Ademiluyi v. Md. State Bd. of Elections

Watts, J. Pursuant to Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law (2002, 2010 Repl. Vol.) ("EL") § 12-202(a), where "no other timely and adequate remedy is provided by" the Election Law Article, a registered voter may bring an action with respect to "any act or omission relating to an election" that is "(1) inconsistent with [the Election Law A]rticle or other law applicable to the elections process[ ] and (2) may change or has changed the outcome of the election." (Paragraph break omitted). This Court has explained that EL § 12-202"governs judicial challenges to certain irregularities in relation to an election[,]" and that, in particular, EL § 12-202"is the mechanism for challenging the qualifications of a candidate seeking election." Lamone v. Schlakman , 451 Md. 468 , 482, 153 A.3d 144 , 152 (2017) (cleaned up).

EL § 12-202(b) sets forth strict deadlines for filing such an action, providing: A registered voter may seek judicial relief under this section in the appropriate circuit court within the earlier of: (1) 10 days after the act or omission or the date the act or omission became known to the petitioner; or (2) 7 days after the election results are certified, unless the election was a gubernatorial primary or special primary election, in which case 3 days after the elections results are certified. This Court has described EL § 12-202(b) as providing "a statutory limitations period[.]" Schlakman , 451 Md. at 485 , 153 A.3d at 154 . A registered voter who fails to file an action within the statutory limitations period risks having his or her judicial challenge dismissed as untimely. Importantly, "the very short time limits for filing a suit challenging an aspect of an election pursuant to EL § 12-202(b) are evidence of this State's public policy that claims for judicial relief relative to an election must be prosecuted without delay." Baker v. O'Malley , 217 Md. App. 288 , 296, 92 A.3d 588 , 593, cert. denied , 440 Md. 115 , 99 A.3d 779 (2014).

Given the clear mandate for prompt action in election cases, independent of EL § 12-202(b)'s statutory limitations period for challenging any act or omission relating to an election, a registered voter's action may be barred by the doctrine of laches. "The doctrine of laches, which is both an affirmative defense and an equitable defense, applies where there is an unreasonable delay in the assertion of one party's rights and that delay results in prejudice to the opposing party." Jones v. State , 445 Md. 324 , 339, 126 A.3d 1162 , 1171 (2015) (cleaned up). The doctrine of laches has been invoked to bar a registered voter's election claims "where the delay in seeking judicial relief was measured in days[.]" Baker , 217 Md. App. at 296 , 92 A.3d at 593 . Indeed, even an action that is arguably filed within the statutory limitations period of EL § 12-202(b) - i.e. , before the election results are certified, and within ten days after the registered voter has knowledge of the challenged act or omission-may nevertheless be barred by the doctrine of laches.

See generally Ross v. State Bd. of Elections , 387 Md. 649 , 668 & n.8, 672-73, 876 A.2d 692 , 703 & n.8, 705-06 (2005). In this case, on May 9, 2017, more than six months after the 2016 general election, April Ademiluyi ("Appellant"), an unsuccessful candidate for the position of judge of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County ("the circuit court") seeking to have the candidacy of the successful candidate, the Honorable Ingrid M. Turner ("Judge Turner"), 1 decertified. Appellant alleged that Judge Turner had never practiced law in Maryland, and was, therefore, constitutionally unqualified for judicial office. Appellant named as defendants the Maryland State Board of Elections, State Administrator of Elections Linda Lamone, Governor Lawrence J. Hogan, Jr., and Judge Turner (together, "Appellees").

In the petition, Appellant sought a writ of mandamus ordering the Governor to rescind the commission that he had issued 2 to Judge Turner, and an order decertifying both Judge Turner's candidacy and the election results. On May 22, 2017, Appellant filed an amended petition, raising the same allegations and seeking the same relief. Before any response from Appellees, Appellant filed a motion for summary judgment and a memorandum of law, contending that she was entitled to the position of judge of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. Thereafter, Appellees filed a motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing, in relevant part, that the election claims were untimely under EL § 12-202(b) and barred by the doctrine of laches.

On September 8, 2017, the circuit court conducted a hearing, and granted the motion to dismiss. The circuit court ruled, in pertinent part, that the petition was untimely filed under EL § 12-202(b), and that the doctrine of laches barred the election claims. On the same day, Appellant filed a notice of appeal to this Court pursuant to EL § 12-203. 3 On September 12, 2017, consistent with its oral ruling, the circuit court issued an order granting the motion to dismiss. In this direct appeal, we consider whether the circuit court properly granted the motion to dismiss on the grounds that the petition was untimely filed under EL § 12-202(b) and barred by the doctrine of laches.

