Adamson v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc.

HARRELL, Judge. Mr. Eddie Adamson, Petitioner, is an inmate in the custody of the Maryland Division of Correction (“DOC”) of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (“the Department”) and housed at the Maryland House of Correction in Jessup. On 15 July 1998, he filed suit in the District Court of Maryland sitting in Anne Arundel County against Correctional Medical Services, Inc., Respondent, a private medical provider under contract 1 with the State of Maryland to provide such services to prisoners at the Maryland House of Correction. Petitioner alleged breach of contract and negligence with regard to inadequate medical services and claimed $2,500 in damages.

The District Court dismissed the suit holding that Petitioner first had not exhausted administrative remedies mandated by the Prisoner Ligation Act (PLA), Maryland Code (1974, 1998 RepLVol., 1999 Supp.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, § 5-1001, et seq.. Petitioner appealed to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. The Circuit Court, also relying on the PLA, granted Respondent’s motion to dismiss the appeal. 2 We granted certiorari to consider the following question: Does the Prisoner Litigation Act, Maryland Code (1974, 1998 RepLVol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, § 5-1001, et seq., require that a prisoner exhaust administrative remedies prior to instituting suit in state court ²⁴⁴ against a private corporation that is contracted to provide medical care to prisoners in the custody of the Division of Correction? We answer in the negative and reverse.

I. Petitioner alleged as follows in his pro se complaint in the District Court: Both named defendants [3] at the times relevant to the plaintiffs [sic] claim were under contract with the Maryland Division of Correction to provide comprhensive [sic] health care to Maryland State Inmates as he [sic] plaintiff duly being []3rd[] party beneficiary. From August 29, 1996 until the present time both named defendants in the scope of their offices as Health Care providers have recklessly and negligencly [sic] failed to provide adequate medical care for Plaintiffs painful Anterior crucrate [sic] ligarment [sic] repair of his right knee causing continued pain and suffering after the plaintiff has relentlessly saught [sic] adequate medical care to no avail[.] On the complaint form, the boxes labeled “contract” and “tort” are checked signaling that Petitioner alleged breach of contract and negligence against Respondent. 4 Petitioner claimed damages in the amount of $2,500. The District Court dismissed Petitioner’s complaint on the ground that Petitioner ²⁴⁵ had not exhausted first available administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief, as required by the PLA. Petitioner, still pro se, appealed to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.

At the hearing in that court on Respondent’s motion to dismiss the appeal, the parties presented a number of documents, including DOC Directives relating its Administrative Review Procedure (ARP) for inmate grievances and correspondence from the Department’s Inmate Grievance Office (IGO), a separate agency within the Department, and the State Attorney General’s Office. The correspondence emanated from cases unrelated to the present one, but nonetheless were used and relied on by both parties, without objection, to argue for their respective interpretations of the PLA exhaustion requirement. Two letters were authored by the Executive Director of the IGO. One letter, predating the PLA’s enactment, was dated 16 July 1992, and the other was dated 20 November 1998.

Both IGO letters, addressed .to prisoners that apparently had inquired about the proper procedures for filing claims against private contractors similar to Respondent, indicated the IGO would not entertain such complaints. A third letter, dated 27 January 1999, originated from the Office of the State Attorney General. The letter, signed by an Assistant Attorney General, was in response to a request from a judge of the District Court apparently seeking clarification of DOC Directive 185-002, Section IY.C.2 (addressing the ARP), in a different case pending before the District Court of Maryland sitting in Anne Arundel County. 5 The author opined that the DOC’s ARP procedure was not available to an inmate asserting negligence against a private medical contractor. Respondent argued that Petitioner’s claim must undergo at least the DOC and perhaps the IGO administrative gauntlet, pursuant to PLA § 5-1001, et seq., before filing a civil action against Respondent in the District or Circuit Court.

The court agreed with Respondent and found that Petitioner had ²⁴⁶ “failed to provide proof that he exhausted the Administrative Remedy Procedure or that, in fact, he exhausted the remedy.” The court cited to PLA § 5-1003, et seq., to support its decision. 6 II. In reviewing the underlying grant of a motion to dismiss, we must assume the truth of the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint, including the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those allegations. Allied Inv. Corp. v. Jasen, 354 Md. 547, 555 , 731 A.2d 957, 961 (1999); Stone v. Chicago Title Ins.

