Accokeek, Mattawoman, Piscataway Creeks Communities Council, Inc. v. Maryland Public Service Commission

ARTHUR, J. Pursuant to Md.Code (1998, 2010 RepLVol., 2014 Supp.), §§ 7-207 and 7-208 of the Public Utilities Article (“PUA”), the Maryland Public Service Commission authorized Dominion Cove Point LNG, LP (“Dominion”), to construct an electric generating station to power a natural gas liquefaction facility. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City affirmed the decision after Accokeek, Mattawoman, Piscataway Creeks Communities Council, Inc., a nonprofit environmental advocacy organization, petitioned for judicial review. On appeal, we affirm. Factual and Procedural Background A. The Dominion Cove Point Liquefíed Natural Gas Terminal Dominion owns and operates a natural gas import terminal on the western shore of the Chesapeake Bay near Cove Point in Calvert County. 1 The Cove Point terminal receives imported liquefied natural gas (LNG) from ocean-going tankers, vaporizes the LNG, and transports the gas by pipeline to an interstate transmission grid for consumption. ²⁷² In 2011, Dominion announced plans to convert the Cove Point site from an import-only terminal to a bi-directional terminal.

Proposed liquefaction facilities, covering approximately 49 acres, would liquefy natural gas from domestic sources, so that it could be stored in canisters, loaded onto vessels, and exported abroad. Dominion sought approval from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to construct the liquefaction facilities and approval from the federal Department of Energy to export LNG to foreign countries. As a major component of the project, Dominion planned to install combustion turbines to mechanically drive the refrigerant compressors used in the liquefaction process. 2 Dominion proposed a design that would repurpose waste heat from those turbines to generate much of the electricity required for the liquefaction process. This design called for the construction of an electricity generation station, closely integrated into the larger liquefaction facilities.

The generating station, with a “name-plate capacity” of 130 megawatts, 3 would not be linked to the larger power grid, as the generated electricity would be consumed exclusively on site. B. Application for Certifícate of Public Convenience and Necessity At the same time that Dominion was pursuing federal approval for the liquefaction project, Dominion applied to state ²⁷³ authorities for permission to construct the generating station. Under Maryland law, a party may not begin construction on a generating station unless that party obtains a certifícate of public convenience and necessity from the Public Service Commission. PUA § 7-207(b)(l)(i). “The certificate may be granted only after other state agencies evaluate and comment upon the proposal, the [Commission] holds a public hearing which local governing bodies may attend,” and the Commission considers the recommendation of the local governing body and various societal effects of the generating station.

See Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Montgomery Cnty., 80 Md.App. 107, 114 , 560 A.2d 50 (1989), aff'd sub nom. Howard Cnty. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 319 Md. 511 , 573 A.2d 821 (1990).

For certain generating stations, the party must apply for the certificate at least two years before beginning construction. PUA § 7-208(c)(1). On April 1, 2013, Dominion submitted an Application for Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity. Dominion requested expedited treatment so that it could begin construction before February 2014.

The Commission initially delegated the matter to a public utility law judge, who set a procedural schedule. Multiple parties intervened, including two environmental organizations: the Sierra Club and Chesapeake Climate Action Network (CCAN). The Commission later rescinded its delegation of the proceedings and set the matter for hearing by an en banc panel of commissioners. In December 2013, Accokeek, Mattawoman, Piscataway Creeks Communities Council, Inc. (AMP), moved to intervene out-of-time.

AMP, whose primary mission is to protect local waterways, asserted that the Sierra Club and CCAN, as national and regional environmental groups, would not adequately represent its interests in the proceedings. Over Dominion’s objection, the Commission granted AMP’s intervention request. Through the Power Plant Siting and Research Act of 1971 and its subsequent revisions, the General Assembly has estab ²⁷⁴ lished a comprehensive process for evaluating the effects of proposed power generation facilities on surrounding communities. In accordance with the siting law, the Commission solicited a review from Maryland’s Power Plant Research Program (PPRP).

