Addison v. Lochearn Nursing Home, LLC

²⁵⁶ BATTAGLIA, J. In this case, we must address whether Section 12-303(3)(ix) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Maryland Code (1974, 2006 RepLVol.), 1 permits an appeal of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration, in a case in which the circuit court judge also expressly denied a motion to certify the denial as a final judgment. We will answer that question in the negative, shall vacate the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, and direct that the appeal be dismissed. I. Background Lochearn Nursing Home, LLC, d/b/a FutureCare-Lochearn, Inc. (hereinafter “FutureCare”), Respondent, sued Beulah Addison, Petitioner, a resident of the nursing home, for $71,928.90 2 in delinquent “nursing home care and service” payments, in a breach of contract action brought in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Ms. Addison defended against the breach of contract claim by filing an Answer, asserting both negative and affirmative defenses, as well as a seven-count ²⁵⁷ counterclaim, 3 alleging that she was unable to pay because one of FutureCare’s employees, a social worker, embroiled her in a real estate “foreclosure rescue scam” that deprived her of the equity in her former home, which not only prevented her from paying the bill, but also from successfully applying for medical assistance, and that FutureCare mismanaged the filing of her Medicaid application. 4 FutureCare responded to Ms. Addi ²⁵⁸ son’s Counterclaim by filing an Answer generally denying liability.

FutureCare also filed a “Motion to Compel Arbitration of Counterclaims, Motion to Stay, and Request for Attorney’s Fees,” asserting that the Resident and Facility Arbitration Agreement, signed by Ms. Addison upon her entry to the nursing home, required her to submit her counterclaims to arbitration. After a hearing, the judge denied FutureCare’s arbitration motion, after which FutureCare requested that the order denying the motions be certified as a final judgment ²⁵⁹ under Rule 2-602(b). The judge denied the motion to certify the order as final. FutureCare, nevertheless, appealed immediately to the Court of Special Appeals, challenging the denial of its motion to compel arbitration and for a stay.

Ms. Addison responded by filing a “Motion to Dismiss the Interlocutory Appeal” in that court, arguing that there was no final judgment on all claims within the meaning of Rule 2-602 and that, therefore, the appeal was premature. The Chief Judge of the Court of Special Appeals denied the motion, stating that Section 12-303(3)(ix) 5 permits an interlocutory appeal of an order “granting a petition to stay arbitration pursuant to § 3-208[ 6 ] of this article,” and that, “[tjhere is little difference between the denial of a motion to arbitrate and a CJ § 12 — 303(3)(ix) order staying arbitration: both stop arbitration. See Essex Corp. v. Susan Katharine Tate Burrowbridge, LLC, et. al, [178 Md. ²⁶⁰ App. 17, 940 A.2d 199 (2008) ].” In the order, the Chief Judge also left open the opportunity for FutureCare, “to request in its brief that a Panel of [the intermediate appellate court] enter a final judgment pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-602(e)(1) on the circuit court’s arbitration ruling, as happened in Essex Corp., supra.” After oral argument, 7 a panel of the Court of Special Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, acceded to Future-Care’s request as to the circuit court order denying Future-Care’s motion to compel arbitration and certified it as final. The Court of Special Appeals reversed the circuit court judge’s denial of FutureCare’s Motion to Compel Arbitration, holding that ambiguity existed regarding whether the counterclaim fell within the arbitration clause and remanded the case with instructions for the circuit court to enter an order compelling arbitration and staying litigation.

In so ordering, the intermediate appellate court, nevertheless, remained cognizant of the public policy dimension of an arbitration agreement involving a nursing home patient: In concluding that the ambiguity of key terms of the agreement require us to defer their interpretation to an arbitrator, we are not unmindful of the fact that the use of arbitration provisions in nursing home contracts is a matter of public concern. In addition, two bills are moving through Congress to make unenforceable all pre-dispute, mandatory binding arbitration clauses in contracts between long-term care facilities and their residents. Nevertheless, the present state of Maryland law on arbitration leaves us no other course. (Internal citations omitted).

