Allen v. Core Target City Youth Program

O’Donnell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The claim of the appellant, Claudine Allen, for unemployment compensation benefits comes before this Court after three adverse administrative determinations and the affirmance of those proceedings in her unsuccessful appeal to the Superior Court of Baltimore City. The appellee, CORE Target City Youth Program, operates a federally funded vocational program designed to train people for “jobs in the business world,” offering courses in clerical skills, offset printing and building maintenance and repair. In July 1971 the appellant, who had earned 96 credits as an English major toward her collegiate degree, was employed at an annual salary of $9,000 by the appellees as an instructor “in clerical skills,” teaching English, business mathematics, office machines, office practices and filing. ⁷¹ Between March and May 1972 she served as a coordinator to review curriculum and develop course outlines in preparation for a proposal to be submitted by CORE to the federal government for future funding.

She resumed her status as a clerical skills instructor in May for the ensuing teaching cycle. Learning that the instructor in mathematics, English and black history was leaving the program she initiated a request, on October 16, 1972, to be transferred to the printing unit. Although her request was initially denied, assurances by her that she could master the job persuaded the program authorities to grant her the transfer and she became an instructor in that unit. Although her salary remained the same, she was placed on a “part-time schedule,” working from 1 p.m. to 5 p.m. in that department as a supportive education instructor.

Upon the grant of the transfer the supervisor in the printing department, Arnold Allen, informed the appellant that she would be required to research certain subjects relating to printing — specifically: cost estimation, printing salesmanship, printing management, printer’s English and printer’s math — and to develop lesson plans for teaching these subjects. Although Allen supplied her with no source material or bibliography, she agreed, using the general outline provided by him, to research these subjects and to prepare lesson plans to instruct in them in the teaching cycle beginning January 1973. Recognizing that the appellant possessed no knowledge of the “technical aspects” of these subjects the supervisor apprised her that the subjects, as set forth in the outline, “dealt with basics — generalities;” that he did not consider it either feasible or practical to expect her to go into depth, particularly on the subject of cost estimation, but rather expected her to be able to simply present to the students an “idea of what went into cost estimation and how to develop the cost of a [printing] job.” At the commencement of her efforts to prepare herself for her new duties she consulted with instructors in ⁷² photolithography, printing and graphics at CORE without being able to obtain any assistance from them. She visited the library, phoned people employed in the printing industry and discussed the situation with a professor of vocational education at Morgan College, who reportedly told her that one needed years of experience in the printing field to be able to teach such subjects.

Finding herself unable to develop even outlines of the courses because she found the information obtained from the library too technical to be understood by her, she approached her supervisor with her predicament in mid-November and he ordered for her a textbook in “cost estimation.” Although the appellant read it twice she professed that she “could not understand” the text material. Despite the preparatory period which commenced in October, when her supervisor, in early January, on the threshhold of the beginning of the course, inquired concerning her preparation for the teaching of these subjects she told him that she did not have adequate materials for teaching the course, that the texts she had were too technical for her comprehension and that she judged herself as not possessing an adequate expertise. Although Allen attempted to reassure her that she was not expected to teach the technical aspects of the assigned subjects — since neither the element of time nor the educational level of the students would permit such discussion — she was adamant in her position of her inability to prepare herself, complaining that the course material was so technical one needed years of experience to be able to teach it, which would justify a higher salary, and that if she taught the course “she wanted more money.” Allen’s only retort at this confrontation was that “the course had to be taught,” and he suggested a meeting with the project director and project coordinator in connection with the position maintained by the appellant. When such a meeting came to pass on January 18th the appellant restated her inability to teach the subjects and declared that she would be unable to do any further research in connection with the work because she would be enrolled in the February semester at Morgan College. ⁷³ On January 24th the appellant’s academic tenure at CORE’S school was terminated.

By letter which chronologically reviewed the events and which pointed out that she had been assigned her new duties upon her representation that she was capable of giving such instructions in accordance with the curriculum outline, the school found that she had exhibited an “apparent unwillingness to make a minimum effort in attempting to teach the course,” which left “no alternative but to terminate [her services].” A replacement instructor was found who, on short notice, assumed her role and proved able to sufficiently research and teach those printing course subjects. When the appellant filed a claim under the provisions of Maryland Code (1957, 1969 Repl. Vol.) Art. 95A, § 7, for unemployment insurance benefits her claim was denied by a claims examiner of the Employment Security Administration who found that she had “voluntarily quit her job without good cause,” within the meaning of Art. 95A, § 6 (a), and imposed a maximum penalty resulting in a bar to the appellant of the receipt of such benefits. Aggrieved at this threshold administrative decision the appellant, pursuant to § 7 (e), appealed the denial of benefits to an appeals referee.

