Ad + Soil, Inc. v. County Commissioners

MURPHY, Chief Judge. Since 1974, the General Assembly has required that any person intending to engage in the “collection, handling, burning, storage, or transportation of sewage sludge” obtain a permit from the State Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. See chapter 680 of the Acts of 1974. 1 ³¹⁰ Involved in this case is a sewage sludge storage and distribution facility located in Queen Anne’s County. The principal issue is whether, in light of the public general laws of the state governing sewage sludge management and utilization, the county may exercise its local zoning power to regulate the operation of such a facility which has previously obtained the requisite state permits from the Department.

I. Ad + Soil, Inc. (Ad + Soil) is a Pennsylvania corporation engaged in the business of disposing of processed sewage sludge. Its first sludge disposal contract, beginning in June of 1982, was with the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission; it expired in March of 1985. Since October 1984, the company has contracted with the District of Columbia to dispose of at least 200 tons of sludge per day from the Blue Plains Wastewater Treatment Plant. Ad+Soil’s primary responsibility under the contract is to transport the sludge in sealed trucks to Maryland’s Eastern Shore, where it applies the sludge free of charge to the fields of cooperating farmers for use as a fertilizer and soil conditioner.

Under certain weather conditions, such as heavy rain or sub-freezing temperatures, the sludge cannot be applied to the fields. Ad + Soil’s contract with the District therefore requires that it maintain the capacity to store 18,000 tons of sludge, this being the amount which it is obligated to remove from Blue Plains over a 90-day period. In 1982, Ad + Soil obtained a site in Queen Anne’s County from which it began distributing sludge to cooperating farms. The site was zoned A-l Agricultural under the county’s Zoning Ordinance.

Although the record is not entirely clear, it appears that Ad + Soil did obtain the ³¹¹ necessary permit from the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, as then required by Code (1982), § 9-210(b) of the Health-Environmental Article, to operate a sludge transfer station at this site. 2 By letter dated December 21, 1982, the County Zoning Administrator notified Ad + Soil that its sludge transfer station violated the applicable provisions of the Queen Anne’s County Zoning Ordinance. 3 In response to Ad + Soil’s request for a clarification, the Zoning Administrator in a letter dated December 28, 1982 explained that “to receive, mix, and then distribute sludge from [Ad + Soil’s site] to off-premise locations is not a permitted use in the ‘A-l’ Agricultural District. It is my opinion that this would be a distributing establishment which is first permitted in the ‘B-2’ General Business District.” 4 In early 1983, Ad + Soil leased a new site in the county comprising approximately ten acres near Queenstown. The site was located in an M-2 General Industrial District, and was part of an existing gravel quarry owned by R.B. Baker & Sons, Inc. Under § 16.101 of the Zoning Ordinance, any use or structure permitted in a B-2 district is also permitted in an M-2 district, subject to certain modifications and exceptions. Ad + Soil selected the new site as the location for both its transfer operation and the construction of a ³¹² sludge storage facility.

By letter dated June 23, 1983, the Zoning Administrator advised Ad + Soil that a zoning permit and a release from an existing conditional use decision affecting the site would be required before operations could begin. 5 On June 24, 1983, Ad + Soil obtained á state permit from the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene authorizing it to transport sludge to its Queen Anne’s County facility, store up to approximately 2,100 tons at the site, and transfer the sludge to cooperating farms. Ad + Soil began such operations immediately upon obtaining the state permit. It did not, however, apply for zoning approval from the county authorities. By letter dated August 23, 1983, the Zoning Administrator notified Baker that because the use of the site had been changed and improvements added without zoning approval, he was to cease all activities at the site until the requisite zoning permits were obtained, together with a release from the existing conditional use decision.

On September 13, 1983, Baker and Ad + Soil applied for a zoning certificate and a building permit for the facility which remained in full operation. The following day, Baker, as owner of the site, filed an application with the County Board of Appeals for the release of the existing conditional use. The applicants were informed that consideration of their application for the zoning certificate and building permit would be delayed until the Board had acted on the application for a release from its earlier conditional use decision. On October 26, 1983, the Board granted Baker’s application for release of the conditional use of the property.