Ms. Addison thereafter petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted, 406 Md. 743 , 962 A.2d 370 (2008), to address the following question: ²⁶¹ Did the Court of Special Appeals err in compelling arbitration of claims arising from a predatory real estate scam and sabotaged Medicaid application? After argument before us, we requested the parties to submit supplemental briefs and to argue an additional issue: Assuming that the denial of the motion to compel arbitration and to stay the judicial proceedings in the present case is not appealable as a final judgment, does Section 12-303(3)(ix) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article permit an appeal as an appealable interlocutory order? We shall not address the merits of this controversy as raised by the original certiorari question, but will vacate the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and direct that Future-Care’s appeal be dismissed, because the Court of Special Appeals could not certify the circuit court order as final, after the circuit court judge had refused to do so, and the denial of the motion to compel arbitration does not constitute an appeal-able interlocutory order or collateral order from which FutureCare could appeal.

II

Discussion A. Final Judgment Generally, under Section 12-301, 8 a party may appeal only from a final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case by a circuit court. A “final judgment” is “a judgment, decree, sentence, order, determination, decision, or other action by a court ... from which an appeal ... may be taken.” Section 12-101(f). We have often stated that our jurisdiction is defined by statute, and that appeals must be taken from final judgments, except under certain limited exceptions, as Judge Irma S. Raker, writing for this Court in Gruber v. ²⁶² Gruber, 369 Md. 540, 546 , 801 A.2d 1013, 1016 (2002), succinctly stated: ²⁶¹ Except as provided in § 12-302 of this subtitle, a party may appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case by a circuit court. ²⁶² This Court has often stated that, except as constitutionally authorized, appellate jurisdiction “is determined entirely by statute, and that, therefore, a right of appeal must be legislatively granted.” Kant v. Montgomery County, 365 Md. 269, 273 , 778 A.2d 384, 386 (2001). Where appellate jurisdiction is lacking, the appellate court will dismiss the appeal on its own motion.

Highfield Water Co. v. Washington County Sanitary Disk, 295 Md. 410, 414 , 456 A.2d 371, 373 (1983). It is well settled that with exceptions not relevant here, an appeal may be taken to the Court of Special Appeals under Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl.Vol., 2001 Supp.) § 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article only from a “final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case by a circuit court.” See Taha v. Southern Mgmt. Co., 367 Md. 564 , 790 A.2d 11 (2002); O’Brien v. O’Brien, 367 Md. 547 , 790 A.2d 1 (2002). Except for the limited category of exceptions codified in § 12-303 or under the collateral order doctrine, an appeal will not lie from an interlocutory order entered in a civil case.

Philip Morris, Inc. v. Angeletti, 358 Md. 689, 713 , 752 A.2d 200, 213 (2000). We have often stated that the underlying policy of the final judgment rule is to avoid piecemeal appeals. See Brewster v. Woodhaven Bldg. & Dev., 360 Md. 602, 616 , 759 A.2d 738, 745 (2000). Whether a matter is appealable is a jurisdictional matter and may be raised by an appellate court even if not noted by the parties.

See, e.g., In re Franklin P., 366 Md. 306, 326 , 783 A.2d 673, 685 (2001). A ruling of the circuit court, to constitute a final judgment, must, among other things, be an “unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controversy.” Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 41 , 566 A.2d 767, 773 (1989). An order merely assuming jurisdiction in a matter does not constitute such a decision. ²⁶³ The certification as final of the denial of the motion to compel arbitration in the instant case, entered by a panel of the Court of Special Appeals under Rule 8-602(e), 9 however, directly contravened the denial by the circuit court judge to certify the same order as final earlier in the litigation, and as such, must be vacated in light of our holdings in Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Gress, 378 Md. 667 , 838 A.2d 362 (2003), and Silbersack v. ACandS, Inc., 402 Md. 673 , 938 A.2d 855 (2008). Gress was a wrongful death action against asbestos and cigarette manufacturers, among others, in which it was alleged that the decedent’s lung cancer was caused by a “synergy” or multiplied risk created by tobacco product-use and workplace exposure to asbestos.

