Allgood v. Somerville

Lowe, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. In this appeal from a demurrer sustained without leave to amend by the Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County, appellant ¹⁸⁸ clings to a thin conclusory reed which is far too insubstantial to keep her afloat. Appellant, Palmira N. Allgood, was a deputy sheriff hired by appellee, Sheriff Somerville, and subsequently terminated by him. No reason for termination was given other than that her services were no longer needed.

She petitioned to enjoin that termination. According to the chancellor’s opinion, appellee’s demurrer (which was not included in the record extract but clearly should have been, Md. Rule 1028) asserted: “that this court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case; that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and that the plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient injury warranting injunctive relief.” He then pointed out that there was no tenure or merit system protecting appellant. “The defendant is a constitutional officer with the common law power to appoint and terminate his deputies. Article 10, Section 44, Maryland Constitution; Beasley v. Ridout, 94 Md. 641 (1902); Anderson on Sheriffs, Section 85. The General Assembly has over the years restricted the Sheriff’s rights by providing deputy sheriffs of several counties with tenure after expiration of probation and certain procedural rights with respect to terminations.

See Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Section 2-309 (h), (Carroll County), 2-309 (1) (Frederick County); and Section 2-309 (w) (Washington County). However, it appears that no similar provision has been enacted pertaining to the Sheriff of St. Mary’s County.” The opinion then addressed what the judge discerned to be the underlying cause of action that appellant was trying to set forth in her vague, conclusory and circuitous petition: “The ‘Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights’ was enacted by the Legislature in 1974 (Chapter 722, Acts of 1974), its application expanded by ¹⁸⁹ amendment in 1975 (Chapter 809, Acts of 1975), and substantially rewritten in 1977, (Chapter 366, Acts of 1977). The purpose of the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights was to guarantee certain procedural safeguards to law enforcement officers during investigations and hearings which could result in disciplinary action, demotion or dismissal. Abbott v. Administrative Hearing Board, 33 Md. App. 681 , 366 A. 2d 756 (1976).

Section 728 (b) sets forth the procedures to be followed and conditions that must be met whenever a law enforcement officer is under investigation or is subject to interrogation by a law enforcement agency, for any reason which could lead to disciplinary action, demotion or dismissal. Similarly, Section 730 (a) confers a right to a hearing if an investigation or interrogation of a law enforcement officer results in the recommendation of some action such as dismissal. Section 731 requires that the hearing board make a finding of guilty or not guilty on each issue before the board. In the instant case, there can be no doubt that the plaintiff is a law enforcement officer within the meaning of Sections 727 (b) (5) and 727 (b-1).

But the plaintiff does not allege or contend that she was either investigated, interrogated, or charged. Nor were any complaints or accusations made against her. This admission appears fatal, for the language of the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights clearly indicates that the law enforcement agency must act in one of the above ways before the procedural safeguards and protections can come into play. Simply put, the court is of the opinion that the language of the statutes here relied upon by the plaintiff do