By letter dated November 2, 1983, however, the Zoning Administrator notified Baker and Ad + Soil that the County Com ³¹³ missioners had adopted amendments to the Zoning Ordinance on October 25, 1983 which expressly made the storage and distribution of sewage sludge a conditional use in A-l, A-2, and M-2 districts. 6 The letter indicated that the application for a zoning certificate and building permit would not be granted until the requisite conditional use permit was obtained from the Board; Baker and Ad + Soil were directed to apply for the necessary zoning authorization or cease all activities at the site within fifteen days. ³¹⁴ Neither Baker nor Ad + Soil applied for the requisite zoning approvals within the allotted time; nevertheless, operations at the site continued and indeed intensified. On December 28, 1983, Ad + Soil obtained a state permit authorizing it to operate, in accordance with its construction and site plan previously approved by the Department, a large, newly constructed sludge storage facility at the same location. The storage facility, characterized by Ad + Soil’s president as a “manure lagoon,” consisted essentially of a shallow, man-made pit surrounded by an earthen dike, containing a surface area of approximately 90,000 square feet, and the capacity to store approximately 36,000 tons of sludge. Ad + Soil began storing sludge within this structure the day after it obtained the state permit, without applying for any form of zoning approval from the county authorities.

During December, Ad + Soil sued the county in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. In its complaint, Ad + Soil challenged the October, 1983 amendments to the Zoning Ordinance on several grounds, including pre-emption by and irreconcilable conflict with state law. In June, 1984, the federal court granted the county’s motion to dismiss on the basis of abstention, concluding that the case presented unsettled questions of state law which were best resolved in a state court. See Ad + Soil Serv. v. Bd. of Cty.

Com’rs of Queen Anne’s, 596 F.Supp. 1139 (D.Md.1984). On August 9, 1984, Baker and Ad + Soil filed applications with the Board of Appeals for the conditional use permit required by § 16.202 of the amended Zoning Ordinance, and for four variances from its setback, freeboard, and bonding requirements. The matter was docketed as Case CU-56, and a hearing was conducted on October 4, 1984. On October 25, the Board unanimously denied the applications.

It first explained that, under the Zoning Ordinance, it was authorized to grant variances only in response to extraordinary conditions unique to the property involved that would make literal compliance with the Ordinance exceptionally ³¹⁵ difficult, and then only when the granting of the variance would not be substantially detrimental to adjacent property or contrary to the purpose of the Ordinance. The Board concluded that Baker and Ad + Soil had failed to produce any evidence of these requisites. Because the variances were necessary to satisfy the requirements for the conditional use permit, the permit was also denied. The Board noted, however, that the Ordinance required it to consider in all conditional use cases such factors as the probable effect of the use on property values and the peaceful enjoyment of people in their homes, and the probable effects of any odors on the surrounding property.

The Board also noted that the Ordinance required denial of permits if the use would adversely affect the public health, safety, security, morals, or welfare, or would jeopardize the lives or property of people living in the neighborhood. Because of undisputed evidence regarding the emanation of odors from Ad + Soil’s facilities, and what it viewed as unresolved questions as to the facilities’ impact on the local environment, the Board indicated that had it considered the merits of the conditional use application it would have denied the permit on that ground as well. The Board further determined that the county zoning ordinance had not been pre-empted by the provisions of state law governing the operation of sewage sludge facilities. In November 1984, Ad + Soil filed a timely appeal to the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County from the Board’s order in Case CU-56, contending that it was arbitrary and capricious and that the county’s zoning ordinance governing sewage sludge facilities was pre-empted by and in conflict with state law on the subject.

Ad + Soil also filed an action for a declaratory judgment in the same court, seeking a determination that the October 1983 amendments were illegal on pre-emption and conflict grounds; the suit included a prayer for damages against the county for alleged violations of Ad + Soil’s right to due process. Shortly thereafter, the parties agreed to stay both of these ³¹⁶ proceedings to allow Ad + Soil and Baker to submit another zoning application for the Board’s consideration. The new zoning application was docketed as Case CU-61, and additional hearings were conducted on May 2, 1985. On May 16, the Board again unanimously denied the application.

It reiterated the criteria set forth in the Zoning Ordinance governing the issuance of variances, and observed that the applicants had again failed to adduce any evidence that these criteria were satisfied in this case. On the basis of the record before it, the Board concluded “that the sludge storage facilities being applied for could easily be located on that property so as to comply with all of the setback requirements of the Queen Anne’s County Zoning Ordinance. The only extraordinary circumstances which would seem to exist in this case are self inflicted and a result of [Ad + Soil’s] construction of the facilities on the site without conforming to the Ordinance’s required setbacks.” The Board also found “overwhelming evidence” that Ad + Soil’s operations generated a “grossly offensive” odor “which has persisted on at least a frequent basis throughout the term of the pit’s operation.” The Board again concluded that the sludge transfer and storage facilities denied local residents the peaceful enjoyment of their homes, and substantially diminished the value of surrounding properties. It discounted Ad + Soil’s testimony that the company had identified and eliminated the source of the odor, noting that it had given the same assurances at the October 4, 1984 hearing but that the problem continued unabated.

