or Director of Finance that collected the transfer tax. Section 14-512(d), which refers to T.P. § 14-908, provides: From recordation or transfer tax refund determination.— The person who submitted a tax refund claim under § 14-907[ 4 ] or § 14-908 of this title may appeal any final action taken under § 14-911[ 5 ] of this title to the Maryland Tax Court on or before 30 days from the date that the notice of disallowance is received by the person. However, if a refund claim under § 14-911 of this title is not allowed or ⁵⁹⁶ disallowed on or before 6 months from the date of filing the claim, the person who filed the claim may: (1) deem the claim to be finally disallowed; and (2) submit an appeal to the Maryland Tax Court.

Appellant argues that these two provisions are inapplicable because: 1) T.P. § 14-908 applies only to State transfer taxes, not local transfer taxes; 2) T.P. § 14-908 applies only when the transfer tax has been paid to, assessed, or collected by a circuit court clerk, the Department, or the Director of Finance in Prince George’s County, but County transfer taxes are paid to the County at the office of its director of finance, see Baltimore County Code § 33-127 (1998 & Supp. 6); 3) the provisions apply only to refund claims, but this is not a refund action; 4) the County has no mechanism for a taxpayer to pay a disputed tax and then seek a refund; 6 and 5) even if appellant could elect to pay the tax, under protest, and then seek a refund, such a procedure is not mandatory. Therefore, Abington urges that it was entitled to pursue its claims in court. As to appellant’s contention that T.P. § 14-908 pertains only to State transfer taxes, not to local transfer taxes, it is patently clear from the statutory language that the provision is not limited to State transfer taxes. Nevertheless, the ⁵⁹⁷ precise statutory language of T.P. § 14-908 seems to apply only if a county’s transfer taxes are “paid to or ... assessed or ... collected by the clerk of a circuit court ... or the Department....” T.P. § 14-908. 7 Yet the County’s transfer taxes are payable “to the county at the office of the director of finance in the county courthouse,” pursuant to Baltimore County Code § 33-127(a) (1988 & Supp. 6).

For virtually all of the counties that impose transfer taxes, the taxes are paid to a circuit court clerk. 8 Our research reveals, however, that four counties — Baltimore, Montgomery, Prince George’s, and Worcester — designate some entity other than a circuit court clerk to collect the tax. As to Prince George’s County, T.P. § 14-908 expressly recognizes its procedure, by which its taxes are collected by its Director of Finance. But a literal construction of T.P. § 14-908 would bar taxpayers in Baltimore, Montgomery, and Worcester counties from an appeal to the Tax Court with regard to a refund claim for county transfer taxes. 9 Compare Allegany County Code § 182-12 (1996); Anne Arundel County Code § 7-101(d) (1996); Caroline County Code § 166-8 (1996); Dorchester County Code, Resolution No. 195 ( June 21, 1994); ⁵⁹⁸ Garrett County Code § 263-25 (1996); Harford County Code § 123-51 (1996); Howard County Code § 20.404 (1997); Kent County Code § 152-13 (1996); St. Mary’s County Code § 267-34 (1996) with Baltimore County Code § 33-127 (1996) (“The payment of the [transfer] tax imposed by this article shall be made to the county at the office of the director of finance in the county courthouse____”); Montgomery County Code § 52-28 (1994) (“The [transfer] tax shall be paid to the county at the office of the director of finance____”); Prince George’s County Code § 10-189 (1996) (“The party offering for recording an instrument in writing transferring title to real property or an interest therein, in the County shall pay the tax imposed to the Director of Finance.”); Worcester County Code § TR 1-801 (c) (1996) (“The county transfer tax shall be collected upon presentation of the instrument of writing to the County Finance Officer prior to the recordation thereof....”). It is difficult to conceive of any reason why the Legislature would have intended to omit Baltimore, Montgomery, and Worcester counties from the purview of T.P. § 14-908.

