Allen v. Ritter

ADKINS, J. The dispute over the estate of Roy H. Allen has been drawn-out and contentious. Allen died in 2005; after much legal maneuvering, and scores of docket entries, the Orphans’ Court for Dorchester County finally approved an account of his estate in 2009. Before personal representative Sharon J. Ritter (“Appellee”) would make the distribution under that account, she required that Roy Allen’s children sign a document releasing her from liability related to her duties as personal representative. Roy Allen’s daughter, Virginia Leitch, signed and returned the document, but his sons, Deane J. Allen and Robert L. Allen (“Appellants”), refused.

The orphans’ court then ordered Appellants to sign, but they again refused. They appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed the order of the orphans’ court. Allen v. Ritter, 196 Md.App. 617, 632 , 10 A.3d 1183, 1191-92 (2010). We granted certiorari.

Allen v. Ritter, 419 Md. 646 , 20 A.3d 115 (2011). Considering the years of legal wrangling among the parties, we are asked to decide a relatively narrow issue. Appellants presented the following questions for our review, which we have summarized and restated: ²¹⁹ 1. Does Estates & Trusts Section 9-111 allow a personal representative to obtain a release when he or she is acting pursuant to a court-approved distribution? 2.

Does an orphans’ court have the authority to order legatees to sign releases when requested by a personal representative under Section 9-111? 1 We shall hold that Section 9-111 entitles a personal representative to obtain a release when she requests one, and that an orphans’ court may order heirs and legatees to sign such releases when requested. We shall affirm the Court of Special Appeals’ judgment. STATEMENT OF FACTS Roy H. Allen died January 28, 2005, survived by three children, Virginia Leitch, Deane J. Allen, and Robert L. Allen. Since Roy Allen’s death, the personal representative of his estate has shifted.

First, Leitch was named personal representative in Roy Allen’s will. Then, Leitch and Robert Allen were named co-personal representatives by the Orphans’ Court for Dorchester County (“orphans’ court”). After ongoing estate disputes, the orphans’ court removed Leitch and Robert Allen and named Sharon J. Ritter as personal representative on February 26, 2008. Appellants continued to quarrel over Roy Allen’s estate.

The record reflects numerous actions by Appellants objecting to Appellee’s handling of the estate. In an attempt to close ²²⁰ the matter, Appellee filed a First and Final Administration Account (“Account”) of Roy Allen’s estate on September 17, 2008, in the orphans’ court. Appellants excepted to portions of this Account, including attorney’s fees to be paid to Appellee and health-care reimbursement costs borne by Leitch. Despite these exceptions, the orphans’ court approved the Account on May 5, 2009, as filed by Appellee.

In a June 10 letter that year, Appellee mailed a request to Appellants that they sign a release before Appellee would distribute money to them. The release read: KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That the undersigned, Robert Allen, hereby acknowledges to have received from Sharon J. Ritter, Personal Representative of the Estate of Roy Harry Allen, deceased, being in full satisfaction of the distribution to the undersigned, as follows: Cash: $71,273.76 and in consideration thereof the undersigned does hereby release, acquit, exonerate and discharge the said Sharon J. Ritter, Personal Representative, as aforesaid, her heirs, executors and administrators of and from all and every action, suit, claim or demand which could or might possibly be brought, exhibited or prosecuted against her, for or on account of her duties as Personal Representative of said estate, arising from or in any way related to the administration thereof, and on account of such distribution, or any part thereof, hereby declaring myself fully satisfied, contented, and paid, as above specified. I do hereby verify and affirm under the penalties of perjury that I executed the foregoing Release for the purposes therein contained. 2 Appellants did not sign the releases. Responding to the June 10 letter, Appellants’ attorney inquired what law required his clients to sign the releases.

Appellants’ attorney ²²¹ was concerned that Appellants could face a lawsuit from Leiteh on a related matter, and stated that they were “not going to foreclose any recourse they may have against anyone else in this matter.” In an attempt to assuage Appellants’ concerns about a potential lawsuit, Leitch’s attorney sent a letter to Appellants on July 21, 2009, stating that Leiteh did not intend to pursue legal action against Appellants. He also observed that Leiteh was barred from raising such claims and that “the appeal time [had] elapsed.” Regardless, Appellants still did not sign the releases. Appellee then filed a petition for release, asking the orphans’ court to enter an Order requiring [Appellants] to show cause why they should not be ordered to sign the Releases prior to distribution of estate funds from the Personal Representative and further, Order that all Orders issued by this Court pertaining to all matters raised during the administration of this estate are binding and further, since the time for appeals has passed, that such Orders have been issued with prejudice. To support this petition, Appellee cited Section 9-111 of Maryland’s Estates & Trusts Article.

The petition said this section “states that a personal representative may obtain a release from an heir or legatee.” The full language of that section reads: “Upon making a distribution, a personal representative may, but is not required to, obtain a verified release from the heir or legatee.” Md.Code (1974, 2011 Repl.Vol.), § 9-111 of the Estates & Trusts Article. Appellee reiterated her desire to “exercise this right” and that she would “not distribute without a Release signed by” Appellants. On September 29, 2009, the orphans’ court ordered Appellants to show cause why they had not given Appellee a “Receipt and Release regarding [their] distribution” under Roy Allen’s will. In their October 20, 2009, response to the court’s order, Appellants argued that Appellee was not entitled to a release.

They said the language in the release “far ²²² exceeds the scope of having made a distribution” of the residuary estate. They argued that because the distribution was court-ordered, there was “nothing to protect” Appellee. And they concluded by arguing that Section 9-111 applies only to “tangible property and not a cash distribution of a residuary estate,” and accordingly, that “Section 9-111 is not applicable to this case.” Appellee answered a week later, disputing Appellants’ interpretation of the law. Appellee stated that “Section 9-111 is a stand-alone provision allowing for the personal representative to obtain a release” and disputed the assertion that Section 9-111 applies only to tangible property.