Ad + Soil thereafter appealed from the Board’s order denying its application in CU-61. On June 7, 1985, the Zoning Administrator ordered Baker and Ad + Soil to cease and desist from all activities at the site. Thereafter, Ad + Soil sought and obtained an ex parte injunction in its declaratory judgment case allowing it temporarily to continue in operation. In July, a fourth action involving Ad + Soil and Queen Anne’s County was ³¹⁷ filed in the circuit court, this time by the county seeking enforcement of its June 7 cease and desist order.

Ad + Soil subsequently filed a motion for an interlocutory injunction in its declaratory judgment action upon which the circuit court (Rollins, J.) conducted extensive evidentiary hearings and heard oral argument on the preemption and conflict issues there raised. On August 28, the county filed a motion in Ad + Soil’s administrative appeal from the Board’s order in Case CU-61, requesting that the circuit court expeditiously issue final judgment in that case before ruling on Ad + Soil’s motion for an interlocutory injunction in the declaratory judgment action. The county suggested that the court could thereby resolve the issues of pre-emption and conflict common to all three of Ad + Soil’s pending cases and thus provide an avenue for appellate review of these issues that could render the remaining actions moot. Acting on the county’s motion on December 2, 1985, the court (Rollins, J.) affirmed the Board’s orders in both administrative appeals.

It first considered the pre-emption issue, and concluded that the state’s regulatory scheme neither expressly nor impliedly pre-empted the county’s traditional zoning authority. It also found no direct conflict between the Zoning Ordinance and the state statute governing sludge utilization, noting that the state law did not address such issues as setbacks or site location. The court further concluded that the county’s denial of Ad + Soil’s applications did not amount to an effective prohibition of activity authorized by the state law, observing that “the County has merely decided that the Baker property is not an appropriate site for a permanent sludge storage facility such as Ad + Soil’s.” The court found no evidence of exceptional circumstances as would authorize the issuance of variances under the Ordinance. It thus upheld the Board’s denial of Ad + Soil’s applications for variances, agreeing with the Board that the only hardships facing Ad + Soil were of its own making.

In addition, the court found substantial evidence in the record that the odor ³¹⁸ produced by Ad + Soil’s operations adversely affected the surrounding properties and the local residents’ peaceful enjoyment of their homes. In affirming the Board’s orders, the court held that the denial of Ad + Soil’s conditional use permit was neither arbitrary nor capricious. In response to a motion for clarification, the court indicated that in reaching its decision it had not considered the evidence adduced at the August 8 hearing on Ad + Soil’s motion in the declaratory judgment action for an interlocutory injunction, but had considered the legal arguments advanced by counsel in that case. From the judgments of the circuit court in Cases CU 56 and 61, Ad + Soil appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. 7 We granted certiorari before the intermediate appellate court’s consideration of the appeals to consider the significant issues presented in the case.

II

Ad+Soil first mounts a procedural challenge to the validity of the circuit court’s judgments. It maintains that Maryland’s constitutional and statutory law requires that a circuit court in an administrative appeal from an order of a county board of appeals conduct a hearing before issuing final judgment. Specifically, Ad+Soil asserts that the circuit court denied its statutory right under Code (1957, 1983 Repl.Vol.), Article 66B, § 4.08(b), and its constitutional right to due process secured by Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, by failing to conduct a hearing on whether the Board of Appeals’ orders were arbitrary and capricious and unsupported by the record. Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights proclaims “That no man ought to be ... deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land.” As we have frequently indicated, Article 24 ³¹⁹ embodies essentially the same concept of due process of law as does the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution.

See, e.g., Webster v. State, 299 Md. 581 , 599 n. 9, 474 A.2d 1305 (1984); Loveday v. State, 296 Md. 226, 241 , 462 A.2d 58 (1983); Comm’n on Med. Discipline v. Stillman, 291 Md. 390 , 414 n. 9, 435 A.2d 747 (1981). In the context of judicial proceedings, due process unquestionably requires that the parties be afforded an opportunity to be heard. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377-79 , 91 S.Ct. 780, 785-786 , 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 , 85 S.Ct. 1187 , 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965).