We hold that the circuit court was correct on both counts. The petition was untimely filed under EL § 12-202(b) because Appellant did not file the petition in the circuit court until May 9, 2017, more than six months after the 2016 general election, and more than one year after Appellant admittedly became aware of the facts that served as the basis for the election claims and at least several months after the election results were certified. And, we determine that there is no basis on which to toll the statute of limitations. Additionally, independent of the statutory limitations period set forth in EL § 12-202(b), the petition is barred by the doctrine of laches because, in filing the petition in the circuit court more than six months after the 2016 general election, Appellant unreasonably delayed in asserting her rights, and that delay prejudiced Appellees.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. Because we hold that the circuit court correctly granted the motion to dismiss, we need not address the three other questions presented on brief by Appellant that concern the merits of the election claims. 4 BACKGROUND 2016 General Election and Judicial Disabilities Complaint In 2016, Appellant was a candidate for judge of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County in the primary and general elections. In the general election, the candidates included three incumbent judges of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, 5 as well as two lawyers, Appellant and Judge Turner. On November 8, 2016, in the general election, Judge Turner and the three incumbent judges received sufficient votes to win the election; Appellant finished last.

After the election results were certified, Governor Hogan issued commissions to the successful candidates, including Judge Turner, who subsequently took the oath that is prescribed by the Constitution of Maryland, and assumed the office of judge of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. Now, we briefly describe events that occurred before the 2016 general election. On April 14, 2016, before both the 2016 primary election on April 26, 2016, and the general election, Appellant filed with the Commission on Judicial Disabilities ("the Commission") a complaint against Judge Turner, alleging that Judge Turner had committed various ethical violations during the election campaign by engaging in prohibited political activities, including endorsing numerous politicians. 6 In the ethics complaint, Appellant alleged that Judge Turner had made a quid pro quo agreement with Maryland Delegate Joseline Peña-Melnyk that Judge Turner would drop out of a congressional race in which Judge Turner had initially been a candidate, run for judge of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, and endorse Delegate Peña-Melnyk for the congressional seat; and, in turn, Delegate Peña-Melnyk would endorse Judge Turner for the judgeship. 7 While the ethics complaint was pending before the Commission, on April 21, 2016, a few days before the 2016 primary election, The Washington Post published an article, which included, in relevant part, the following information about Judge Turner: The other challenger is veteran politician [ ] Turner, who dropped out of a crowded congressional race to compete for a judgeship, hoping to capitalize on her experience as a military lawyer and former member of the [Prince George's C]ounty [C]ouncil. * * * Turner, a former Prince George's County Council member, wants to reform the judicial system. "We need an eye toward rehabilitation and becoming more of a problem-solving court," she said.

Turner, 52, was running for Congress when she learned about the court opening. The retired military attorney quickly changed gears. For 20 years, the [United States] Naval Academy graduate served as legal counsel to admirals, administrative units[,] and sailors. But she has little experience in local courts.

She returned to Prince George's [County] after her 2006 retirement[,] and was elected to two terms on the [C]ounty [C]ouncil. Turner's detractors say [that] the politician is simply seeking secure employment-the job pays about $154,000 a year-after she was term-limited and dropped out of the congressional race. But Turner says she is running to educate voters that they have a choice when it comes to the judicial system. "In 1986, they didn't want women at the [United States Naval A]cademy.

Let alone a black woman," she said. "When I ran in 2006 for [Prince George's] County Council, they said I wouldn't win because I wasn't in the politician pipeline. But the community rallied around me[,] and told me I belonged." Arelis R. Hernández, A rare challenge in Maryland judge's race , Wash. Post, Apr. 21, 2016, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/a-rare-challenge-in-maryland-judges-race/2016/04/21/65468dfe-f513-11e5-9804-537defcc3cf6_story.html? utm_term=.feb4d1c8449f [https://perma.cc/5BGG-UA98]. 8 In an affidavit that was later filed in the circuit court, Appellant averred that she "had no knowledge of [Judge] Turner's legal practice history until [T]he Washington Post['s] article[ ] dated April 21, 2016 had been published[,] and [the Commission] was invest[igat]ing [Judge] Turner." (Record citation omitted).

Over a year later, after the 2016 primary and general elections, the Commission responded to Appellant's ethics complaint against Judge Turner, who had assumed office. Specifically, in a letter dated April 26, 2017, the Commission stated that the ethics complaint against Judge Turner had been "reviewed and discussed by the Judicial Inquiry Board" and the Commission, and, after the full and complete review of the materials and discussion by the Board and Commission, the Commission concluded that the evidence failed to show that Judge Turner committed sanctionable conduct, as defined [by] Maryland Rule 18-401( [j] ). As a result, the Commission dismissed the complaint, as required by Maryland Rule 18-406(a)(1). Proceedings in the Circuit Court On May 9, 2017, almost two weeks after the date of the Commission's letter, and more than six months after the 2016 general election, Appellant filed in the circuit court a "Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief" against Appellees, contending that Judge Turner was constitutionally unqualified for office because she allegedly had never practiced law in Maryland.

Appellant requested that the circuit court issue a writ of mandamus ordering Governor Hogan to rescind Judge Turner's commission, as well as an order decertifying both Judge Turner's candidacy and the election results. In the petition, Appellant alleged that Judge Turner, as a military lawyer, had not practiced law in Maryland, and, accordingly, was not qualified to be a Maryland judge. In the petition, Appellant also contended that there was no prejudice or unreasonable delay in the timing of the filing of the petition. On May 22, 2017, Appellant filed an amended petition, raising the same allegations and seeking the same relief.