Appellee further asked the orphans’ court to order Appellants to sign the releases. After a further answer by Appellants, the orphans’ court ordered Appellants on November 10, 2009, to sign the releases and return them to Appellee within two weeks. Appellants filed a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed: Pursuant to § 9-111, a personal representative “may ... obtain” a release from an hem or legatee.

We hold that this language provides a personal representative with the right to require a release from a distributee. As such, [Appellee] had the right to require a release from the [Appellants] prior to making a distribution pursuant to the Final Account. Allen, 196 Md.App. at 632 , 10 A.3d at 1191 . The Court of Special Appeals also held that the orphans’ court had the power to order Appellants to sign the releases, as such power was “incident to the exercise of its powers to administer estates.” Id. at 633 , 10 A.3d at 1192 .

The court denied Appellants’ motion for reconsideration on February 4, 2011, and we granted certiorari on May 20, 2011. Allen, 419 Md. at 646 , 20 A.3d at 115 . DISCUSSION Pursuant to the questions presented by Appellants, we must interpret the meaning of Section 9-111 of the Estates & ²²³ Trusts Article, which reads: “Upon making a distribution, a personal representative may, but is not required to, obtain a verified release from the heir or legatee.” To construe the statute, we apply principles of statutory interpretation, as we have recently described: The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Statutory construction begins with the plain language of the statute, and ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology.

When a statute’s plain language is unambiguous, we need only to apply the statute as written, and our efforts to ascertain the legislature’s intent end there. Carven v. State Ret. & Pension Sys., 416 Md. 389, 407-08 , 7 A.3d 38, 49 (2010) (citations omitted) (quoting Crofton Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 413 Md. 201, 216 , 991 A.2d 1257, 1266 (2010)). 1. Statutory Scope This statute was enacted in 1969 as part of a comprehensive reform of Maryland testamentary law. The language of Section 9-111 comes directly from the Second Report of the Governor’s Commission to Review and Revise the Testamentary Laws of Maryland, which was appointed in 1965 to help the state in “recodifying and revising the Maryland laws concerning testamentary matters[.]” William L. Henderson et al., Second Report of Governor’s Commission to Review and Revise the Testamentary Laws of Maryland, Article 93: Decedents’ Estates i, 144-45 (1968) (“Henderson Commission Report ”).

The comments to the Commission’s report suggest that Section 9-111 was designed to continue the “Maryland practice of not requiring releases, although personal representatives, out of caution, have, in the past, obtained releases in many instances.” Henderson Commission Report at 144. Additionally, the comments indicate: The Commission does not, however, intend to imply ... that an heir or legatee does not have the right to petition a ²²⁴ Court to compel the personal representative to make a distribution, if the personal representative is abusing his discretion in withholding any distribution. Henderson Commission Report at 145. Appellants make several arguments for why the language of Section 9-111 does not require them to sign the releases sent to them by Appellee.

At oral argument, Appellants argued that a “release” under Section 9-111 does not extend to “release from liability,” asserting instead that personal representatives are only entitled to something more akin to a “receipt.” We do not agree. If the Legislature had intended for Section 9-111 to allow only for a “receipt,” then that word would have appeared in the statute. Instead, the plain meaning of the word “release” 3 unambiguously indicates that a release of liability is intended. Furthermore, a leading treatise on Maryland estate and trust law contains sample release forms that use language similar to the releases in this case.

See Allan J. Gibber, Gibber on Estate Administration 10-114 (5th ed.2011) (sample form containing this language: “I do hereby Release, Acquit, Exonerate and Discharge ... Personal Representative of and from all and every action, suit or demand which could or might possibly be brought, exhibited or prosecuted[.]”). 4 Appellants argue that the discretionary nature of the statute and the Henderson Commission comments preclude a personal representative from obtaining a release in this case. They argue, in effect, that an heir may refuse to sign a release because the statute only says that a personal representative “may, but is not required to ” obtain a release before distribution. None of the legislative history or case law indicates that ²²⁵ an heir or legatee may refuse to sign a release before distribution when presented with one.

Although the comments to the Henderson Commission Report indicate that Section 9-111 continued the “Maryland practice of not requiring releases,” Henderson Commission Report at 144, it is clear to us that this practice simply means that a release is not necessary for distribution to proceed in all cases. Section 9-111 says that a personal representative “may” obtain a release. We therefore agree with the Court of Special Appeals in that “we construe the plain language of the statute involved here, providing that the personal representative ‘may ... obtain’ a release, as conferring the right to obtain a release prior to distribution.” Allen v. Ritter, 196 Md.App. at 628 , 10 A.3d at 1189 . Moving away from plain language, Appellants argue that Section 9-111 does not apply when the corresponding distribution is made according to a court order.

Appellants assert: “No where in the language of the statute is it even intimated that the personal representative has the right to demand and obtain any release prior to paying over to the distributees the amount approved by the Orphans’ Court when it approved the [Account].” Appellants contend that the functional need for a release, when a personal representative is acting under a court-ordered distribution, is obviated by the language of Section 9-112(e), which reads: “Distribution by the personal representative in accordance with the direction of the court at the meeting protects and indemnifies the personal representative acting in obedience to it.” § 9-112(e) of the Estates & Trusts Article. Appellants continue: If a personal representative making a distribution pursuant to a court order in accordance with a 9-112 situation is protected, because that is clearly not a final account situation, then why isn’t a personal representative making a distribution in