After an evidentiary hearing in which the appellant, the graphics instructor whom she had consulted, her supervisor and the project coordinator testified, the referee found that despite the “employer’s assurance to the claimant that she was expected to, in effect, ‘give the highlights’ of the subjects and not teach them in depth were to no avail, the claimant continued in her refusal to teach the subjects.” In sustaining the determination of the claims examiner, the referee found that the appellant “voluntarily left her employment, without good cause, within the meaning of Section 6 (a) of the Maryland Unemployment Insurance Law, when she followed her own evaluation of the job situation, rather than attempting to comply with the employer’s requirements.” Next the appellant invoked the provisions of Art. 95A, § 7 ⁷⁴ (f), and requested a review before the Board of Appeals of the Employment Security Administration where, following a de novo hearing, the Board adopted the referee’s findings of fact and affirmed the decision denying her benefits. Aggrieved at her failure to obtain. administrative relief the appellant, pursuant to Art. 95A, •§ 7 (h), appealed the Board’s decision to the Superior Court of Baltimore City where Judge Harry A. Cole, upon the record, memoranda and argument of counsel, affirmed the decision. Judge Cole, finding from the record that she was “directed to prepare herself so that she could impart certain information to the students whom she was going to teach [and] was not expected to give a technical dissertation . . . but to develop broad guidelines and present this information as best she could,” concluded “that by the pattern of her actions, in the light of the request made of her, that she, without good cause, refused to work, and by her own actions provoked her discharge and voluntarily quit without good cause.” From Judge Cole’s affirmance of the decision of the Board of Appeals the appellant seasonably appealed to this Court. The scope of judicial review is fixed by the provisions of Art. 95A, § 7 (h), which states, inter alia, that: “In any judicial proceeding under this section, the findings of the Board of Appeals as to the facts, if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of said court shall be confined to questions of law.” This test has been consistently applied in our decisions.

See Rogers v. Radio Shack, 271 Md. 126, 129-30 , 314 A. 2d 113, 116 (1974); Watkins v. Employment Sec. Adm., 266 Md. 223, 225 , 292 A. 2d 653, 654 (1972); Barley v. Md. Dept. of Employment Security, 242 Md. 102, 105-06 , 218 A. 2d 24, 26 (1966); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Bd. of Appeals, 219 Md. 146, 150 , 148 A. 2d 403, 406 (1959); Employment Security Bd. v. LeCates, 218 Md. 202, 207 , 145 A. 2d 840, 843 (1958); Mitchell, Inc. v. Md. Employment Security Bd., 209 Md. 237, 240 , 121 A. 2d 198, 199 (1956). Thus, in the absence of an allegation of fraud — not present here — the findings of fact of the Board’s referee if supported by evidence, and adopted and affirmed by the Board, were conclusive upon ⁷⁵ the Superior Court of Baltimore City and are binding upon us. Watkins v. Employment Sec. Adm., supra, at 225. The appellant does not dispute the factual findings made by the referee, as adopted and affirmed by the Board, but, conceding, the existence of evidence to support those conclusions, argues that such facts do not support the legal conclusion that she “voluntarily left her employment, without good cause.” Hence the sole question presented to us is whether the lower court and the Board of Appeals erred, as a matter of law, upon the factual findings, in applying the provisions of Art. 95A, § 6 (a), to disqualify the appellant for unemployment benefits.

The Unemployment Insurance Law is a remedial statute intended to prevent economic insecurity and to alleviate the consequences of involuntary unemployment and economic distress. Waters v. State ex rel. Md. Unemployment Ins. Fund, 220 Md. 337, 346-47 , 152 A. 2d 811, 815-16 (1959); State ex rel.

Employment Sec. Bd. v. Rucker, 211 Md. 153, 159-60 , 126 A. 2d 846, 850 (1956); Steamship Trade Ass’n v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 190 Md. 215, 222 , 57 A. 2d 818, 821 (1948). See also Saunders v. Md. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 188 Md. 677, 681 , 53 A. 2d 579, 581 (1947); Md. Unemployment Comp.

Bd. v. Albrecht, 183 Md. 87, 94 , 36 A. 2d 666, 670 (1944). As a remedial law it should be construed, if possible, to accomplish its objective of alleviating economic distress, and be liberally construed in favor of carrying out its purpose. Warren v. Bd. of Appeals, 226 Md. 1, 15, 172 A. 2d 124, 130 (1961); State ex rel. Emp.

Sec. Bd. v. Rucker, supra; Md. Unemployment Comp. Bd. v. Albrecht, supra. Section 2 of Art. 95A sets forth “[a]s a guide to the interpretation and application of this article, the public policy of this State” which the Act is intended to serve. The declaration of policy also set forth in § 2 states in part that “[(involuntary unemployment is ... a subject of general interest and concern which requires appropriate action by the legislature to prevent its spread and to lighten its burden which now so often falls with crushing force upon the ⁷⁶ unemployed worker and his family.” The Legislature further declared, in § 2, that in its considered judgment the public good, and the general welfare of the citizens of this State require the enactment of this measure “for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own” (Emphasis supplied.) See Waters v. State ex rel.