PPRP, a division of the Department of Natural Resources, is a “continuing research program for electric power plant site evaluation and related environmental and land use considerations.” Md.Code (1974, 2012 Repl.Vol.), § 3-301(d) of the Natural Resources Article (“NR”). In coordination with other government agencies, PPRP studies the environmental and socioeconomic effects of electric power generation facilities in Maryland. NR § 3-303. PPRP submitted an environmental review report on behalf of seven Maryland agencies. 4 PPRP concluded “that the power plant site [wa]s suitable and that the generating facility c[ould] be constructed and operated in accordance with all applicable environmental regulations,” provided that the Commission adopted an extensive list of conditions.

First and foremost, PPRP recommended that the Commission require Dominion to obtain necessary federal approvals for the larger LNG facility before constructing the generating station. The majority of the proposed limitations related to air quality. The remaining requirements concerned terrestrial and aquatic ecology, stormwater management or erosion and sediment control, water supply, cultural resources, visual quality, emergency preparedness and security, traffic, and noise. C. Evidentiary Hearing Before the Commission The Commission received testimony and heard arguments at an evidentiary hearing on February 20, 21, and 24, 2014.

In support of its application, Dominion offered testimony from consultants and from company executives. Dominion asserted that the project would result in “significant economic ²⁷⁵ benefits in Maryland,” in the form of temporary jobs for construction of the facilities, permanent jobs for the operation of the facilities, and increased tax revenue for Calvert County. Dominion admitted that the export of LNG would put upward pressure on energy prices, but Dominion argued that benefits to the local economy would outweigh the potential adverse effects on consumers. AMP and the other environmental groups opposed the application, offering testimony from environmental experts and energy industry experts.

AMP argued that the Commission could not consider benefits of the larger liquefaction project in determining whether to certify the generating station. AMP also argued that Dominion had provided inadequate information about the economic benefits of the generating station and that the application should be denied on that basis. PPRP submitted extensive testimony from experts in air quality, water management, geology, ecology, engineering, and economics. The program’s deputy director testified that the power plant could be constructed and operated in compliance with applicable environmental and other regulations as long as Dominion complied with PPRP’s proposed conditions. 5 The Public Service Commission’s staff presented its analysis of the effect of the generating station on the power grid.

The Commission’s staff concluded that the proposed station, as an “islanded” project that benefitted a single energy user, would not adversely affect the grid. The staff concluded that the Commission could approve the project, subject to a set of conditions. ²⁷⁶ D. Post-Hearing Developments The Commission presided over a public hearing in Lusby on March 1, 2014, in accordance with PUA § 7-207(d). Approximately 80 members of the community offered comments either in support of or in opposition to Dominion’s proposals. A member of the Board of County Commissioners for Calvert County spoke at the hearing to announce the Board’s “unanimous support” for the project.

In a letter dated March 25, 2014, signed by the five county commissioners, the Board affirmed that it “fully support[ed]” Dominion’s application for a certificate to construct the generating station. At AMP’s request, the Commission extended the public comment period until April 2, 2014. In total, the Commission received over 60,000 written comments and letters. Most of the comments, from both proponents and opponents of the project, emphasized broader consequences of the LNG facility rather than direct effects of the construction and operation of the generating station.

In a post-hearing reply brief, Dominion stated that it would accept all conditions proposed by PPRP and by the Commission’s staff, along with four “additional conditions developed at the suggestion of the [cjommissioners.” As Condition J-8, Dominion offered to “make a one-time contribution in the amount of $400,000 to the Maryland Energy Assistance Program, or other low income energy assistance program to be specified” by the Commission. As a final condition, Condition J-4, Dominion offered to “provide $20.38 million in in-kind contributions and funding to support Maryland [Greenhouse Gas Reduction Act] goals.” Under this proposal, Dominion would offer “[a] $1 cost perpetual license of Dominion’s EDGE® Energy Efficiency Program” to Maryland electric distribution utilities and would “service, maintain and provide software updates at no cost for the first 4 years” to each utility that adopted the program. Dominion agreed that, in the event that utility companies might decline to adopt its energy efficiency technology, Dominion would finance a trust or similar instrument with funds ²⁷⁷ “not to exceed $20.38 million,” to support other greenhouse-gas reduction projects determined by the Commission. In a joint reply brief submitted on the same day as Dominion’s reply brief, the Sierra Club and CCAN recommended that the Commission require Dominion to make a “significant investment in carbon-free Maryland-based renewables ... in order to help mitigate several of the most significant adverse impacts of the project.” After reviewing the final briefs, the Commission’s staff submitted a comment on the additional conditions proposed by Dominion.