Co. of Maryland, 330 Md. 329, 333 , 624 A.2d 496, 498 (1993); Tafflin v. Levitt, 92 Md.App. 375, 379 , 608 A.2d 817, 819 (1992). We have noted that “the facts comprising the cause of action must be pleaded with sufficient specificity. Bald assertions and conclusory statements by the pleader will not suffice.” Bobo v. State, 346 Md. 706, 708-09 , 697 A.2d 1371, 1372 (1997) (citations omitted). In the end, “[dismissal is proper only if the alleged facts and permissible inferences, so viewed, would, if proven, nonetheless fail to afford relief to the plaintiff.” Bobo, 346 Md. at 709 , 697 A.2d at 1373 .

See also Allied Inv. Corp., 354 Md. at 555 , 731 A.2d at 961 . In sum, because we must deem the facts to be true, our task is confined to determining whether the trial court was legally correct in its decision to dismiss. See Allied Inv.

Corp., 354 Md. at 555 , 731 A.2d at 961 ; Bobo, 346 Md. at 709 , 697 A.2d at 1373 . With the appellate review standard in mind, we consider the legal issue in this case. Petitioner, acquiring legal representation following the Circuit Court’s ruling, now argues more pointedly that the PLA’s administrative exhaustion requirement does not apply to prisoner malpractice claims against private medical providers under contract with the State. He asserts that the PLA ²⁴⁷ process was designed only to apply to prisoner grievances regarding conditions of confinement against the State of Maryland, the DOC, and its officials and employees.

Petitioner reasons that the purpose of the statute was threefold: to weed out frivolous claims against the State, to conserve judicial resources, and to relieve the burden on the Attorney General of defending an influx of lawsuits filed in state courts following passage of the federal analog to the PLA. He contends that the complaint filed in the District Court does not relate to conditions of his confinement, but rather to an injury (past and ongoing pain and suffering) inflicted by medical treatment or the lack thereof attributable to Respondent. Furthermore, he argues, the PLA was not designed to be used by private contractors as a screening device for prisoner complaints because the available administrative procedures are not equipped to deal with malpractice claims, nor do any such procedures empower the DOC to provide Petitioner with any remedy in the nature of damages. Respondent presents essentially two arguments why Petitioner must exhaust available administrative remedies before filing a civil action in state court.

First, Respondent states that under the principles of statutory construction, coupled with the specific legislative history of the statute involved, the PLA’s administrative exhaustion requirement plainly encompasses prisoner malpractice lawsuits filed against private contractors. Respondent focuses in particular on the defined statutory term “civil action,” stating: Four elements comprise the principal definition of “civil action” under the Act. To be a “civil action,” an action must be: (1) a legal action (2) seeking money damages, injunctive relief, or any appeal (3) filed in any court in the State (4) that relates to or involves a prisoner’s conditions of confinement. See § 5~1001(c)(l).

Petitioner’s actions against [Respondent] in the district court and the circuit court satisfy each of those elements. Petitioner filed his lawsuit against [Respondent] in the district court, then appealed to the circuit court, alleging that [Respondent] “recklessly and negligencly [sic] failed to provide adequate medical care for ²⁴⁸ the Plaintiffs painful Anterior crucrate ligarment [sic] repair of his right knee.... ” Plaintiff sought damages of $2,500.00. Certainly this case is a legal action, seeking money damages, filed in a court in this State. A crux of Respondent’s argument lies in its conception of the statutory term “conditions of confinement.” It asserts that Petitioner’s malpractice claim relates to a “condition of confinement” by referencing Supreme Court jurisprudence and several federal court decisions.

It states: In Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 [ 111 S.Ct. 2321 , 115 L.Ed.2d 271 ] (1991), for example, the Court held that claims arising from prison-wide deprivations, and deprivation of medical care to an individual prisoner, were actions addressing “conditions of confinement”: [T]he medical care a prisoner receives is just as much a “condition” of his confinement as the food he is fed, the clothes he is issued, the temperature he is subjected to in his cell, and the protection he is afforded against other inmates. Id. at 303 [ 111 S.Ct. 2321 ], Federal courts have dismissed prisoner lawsuits relating to medical services, construing the [federal Prison Litigation Reform Act] to require prisoners to exhaust all administrative remedies before filing suits relating to “prison conditions.” Respondent then cites several federal court cases 7 to support its proposition and notes that the PLA was enacted in 1997 to complement the Federal Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, § 801-10, signed into law on 26 April 1996. The PLRA was designed to discourage frivolous lawsuits and to slow the tide of lawsuits filed in federal courts for grievances relating to prisoners’ confinement. The federal statute used several mechanisms to ²⁴⁹ achieve these goals, namely to require the payment of a filing fee, to limit the types of actions that may be filed, to limit attorney’s fees, to empower judges to determine and dismiss frivolous suits, and to require the exhaustion of administrative remedies before a prisoner may seek independent judicial intervention by way of a civil action.