Before any response by Appellees to the petition or the amended petition, on July 9, 2017, Appellant filed a motion for summary judgment and a memorandum of law. In the memorandum, Appellant contended that Judge Turner was constitutionally unqualified to be a judge in Maryland because she allegedly had not practiced law in Maryland, and argued that she (Appellant) was entitled to the commission for judgeship in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. Appellant asserted that the statute of limitations, EL § 12-202(b), was inapplicable, or, in the alternative, must be tolled. Appellant maintained that Judge Turner had committed fraud upon Maryland taxpayers to secure her salary as a judge, and that such fraud warranted tolling the statute of limitations.

According to Appellant, she "was entirely justified in pursuing and awaiting disposition of her claims with [the Commission] because [Judge] Turner's lack of qualifications and prohibited political activity during the 2016 election cycle [were] so prejudicial to the administration of justice that it could have resulted in [Judge Turner's] removal." In the memorandum, Appellant contended that the doctrine of laches did not apply because there was neither prejudice nor inexcusable delay. In an "Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment," Appellant averred, in relevant part, as follows: [ ] I had no knowledge of [Judge] Turner's legal practice history until [T]he Washington Post['s] article[ ] dated April 21, 2016 had been published[,] and [the Commission] was invest[igat]ing [Judge] Turner. * * * [ ] On April 29, 2017, I received notice from the [Commission] that my complaint against [Judge] Turner went through the full process[,] but the [Commission] decided not to take action. [ ] After receiving notice of disposition from [the Commission], I immediately verified [Judge] Turner's online official Maryland biographies and commenced this suit[.] (Record citations omitted). On July 21, 2017, Appellees filed a "Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to [Appellant]'s Motion for Summary Judgment," contending that the election claims were barred in their "entirety by limitations and [the doctrine of] laches," and, that the claims, "as a matter of law," lacked merit. Appellees requested that the circuit court dismiss the amended petition, or, in the alternative, issue a declaratory judgment in their favor.

In the motion to dismiss, in relevant part, Appellees argued that Appellant's claims, in which she challenged Judge Turner's qualifications as a candidate for judge of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, were election claims that were not filed within the statutory limitations period that was prescribed by EL § 12-202(b), and, as such, were barred. Appellees pointed out that Appellant waited to bring the election claims until more than a year after the 2016 primary election, and more than six months after the 2016 general election, which, "on its face," demonstrated that the claims were untimely under EL § 12-202(b). Appellees also asserted that, in the affidavit in support of the motion for summary judgment, Appellant acknowledged seeing The Washington Post's article in April 2016, and, accordingly, Appellant "admittedly had knowledge of the alleged deficiency in qualifications by April 2016[.]" Appellees contended that filing the ethics complaint with the Commission concerning a judicial candidate's campaign conduct did not toll EL § 12-202(b) with respect to an election claim concerning a judicial candidate's qualifications. Appellees asserted that Appellant failed to demonstrate any ground on which to toll the statute of limitations because Appellant had not alleged "that she was somehow tricked or deceived into missing the deadline[, or] that the failure to meet the deadline was beyond her control." Appellees also contended that the election claims were barred by the doctrine of laches, and that claims challenging the qualifications of a judicial candidate must be promptly brought so that such claims can be resolved prior to an election.

Appellees argued that the delay in bringing the election claims-more than six months after the general election-was inexcusable, and that the delay prejudiced Judge Turner, the State Board of Elections, the voters of Prince George's County, and the circuit court. Appellees asserted that, if Appellant were successful in bringing the election claims, and Judge Turner were disqualified and removed, voters who had voted for Judge Turner would be prejudiced by having their votes invalidated. On July 23, 2017, Appellant filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss, requesting that the circuit court grant summary judgment in her favor, declare the commission that Governor Hogan issued to Judge Turner to be void, and order Governor Hogan to issue the commission for judgeship in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County to Appellant. On September 8, 2017, the circuit court conducted a hearing on the motion for summary judgment and the motion to dismiss.

During the hearing, as to The Washington Post's article, Appellant argued as follows: I reported to [the] Commission[,] and[,] as soon as I reported my complaint[, it] started investigating. But it was maybe a few days before the primary [election] that [The] Washington Post['s] article came out[,] outlining everyone's qualifications and criticizing [Judge] Turner for her motives [in] switching from the congressional race to the judge race[,] and also criticizing her qualifications. She has never practiced law. That is actually when I found out that she has never practiced law.

And [I] actually started researching her bio[graphie]s on[ ]line, asking some people. No, she has never practiced law in this State. But[,] at that time[,] I already had the ethics complaint pending. When asked by the circuit court why she did not file a complaint in the circuit court concerning Judge Turner's alleged lack of qualifications, in addition to the ethics complaint filed with the Commission, Appellant responded: Well, I thought [that] it was best for the [ ] Commission to handle it.

I mean, you know, as I said[,] it was [Judge Turner's] lack of qualifications on top of the rules that she had breached, I thought bolster[ed] the ethics complaint. It made it more appropriate for the [ ] Commission to investigate and to take action than myself. It made more sense to me to wait for [the Commission] to do what the[ ] Constitution specially created [it] to do. So, I thought [that] it made sense to allow the [ ] Commission to act first.