The Commission’s staff determined that it would be “unworkable” for utility companies to adopt Dominion’s energy-efficiency software, as Dominion had proposed. The staff concluded that “the $20.38 million funding support ... would be more appropriately directed to the Strategic Energy Investment Fund in which these monies are allocated specifically to greenhouse-gas reduction-related activities.” 6 E. Approval from the Commission On May 30, 2014, by Order No. 86372, the Commission granted the certificate of public convenience and necessity subject to a revised set of conditions. The Commission explained its findings and conclusions in an 83-page opinion and set forth the required conditions in a 64-page appendix. The Commission declared: “if all conditions imposed under this Order are met to address environmental, economic, health and safety impacts demonstrated in this proceeding, the Generating Station can be built in conformity with applicable Maryland and Federal laws and standards, and in a way that will be ²⁷⁸ consistent with the public convenience and necessity standard.” After a comprehensive summary of the testimony and arguments of the parties, the opinion discussed the required statutory considerations: (e) The Commission shall take final action on an application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity only after due consideration of: (1) the recommendation of the governing body of each county or municipal corporation in which any portion of the construction of the generating station ... is proposed to be located; and (2) the effect of the generating station ... on: (i) the stability and reliability of the electric system; (ii) economics; (iii) esthetics; (iv) historic sites; (v) aviation safety as determined by the Maryland Aviation Administration and the administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration; (vi) when applicable, air and water pollution; and (vii) the availability of means for the required timely disposal of wastes produced by any generating station.

PUA § 7-207(e). Addressing these factors, the Commission first noted that the local governing body had “voted unanimously to support this Project.” The Commission agreed with findings of its staff that the generating station would have no adverse effect on the electric system. The Commission concluded that the conditions recommended by PPRP adequately addressed concerns as to the effect of generating station on aesthetics, historic sites, aviation safety, and waste disposal. In assessing the station’s effect on air pollution, the Commission focused on whether the project would comply with federal and state clean air laws, an issue that had “taken up perhaps the largest amount of time and testimony in th[e] proceeding.” The ²⁷⁹ Commission concluded that the project would comply with the requisite air pollution and other standards if Dominion adopted the conditions proposed by PPRP.

According to the Commission, Dominion had the burden “to demonstrate that the benefits of the generating station, including economic benefits, outweigh[ed] the environmental, safety, and societal costs of siting the generating facility[.]” The Commission explained that its task of analyzing the generating station was particularly difficult because much of the testimony had addressed the LNG project as a whole rather than the station itself. The Commission reasoned that the generating station was “likely directly responsible for only a fraction of the air emissions, water impacts, and economic effects of the entire Project.” Referring to estimates from Dominion and from PPRP, the Commission noted that the generating facilities “may account for between 5% and 20% of the overall effects of the Project,” but the Commission commented that it had “nothing beyond that to further refine the appropriate number.” The Commission highlighted the economic impact analysis from PPRP, which concluded that only a small fraction of overall economic benefits could be attributed to the generating station alone. PPRP’s economist gave estimates indicating that the generating facility would account for approximately five percent of construction jobs and two percent of overall salary and wage costs. According to PPRP, once the facility was operational, the project would continue to have a significant revenue effect in the form of property taxes for Calvert County.

The Commission cited various projections of the total property taxes for the overall LNG project, but it made no finding as to the portion of property taxes attributable to the generation station. The Commission concluded that the economic impacts of the project would not be uniformly positive. The Commission credited studies showing that Dominion’s facility, by exporting LNG abroad, would increase gas prices for Maryland consumers. The Commission also concluded that the generating ²⁸⁰ station’s “ ‘island mode’ of electricity [wa]s not a positive factor in calculating its economic effects.” To operate a power plant connected to the grid, a company ordinarily would be required to purchase carbon emission allowances as part of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. 7 Proceeds from the sale of those allowances are deposited in Maryland’s Strategic Energy Investment Fund (SEIF) to finance investments in energy efficiency and conservation programs, renewable energy resources, low-income energy assistance, and other purposes.