Respondent reasons that since the PLA was formulated after the PLRA and that the federal courts have determined that the delivery of medical services in correctional institutions is a “condition of confinement”, Petitioner’s lawsuit relates to a “condition of confinement” and thus is subject to the administrative procedures of the DOC, and perhaps the IGO, through the exhaustion requirement of the PLA. Secondly, Respondent asserts that Petitioner is mistaken in his assertion that there is no administrative remedy available to his malpractice claim because the DOC routinely handles prisoner grievances relating to prison medical services. It argues the Administrative Remedy Procedure delineated by the DOC in its written Directives implicitly allows for medical malpractice complaints against private contractors. It points to DOC Directive 185-002, Section IV(C), which states in pertinent part: Inmates may seek relief through the Administrative Remedy Procedure for issues which include but are not limited to: 1. institutional policies and procedures; 2. medical services; 3. access to courts; 4. religious liberties; 5. lost, damaged, stolen, destroyed, or improperly confiscated property; 6. use of force; 7. institutional conditions affecting health, safety, and welfare; and 8. administration and operation of the Administrative Remedy Procedure. ²⁵⁰ (Emphasis added).

Respondent sees the term “medical services” as all encompassing. It asserts that the medical services referenced in Section IV.C.2. includes malpractice allegations against private contractors. None of Respondent’s arguments convinces us that the PLA exhaustion requirement applies to Petitioner’s complaint in the case sub judice. A. This is a case of first impression in Maryland. 8 The central issue here is whether the PLA administrative exhaustion requirement encompasses prisoner malpractice lawsuits filed against private contractors who provide medical services to prisoners under the control and responsibility of the DOC.

We hold that it does not. At the outset, we recognize that because they are “[established by legislative bodies, administrative agencies derive their power from enabling statutes that govern them.” Department of Econ. and Employment Dev. v. Lilley, 106 Md.App. 744, 759 , 666 A.2d 921, 928 (1995). An administrative agency is a “creature of statute, [which] has no inherent powers and its authority thus does not reach beyond the warrant provided it by statute.” Holy Cross Hosp. Of Silver Spring, Inc. v. Health Servs.

Cost Review Comm’n, 283 Md. 677, 683 , 393 A.2d 181, 184 (1978). Generally, absent express legislative intent, the role of this Court is to determine whether an agency is empowered to decide the issue in controversy and whether the agency’s procedures can be “performed within the confines of the traditional standards of procedural and substantive fair play.” Department of Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211, 223 , 334 A.2d ²⁵¹ 514, 523 (1975). When it is doubtful that the General Assembly has vested powers in an agency to decide certain issues, the agency’s ability to exercise that power will be circumscribed by the courts. See Jackson v. Wyoming, 786 P.2d 874, 878 (Wy.1990); Hills Dev.

Co. v. Township of Bernards, 229 N.J.Super. 318 , 551 A.2d 547, 559 (A.D.1988). Our task, therefore, is to determine whether the legislature intended, when it enacted the PLA, that a prisoner asserting medical malpractice against a private contractor providing medical services for the State first be required to file his alleged grievance with the DOC and/or the IGO before filing a common law tort complaint in state court. 9 The principles of statutory construction are not novel. “Every quest to discover and give effect to the objectives of the legislature begins with the text of the statute.” Huffman v. State, 356 Md. 622, 628 , 741 A.2d 1088, 1091 (1999). If the legislature’s intentions are evident from the text of the statute, our inquiry normally will cease and the plain meaning of the statute will govern. See id.

See also Martin v. Beverage Capital Corp., 353 Md. 388, 399 , 726 A.2d 728, 733 (1999); Philip Elec. North America v. Wright, 348 Md. 209, 216-17 , 703 A.2d 150, 153 (1997); Schuman, Kane, Felts & Everngam v. Aluisi, 341 Md. 115, 119 , 668 A.2d 929, 931 (1995). We bear in mind, however, that the plain-meaning rule is elastic, rather than cast in stone. See Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513 , 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987).