Unemployment Ins. Fund, supra. The negative words in § 2, “through no fault of their own,” included in the declaration by the Legislature cannot be construed as establishing an affirmative disqualification 'for “fault” without regard to the other express provisions in § 6 of the Act, providing disqualification for benefits. Fino v. Md. Emp.

Security Bd., 218 Md. 504, 507 , 147 A. 2d 738, 740 (1959); Tucker v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 189 Md. 250, 258 , 55 A. 2d 692, 695 (1947). In connection with the intention of the General Assembly that those “unemployed through no fault of their own” should be entitled to benefits under the Act, the legislative scheme, in § 6, lays down criteria for the disqualification for such benefits: as to those who leave their work voluntarily without good cause (§ 6 (a)); those discharged for gross misconduct connected with their work (§ 6 (b)); those discharged or suspended as a disciplinary measure for misconduct other than gross connected with their work (§ 6 (c)); those who fail, without good cause, either to apply for available, suitable work or to accept suitable work when offered or to return to their customary employment (§ 6 (d)); those who become unemployed as a result of stoppage of work because of labor disputes, under certain conditions (§ 6 (e)); and those physically unable to continue employment because of pregnancy (§ 6 (f)). 1 See Waters v. State ex rel. Md. Unemployment Ins. Fund, supra, at 349, 152 A. 2d at 817 .

Section 17 (e) affords an additional basis for disqualification when a claimant is found to have made a false statement or representation or failed to disclose a ⁷⁷ material fact in order to obtain or gain an increase in any benefit or other payment under the Act. See State ex rel. Emp. Sec. Bd. v. Rucker, supra, at 157, 126 A.2d at 848-49 .

The term “leaving work voluntarily” is not anywhere defined in the statute and absent some imperative reason for enlarging its meaning the term “should be construed as having its ordinary and commonly-accepted meaning.” See Scoville Service, Inc. v. Comptroller, 269 Md. 390, 395 , 306 A. 2d 534, 537 (1973). What . our predecessors stated in connection with construing the provisions of the Unemployment Insurance Law in Celanese Corp. of America v. Davis, 186 Md. 463 , 47 A. 2d 379 (1946) (where it was held that the appellant was not exempt from the taxing provisions of the statute) seems here particularly apposite. Judge Collins, writing for the Court, stated: “It is a primary rule of statutory construction that statutes should be construed to effectuate the intention of the Legislature. The meaning and intention must first be sought in the language of the statute itself.

If that language is plain and free of ambiguity and has a definite and sensible meaning, such is conclusively presumed to be the meaning of the Legislature in enacting the statute. The courts are not at liberty to gather a legislative intention contrary to the plain words of the statute or to insert words to express an intention not shown in the original form. The court is justified in disregarding the natural import of the language only when some imperative reason is found in a statute for enlarging or restricting its meaning. Wilson v. State, 21 Md. 1 ; Roach v. Jurchak, 182 Md. 646, 652 , 35 A. 2d 817 .” 186 Md. at 470 , 47 A. 2d at 383 .

See also Saunders v. Unemp. Comp. Bd., supra; and Tucker v. American Smelting & Refining Co., supra. ⁷⁸ The phrase “leaving work voluntarily” cannot by construction be extended so as to make it applicable to any case which is not shown to be clearly within the contemplation of the Legislature. See Maryland Unemployment Comp.

Bd. v. Albrecht, supra. Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English Language, at 2858 (2d ed. 1944), defines “voluntary” as: “1. Proceeding from the will, or from one’s own choice or full consent; produced in or by an act of choice; .... 2. Unconstrained by interference; unimpelled by another’s influence; spontaneous; acting of oneself; free ... 3. a.

Done by design or intention; intentional; purposed; intended, not accidental . . . b. Made or given of one’s own free will; . . .” Black’s Law Dictionary at 1746 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968), similarly defines “voluntarily” to mean “[d]one by design or intention, intentional, purposed, intended, or not accidental . . . Intentionally and without coercion.” “Voluntarily” is defined in Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary at 998 (1967), as done “of one’s own free will.” The Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm’n v. Young, 389 S.W.2d 451, 453 (Ky. 1965), in construing their statute which denied benefits to a worker if “ ‘he has left his most recent suitable work voluntarily without good cause,’ ” held that “[T]he word ‘voluntary’ must certainly be defined as meaning ‘freely given’ and ‘proceeding from one’s own choice or full consent.’ ” In accord, Churchill Downs, Inc. v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins.

Comm’n, 454 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Ky. 1970). Similarly, in MacFarland v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 158 Pa.Super. 418 , 45 A. 2d 423 (1946), where an employee entrusted .with the inspection and maintenance of safety measures performed his duties with an excess of zeal amounting to officious interference in matters outside the scope of those duties and he was discharged for insubordination, it was held that he had not “voluntarily left his work” within the meaning of the Unemployment Compensation Law. That court stated: “The board’s decision that a discharge under ⁷⁹ certain circumstances is equivalent to a voluntary relinquishment of employment is directly counter to our construction of the act.

We have heretofore plainly held