The tobacco defendants moved to dismiss or to sever the action from the asbestos claims, which the circuit court judge granted. The decedent’s representatives requested that the judge certify the dismissal order as a final judgment, which the judge refused to do. The decedent’s representatives, nevertheless, immediately appeal ²⁶⁴ ed to the Court of Special Appeals, and the intermediate appellate court, based upon Rule 8-602(e)(1)(C), did what the circuit court judge had refused to do and entered a final judgment on the denial of the motion to dismiss, before reversing the judgment. Gress v. ACandS, 150 Md.App. 369 , 820 A.2d 616 (2003).

We granted the tobacco defendants’ petition for certiorari. In Gress, then, we faced the same issue that we must address in the present case — namely, “whether the Court of Special Appeals has the authority to enter final judgment pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-602(e)(1)(C) when the trial court, that could have entered final judgment pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-602(b), has expressly refused to do so....” Gress, 378 Md. at 675-76 , 838 A.2d at 367 . We held that the Court of Special Appeals lacked such authority, based upon our interpretation of Rule 8-602(e)(l)(C). The basis for the Gress holding was in Rule 8-602(e), which only permits appellate certification as final when the judge overlooked the opportunity to certify, not when the judge acted and refused to certify.

Id. at 677-78, 838 A.2d at 368 . As we stated in Gress: We hold that where a trial court has been invited to direct entry of a final judgment in a case in which that trial court has discretion to do so and that trial court expressly declines to do so, and the merits of that ruling is not appealed, Rule 8-602(e)(l)(C) does not authorize an appellate court nevertheless to enter final judgment on its own initiative. Id. at 682, 838 A.2d at 371 (footnote omitted). In reaching this holding, we interpreted the use of the past tense in subsection (e)(1), regarding when a final judgment can be entered by an appellate court, as limiting appellate entry of a final judgment to those “situation[s] in which the trial court has not entered final judgment and, indeed, in which the trial court has not considered the issue.” Id. at 677-78 , 838 A.2d at 368 .

We explained that it would be inconsistent and illogical, moreover, to include subsection (e)(2), prescribing the procedure for remanding to the trial court, if an appellate court ²⁶⁵ unilaterally could enter a final judgment after the trial judge had considered the issue under subsection (e)(1): If still further confirmation is necessary, subsection (e)(2) supplies it. That subsection further addresses the situation in which the case is remanded for the trial court to determine whether to direct the entry of final judgment. It instructs that when “the lower court decides not to direct the entry of a final judgment pursuant to Rule 2-602(b), the lower court shall promptly notify the appellate court of its decision and the appellate court shall dismiss the appeal.” If dismissal is required where the case has been remanded for a determination of whether a final judgment should be directed to be entered, it follows that the same requirement must apply when, as in this case, the trial court has been invited to consider the same issue after a premature appeal has been noted, and the trial court has not only considered the desirability of certification, but rejected it. A different construction renders the Rule internally inconsistent and, in truth, illogical.

Id. at 678 , 838 A.2d at 368 . We also reviewed the history of Rule 8-602(e), explaining that subsection (e) “was intended to deal with the vexing problem of premature appeals,” and more specifically, was intended to permit the appellate court to enter final judgment when no determination was made by the circuit court, so that an appellate court could enter a final judgment and rule on the merits without first having to remand the case to circuit court with instructions to enter a final judgment: Section (e) deals with the Rule 2-602 problem. Essentially, it permits the appellate court, instead of simply dismissing the appeal as it does now, to return the case to the Circuit Court in compliance with Rule 2-602. If the Circuit Court makes the required determination, the appeal can proceed; otherwise it will be dismissed.