If persuasive evidence exists outside the plain text of the statute, we do not turn a blind eye to it. See Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 514 , 525 A.2d 628 . We often look to the legislative history, an agency’s interpretation of the statute, and other ²⁵² sources for a more complete understanding of what the General Assembly intended when it enacted particular legislation. See Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 146 , 626 A.2d 946, 950 (1993).

In so doing, “[w]e may also consider the particular problem or problems the legislature was addressing, and the objectives it sought to attain.” Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore v. Department of Employment and Training, 309 Md. 28, 40 , 522 A.2d 382, 388 (1987). This enables us to put the statute in controversy in its proper context and thereby avoid unreasonable or illogical results that defy common sense. See Huffman, 356 Md. at 628 , 741 A.2d at 1091 ; Marriott Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 346 Md. 437, 445 , 697 A.2d 455, 459 (1997); Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 513 , 525 A.2d at 632 . “We should first attempt to ascertain [the legislature’s] intent from the statutory language, reading pertinent parts of the legislative language together, giving effect to all of those parts if we can, and rendering no part of the law surplusage.” Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, 309 Md. at 39-40, 522 A.2d at 388 . Our statutory construction analysis, therefore, requires an extensive restatement and integration of various sections of the PLA under Maryland Code (1974, 1998 Repl.

Vol, 1999 Supp.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, §§ 5-1001, et seq., and Maryland Code (1999), Correctional Services Article (CSA), §§ 10-201, et seq. Only after the statutory mosaic is pieced together, and placed in its proper context, can we gather a true picture of the scope of the PLA’s exhaustion requirement as it may apply to the case sub judice. PLA § 5-1001 provides the definitions at issue: (a) In general.—In this subtitle the following words have the meanings indicated. (b) Administrative remedy.—(1) “Administrative remedy” means any procedure for review of a prisoner’s complaint or grievance, including judicial review, if available, that is provided by the Department, the Division of Correction, or any county or other municipality or political subdivision, and results in a written determination or disposition. ²⁵³ (2) “Administrative remedy” includes a proceeding under Title 10, Subtitle 2 of the State Government Article or Title 10, Subtitle 2 of the Correctional Services Article.

(c) Civil action.—(1) “Civil action” means a legal action seeking money damages, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, or any appeal filed in any court in the State that relates to or involves a prisoner’s conditions of confinement. (2) “Civil action” includes: (i) An appeal of an administrative remedy to any court; (ii) A petition for mandamus against the prisoner’s custodian, its officers or employees, or any official or employee of the Department; (iii) Any tort claim against a custodian, the custodian’s officers or employees, or any employee or official of the Department; (iv) Any action alleging a violation of civil rights against a custodian, the custodian’s officers and employees, or any official or employee of the Department; or (v) Any appeal, application for leave to appeal, or petition for certiorari. (3) “Civil action” does not include a postconviction petition or petition for habeas corpus relief. (d) Conditions of confinement. —“Conditions of confinement” means any circumstance, situation or event that involves a prisoner’s custody, transportation, incarceration, or supervision.

(e) Custodian.—“Custodian” means the institution or agency that has custody of the prisoner. (f) Department.—“Department” means the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services. (g) Prisoner.—(1) “Prisoner” means a person who is in the custody of the Department or a local detention center. (2) “Prisoner” includes pretrial detainees.

The “administrative remedy” process referenced in PLA § 5-1001(b)(2) and, at issue here, is set forth under CSA, Title 10, ²⁵⁴ Subtitle 2. 10 CSA § 10-206 permits a prisoner to submit a complaint for grievances against employees of the DOC to the IGO. It states: (a) Authorized.—Subject to subsection (b) of this section, if an individual confined in a correctional facility in the Division of Correction, otherwise in the custody of the Commissioner of Correction, or confined in the Patuxent Institution has a grievance against an official or employee of the Division of Correction or the Patuxent Institution, the individual may submit a complaint to the Office within the time and in the manner required by regulations adopted by the Office. (b) Exhaustion of remedies.—If the Division of Correction or the Patuxent Institution has a grievance procedure applicable to the particular grievance of an individual described in subsection (a) of this section and the Office considers the procedure to be reasonable and fair, the Office, by regulation, may require that the procedure be exhausted before submission of a complaint to the Office. (Emphasis added).