At the appellate level, however, the constitutional right to be heard is satisfied where the parties are provided an opportunity to present their arguments to the court through the submission of written briefs, without oral argument. As we said in Chevy Chase Village v. Board, 249 Md. 334, 346 , 239 A.2d 740 (1968), “[a] hearing in an appellate court is an argument-type hearing and appellate courts ... can decide and often have decided important cases and issues on printed arguments without oral presentation.” The cases are generally in accord. See Groendyke Transport, Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1012 , 89 S.Ct. 1628 , 23 L.Ed.2d 39 (1969); Moore v. Spangler, 401 Mich. 360 , 258 N.W.2d 34, 37-38 (1977); Byrd v. Columbia Falls Lions Club, 183 Mont. 330 , 599 P.2d 366, 367-68 (1979); State ex rel. Reed v. Schwab, 287 Or. 411 , 600 P.2d 387, 390 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1088 , 100 S.Ct. 1051 , 62 L.Ed.2d 776 (1980).

This principle is, we think, clearly applicable to a circuit court’s on the record review of the decision of a county board of appeals in a zoning action. Ad+Soil was provided with ample opportunity to present its arguments to the court regarding the allegedly arbitrary and capricious nature of the Board’s decisions. Indeed, in its initial legal memorandum filed in the circuit court in Case CU-61, Ad+Soil” presented a lengthy argument which it captioned “The Zoning Ordinance and the Board’s ³²⁰ Decision Thereunder are Patently Arbitrary and Capricious.” Ad+Soil further developed this argument in a reply memorandum filed in response to the county’s brief. In these circumstances, the circuit court’s decision to issue its judgment without hearing oral argument from Ad+Soil did not violate the company’s right to due process under Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights.

Nor is there merit in Ad+Soil’s argument that Article 66B, § 4.08(b) of the Code affirmatively required the circuit court to conduct a hearing before issuing final judgment. That section provides that “[i]f, upon the hearing, it shall appear to the court that testimony is necessary for the proper disposition of the matter, it may take evidence or appoint a referee to take such evidence as it may direct and report the same to the court with his findings of fact and conclusions of law, which shall constitute a part of the proceedings upon which the determination of the court shall be made.” (Emphasis added.) The “hearing” contemplated by § 4.08(b) is one which permits, but does not require, the circuit court to take additional evidence, if warranted in the court’s discretion. Nothing in this section, as we read it, compels the court to hold a hearing if it determines to decide the case in its appellate capacity on the basis of the written briefs, without oral argument. Relying primarily upon Aspen Hill Venture v. Mont.

Co., 265 Md. 303 , 289 A.2d 303 (1972), Ad+Soil asserts that in any event the circuit court abused its discretion under § 4.08(b) by not conducting an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously. In its brief, Ad+Soil proffers certain facts which it alleges constitute “prima facie evidence of the Board’s participation in a multiple-step conspiracy to prevent Ad-(-Soil from operating in the County.” It maintains that it was denied an opportunity to prove these facts by evidence adduced in the circuit court. In our view, Aspen Hill ³²¹ is inapposite on its facts and we conclude, in the circumstances of this case, that Ad+Soil’s allegations are without merit. Of course, a circuit court’s review of an administrative agency decision is ordinarily restricted to evidence in the record developed before the agency.

See, e.g., County Council v. District Land, 274 Md. 691, 705-06 , 337 A.2d 712 (1975); Pattey v. Board of Co. Comm’rs, 271 Md. 352, 359-60 , 317 A.2d 142 (1974); cf. Consumer Protection v. Consumer Pub., 304 Md. 731, 749 , 501 A.2d 48 (1985); Cicala v. Disability Review Bd., 288 Md. 254, 260 , 418 A.2d 205 (1980); Port Wardens v. Md. Cap. Yacht Club, 261 Md. 48, 60 , 273 A.2d 102 (1971). In Aspen Hill, however, we indicated that under certain narrowly prescribed circumstances the circuit court should consider evidence not contained in the administrative record. That case involved a local zoning body’s denial of an application for rezoning.

In the circuit court, the appellant attempted to prove the arbitrary and capricious nature of the zoning body’s decision by proffering evidence that, shortly after denying the appellant’s application, the same zoning body had approved similar applications regarding tracts adjacent to the appellant’s. The circuit court declined to consider this evidence, holding that because it was not contained in the record it was outside the scope of judicial review. 265 Md. at 316-17 , 289 A.2d 303 . In reversing the circuit court, we emphasized that evidence of subsequent inconsistent decisions of the same zoning body was highly reliable and probative, observing that they were “matters of public record which directly relate to the arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory quality of the conduct of the zoning authority which affects the property of the applicant.” Id. at 317 , 289 A.2d 303 . We concluded that such evidence was admissible before the reviewing court as an exception to the general rule restricting judicial review to evidence in the administrative record.