The Rule also permits the appellate court to enter a final judgment on its own initiative and to proceed with the appeal without returning the case to the Circuit Court. ²⁶⁶ Id. at 679-80 , 838 A.2d at 369-70 (footnote omitted), quoting Reporter’s Note to Rule 8-602(e). As a result, we were clear in Gress that only when a trial judge had not acted to refuse certification would an appellate court be able to certify finality. We reinforced our holding in Gress recently in Silbersack, 402 Md. 673 , 938 A.2d 855 , and answered the question of whether, even when the merits of a circuit court judge’s refusal to certify is appealed, an appellate court can reverse and direct certification — a question that had been lurking since Gress. Silbersack presented a nearly identical factual situation as Gress, in which the spouse of a man who died of lung cancer attempted to join tobacco and asbestos defendants in the same suit.

After the asbestos defendants had been removed from the case, either by bankruptcy stay or settlement, Silbersack moved to “reinstate” the tobacco defendants, and the trial judge denied her motion, after which she asked the judge to certify his denial as a final judgment, which the judge also refused to do. Silbersack appealed from the order denying the motion to “reinstate,” and we granted certiorari prior to any proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals. Before this Court, Silbersack argued that we should remand the case to the circuit court and mandate that the judge enter a final judgment under Rules 2-601 10 and 2-602(b), 11 so that ²⁶⁷ she could then appeal from the order. We refused to do so.

In reaching our conclusion, we discussed “bedrock” principles of appellate jurisdiction and most notably, that ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction is dependent upon “the entry of a final judgment that disposes of all claims against all parties”: To set the context, there is a long-standing bedrock rule of appellate jurisdiction, practice, and procedure that, unless otherwise provided by law, the right to seek appellate review in this Court or the Court of Special Appeals ordinarily must await the entry of a final judgment that disposes of all claims against all parties. Id. at 678, 938 A.2d at 858 (citations omitted). We placed the general rule within the context of Rule 2-602, explaining that Rule 2-602(a) embodies the general rule: Rule 2-602(a), subject to an exception provided for in section (b) of that Rule, makes clear that an order or decision “that adjudicates fewer than all of the claims in an action ... or that adjudicates the rights and liabilities of fewer than all of the parties to the action: (1) is not a final ²⁶⁸ judgment; (2) does not terminate the action as to any of the claims or any of the parties; and (3) is subject to revision at any time before the entry of a judgment that adjudicates all of the claims by and against all of the parties.” Id. at 678 , 938 A.2d at 858 . We noted the limited exception provided in Rule 2-602(b), which permits a trial judge to certify as a final judgment an order not qualifying as final under 2-602(a), if “there is no just reason for delay,” but we explicitly recognized that this act is to be reserved only for the “very infrequent harsh case”: Rule 2-602(b) provides a limited exception.

It allows the Circuit Court to order the entry of a judgment as to fewer than all of the claims or parties if the court expressly determines in a written order that “there is no just reason for delay.” For more than three decades, however, we have made clear that the discretion to enter judgment under Rule 2-602(b), or its predecessor Rule 605a, was to be reserved for the “very infrequent harsh case.” Diener Enterprises v. Miller, 266 Md. 551, 556 , 295 A.2d 470, 473 (1972). We pointed out in Smith v. Lead, supra, 386 Md. 12, 25 , 871 A.2d 545 , 553 that the purpose of Rule 2-602(a) is to prevent piecemeal appeals “which, beyond being inefficient and costly, can create significant delays, hardship, and procedural problems.” We noted, among other things, that piecemeal appeals may cause the appellate court to be faced with having the same issues presented multiple times and may burden the parties with having to assemble records, file briefs and record extracts, and prepare and appear for oral argument on multiple occasions. That is “precisely why,” we said, “Rule 2-602(b) is reserved for the ‘infrequent harsh case, ’ and why the trial judge, who normally has a much better grasp of the situation than an appellate court, is viewed, at least in the first instance, as the ‘dispatcher.’ ” Id. at 26, 871 A.2d at 553 . Id. at 679, 938 A.2d at 858 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). ²⁶⁹ After addressing the limits of the circuit court judge’s ability to certify as final, we reaffirmed the Gress holding regarding the inability of an appellate court to enter a final judgment in direct contravention of the judge’s ruling.