Appellant acknowledged that she "could have" pursued both actions simultaneously, but maintained that, "[i]f [she had] filed an ethics complaint against [Judge Turner,] and [Judge Turner] could have been disqualified at any point in time by the [ ] Commission, [Judge Turner] was on notice that that could have happened." After hearing argument from the parties on the motion to dismiss, the circuit court orally granted the motion to dismiss, explaining that the petition was untimely filed under EL § 12-202(b) and that the doctrine of laches barred the election claims: And[,] in this case[,] I can't get around the fact that[,] while you filed the ethics complaint ... with [the Commission,] the Election Law Article clearly provided that you had to file within 10 days after the act or omission[,] or within seven days after the election results were certified. And[,] even in the light most favorable to [Appellant], in the complaint, [she stated that she] didn't do it until six months later. The question becomes [whether] equitable tolling [would] apply. And I have not seen a case or a statute [that] would allow the [c]ourt to reach the equitable tolling argument.

There is nothing to indicate in the pleadings that [Appellant was] misled. There is nothing to indicate that there was [an] inability to file. And there is nothing that I have read in the complaint [that] would indicate that there [were] some unavoidable circumstances. And[,] as I read the election cases, it certainly seems to the [c]ourt that [the doctrine of] laches may come into play because[,] were I to vacate the seat, then I would be overturning an election, depriving the citizens of who[m] they voted for, depriving [Judge] Turner of her seat in the Circuit Court [for Prince George's County] and depriving the Circuit Court [for Prince George's County] of a judge. * * * ...

I feel compelled to grant the [m]otion to [d]ismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted even in the light most favorable reading of the complaint because of the clear language of [ EL §] 12-202 [,] and there not being a timely challenge[,] and no facts within the complaint to indicate [that] equitable tolling would be appropriate. And the [c]ourt would also find that [the doctrine of] laches applies. The circuit court stated that the order granting the motion to dismiss would specify that the motion to dismiss was being granted "for failure to state a claim because[,] under the [s]tatute of [l]imitations[,] the [c]ourt finds that [ EL §] 12-202 [ (b) ] applies. And equitable tolling does not apply....

And [the doctrine of] laches applies." According to the circuit court, it did not need to address the motion for summary judgment, but, were it to rule on the motion for summary judgment, there were no disputed facts, and it "would have granted [s]ummary [j]udgment for [Appellees,] and not for [Appellant]." 9 On the same day as the hearing, September 8, 2017, Appellant filed a notice of appeal directly to this Court pursuant to EL § 12-203. On September 12, 2017, consistent with its oral ruling, the circuit court issued an order granting the motion to dismiss that stated, in pertinent part, as follows: [The circuit court has] determined that (a) [Appellant] failed to avail herself within the applicable time limits of her statutory remedy under [EL] § 12-202...; (b) equitable tolling does not apply; (c) [Appellant]'s claims[,] brought months after the election[,] are barred by [the doctrine of] laches[;] and (d) [Appellant] has failed to state a claim for mandamus relief[.] MOTION TO DISQUALIFY On November 27, 2017, in this Court, Appellant filed a "Motion to Disqualify Counsel and Other Relief," requesting that "this Court [ ] disqualify the Attorney General's representation of [Judge] Turner, and hold [Judge] Turner in default, and if that relief [were] granted," Appellant further "move[d], pursuant to [Maryland] Rule 8-523(a)(2), [ 10 ] to dispose of the case without oral argument[.]" In the motion to disqualify, Appellant contends that the Attorney General was prohibited by statute from representing Judge Turner "because this case does not involve [Judge] Turner acting in her official duties[.]" Appellant argues that there is a conflict of interest in having the Attorney General represent Judge Turner where Appellant has alleged that Judge Turner "violat[ed] the laws and Constitution[.]" Specifically, Appellant asserts: If [Judge] Turner is not qualified, then the State has an interest in removing her from the bench[,] but the Attorney General is fighting to avoid that outcome. It[ is] highly unethical for the Attorney General to spend tax[ ]pay[e]r dollars to assist one candidate over the other to win a judicial election. (Citation omitted).

Thus, according to Appellant, the Attorney General should be disqualified from representing Judge Turner, and Judge Turner should be held in default. On November 28, 2017, Appellees filed an opposition to the motion to disqualify, contending that the motion to disqualify should be denied for three reasons. First, Appellees correctly point out that Appellant failed to raise any issue concerning disqualification of the Attorney General until on appeal in this Court, and Appellees argue that, accordingly, the motion is untimely, and any issue of disqualification has been waived. Second, Appellees assert that, even if this Court were to consider the merits, the motion to disqualify fails to identify any violation or potential violation of the Maryland Attorneys' Rules of Professional Conduct by the Office of the Attorney General or its attorneys.