See Md.Code (1984, 2014 Repl.Vol., 2015 Supp.), § 9-20B-05 of the State Government Article (“SG”). Instead of purchasing those allowances, however, Dominion planned to “avail itself of a portion of the free Limited Industrial Exemption set-aside allowances to account for carbon emissions,” which would reduce the supply of allowances for future projects. In summary, the Commission stated that “the ‘costs’ to Maryland ratepayers” in the form of increased energy prices and lost compliance revenues “could be well in excess of $75 million by 2025.” Overall, the Commission identified the most significant negative effects of the generating station as: increased emissions of pollutants that would affect air quality and climate, Dominion’s use of a limited supply of industrial greenhouse-gas emission allowances, increased noise, clear-cutting of trees, and the additional burden on the County’s transportation infrastructure and the State’s water resources. According to the Commission, Dominion had not demonstrated that these “considerable” negative impacts “would be offset by the relatively limited and short-lived monetary benefits accruing to Calvert County through construction employment or through the longer-term tax payments from the Generating Station.” The Commission concluded that, even after implementing the conditions proposed by PPRP, the generating facility would ²⁸¹ not “provide sufficient economic and other benefits to residents of Maryland” to justify granting the certificate.

The Commission determined that Dominion’s “last minute agreement” to provide “a $20.38 million ‘in-kind’ contribution and funding” to advance greenhouse-gas reduction goals was “too speculative and insufficient to provide the necessary offsetting economic benefits to Maryland residents.” Adopting the recommendation of its staff, the Commission concluded that the offer “could be more effectively utilized through a direct contribution to the consumer side through the State’s Strategic Energy Investment Fund (‘SEIF’).” As a new condition for approval of the generating station, the Commission directed that the $20.38 million in funds earmarked for Dominion’s voltage reduction services be increased to $40 million, to be contributed directly to SEIF over five years. The Commission also found Dominion’s one-time contribution of $400,000 to the Maryland Energy Assistance Program or other low-income energy assistance program to be inadequate. To mitigate anticipated increases in gas prices for Maryland residents, the Commission directed Dominion to “provide this level of contribution for each of the expected 20 years that the plant is currently under contract to operate, for a total of $8 million.” After the Commission issued the order, Dominion promptly notified the Commission that it had accepted all of the specified conditions. AMP petitioned for judicial review of the Commission’s order in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City.

After a hearing, the court denied the petition and entered an order affirming the Commission’s decision on December 22, 2014. AMP noted a timely appeal from that order. Questions Presented In this appeal, AMP raises several grounds for reversal of the Commission’s order. AMP’s brief presents four questions, which we quote: 1.

Did [the Commission] violate Petitioner’s right to due process by failing to make sufficient findings of fact ²⁸² regarding the positive economic effects of the Generating Station? 2. Was the [Commission’s] calculation of economic effects under [PUA] § 7-207(e)(2)(ii) supported by substantial evidence in the record? 8. Did the [Commission] act outside of its statutory authority by imposing $48 million dollars in taxes or, in the alternative, fees which it was not empowered to enact? 4. Did the [Commission] act arbitrarily or capriciously in ignoring competent evidence that showed the [Board of County Commissioners’] recommendation was based on the overall Liquefaction Project, and thus was outside of the [Commission’s] statutory authority to consider?

For the reasons explained in this opinion, we answer all four questions in the negative and conclude that the order should be affirmed. Discussion In an appeal from a circuit court’s judgment in an action for judicial review, our task is to review the underlying decision of the agency. See, e.g., Mid-Atlantic Power Supply Ass’n v. Maryland Pub. Serv.

Comm’n, 143 Md.App. 419, 432 , 795 A.2d 160 (2002). The scope of judicial review over decisions of the Public Service Commission is limited by statute. A final decision or order of the Commission is “prima facie correct and shall be affirmed unless clearly shown to be: (1) unconstitutional; (2) outside the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the Commission; (3) made on unlawful procedure; (4) arbitrary or capricious; (5) affected by other error of law; or (6) if the subject of review is an order entered in a contested proceeding after a hearing, unsupported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.” PUA § 3-203. “A great deal of discretion is necessarily vested in the Commission in order that it may properly discharge its important and complex duties.” People’s Counsel v. Pub. ²⁸³ Serv. Comm’n, 52 Md.App. 715, 722 , 451 A.2d 945 (1982).