We have previously indicated that Aspen Hill is not to be read as a general endorsement of inquiry into the motives ³²² or thought processes of a zoning body. Thus, in District Land, supra, 274 Md. at 706 , 337 A.2d 712 , we stated that “[t]he language in Aspen Hill must be considered against its facts,” and we there held that the circuit court had erred in admitting the depositions and correspondence of state officials as evidence that the zoning body’s down-zoning of a certain tract was part of a scheme to depress the tract’s value. Cf. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 , 91 S.Ct. 814, 825 , 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971); Public Service Comm’n v. Patuxent Valley, 300 Md. 200, 209 , 477 A.2d 759 (1984).

Specifically, Ad+Soil contends that had it been afforded an evidentiary hearing, it would have presented evidence that the timing of the Board’s decision granting Baker’s release from the then existing conditional use was the result of a “conscious conspiracy” to prevent Ad+Soil from operating. Ad+Soil suggests that the Board of Appeals, in an attempt to interpose a “new procedural barrier” to the company’s zoning approval, deliberately delayed the announcement of its decision until after the County Commissioners had amended the Zoning Ordinance in October 1983. Initially, we note that the chronology of events relevant to Ad+Soil’s contention is well documented in the administrative record before the circuit court. The chronology was reiterated by Ad+Soil’s president in an affidavit appended to Ad+Soil’s initial memorandum filed in the administrative appeals.

These averments, therefore, which served as the basis for the allegations of discrimination advanced by Ad+Soil in the memorandum submitted in its administrative appeals, and at the August 22, 1985 hearing in the declaratory judgment action, were before Judge Rollins in the circuit court when the court reached its decision in this case. Furthermore, the absence of a formal evidentiary hearing did not preclude Ad+Soil from proffering additional evidence to the court, subject to the strictures of Aspen Hill and District Land . In Aspen Hill, the evidence of subse ³²³ quent inconsistent decisions of the zoning body was submitted, not at a hearing, but as an appendix to the appellant’s pleadings. Indeed, as already noted, Ad+Soil did proffer additional evidence in the form of an affidavit in precisely this manner.

In its motion for an expedited judgment in these cases, the county proposed that the court issue its decision without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Ad+Soil received a copy of this motion three months before the decision was ultimately filed, and was therefore well aware that a final judgment might be imminent and that a hearing might not be held. Had Ad+Soil wished to proffer additional evidence outside the context of a hearing, it had ample opportunity to do so. Finally, the relevant issue before the circuit court in Ad+Soil’s administrative appeals was whether the Board had acted arbitrarily or capriciously in reaching its decisions in those cases, not in the case involving Baker’s application for a release from the conditional use.

Thus, even if Ad+Soil could have demonstrated that the Board had acted with a discriminatory purpose in delaying the announcement of its decision regarding Baker’s release, such evidence would have been marginally probative at best in Ad-(-Soil’s administrative appeals—far less probative than the evidence we held admissible in Aspen Hil 8 We conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in declining to conduct an evidentiary hearing in these appeals.

III

In its administrative appeals to the circuit court, Ad+Soil challenged the Board’s decisions in Cases CU-56 and CU-61 ³²⁴ on three grounds: that the entire field of sewage sludge utilization had been impliedly pre-empted by the state legislature’s enactment of public general laws on the subject, thereby precluding any local regulation of Ad+Soil’s facility; that the county’s Zoning Ordinance conflicted with and was superseded by state law; and that the Board’s decisions in these cases were arbitrary and capricious and unsupported by the record. We think the circuit court was correct in its determination that these arguments were lacking in merit. A. Pre-emption The doctrine of pre-emption is grounded upon the authority of the General Assembly to reserve for itself exclusive dominion over an entire field of legislative concern. When properly invoked, the doctrine precludes local legislative bodies from enacting any legislation whatsoever in the pre-empted field.