While we discuss, infra, the principles of statutory construction, it is sufficient to note here that “the plain meaning rule is not rigid.” Kaczorowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513 , 525 A.2d 628 (1987). Although the courts may not “rewrite a statute merely because of some judicial notion of legislative purpose,” id. at 516 n. 4, 525 A.2d 628 , we may consider evidence of legislative purpose and intent “beyond the plain language of the statute.” State v. Pagano, 341 Md. 129, 133 , 669 A.2d 1339 (1996). Therefore, when the Legislature’s purpose and “intent can be ascertained it will prevail over precise grammatical construction or literal intent. ...” Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 516 n. 4, 525 A.2d 628 . See also Potter v. Bethesda Fire Dep’t, 309 Md. 347, 353 , 524 A.2d 61 (1987).

Here, the legislative history does not reflect that the Legislature intended to omit taxpayers in these three counties from the protections statutorily afforded to other taxpayers. This conclusion is supported by a review of the evolution of the statutory provision. ⁵⁹⁹ In Rapley v. Montgomery County, 261 Md. 98 , 274 A.2d 124 (1971), the Court determined that Code (1957, 1969 Repl.Vol.), Article 81, §§ 213-219 did not authorize taxpayers to recover, through refund actions, special taxes (ie., transfer or recordation tax) that were voluntarily paid, under protest, to the County. The statute permitted a refund action only for such taxes paid to the State. Because of the “absence of express legislative sanction .... ” for the taxpayers’ action, id. at 100, 274 A.2d 124 , and the lack of a common law right to recover taxes that have been voluntarily paid, the county taxpayers were denied recovery.

Thereafter, the Legislature amended Art. 81 to provide for refund actions in connection with special taxes paid to any county authorized to collect such tax. 1971 Md.Laws ch. 644; see also White, 282 Md. at 648 n. 4, 387 A.2d 260 . These changes remained in effect until 1985, when the Legislature recodified the tax provisions of the Maryland Code, creating the Tax-Property Article. During the recodifi-cation process, some changes were made to the language of T.P. § 14-908. In place of the phrase “any State, county or municipal agency authorized to collect [special taxes],” which was used in Art. 81, § 215, as revised, the Legislature substituted language authorizing a taxpayer to request a refund of a transfer tax erroneously paid to, assessed, or wrongfully collected by “the clerk of a circuit court, the Director of Finance in Prince George’s County, or the Department.... ” Nevertheless, the legislative history suggests that the substituted language was not intended to alter the scope of Art. 81.

The revisor’s note to T.P. § 14-908 states that the change in the section’s language was implemented “to identify specifically to whom the transfer tax is paid.” See Allers v. Tittsworth, 269 Md. 677, 683 , 309 A.2d 476 (1973) (stating that the revisor’s construction is a factor to be considered in determining legislative intent). Absent a manifest intent to the contrary, we normally presume that when the Legislature recodifies a statute, it is for the purpose of clarity, and does not result in a substantive change in the law. Rohrbaugh v. Estate of Stern, 305 Md. 443, 449 , 505 A.2d 113 (1986); Welch ⁶⁰⁰ v. Humphrey, 200 Md. 410, 417 , 90 A.2d 686 (1952) (stating that recodification changes are presumed to be for the purpose of clarification only, “unless the change is so radical and material that the intention of the Legislature to modify the law appears unmistakably from the language of the Code”). We need not decide, however, whether the change in language brought about by the 1985 recodification removed the County’s transfer taxes from the scope of T.P. § 14-908 and, consequently, T.P. § 14 — 512(d).

This is because T.P. §§ 14-512(d) and 14-908 only apply when transfer taxes have been paid and a refund is sought. As appellant has not paid the disputed taxes, and does not seek a refund, these provisions are inapplicable in any event.

III

In the ordinary course, a property tax dispute is usually litigated through a refund action; in this way, the property owner avoids the risk of a lien and tax sale. 10 This is not to say, though, that a refund action is the only avenue of recourse available to a taxpayer seeking to challenge a particular tax. Indeed, we have not been made aware of any State statute or