When the agency exercises discretion on a matter specific to its mandate and expertise, court review is generally limited to whether the agency exercised its discretion arbitrarily or capriciously or whether the action violated regulations, statutes, common-law principles, due process, and other constitutional requirements. Communications Workers of America v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Maryland, 424 Md. 418, 434 , 36 A.3d 449 (2012). “Because the Commission is well informed by its own expertise and specialized staff,” the reviewing court must affirm the Commission’s decision as long as the matter is at least fairly debatable, meaning that “a reasoning mind could have reached the same conclusion as the agency[.]” Id. at 433 , 36 A.3d 449 .

Therefore, in reviewing a factual determination of the Commission, the court “ ‘should not examine the facts in any case further than to determine whether there was substantial evidence to sustain the order.’” People’s Counsel v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 52 Md.App. at 722 , 451 A.2d 945 (quoting Howard Sports Daily v. Weller, 179 Md. 355, 365 , 18 A.2d 210 (1941)). Overall, the courts will not disturb a decision of the Commission “except upon clear and satisfactory evidence that it was unlawful and unreasonable.” Town of Easton v. Pub.

Serv. Comm’n of Maryland, 379 Md. 21, 30 , 838 A.2d 1225 (2003). As discussed below, AMP has failed to show that the Commission’s decision was unconstitutional, unsupported by substantial evidence, outside of the Commission’s authority or jurisdiction, or arbitrary or capricious. I. As its first ground for challenging the Commission’s order, AMP contends that the Commission denied it due process of law by failing to articulate certain factual findings.

Specifically, AMP argues that the Commission violated its “right to due process by failing to name the value, or possible range of values, [the Commission] assigned to the economic benefit of the Generating Station.” According to AMP, the Commission’s failure to provide those numerical figures de ²⁸⁴ prived AMP of a “meaningful opportunity” to challenge “how the [PUA § 7-207] balancing test was implemented” in approving the certificate. In a contested proceeding, the Public Service Commission is required to issue a written decision and order that “state[s] the grounds for the conclusions of the Commission^]” PUA § 3-113(a). The requirement of written findings is essential for judicial review, because a court generally may not uphold an agency’s decision “ ‘unless it is sustainable on the agency’s findings and for the reasons stated by the agency.’ ” Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub.

Serv. Comm’n of Maryland, 75 Md.App. 87, 99 , 540 A.2d 820 (1988) (quoting United Steelworkers of America AFL-CIO, Local 2610 v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 298 Md. 665, 679 , 472 A.2d 62 (1984)). The Commission’s written findings “must at least be-sufficiently detailed to apprise the parties as to the basis for the agency’s decision.” Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub.

Serv. Comm’n, 75 Md.App. at 97 , 540 A.2d 820 (reversing order of Commission because written order included Commission’s ultimate factual conclusion without articulating basic evidentiary facts underlying that conclusion); see also Bucktail, LLC v. Cnty. Council of Talbot Cnty., 352 Md. 530, 553 , 723 A.2d 440 (1999) (explaining that an agency’s “[findings of fact must be meaningful and cannot simply repeat statutory criteria, broad conclusory statements, or boilerplate resolutions”) (citation omitted). In Mid-Atlantic Power Supply Ass’n v. Maryland Pub.

Serv. Comm’n, 143 Md.App. 419 , 795 A.2d 160 (2002), this Court rejected a challenge to the adequacy of certain written orders from the Public Service Commission. In that case, the Commission had approved a settlement agreement and implemented an electric utility restructuring plan. Id. at 425-26 , 795 A.2d 160 .

This Court held that the order approving the agreement contained the required factual determinations and sufficiently set forth the basis for the Commission’s conclusion. Id. at 434-35 , 795 A.2d 160 . In its written opinion, the Commission had “reviewed each issue addressed by the ²⁸⁵ Agreement, liberally drawing from the testimony adduced by both sides, while discussing in detail the evidence presented and the applicable law,” and “made findings of fact and conclusions of law, which were later summarized at the conclusion of the opinion[.]” Id. at 435 , 795 A.2d 160 . The appellant in that case contended that the Commission’s orders were deficient for failing to address requisite statutory factors.