Appellees maintain that the Attorney General's representation of Judge Turner is appropriate because Judge Turner is a duly elected and sworn State official, and, when the Office of the Attorney General began representing Judge Turner, neither Appellant nor Judge Turner was a candidate for judicial office, as the election was over, and the results certified. Finally, Appellees contend that the concept of "default" has no application here, that granting the motion to disqualify would merely permit Judge Turner to obtain other counsel, and that the Attorney General would continue representing the State officers and State Board of Elections. On November 29, 2017, Appellant filed a reply to the opposition to the motion to disqualify, contending that: (1) the Attorney General has engaged in an "unethical pursuit" favoring Judge Turner over Appellant for the position of judge of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County; (2) there is a conflict of interest that cannot be waived; and (3) Judge Turner may be held in default on appeal, and, if held in default, Judge Turner is not entitled to additional time to seek new counsel. On the same day, November 29, 2017, this Court issued an order deferring action on the motion to disqualify pending oral argument. 11 We now address the motion to disqualify, and deny the motion.

It is undisputed that, until the filing of the motion to disqualify in this Court, Appellant had not raised, either in the circuit court or this Court, any issue as to disqualification of the Office of the Attorney General in representing Judge Turner. This circumstance raises an issue of waiver. In Balt. Cty. v. Barnhart , 201 Md. App. 682 , 684-85, 712-13, 30 A.3d 291 , 293, 309 (2011), where a former Baltimore County Attorney had represented a former Baltimore County employee in an administrative appeal of Baltimore County's calculation of the former employee's retirement benefits, the Court of Special Appeals discussed waiver of the ability to request an attorney's disqualification, stating: When determining whether a party has waived its right to move to disqualify counsel, the Court must examine whether the party filed its motion in a timely manner.

Timely service of a motion to disqualify helps to curb the potential use of the motion as a litigation tactic or to harass the opposing party. Courts analyze a number of factors when considering whether the motion was timely made, including: when the movant learned of the conflict; whether the movant was represented by counsel during the delay; why the delay occurred, and, in particular, whether the motion was delayed for tactical reasons; and whether disqualification would result in prejudice to the nonmoving party. (Cleaned up). Although this case arises in a different context, the factors that were discussed by the Court of Special Appeals in Barnhart with respect to waiver of the ability to request disqualification of an attorney apply with equal force here.

Applying those factors, we conclude that Appellant has waived any right to move for disqualification of the Attorney General. As to the first factor-when Appellant learned of the alleged conflict-on June 26, 2017, after Appellees were served with Appellant's petition, an Assistant Attorney General filed in the circuit court a consent motion to extend the time for Appellees to file a response to the petition. In the consent motion, the Assistant Attorney General stated that service on Judge Turner was ineffective because it was not made by serving the Attorney General. It would have been readily apparent from the consent motion that the Attorney General was representing Judge Turner.

Yet, Appellant never filed in the circuit court a motion to disqualify. Indeed, it was not until November 27, 2017, over five months after being made aware that the Attorney General was representing Judge Turner, that Appellant filed in this Court the motion to disqualify. As to the second factor-whether Appellant was represented by counsel during the delay-although Appellant represents herself, Appellant is an attorney who, according to the amended petition, has been both licensed to practice law in Maryland, and has owned and operated a solo practice, for approximately nine years at the time of the filing. As to the third factor-why the delay occurred, and whether the motion to disqualify was delayed for tactical reasons-Appellant fails to provide any explanation in either the motion to disqualify or the reply as to why she waited over five months to file a motion to disqualify, or why she did not move to disqualify the Attorney General in the circuit court.

Finally, as to the fourth factor-whether disqualification would prejudice Judge Turner, the nonmoving party-obviously, had the Attorney General been disqualified from representing Judge Turner before the completion of briefing and oral argument in this Court, Judge Turner would have been prejudiced, as Judge Turner would have needed to either seek new counsel or represent herself. Plainly, consideration of the above factors leads to the conclusion that, through Appellant's inaction, despite knowing of the Attorney General's representation of Judge Turner as early as June 2017, Appellant has waived the right to request the Attorney General's disqualification. The motion to disqualify is denied. 12 DISCUSSION Having denied the motion to disqualify, we now address the dismissal of Appellant's petition on the grounds that the petition was untimely filed under EL § 12-202(b) and barred by the doctrine of the laches. The Parties' Contentions Appellant contends that neither EL § 12-202(b)'s statutory limitations period nor the doctrine of laches applies in this case.

Appellant argues that Art. IV, § 5 of the Constitution of Maryland requires that "Judge Turner's qualifications be verified[,]" and that applying EL § 12-202(b)'s statutory limitations period would conflict with that constitutional requirement. (Bolding omitted). Alternatively, Appellant asserts that Judge Turner's alleged "inequitable conduct" justifies tolling EL § 12-202(b)'s statutory limitations period. (Bolding omitted).

Specifically, Appellant maintains that, in becoming a judge, Judge Turner committed fraud and constructive fraud on the taxpayers. As to this point, Appellant contends, in pertinent part: [Judge] Turner did not care whether she was qualified, which is shown when she bragged to [T]he [Washington] Post about her ability to beat the odds in her life[ ]time. [Judge] Turner also did not proffer an affidavit to the [circuit] court demonstrating her due diligence to assess her qualifications. Thus[, Judge] Turner's unclean hands created the wrong in which Appellant seeks relief. (Citations omitted).