We recognized that requiring the circuit court judge to enter a final judgment under Rule 2-602(b), after the trial judge had explicitly declined to do so, would have the same effect as our own certification of a final judgment: Our reasoning [in Gress ] was clear and precise — that the appellate court’s authority under Rule 8-602(e)(l)(C) to enter judgment on its own initiative may be exercised only when the circuit court has never exercised its own discretion in the matter and not when the trial court was asked to enter judgment under Rule 2-602(b) and expressly declined to do so: We hold that where a trial court has been invited to direct entry of a final judgment in a case in which that trial court has discretion to do so and that trial court expressly declines to do so, and the merits of that ruling is not appealed, Rule 8-602(e)(l)(C) does not authorize an appellate court nevertheless to enter final judgment on its own initiative. Id. at 682, 838 A.2d at 371 . Id. at 681 , 938 A.2d at 859 . We emphasized various policy considerations that underpinned the notion that the trial judge is a “dispatcher” and the wide discretion accorded the judge to deny certification.

Id. at 683-84 , 938 A.2d at 861 . We concluded that a request for mandamus review, itself separately granted, 12 may be more appropriate than one for certification as final on an appellate level: [A]ny decision by the appellate court that the denial of a request to enter a Rule 2-602(b) judgment suffices under its ²⁷⁰ criteria to constitute a final judgment will almost necessarily require a finding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the request. What would be presented, therefore, is the somewhat anomalous situation whereby the preliminary decision to review the ruling will amount to a determination that the ruling constituted an abuse of discretion. As a practical matter, the right to appeal translates into a right to win the appeal.

If the Court is to travel that road, of effectively co-mingling the right to appeal with the merits of the appeal, it must be extremely cautious in doing so. That kind of situation seems more appropriate to be presented in a petition for extraordinary relief through mandamus, which is also very rarely granted (see Forster v. Hargadon, 398 Md. 298 , 920 A.2d 1049 (2007)), rather than an appeal. Id. at 685, 938 A.2d at 861-62 (emphasis added). In Silbersack , then, as well as Gress, we were clear that appellate authority to enter final judgment is limited to circumstances where the circuit court judge had overlooked certification, and even then, only in the “very infrequent harsh case[s].” Id. at 679, 681, 938 A.2d at 858-59 .

Without distinguishing Gress or Silbersack , the Court of Special Appeals in the present case entered a final judgment under Rule 8-602(e)(1), relying on Town of Chesapeake Beach v. Pessoa Construction Company, Inc., 330 Md. 744 , 625 A.2d 1014 (1993). Town of Chesapeake involved a dispute between the Town of Chesapeake and a contractor, wherein the Town terminated the contract, and the contractor filed a demand for arbitration. The Town filed a petition to stay arbitration pursuant to Section 3-208, but the judge denied the petition and entered an order compelling arbitration. The Town immediately appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which ultimately dismissed the appeal.

