Allen v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.

²⁸ Delaplaine, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant is seeking to compel the appellee to re-convey to her one-half of the corpus of a trust estate, which she created over thirty years ago. On May 21st, 1909, the appellant, then named Louise M. Gill Dimpfel, conveyed her interest in certain securities to the Safe Deposit and Trust Company of Baltimore, in trust to pay one-third of the income to her mother for life and two-thirds to herself for life, and the entire income to herself upon her mother’s death. Upon her own death the income from one-half of the corpus is to be applied for the support and education of her children or descendants of a deceased child until they arrive at the age of twenty-one years, when the respective shares of the children or descendants are to be delivered to them free of trust.

The other half is to be held in trust for any person or persons whom she might appoint by will; but if she dies without leaving children or descendants and without a will, “then in further trust for and for the use of the next of kin of the said Louise M. Gill Dimpfel.” The appellant did not reserve any power to revoke the trust. She did reserve, however, the right to withdraw not more than $10,000 from the corpus after attaining the age of twenty-one years. On May 4th, 1911, the appellant was allowed to withdraw $875 on signing a release, in which she waived the right to make any further withdrawals. On November 24th, 1911, she became twenty-one years of age.

On December 18th, 1911, she made a supplemental deed conveying to the trustee her undivided one-half interest in real estate in Baltimore City in consideration of the payment to her of $784.90 from the corpus. The trust estate now consists of bonds valued at about $38,350 and one-half interest in the real estate, assessed at $5180. The appellant has two children and one grandchild. But her mother has died, and she contends that she is now the sole beneficiary of one-half of the estate. ²⁹ It is a well-established rule that a valid trust, in which no power of revocation has been reserved by the settlor, cannot be revoked without the consent of all the beneficiaries.

When a settlor has granted property rights, whether voluntarily or for a consideration, he cannot resume his former status merely because of a change of mind, or a feeling that he has made an unwise conveyance. 4 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, p. 2890, sec. 993; Price v. Price, 162 Md. 656 , 161 A. 2 . The question, therefore, is whether the deed of trust has granted remainder interests to the next of kin. This question must be decided by construing its language to determine the intention of the settlor. If a settlor manifests no intention to grant a beneficial interest to any one else, then he is the sole beneficiary. “If, however, he manifests an intention to create a vested or contingent interest in others, as for example, his children, or the persons who may be his heirs or next of kin on his death, he is not the sole beneficiary.” 2 Restatement of the Law of Trusts, sec. 339.

In Raffel v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 100 Md. 141 , 59 A. 702, 703 , where a young woman conveyed property to a trustee to pay the income to herself, provided that if she failed to make a will the property should “vest in her next of kin or heirs according to law,” it was held that she had the right to terminate the trust. But the court explained in that case that it was clear from the preponderance of the evidence that the appellant had never intended to surrender control of her property, but that she had been misadvised as to the legal effect of the deed and her rights under it, and that she had executed it under a mistaken belief regarding her power to revoke it. An entirely different construction was given in Kensett v. Safe Deposit & Trust