Appellant argues that she "was entirely justified in" filing and awaiting resolution of the ethics complaint by the Commission "because [Judge] Turner's lack of qualifications and prohibited political activity during the 2016 election cycle [were] so prejudicial to the administration of justice that [they] could have resulted in her removal." Appellant asserts that the filing of the complaint with the Commission provided notice to Judge Turner of Appellant's claims to disqualify her candidacy; Appellant maintains that this filing satisfied the purpose of the statute of limitations. Appellant contends that the doctrine of laches does not apply because there was no inexcusable delay or prejudice. Appellant asserts that she "has been diligent in pursuing her claims with the [Commission] and" in the circuit court. According to Appellant, there is no prejudice to Judge Turner because she has known since the filing of the ethics complaint that Appellant is challenging "the legitimacy and integrity of her candidacy[.]" Appellees respond that a registered voter must seek judicial relief in the circuit court within the timeframe that is specified by EL § 12-202(b), which ensures that an election claim is processed expeditiously and without unreasonable delay.

Appellees contend that, here, Appellant waited six months after the election before filing the petition, despite having become aware of the facts that served as the basis for the election claims in April 2016, when The Washington Post's article was published. According to Appellees, under the circumstances, the circuit court correctly ruled that Appellant failed to file the election claims within EL § 12-202(b)'s statutory limitations period. Appellees argue that Appellant confuses eligibility for judicial office- i.e. , having the requisite qualifications such as residency, age, and bar membership-with the process of qualifying for judicial office, which includes receiving a commission, taking an oath, and posting any applicable bond. Appellees argue that the use of the term "qualification" in Art. IV, § 5 of the Constitution of Maryland refers to the process of qualifying for judicial office, not an individual's eligibility for judicial office, and thus does not provide a basis on which to challenge a candidate's eligibility more than six months after an election.

Appellees assert that the filing of the ethics complaint with the Commission concerning Judge Turner's campaign conduct did not toll EL § 12-202(b)'s statutory limitations period for an election claim concerning Judge Turner's eligibility. Appellees maintain that equitable tolling applies only where a plaintiff has been tricked or induced by a defendant's conduct into not filing a claim within the limitations period- i.e. , there must be some wrongful conduct by the defendant. Appellees contend that, in this case, the circuit court properly concluded that equitable tolling did not apply because Appellant was neither tricked nor induced into delaying in filing the election claims. Appellees argue that, instead, Appellant decided of her own accord to await the outcome of the ethics complaint with the Commission before filing the petition in the circuit court.

Appellees also assert that the election claims, which were filed more than six months after the election, are barred by the doctrine of laches. Appellees maintain that Appellant knowingly failed to file the election claims expeditiously, and that the delay prejudiced Judge Turner, who relied upon the initial certification of her candidacy and later on the certification of the election results. Appellees argue that the delay may also prejudice the voters of Prince George's County, and in particular those who voted for Judge Turner, because they may have their votes invalidated. Standard of Review In State Ctr., LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P'ship , 438 Md. 451 , 496-97, 92 A.3d 400 , 426-27 (2014), this Court explained that we review without deference a trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss to determine whether the ruling was legally correct, stating: Considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a court must assume the truth of, and view in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, all well-pleaded facts and allegations contained in the complaint, as well as all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from them, and order dismissal only if the allegations and permissible inferences, if true, would not afford relief to the plaintiff, i.e. , the allegations do not state a cause of action for which relief may be granted.

Consideration of the universe of "facts" pertinent to the court's analysis of the motion are limited generally to the four corners of the complaint and its incorporated supporting exhibits, if any. The well-pleaded facts setting forth the cause of action must be pleaded with sufficient specificity; bald assertions and conclusory statements by the pleader will not suffice. Upon appellate review, the trial court's decision to grant such a motion is analyzed to determine whether the court was legally correct. (Citation omitted).

Similarly, where a trial court considers materials outside of the pleadings, such as an affidavit, it is appropriate to treat the trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, and "[w]e review all questions of law, including whether summary judgment was properly granted, without deference." Vito v. Grueff , 453 Md. 88 , 104, 160 A.3d 592 , 601 (2017) (citations omitted). Moreover, "insofar as [the circuit court's decision] rested on the interpretation of the Election Law Article[,]" "[w]e review de novo " the circuit court's decision. Cabrera v. Penate , 439 Md. 99 , 106, 94 A.3d 50 , 54 (2014) (citation omitted). And, "[w]here the issue is whether a party is precluded by [the doctrine of] laches from challenging an action of another party, we shall review the trial court's ultimate determination of the issue de novo ." Schlakman , 451 Md. at 480 , 153 A.3d at 151 (cleaned up).