Id. at 437-38 , 795 A.2d 160 . The relevant statute, however, stated only that the Commission “shall consider” certain enumerated statutory criteria in making its determination. Id. at 438 , 795 A.2d 160 . The Court explained that “the words ‘shall consider’ in an administrative statute ‘only require[] [an agency] to consider the listed factors’ of the statute” and do not require the agency “ ‘to make written findings or findings on the record.’ ” Id.

(quoting Lussier v. Maryland Racing Comm’n, 100 Md.App. 190, 213 , 640 A.2d 259 (1994)). Consequently, in reviewing an administrative decision based on a statute that requires the Commission only to “ ‘consider’ certain enumerated factors ... ‘it is sufficient if the record supports the conclusion that the Commission considered these factors.’ ” Mid-Atlantic Power Supply Ass’n v. Maryland Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 143 Md.App. at 439 , 795 A.2d 160 (quoting Lussier, 100 Md.App. at 213 , 640 A.2d 259 ).

The relevant statute here similarly provides that the “Commission shall take final action ... only after due consideration of,” among other things, “the effect of the generating station ... on ... economics[.]” PUA § 7-207(e)(2)(ii). Expressly addressing this consideration, the Commission’s opinion summarized testimony from Dominion’s witnesses estimating the “dollar impact” of the generating station. The opinion recounted the testimony of PPRP’s economist, who concluded that income effects attributable to construction of the generating station would be “significantly less” than the estimates from Dominion. The Commission also referred to testimony that the overall project would result in “up to $40 million per year in property taxes for Calvert County.” The Commission noted other potential benefits, including highway improvements, re-establishment of oyster beds in an offsite area, and ²⁸⁶ the possibility of additional land preservation.

The Commission also analyzed potential negative economic effects from the LNG export facility, referring to estimates of likely increases in consumer gas prices and to decreased revenue associated with compliance costs. In sum, the opinion amply demonstrates that the Commission gave “due consideration” to all of the required factors, including the economic effects of the generating station. This is by no means a case in which the Commission made conclusory findings on a central issue without articulating any evidentiary facts to support those findings. Cf.

Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 75 Md.App. at 100 , 540 A.2d 820 .

The opinion did more than enough to apprise the parties and the courts of the basis for the Commission’s decision. See Mid-Atlantic Power Supply Ass’n v. Maryland Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 143 Md.App. at 435-36 , 795 A.2d 160 .

While ostensibly criticizing the Commission for allegedly failing to articulate its findings, AMP effectively seeks to use certain details from the Commission’s thorough explanation as a basis for requiring even further explanation. In the Commission’s opinion, it stated that Dominion had failed to show that monetary benefits from construction employment and longer-term tax payments would offset the potential negative effects of the power plant. For example, the Commission found that Dominion’s proposal to contribute $20.38 million to advance greenhouse-gas reduction goals was “too speculative and insufficient to provide the necessary offsetting economic benefits[.]” On the other hand, the Commission found that it could approve the certificate if Dominion contributed $40 million over five years to the Strategic Energy Investment Fund and $8 million over 20 years to the Maryland Energy Assistance Program. Based on this series of findings, AMP asserts that “the Order makes clear” that the Commission “assigned a specific value, or range of values, to the economic benefit” of the generating station.

AMP theorizes that the Commission reduced all of the considerations to two values: A, the net ²⁸⁷ economic benefits of the station, and B, the overall negative effects of the station. AMP asserts that the Commission then made the following “calculation”: first that A was less than B; next that “A + 20.38 million dollars is still less than B”; and finally that “A + $48 million dollars was greater than B.” According to AMP, the Commission violated due process by failing to disclose “A,” the value or range of values for the generating station’s net economic effect. AMP’s argument is creative but unpersuasive. It is not at all “clear” that the Commission reduced, or could have reduced, its analysis to a single dollar-figure or range of figures.