We reversed and held that an order denying a petition to stay arbitration and thereby compelling arbitration was immediately appealable under both the final judgment rule and the collateral order doctrine, because the petition to stay arbitration involved a separate ²⁷¹ demand and operated to put parties “out of court.” Id. at 750-54 , 625 A.2d at 1017-20 . In ruling that the order was appealable as a final judgment, we discussed Horsey v. Horsey, 329 Md. 392 , 620 A.2d 305 (1993), in which we held that a judge’s order is final and appealable when it “has the effect of putting parties out of court”: [A] trial court’s order sometimes may constitute a final appealable judgment even though the order fails to settle the underlying dispute between the parties. Where a trial court’s order has “the effect of putting the parties out of court, [it] is a final appealable order.” Houghton v. County Comm’rs. of Kent Co., 305 Md. 407, 412 , 504 A.2d 1145, 1148 (1986) , and cases there cited. See, e.g., Wilde v. Swanson, 314 Md. 80, 85 , 548 A.2d 837, 839 (1988) (“An order of a circuit court ... [may be] a final judgment without any adjudication by the circuit court on the merits”); Doehring v. Wagner, 311 Md. 272, 275 , 533 A.2d 1300, 1301-1302 (1987) (trial court’s order “terminating the litigation in that court” was a final judgment); Walbert v. Walbert, 310 Md. 657, 661 , 531 A.2d 291, 293 (1987) (circuit court’s unqualified order was a final judgment because it “put Denise Walbert out of court, denying her the means of further prosecuting the case at the trial level”); Houghton v. County Com’rs of Kent Co., 307 Md. 216, 221 , 513 A.2d 291, 293 (1986); Concannon v. State Roads Comm., 230 Md. 118, 125 , 186 A.2d 220, 224-225 (1962), and cases there cited.

Town of Chesapeake, 330 Md. at 750-51 , 625 A.2d at 1017 , quoting Horsey, 329 Md. at 401-02 , 620 A.2d at 310 . We then stated the importance of the fact that a petition to stay arbitration can be “filed as a separate action,” and that, “if we should determine that the order denying a stay of arbitration constitutes a final judgment, we may certify that order as a final judgment, notwithstanding that it does not finally dispose of all claims in the action in which it was filed. See Maryland Rules 2-602 and 8-602(c).” Id. at 752-53, 625 A.2d at 1018 . We also relied on Litton Bionetics v. Glen Construction Company, Inc., 292 Md. 34 , 437 A.2d 208 (1981), a case ²⁷² involving a judge’s refusal to consolidate arbitration proceedings, where we stated, similar to in Horsey , that an appellate court may have the authority to enter a final judgment, when an order denies all relief to a party and completely terminates the circuit court action: The present Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act does not expressly deny the right of appeal from a final judgment entered by a court in the exercise of jurisdiction under that statute.

Thus, the question is simply whether the order appealed from constitutes a final judgment. Because the order denied all of the relief sought by Litton and completely terminated the action in the circuit court, it is an appeal-able final judgment. Town of Chesapeake Beach, 330 Md. at 754 , 625 A.2d at 1019 , quoting Litton, 292 Md. at 41-42 , 437 A.2d at 212 (citation omitted). The Town had been effectively “put out of court,” and we elected to enter final judgment pursuant to Rule 8-602(e)(1) and to entertain the merits of the Town’s appeal: In the case before us, as in Litton Bionetics , the order denying the stay of arbitration denied all of the relief sought by the petition and completely terminated the claim brought pursuant to § 3-208 of the Courts Article.

Notwithstanding that the petition was filed in an existing action, it involves a separate claim which we elect to enter as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 8-602(e)(1). Id. at 752-754, 625 A.2d at 1018-19 . In using Town of Chesapeake to support the certification as final of the denial of the arbitration motion, the intermediate appellate court not only eviscerated our holdings in Gress and Silbersack , but reflected a misinterpretation of our holding in Town of Chesapeake, itself. 13 In Town of Chesapeake, we entertained certifi ²⁷³ cation of an order compelling arbitration as a final judgment because that order effectively put parties out of court. By contrast, an order denying a motion to compel arbitration, which effectively keeps parties in court, is not a final judgment.