EL § 12-202 EL § 12-202, concerning judicial challenges to elections, provides, in its entirety: (a) In general .-If no other timely and adequate remedy is provided by this article, a registered voter may seek judicial relief from any act or omission relating to an election, whether or not the election has been held, on the grounds that the act or omission: (1) is inconsistent with this article or other law applicable to the elections process; and (2) may change or has changed the outcome of the election. (b) Place and time of filing .-A registered voter may seek judicial relief under this section in the appropriate circuit court within the earlier of: (1) 10 days after the act or omission or the date the act or omission became known to the petitioner; or (2) 7 days after the election results are certified, unless the election was a gubernatorial primary or special primary election, in which case 3 days after the election results are certified. Significantly, EL § 12-202"is the mechanism for challenging the qualifications of a candidate seeking election." Schlakman , 451 Md. at 482 , 153 A.3d at 152 (cleaned up). See also Cabrera , 439 Md. at 109 , 94 A.3d at 56 .

In Schlakman , 451 Md. at 482 , 153 A.3d at 152 , we described EL § 12-202 as follows: [ EL §] 12-202... governs judicial challenges to certain irregularities in relation to an election; it provides judicial redress for any act or omission that violates the Election Law Article.... [EL] § 12-202(b) [,] by its terms, affords a party the opportunity to challenge irregularities as elaborated in [EL] § 12-202(a) by seeking judicial relief in the appropriate circuit court, and constitutes general judicial review authority when no other Election Law provisions apply. (Cleaned up). EL § 12-202(b) provides "a statutory limitations period" in which an election claim must be filed. Id. at 485, 153 A.3d at 154 .

The purpose of EL § 12-202(b), the statute of limitations for election claims, is to ensure that "any claim against a [S]tate electoral procedure [is] expressed expeditiously, [and] without unreasonable delay, so as to not cause prejudice to the defendant." Liddy v. Lamone , 398 Md. 233 , 245, 919 A.2d 1276 , 1284 (2007) (cleaned up). Notably, as the Court of Special Appeals has recognized, "the very short time limits for filing a suit challenging an aspect of an election pursuant to EL § 12-202(b) are evidence of this State's public policy that claims for judicial relief relative to an election must be prosecuted without delay." Baker , 217 Md. App. at 296 , 92 A.3d at 593 . Indeed, a registered voter who fails to file an action within the statutory limitations period risks having his or her judicial challenge dismissed as untimely. Under certain circumstances, a statute of limitations may be tolled, i.e. , stopped.

In Booth Glass Co., Inc. v. Huntingfield Corp. , 304 Md. 615 , 623, 500 A.2d 641 , 645 (1985), this Court stated that "[w]e have long adhered to the principle that[,] where the [General Assembly] has not expressly provided for an exception in a statute of limitations, the court will not allow any implied or equitable exception to be engrafted upon it." (Citations omitted). We noted, as one example, an exception to the general three-year statute of limitations for civil actions where "a party is kept in ignorance of a cause of action by the fraud of an adverse party"; in that circumstance, the cause of action accrues- i.e. , the statute of limitations begins to run-"when the fraud is discovered." 13 Booth Glass , 304 Md. at 623 -24 , 500 A.2d at 645 (cleaned up). As to whether equitable estoppel may toll a statute of limitations, we stated: "In Maryland, [ ] it is well settled that equitable estoppel will not toll the running of limitations absent a showing that the defendant held out any inducements not to file suit or indicated that limitations would not be pleaded." Id. at 624 , 500 A.2d at 645 (cleaned up). More recently, in Adedje v. Westat, Inc. , 214 Md. App. 1 , 13, 75 A.3d 401 , 408 (2013), the Court of Special Appeals explained that "equitable tolling seeks to excuse untimely filing by an individual plaintiff[,] and is generally applicable where the plaintiff has been induced or tricked by the defendant's conduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass." (Cleaned up).

Stated otherwise, for equitable estoppel to toll a statute of limitations, a plaintiff must show that there was some wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant that prevented the plaintiff from asserting his or her claim. The Doctrine of Laches The doctrine of "[l]aches is a defense in equity against stale claims[ that] is based upon grounds of sound public policy by discouraging fusty demands for the peace of society." Ross , 387 Md. at 668 , 876 A.2d at 703 (cleaned up). This Court has explained that "[t]he doctrine of laches, which is both an affirmative defense and an equitable defense, applies where there is an unreasonable delay in the assertion of one party's rights[,] and that delay results in prejudice to the opposing party." Jones , 445 Md. at 339 , 126 A.3d at 1171 (cleaned up). Application of the doctrine of laches is determined on a case-by-case basis.

See Schlakman , 451 Md. at 485 , 153 A.3d at 154 ("[T]here is no inflexible rule as to what constitutes, or what does not constitute, laches; hence, its existence must be determined by the facts and circumstances of each case." (Cleaned up) ). Significantly, the doctrine of laches has been invoked in the context of election cases and held to bar a plaintiff's election claims. This is so because this Court has recognized that, to avoid prejudice to a defendant, "any claim against a [S]tate electoral procedure must be expressed expeditiously[ and] without unreasonable delay[.]" Liddy , 398 Md. at 245 , 919 A.2d at 1284 (cleaned up). Recently, in Schlakman , 451 Md. at 473 , 485 , 153 A.3d at 147 , 154 , this Court held that the plaintiffs' challenge "to a candidate's qualifications to appear on the ballot" was "barred as a matter of law by [the doctrine of] laches." In Schlakman , id. at 473 , 153 A.3d at 147 , the plaintiffs, along with an individual named Dan Sparaco, were candidates in the 2016 general election for the Councilmanic District Twelve seat on the Baltimore City Council.