After a prisoner files a complaint, CSA § 10-207(a) then requires that “[t]he Executive Director or the Director’s designee shall conduct a preliminary review of each complaint submitted to the Office.” Following the preliminary review, the Executive Director or designee will either dismiss a complaint that lacks merit or refer a meritorious complaint to the Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings (an independent administrative adjudicatory agency). See CSA § 10-207(b) and (c). 11 If the complaint is meritorious, the administrative ²⁵⁵ review process continues under CSA §§ 10-208 and 10-209. CSA § 10-208(a) grants to the Office of Administrative Hearings the authority to “conduct hearings under this subtitle at correctional facilities in the Division of Correction or at the Patuxent Institution.” The hearing process provides for access to documentary evidence, the power of subpoena, requirements of testimony under oath, and that the testimony be recorded. See § 10-208(b) and (c). 12 After a hearing on the complaint, the Office of Administrative Hearings issues “a decision in the form of an order.” § 10—209(a)(1). “The order shall include a statement of the findings of fact, the conclusions of law, and the disposition of the complaint under subsection (b) of this section.” § 10—209(a)(2).

The Office of Administrative Hearings may either dismiss the complaint as ²⁵⁶ lacking in merit, or, if the complaint has merit, forward a proposed order to the Secretary for review. See § 10-209(b)(l)(i) and (2). If the complaint is dismissed by the Office of Administrative Hearings “[t]he order of dismissal constitutes the final decision of the Secretary for purposes of judicial review.” § 10—209(b)(l)(ii). If, however, the complaint is meritorious, the Secretary reviews the order and affirms, remands, or modifies it.

See § 10-209(c). 13 “Unless the complaint is remanded, the Secretary’s order constitutes the final decision for purposes of judicial review.” § 10-209(c)(3)(ii). The final step of the statutorily-contemplated process is judicial review. The procedure for judicial review is set forth in CSA § 10-210: § 10-210. Judicial review (a) Exhaustion of remedies.—A court may not consider an individual’s grievance that is'within the jurisdiction of the Office or the Office of Administrative Hearings unless the individual has exhausted the remedies provided in this subtitle.

(b) Circuit court review.—(1) The complainant is entitled to judicial review of the final decision of the Secretary under § 10—207(b)(2)(ii) or § 10-209(b)(l)(ii) or (c)(3)(ii) of this subtitle. (2) Proceedings for review shall be instituted in the circuit court of the county in which the complainant is confined. ²⁵⁷ (3) Review by the court shall be limited to: (1) a review of the record of the proceedings before the Office and the Office of Administrative Hearings and any order issued by the Secretary following those proceedings; and (ii) a determination of whether the complainant’s rights under federal or State law were violated. (c) Appellate review.—(1) The Administrative Procedure Act does not apply to appellate review of a final judgment of the circuit court under this section. (2) A party aggrieved by the decision of the circuit court may file an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Special Appeals in accordance with the Maryland Rules.

It is clear that the CSA establishes for covered inmate grievances an administrative remedy through the ICO that is primary, but not exclusive, and which must be invoked and exhausted before an inmate ordinarily may seek review of an adverse decision. See Zappone v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 349 Md. 45, 60 , 706 A.2d 1060, 1067-68 (1998). The legislature also injected several judicial screening procedures into the PLA to ensure strict compliance with its administrative exhaustion requirement, including documentary proof of exhaustion and judicial scrutiny of the initial complaint in any civil action filed with a court by an inmate.

PLA § 5-1003 states, in pertinent part: (a) In general.—(1) A prisoner may not maintain a civil action until the prisoner has fully exhausted all administrative remedies for resolving the complaint or grievance. (2) Except as provided in paragraph (3) of this subsection, an administrative remedy is exhausted when the prisoner has pursued to completion all appropriate proceedings for appeal of the administrative disposition, including any available proceedings for judicial review. (3) Judicial review following administrative consideration shall be the exclusive judicial remedy for any grievance or complaint within the scope of the administrative process, unless the prisoner’s complaint or grievance was ²⁵⁸ found to be meritorious and monetary damages were not available through the administrative remedy available to the prisoner. (b) Proof.—(1) When a prisoner files a civil action, the prisoner shall attach to the initial complaint proof that administrative remedies have been exhausted.

(2) The attachment shall include proof: (i) That the prisoner has filed a complaint or grievance with the appropriate agency; (ii) Of the administrative disposition of the complaint or grievance; and (iii) That the prisoner has appealed the administrative disposition to the. appropriate authority, including proof of judicial review, if available. (3) On receipt of a prisoner’s initial complaint that does not have attached to it proof that the prisoner has fully exhausted the administrative remedies available, the court shall dismiss the case without prejudice and grant the prisoner reasonable leave to amend the complaint and to provide the proof necessary to demonstrate that the prisoner has fully exhausted the administrative remedies. (c) Dismissal.—A court shall dismiss a civil action if the prisoner filing the action has not completely exhausted the administrative remedies. (Emphasis added).