Town, of Chesapeake, therefore, is inapposite to the present case. 14 B. Interlocutory Orders There are limited exceptions to the final judgment rule; in Salvagno v. Frew, 888 Md. 605 , 615, 881 A.2d 660, 666 (2005), Judge Alan M. Wilner, writing for the Court, identified them as: [W]e have made clear that the right to seek appellate review of a trial court’s ruling ordinarily must await the entry of a ²⁷⁴ final judgment that disposes of all claims against all parties, and that there are only three exceptions to that final judgment requirement: appeals from interlocutory orders specifically allowed by statute; immediate appeals permitted under Maryland Rule 2-602; and appeals from interlocutory rulings allowed under the common law collateral order doctrine. Appeals from interlocutory orders specifically allowed by statute are those delineated in Section 12-303: A party may appeal from any of the following interlocutory orders entered by a circuit court in a civil case: (1) An order entered with regard to the possession of property with which the action is concerned or with reference to the receipt or charging of the income, interest, or dividends therefrom, or the refusal to modify, dissolve, or discharge such an order; (2) An order granting or denying a motion to quash a writ of attachment; and (3) An order: (i) Granting or dissolving an injunction, but if the appeal is from an order granting an injunction, only if the appellant has first filed his answer in the cause; (ii) Refusing to dissolve an injunction, but only if the appellant has first filed his answer in the cause; (iii) Refusing to grant an injunction; and the right of appeal is not prejudiced by the filing of an answer to the bill of complaint or petition for an injunction on behalf of any opposing party, nor by the taking of depositions in reference to the allegations of the bill of complaint to be read on the hearing of the application for an injunction; (iv) Appointing a receiver but only if the appellant has first filed his answer in the cause; (v) For the sale, conveyance, or delivery of real or personal property or the payment of money, or the refusal to rescind or discharge such an order, unless the delivery or payment is directed to be made to a receiver appointed by the court; ²⁷⁵ (vi) Determining a question of right between the parties and directing an account to be stated on the principle of such determination; (vii) Requiring bond from a person to whom the distribution or delivery of property is directed, or withholding distribution or delivery and ordering the retention or accumulation of property by the fiduciary or its transfer to a trustee or receiver, or deferring the passage of the court’s decree in an action under Title 10, Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules; (viii) Deciding any question in an insolvency proceeding brought under Title 15, Subtitle 1 of the Commercial Law Article; (ix) Granting a petition to stay arbitration pursuant to § 3-208 of this article; (x) Depriving a parent, grandparent, or natural guardian of the care and custody of his child, or changing the terms of such an order; and (xi) Denying immunity asserted under § 5-525 or § 5-526 of this article. (Emphasis added). In interpreting Section 12-303 our goal is, as it always is in statutory interpretation, “to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a particular provision, be it statutory, constitutional or part of the Rules.” Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 172 , 935 A.2d 699, 708 (2007); Gen.

Motors Corp. v. Seay, 388 Md. 341, 352 , 879 A.2d 1049, 1055 (2005). See also Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Kelly, 397 Md. 399, 419-20 , 918 A.2d 470, 482 (2007). We begin our analysis by first looking to the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute, reading the statute as a whole to ensure that “ ‘no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.’ ” Barbre, 402 Md. at 172 , 935 A.2d at 708 ; Kelly, 397 Md. at 420 , 918 A.2d at 482 . See also Kane v. Bd. of Appeals of Prince George’s County, 390 Md. 145, 167 , 887 A.2d 1060, 1073 (2005).