Pre-emption may be accomplished either expressly by statutory language prohibiting local legislation, e.g., Montgomery County v. Atlantic Guns, Inc., 302 Md. 540 , 489 A.2d 1114 (1985), or impliedly, by other unequivocal conduct of the General Assembly, e.g., McCarthy v. Bd. of Education of A.A. Co., 280 Md. 634 , 374 A.2d 1135 (1977); County Council v. Montgomery Ass’n, 274 Md. 52 , 325 A.2d 112 (1975). In either case, the focus of the inquiry must be on whether the General Assembly has manifested a purpose to occupy exclusively a particular field. See generally 2 A. Rathkopf & D. Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning § 31.03, .04 (1986); 4 C. Antieau, Local Government Law § 31.09 (1986). Ad+Soil readily concedes that the General Assembly has not expressly pre-empted the field of sludge utilization.

Neither the statute in existence when Ad+Soil obtained its state permits, § 9-210, nor the current statute governing sludge utilization, § 9-210.1, contains any language prohibiting local legislation. Ad+Soil maintains, however, that these statutes constitute such a comprehensive regulatory scheme as clearly to imply a legislative purpose to occupy ³²⁵ the field and preclude all local regulation of sludge utilization facilities. In recent years, we have considered implied pre-emption in a variety of contexts. In National Asphalt v. Prince Geo’s Co., 292 Md. 75 , 437 A.2d 651 (1981), we found no legislative purpose to occupy exclusively the field of employment discrimination law, and therefore upheld against a challenge of implied pre-emption county ordinances prohibiting such discrimination.

In so concluding, we noted that state legislation in this field was not comprehensive, since it failed to cover certain businesses and certain categories of employees, and that the state statutes did not mention pre-existing local law in the field, of which the state legislature was presumed to be aware. 292 Md. at 79 , 437 A.2d 651 . Similarly, in Annapolis v. Annap. Waterfront Co., 284 Md. 383 , 396 A.2d 1080 (1979), we upheld a provision in a city charter that permitted the port wardens to consider environmental factors in issuing licenses for the construction of wharves, even though such factors were not enumerated in the state statute authorizing municipal regulation of harbors. We again emphasized the lack of comprehensiveness of the applicable state law and the failure of the state enactment to specifically address the pre-existing local law. 284 Md. at 392-93 , 396 A.2d 1080 .

Implied pre-emption was successfully invoked in McCarthy, supra, to invalidate two county ordinances providing for public transportation of children attending private schools. In an exhaustive opinion for the Court by Judge Smith, we traced the state’s traditional stewardship of the field of education from early colonial times, and detailed the current state law’s comprehensive regulation of all public aspects of education, including the publicly funded transportation of school children. We concluded that the long tradition of public control and the thoroughness of the state’s regulation evidenced a legislative purpose to preempt the field, despite the absence of an express statutory ³²⁶ declaration to that effect. County ordinances purporting to regulate real property tax assessments were similarly invalidated in Mont Co. Bd. of Realtors v. Mont.

Co., 287 Md. 101, 107-10 , 411 A.2d 97 (1980), in view of the state’s comprehensive and elaborately detailed legislation in this field. The local ordinances involved in Montgomery Ass’n, supra, purported to regulate the campaign finance practices of candidates for the political offices of county executive and county councilman in Montgomery County. In holding the ordinances invalid on the basis of implied pre-emption, Judge Eldridge for the Court surveyed Maryland’s constitutional and statutory law governing elections, and found “pervasive state administrative control of the election process, on both the statewide and local levels.” 274 Md. at 62, 325 A.2d 112 . We observed that this body of state law “contains detailed provisions covering every aspect of the electoral process,” and that “[i]n the specific area of election practices dealt with by the county ordinances, namely the regulation of campaign finance and spending, the General Assembly has enacted extensive legislation.” Id. at 61, 63, 325 A.2d 112 .

We further noted that, if the county ordinances were upheld, a dual system of regulating election finances would exist in the county “which would inevitably lead to utter confusion.” Id. at 64, 325 A.2d 112 . In light of the comprehensiveness of the state legislation, and the unreasonable consequences that would ensue from concurrent regulation, we concluded that “the purpose of the General Assembly [was] to occupy the field of election finances.” Id. Although the General Assembly has enacted extensive statewide legislation in the field of sewage management, the legislation manifests a general policy of fostering local control under state supervision, rather than to totally prohibit the enactment of laws on the subject at the local level. Title 9 of the Health Environmental Article, which contains the bulk of the state law governing sewage management, is replete with references to the concurrent legislative authori ³²⁷ ty of local jurisdictions.

Each county is required to adopt a comprehensive plan for sewage management, to be submitted for the review and approval of the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. §§ 9-501 to -521. Such a plan must be consistent with all local zoning regulations, and must provide the Department with adequate