When a civil action is filed with a court, PLA § 5-1004 mandates that the court conduct a review of the initial complaint. It states: (a) Review of complaint. —prior to service of process of the prisoner’s civil action, the court shall review the prisoner’s initial complaint and identify any cognizable claims. (b) Grounds for dismissal.—After reviewing the prisoner’s complaint, the court may dismiss the civil action, or any portion thereof, with or without prejudice, if it finds that the civil action: (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted; ²⁵⁹ (2) Seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief; or (3) is barred under § 5-1003(a) of this subtitle. (c) Proof of exhaustion of remedies. —An order of dismissal under subsection (b)(1) or (2) of this section may be issued without first requiring proof of exhaustion.

PLA § 5-1005 further provides the court with the power to dispose of frivolous actions and impose restrictions on prisoners that file them. 14 In addition to exhausting all administrative remedies, the PLA requires prisoners to pay for court costs. 15 Aligned with this requirement is a provision for judicial discretion to waive or reduce the court costs imposed ²⁶⁰ should the court consider the prisoner’s grievance merits such a reduction or waiver. The PLA reinforces the CSA’s regulatory scheme for the IGO as the primary, but not exclusive, administrative remedy for covered inmate grievances or complaints and the need for invocation and exhaustion of that process. Of additional note, however, PLA § 5-1003(a)(3) directs limited exclusivity for the judicial review of an unfavorable disposition of an aggrieved inmate’s covered grievance or complaint. Thus, an inmate, having exhausted the administrative remedy, generally may invoke the jurisdiction of the courts in aid of his or her cause solely through the judicial review authorized by CSA § 10—210(b) and (c), unless the administrative process resulted in a determination of merit in the complaint or grievance and monetary damages were not available through the administrative process. 16 ²⁶¹ B. In addition to the procedures fashioned by integration of the PLA and CSA, the legislative history of the PLA further illustrates the regulatory scheme intended by the General Assembly.

In enacting the PLA, the legislature essentially was reacting to federal legislation that similarly sought to inhibit the ability of prisoners to file lawsuits in the federal court system without first attempting to resolve their grievances through available administrative procedures. In 1996, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Pub.L. 104-134, Act of April 26, 1996. Congress recognized that: Prisoners file civil rights actions primarily to challenge their conditions of confinement in prisons or jails. Federal district courts have jurisdiction over cases by state prisoners under the 1871 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .

Section 1983 is now interpreted as creating a private cause of action against any person who, under color of state law, deprives another citizen or person within the jurisdiction of the United States of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States Alleged violations of prisoners’ civil rights most commonly involve the “cruel and unusual punishments” clause of the Eighth Amendment, the free exercise of religion clause of the First Amendment, and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ²⁶² Dorothy Schrader, Prison Litigation Reform Act: Survey of Post-Reform Act Prisoners’ Civil Rights Cases, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 4 Nov. 1997, at 2 (“CRS PLRA Survey”). These civil rights claims were seen by Congress as being largely frivolous. The PLRA was enacted to stop the flood of prisoner cases by curtailing “the authority of the federal courts to remedy prison conditions, including prison overcrowding, that allegedly violate prisoners’ federal rights.” CRS PLRA Survey, at 1. Until its inception, “[t]he pre-PLRA section 1997e(a) granted district courts discretion whether to require a prisoner to exhaust his administrative remedies.” Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1323 (11th Cir.1998).

Under the PLRA, Congress created a steeplechase obstacle in the path of prisoner actions seeking a forum in federal court. Getting over that wall is difficult: The [PLRA] generally requires payment of filing fees and exhaustion of administrative remedies; curtails the authority of federal courts to order prospective relief, including early releases of prisoners to remedy prison overcrowding; bars federal court-ordered prison construction and orders to raise taxes as remedies; places limits on repeat frivolous fliers; and requires that prisoners who win monetary damage awards must use the money to pay their outstanding restitution orders to compensate crime victims. CRS PLRA Survey, at 3. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) in particular requires the exhaustion of all available administrative remedies. 17 It states: ²⁶³ (a) Applicability of administrative remedies. No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1979 of Revised Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C.1983), or any