If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute’s ²⁷⁶ provisions and our analysis ends. Barbre, 402 Md. at 173 , 935 A.2d at 708-09 ; Kelly, 397 Md. at 419 , 918 A.2d at 482 ; City of Frederick v. Pickett, 392 Md. 411, 427 , 897 A.2d 228, 237 (2006); Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604-05 , 861 A.2d 78, 81 (2004). In construing a statute, “[w]e neither add nor delete words to a clear and unambiguous statute to give it a meaning not reflected by the words the Legislature used or engage in forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the statute’s meaning.” Taylor v. NationsBank, N.A., 365 Md. 166, 181 , 776 A.2d 645, 654 (2001). See, e.g., Lamone v. Capozzi, 396 Md. 53, 72 , 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006) (“[T]his Court ... first will look to the normal, plain meaning of the language, and, if the language is clear and unambiguous, it will not look past those terms.”) (internal quotations omitted); Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 668 , 911 A.2d 1245, 1254 (2006) (“When interpreting a statute, the ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology.”) (internal quotations omitted); Blake v. State, 395 Md. 213, 224 , 909 A.2d 1020, 1026 (2006); Sears v. Gussin, 350 Md. 552, 562 , 714 A.2d 188, 192 (1998) (“The words of the statute should be given their ordinary and commonly understood meaning”); In re Special Investigation No. 236, 295 Md. 573, 576 , 458 A.2d 75, 76 (1983) (“[T]he Court considers the language of an enactment in its natural and ordinary signification.

A corollary to this rule is that if there is no ambiguity or obscurity in the language of a statute, there is usually no need to look elsewhere to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly.”). “Occasionally we see fit to examine extrinsic sources of legislative intent merely as a check of our reading of a statute’s plain language.” Robey v. State, 397 Md. 449, 454 , 918 A.2d 499, 502 (2007), citing Stanley v. State, 390 Md. 175, 185 , 887 A.2d 1078, 1084 (2005). “In such instances, we may find useful the context of a statute, the overall statutory scheme, and archival legislative history of relevant enactments.” Id. Both FutureCare and Ms. Addison argue that the language of Section 12-303(3)(ix) is unambiguous. FutureCare argues that the dictionary definitions of “petition” and “stay” demon ²⁷⁷ strate that Ms. Addison’s opposition to FutureCare’s “Motion to Compel Arbitration” was, in fact, a “Petition to Stay Arbitration,” and that the denial of FutureCare’s Motion to Compel Arbitration was equivalent to the grant of a petition to stay arbitration. FutureCare further argues that the legislative history of the Section confirms its interpretation.

Ms. Addison argues that an order denying a motion to compel arbitration is not an appealable interlocutory order because Section 12-303 explicitly identifies an order granting a petition to stay arbitration as an appealable interlocutory order, but excludes orders denying motions to compel arbitration. Ms. Addison explains that, “[n]o ordinary or commonly understood meaning of ‘petition to stay arbitration’ includes a ‘petition to stay litigation ’ or to ‘compel arbitration.’ ” (emphasis in original). Section 12-303(3) includes eleven specific interlocutory orders from which an appeal may be taken, none of which identifies a “motion to compel arbitration,” while the grant of a stay of arbitration is explicitly identified in Section 12-303(3)(ix). When a statute expressly sets forth certain exceptions to the coverage of the enactment, this Court “cannot disregard the mandate of the Legislature and insert an exception, where none has been made by the Legislature,” Johnson v. Baltimore, 387 Md. 1, 15 , 874 A.2d 439, 447-48 (2005) (holding that statutory language providing an exception for firefighters suffering from a particular occupational disease to collect dual workers compensation benefits was unambiguous and did not provide the same exception to the dependents of those individuals), quoting Schmeizl v. Schmeizl, 186 Md. 371, 375 , 46 A.2d 619, 621 (1946).

See, e.g., Nasseri v. Geico, 390 Md. 188, 198 , 888 A.2d 284, 290 (2005) (Where there are “exceptions ... expressly authorized by the Legislature, this Court has consistently” refused to recognize “exceptions [to statutorily mandated insurance coverage] which were not authorized by the Legislature”) (internal quotations omitted); Selig v. State Highway Admin., 383 Md. 655, 672 , 861 A.2d 710, 720 (2004) (“When the legislature has expressly enumer ²⁷⁸ ated certain exceptions to a principle, courts ... should be reluctant thereafter to create additional exceptions.”); O’Connor v. Baltimore County, 382 Md. 102, 113 , 854 A.2d 1191, 1198 (2004) (“We will not ... insert