The Commission’s discussion of economic factors covered the facility’s effects on employment, government revenue, and consumer energy prices. Data regarding each of these effects can be expressed in dollar figures, but nothing obligates the Commission to give the same weight to a dollar in property taxes as it gives, for example, to a dollar in wages (which results in additional state and local taxes, as well as other economic benefits). Moreover, the Commission could not simply “add” the positive economic contributions to Dominion’s proposed $20.38 million contribution to reduce energy consumption and greenhouse-gas emissions, as those goals are not strictly economic. For similar reasons, the Commission could not simply “add” $48 million, as an economic benefit, to account for the contributions that it required Dominion to make to the government funds that are designed to achieve environmental objectives and to assist low-income residents, as those goals, too, are not strictly economic.

Even if it were possible to reduce these qualitatively different costs and benefits into a single quantity or range of quantities (as AMP suggests the Commission did and was required to do), the Commission would need to compare those figures against the value of “B” on the other side of the scale. The negative effects identified by the Commission (increased emissions, use of a limited supply of greenhouse-gas allowances, increased noise, clear-cutting of trees, and burdens on transportation and water resources) were largely noneconom ²⁸⁸ ic. AMP, in seeking to challenge the Commission’s balancing of the competing considerations, incorrectly reasons that this flexible multi-factor balancing can be reduced (and in fact was reduced) to mere “calculations.” Like many other determinations that the General Assembly has entrusted to the Commission’s discretion, however, the public convenience and necessity standard of PUA § 7-207(e) requires that the Commission consider all relevant facts and factors and exercise reasonable judgment, not that the Commission employ a particular formula or method. See Potomac Edison Co. v. Pub.

Serv. Comm’n, 279 Md. 573, 585 , 369 A.2d 1035 (1977) (holding that, under statute requiring Commission to determine “fair value” of utility’s property, Commission’s determination “must reflect the reasonable judgment of the [C]ommission, based on all relevant facts of which only several, or indeed but one, may prove to be controlling”); Bldg. Owners & Managers Ass’n of Metro. Baltimore, Inc. v. Pub.

Serv. Comm’n of Maryland, 93 Md.App. 741, 762 , 614 A.2d 1006 (1992) (holding that statute directing Commission to approve “just and reasonable rates” permitted Commission to use factors other than pure cost of service and did not require any specific formula). The requirement that an agency make meaningful findings of fact exists in part to protect the ‘“fundamental right of a party to a proceeding before an administrative agency to be apprised of the facts relied upon by the agency in reaching its decision and to permit meaningful judicial review of those findings.’” Neutron Prods., Inc. v. Dep’t of the Env’t, 166 Md.App. 549, 589 , 890 A.2d 858 (2006) (quoting Eastern Outdoor Adver. Co. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 128 Md.App. 494, 530 , 739 A.2d 854 (1999)).

The opportunity for “meaningful” review is not necessarily an opportunity for exhaustive review of every possible basis for a petitioner’s challenge. See Neutron Prods., 166 Md.App. at 593 , 890 A.2d 858 (holding that, under statute authorizing agency to assess penalties up to certain individual and aggregate statutory limits, “the agency was not required to assign a particular dollar amount for each category of violation or individual violations”). ²⁸⁹ For a court to conduct meaningful review of a decision to grant a certificate under PUA § 7-207, the findings and the record must at least show that the Commission gave “due consideration” to each of the requisite statutory factors. See Mid-Atlantic Power Supply Ass’n v. Maryland Pub. Serv.

Comm’n, 143 Md.App. at 439 , 795 A.2d 160 (holding that where a statute “only requires the Commission to ‘consider’ certain enumerated factors ... it is sufficient if the record supports the conclusion that the Commission considered th[o]se factors”). The Commission’s opinion here sufficiently demonstrates that the Commission did so. There is no need for the Commission to make further written findings.