On January 13, 2016, Sparaco, an independent candidate, filed a campaign finance report with the State Board of Elections. See id. at 475 , 153 A.3d at 148 . Sparaco did not file a declaration of intent by February 3, 2016; instead, on May 20, 2016, Sparaco filed in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland a complaint "challenging the constitutionality of the early filing deadline for unaffiliated candidates." Id. at 475-76 , 153 A.3d at 148-49 (cleaned up). On August 15, 2016, Sparaco voluntarily dismissed the federal case.

See id. at 476 , 153 A.3d at 149 . In the meantime, on July 11, 2016, Sparaco filed with the Baltimore City Board of Elections a declaration of intent to seek nomination by petition for the District Twelve seat, and, on August 2, 2016, that board approved the petition signatures and certified Sparaco's candidacy. See id. at 476 , 153 A.3d at 149 . Thereafter, the State Board of Elections included Sparaco's name on the ballot; and, on August 31, 2016, it posted on its website ballot proofs that included Sparaco's name.

See id. at 476 , 153 A.3d at 149 . The plaintiffs challenged the Baltimore City Board of Elections's decision to certify Sparaco as an eligible candidate and the State Board of Elections's decision to include him as a candidate on the ballot, contending that Sparaco had failed to timely comply with statutory filing requirements, and, therefore, was disqualified. See id. at 473 , 153 A.3d at 147 . Initially, on August 25, 2016, the plaintiffs filed an action in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland against the State Board of Elections, but the federal court dismissed the case because the plaintiffs' counsel had not been admitted to practice before the federal court.

See id. at 473 , 153 A.3d at 147 . Then, on September 20, 2016, the plaintiffs filed in a State trial court a complaint against the Administrator of the State Board of Elections and the Election Director of the Baltimore City Board of Elections. See id. at 473-74 , 153 A.3d at 147 . Two days later, on September 22, 2016, in response to the plaintiffs' ex parte request for an immediate temporary restraining order, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order that required the defendants to remove Sparaco's name from ballots.

See id. at 474 , 153 A.3d at 147 -48 . Thereafter, we granted the defendants' petition for a writ of certiorari . See id. at 474 , 153 A.3d at 148 . In this Court, the defendants contended that the plaintiffs' complaint was untimely because it was not filed within the time period specified by EL § 12-202(b)(1), and argued that the challenge was also barred by the doctrine of laches.

See id. at 483, 153 A.3d at 153 . At the outset, we noted that, "because the action before us [was] an equitable one, [the doctrine of] laches, rather than direct application of the statutory time period, [was] the proper focus[,]" but that we could "gauge the[ plaintiffs'] delay against the statutory limitations period because courts sitting in equity will apply statutory time limitations in determining, at least as an outside limit, whether laches has run." Id. at 484 , 153 A.3d at 153 (cleaned up). We stated that "a statutory limitations period, such as that provided by [EL] § 12-202(b)(1), provides a benchmark for the application of [the doctrine of] laches ... against which this Court can assess whether the [plaintiff]s' delay in filing in the [trial c]ourt was unreasonable and whether it prejudiced the interests of [the defendant]s." Id. at 485, 153 A.3d at 154 . Applying these principles, this Court concluded that the plaintiffs' complaint was barred by the doctrine of laches, explaining: Even granting, arguendo , that [the plaintiffs] did not learn of the [Baltimore] City Board[ of Elections]'s certification of [ ] Sparaco's candidacy until August 15, 2016, [the date on which Sparaco voluntarily dismissed his complaint in the federal court,] their challenge under [EL] § 12-202(a) came too late because they did not file the instant action in the [c]ircuit [c]ourt ... until September 20, 2016, when their complaint was docketed by the clerk[,] and, on this record, their delay was unreasonable and prejudicial to [the defendant]s and the election process.

Id. at 485, 153 A.3d at 154 (footnote omitted). We determined that there was "no basis ... to hold that [the plaintiff]s' obligation to file in the appropriate circuit court, as instructed by [EL] § 12-202(b)(1) [,] was tolled by their failed attempt to" obtain relief in the federal court. Id. at 486, 153 A.3d at 155 . We observed that the plaintiffs had "offered no valid explanation as to why they waited until September 20[, 2016,] to" file the complaint in the State trial court, despite having notice of Sparaco's certification on August 15, 2016.

Id. at 488, 490 , 153 A.3d at 156 , 157 . As a final point, we noted that the plaintiffs failed to explain "why they did not institute a parallel action in the [trial c]ourt within the time limits mandated by [EL] § 12-202(b)." Id. at 490, 153 A.3d at 157 . In Liddy , 398 Md. at 236 , 919 A.2d at 1278 -79 , this Court held that the doctrine of laches barred a plaintiff's