Adams v. Cambridge Wire Cloth Co.

ROBERT M. BELL, Judge. The only issue presented on this appeal from the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City is: Did Cambridge Wire Cloth, the appellee/employer, make offers of suitable work to the appellants so as to disqualify them from unemployment compensation benefits under Maryland Annotated Code Art. 95A, § 6(d)? Appellee, Board of Appeals of the Department of Employment and Training, (“Board”) found as a fact that it did, and the Circuit Court agreed. Our review of the record convinces us that the Board’s findings of fact in this regard are “supported by competent, material and substantial evidence in view of the entire record” and, so, we shall affirm.

Factual Background Appellants, 1 members of Local 8678 of the United Steelworkers of America and employees of appellee, Cambridge Wire Cloth Company (Cambridge), voted to, and in fact did, strike Cambridge as a result of a labor dispute over recognition of their union as their bargaining agent. Subsequent to the commencement of the strike, appellants filed for unemployment compensation benefits. Prior to the applications for unemployment compensation benefits being filed, but after the strike had commenced, ⁶⁶⁹ Cambridge mailed the following letter to each individual appellant: Dear Employee: We are confident of our ability to sustain operations at near normal levels. Our situation will improve each week with new production people coming in.

However, we still feel that this strike is not good for the company or the employees, and we would like to have you come back to work. As in the past, Cambridge Wire Cloth has tried to keep you abreast of the current situation; these are the facts: ----The company shipped 49% of its forecast the first week, 79% the second week, and 83% in the third week. ----We have over 140 people, plus part-timers, putting in direct labor hours on our products. ----We have sufficient capacity to handle our customers’ requirements. Incoming orders still are at prestrike quota levels. I would like to address the statement made by many striking employees that they are too scared to come back to work.

Surely you are not fearful of the people you elected to represent you. Your company does not believe that fear is the type of atmosphere that most of the union members want. I feel that a very important decision rests with you, and those who are not for the strike, but who have been intimidated by people whom they thought were their friends. Each employee must stand up for what is best for his future.

The real decision is to come back to work, and wait for an orderly solution by the court. The company will abide by the court’s decision, and it is still willing to join with the union in an expedited appeal. The 200 people coming to work daily hope you will join us. This letter, signed by Cambridge’s president, was posted on Cambridge’s premises and published in the local newspaper.

Moreover, in response to a telephone inquiry from the ⁶⁷⁰ manager of the local unemployment office, Cambridge reaffirmed the “general offer”, which it had made on August 24, 1981, and stated that it continued to be in effect. 2 This fact was communicated to each appellant by claims examiners conducting agency interviews. Despite the fact that, subsequent to issuing it, Cambridge had decided not to extend the general offer to certain striking employees, all appellants were disqualified, en masse, from receiving unemployment benefits. The Board, however, placing particular emphasis on the evidence in the record that the offer would not be extended to all striking employees, reversed the mass disqualifications. 3 With particular reference to § 6(d), 4 the Board observed: This general offer of reinstatement is insufficient to cause the Employment Security Administration to invoke an automatic disqualification on all Claimants in this case under section 6(d) of the Law. The whole raison d’etre of group hearings, appeals and decisions is simply convenience.

When the facts of each individual’s case are the same, and no one is prejudiced by a group decision, the law provides in section 7(g) for these group hearings. In this case, a mass decision concerning section 6(d) would clearly be prejudicial to those employees who are not called back to work at all by the employer. No more prejudicial set of facts can be imagined than to be disqualified for refusing a job offer, without a chance for a hearing, when no such job offer was made. Since there is the possibility of prejudice inherent in allowing a group ⁶⁷¹ decision in this case, the convenience of issuing a mass, comprehensive decision simply must be dispensed with. sjc j)c !jt tie s}: % ... [T]he refusal to accept suitable work when offered, can be activated by a private employer.

This disqualification is triggered only by an offer of suitable work. Since in this case, there was no unequivocal offer of work made to all of the employees, there could be no mass disqualifications under § 6(d), The Board remanded the cases to the claims examiners for individual determinations as to whether each appellant had been offered suitable work. This Court affirmed the Board’s decision in a per curiam, unpublished opinion. Cambridge Wire Cloth Company v. Adams, No. 452, September Term, 1983, filed January 23, 1984.