II

In its first challenge, AMP criticized the Commission for failing to assign a specific numerical value for the overall economic benefits of the generating station. In its second challenge, AMP contends that this “unnamed valuation of the economic benefit of the generating station is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.” The focus of AMP’s argument is that, although the Commission received some evidence about economic effects of the generating station, most of the economic evidence related to the larger LNG export facility. At the outset, we disagree with AMP’s suggestion that evidence concerning effects of the overall liquefaction project was irrelevant in evaluating the effects of the power plant component. As explained in the Commission’s opinion, “the sole purpose of the Generating Station would be to serve the proposed expanded LNG operations[.]” The generating station was not only “located within” the larger LNG facility, but was also “very closely intertwined with the components of the broader Liquefaction Project.” Because the components were so inseparably integrated, Dominion encouraged the Commission to consider costs and benefits of the entire project.

Experts from PPRP took similar approaches in their siting studies. PPRP’s environ ²⁹⁰ mental review report concluded that the environmental effects of the power plant could not be separated from the larger liquefaction project. The economic impact analysis from PPRP isolated only some effects specific to the generating station, but at other times analyzed the effects of the entire facility. PPRP’s economics expert reported that it was “difficult to segregate the generating station” from the larger liquefaction project.

Based on a comparison study to a “generic 130 [megawatt] conventional gas combined cycle facility,” he concluded that employment and income effects attributable to construction of the electric generation components would be “relatively small” in relation to the entire facility. During the hearing, the Commission attempted to elicit more specific information about economic effects attributable only to the generating station. One of the commissioners commented that it would be “helpful” if Dominion provided a separate personal and real property valuation for the generation station. An executive from Dominion later offered a “rough estimate” of the “costs and benefits” attributable to the generating station.

Based on a comparison to a “very similar existing facility” with the “same configuration,” Dominion’s witness estimated that “from both a man-hours to construct standpoint and a total dollar impact,” the power generation components represented “approximately 20 percent of the overall costs” and “approximately 20 percent of the overall value of the project.” He summarized that “from a tax standpoint, from a jobs standpoint” the Commission could allocate 20 percent of costs and benefits to the generating station. In response to questions about the reasonableness of Dominion’s estimate, PPRP’s economics expert explained that there were “legitimate reasons why the generation component could not be separated from the liquefaction project,” most notably the “common elements” used for both the liquefaction process and for electricity generation. On appeal, AMP contends that the Commission lacked substantial evidence to reach a conclusion about isolated eco ²⁹¹ nomic effects of the generating station. More specifically, AMP asserts that the Commission could not consider property tax payments as a likely economic benefit unless the Commission received direct evidence about the specific portion of property taxes derived solely from the generating station.

AMP also argues that the Commission was required to assign a specific numerical value to that portion of the property taxes. AMP seems to presume that the Commission must meet a high evidentiary standard for a court to uphold its factual determinations. In reality, the substantial evidence test is nowhere near as exacting as AMP’s argument suggests. To determine whether the entire record contains substantial evidence to support an agency’s findings, the ultimate question is whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the conclusion reached by the agency based on the record.

See, e.g., Spicer v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 152 Md.App. 151, 159 , 831 A.2d 472 (2003) (citing Rideout v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 149 Md.App. 649, 656 , 818 A.2d 250 (2003)).

The Commission need not rely on direct testimony to support every finding and conclusion, but its findings “may include inferences which can be reasonably drawn from the facts[.]” Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Maryland, 75 Md.App. at 97 , 540 A.2d 820 (citing Bulluck v. Pelham Wood Apartments, 283 Md. 505, 515 , 390 A.2d 1119 (1978)).

For example, in People’s Counsel v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 52 Md.App. 715, 716-17, 451 A.2d 945 (1982), cert. denied, 295 Md. 441 (1983), this Court held that substantial evidence supported a decision of the Commission setting taxicab rates. In that case, taxicab companies had petitioned for a rate increase, based largely on evidence of increases in gasoline price.

Id. at 725, 451 A.2d 945 . The companies “presented very little specific information about their own financial affairs and condition” (id.) even though that information was necessary to justify the rate increase. The Commission relied on the findings of a hearing examiner who had “decried the lack ²⁹² of better evidence,” but who nonetheless drew a “reasonable inference,” based on testimony from the representatives of two companies who mentioned their declining revenues, that revenues were declining throughout the industry. Id. at 726 , 451 A.2d 945 .

Writing for this Court, Judge Wilner explained that “[t]he weight to be accorded the kind of evidence presented at the two hearings, unsupported by