At the remand hearings, appellants conceded that Cambridge’s letter was mailed to each of the appellants and that it contained a general request that appellants return to work. They also conceded that Cambridge posted the letter on its bulletin board and published it in the local newspaper. Cambridge acknowledged that, subsequent to mailing the letter and notifying unemployment officials that its general offer was continuing in nature, it determined not to rehire certain of the appellants, specifically four persons alleged to have committed acts of violence and vandalism during the labor dispute. Other evidence revealed that all appellants were continuously on strike from August 4,1981 to the date of the start of the remand hearings.

Although appellants’ testimony differed in some particulars, all essentially agreed that they were voluntarily on strike and would not return to work until the strike was settled and all employees could return. Appellants contended, as they do here, that the letter was not specific enough to constitute an offer of suitable work. The appeals referee found disqualification pursuant to § 6(d) was inappropriate, noting: ⁶⁷² The company by offering only a vague general “come back to work”, in effect, did not offer a genuine suitable job or specify the perimeters of the job so as to, in effect, make a suitable offer to come back to work. Under the circumstances, it was not a suitable offer of employment within the meaning of Section 6(d) of the Maryland Unemployment Insurance Law.

On the other hand, the referee found that appellants were not able and available for work within the meaning of § 4(c). Accordingly, he denied them benefits on that basis. The Board reversed. It concluded that the referee’s conclusions concerning disqualification pursuant to § 4(c) were “clearly wrong”.

Turning to the referee’s findings with regard to disqualification pursuant to § 6(d), the Board found as fact that: The letter did not list the specific job the Claimant was to perform, the wages, or the other conditions of the employment, but the Claimant was aware of the exact conditions of his former employment. This offer was continuing in nature and was in effect on the date that the Claimant applied for benefits. It then concluded, as a matter of law, that: In the circumstances of this case, the employer’s letter of August 24, 1981 is an offer of work within the meaning of § 6(d). This offer was still in effect at the time the Claimant filed for benefits.

The Board reaches this conclusion despite the fact that the written job offer did not mention any specific duties, salary or working conditions. The Board is not retreating from its historic policy of applying job refusal disqualifications under Section 6(d) only to actual job offers of specific jobs with stated salaries, duties and starting dates. In this case, however, the Board concludes that the offer of work was sufficiently specific, since the Claimant was well aware of the salary and the duties, and the work obviously started immediately. Since the Claimant was offered and refused available suitable work within the meaning of Sec ⁶⁷³ tion 6(d), without good cause, he will be disqualified under that Section.

The circuit court affirmed. This appeal followed. The scope of review of a decision of the Board is statutorily limited by § 7(h) which, in pertinent part, provides: ... the findings of the Board of Appeals as to facts, if supported by competent, material and substantial evidence in view of the entire record, and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of said court shall be confined to questions of law. See Barley v. Dept. of Employment Security, 242 Md. 102, 105 , 218 A.2d 24 (1966).

Where the Board’s findings of facts are supported by substantial evidence in the record, they are binding on the reviewing court. Employment Security and Board v. LeCates, 218 Md. 202, 207 , 145 A.2d 840 (1958); Painter v. Dept. of Employment Training, 68 Md.App. 356, 360 , 511 A.2d 585 (1986). Such findings are supported by substantial evidence if, from the facts and permissible inferences in the record before the court, reasoning minds could reach the same result. Baltimore Lutheran High School Assoc. v. Employment Security Administration, 302 Md. 649, 662 , 490 A.2d 701 (1985); Painter, supra; Commissioner v. Cason, 34 Md.App. 487, 508 , 368 A.2d 1067 (1977).

Thus, in the absence of an allegation of fraud, which has not been made here, we may reject the Board’s decision only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or it is wrong as a matter of law. § 7(h). See Barley, supra, 242 Md. at 107-08 , 218 A.2d 24 (“The determination of the facts in regard to whether or not a claimant has ... accepted suitable work when offered to the claimant is especially within the expertise of the administrative officials administering the Unemployment Insurance Law, involving as it does many subtle considerations and nuances of