Allstate Insurance v. Kyong Ho Kim

WILNER, Judge. In its 2001 session, the General Assembly abolished the defense of parent-child immunity in a tort action arising from the operation of a motor vehicle, up to the minimum amount of liability insurance coverage required by Maryland Code, § 17-103(b) of the Transportation Article ($20,000 per person/$40,000 per accident). The law took effect October 1, 2001. The issue in this appeal is whether that law was intended to apply, and lawfully can apply, to an action that was filed after October 1, 2001, but that arose from an accident that occurred prior to that date.

In an action for declaratory judgment filed by appellant, Allstate Insurance Company, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County declared that the law was applicable. We shall affirm. BACKGROUND This Court adopted the doctrine of parent-child tort immunity in 1930. In Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18 , 152 A. 498 (1930), we barred an action by a mother against her minor son for injuries arising from an automobile accident caused by her son’s negligent driving.

In doing so, as we later explained in Warren v. Warren, 336 Md. 618, 622 , 650 A.2d 252, 254 (1994), “[w]e fashioned a broad reciprocal immunity under which parents and children could not assert any claim for civil redress [against each other].” We have, over time, offered various rationales for that immunity — that it preserved both the harmony and integrity of the family unit and parental authority in the parent-child relationship, that it prevented ²⁸² fraud and collusion among family members to the detriment of third parties, and that it averted the threat that intra-familial litigation would deplete family resources. See Renko v. McLean, 346 Md. 464, 469 , 697 A.2d 468, 470-71 (1997) and Eagan v. Calhoun, 347 Md. 72, 75 , 698 A.2d 1097, 1099 (1997). The doctrine was first enunciated in an 1891 Mississippi case, Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703 , 9 So. 885 (1891), and, for a time, gained recognition in many other States. By 1994, however, the doctrine had either been abrogated altogether or made inapplicable to motor torts in most of the States that had ever adopted it, including Mississippi.

In Warren v. Warren, supra, 336 Md. at 627, n. 2 , 650 A.2d at 257, n. 2 , we noted that 43 jurisdictions then permitted suits between parents and children for motor torts, either because parent-child tort immunity had never been adopted or because it had been totally or partially abrogated. Notwithstanding that Maryland remained increasingly isolated in its attachment to this doctrine, we steadfastly refused to abolish it and consented to only three exceptions to it. In Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61 , 77 A.2d 923 (1951), we held that a minor child who had suffered from cruel, inhuman, or outrageous conduct at the hands of a parent could sue that parent for money damages. In Waltzinger v. Birsner, 212 Md. 107 , 128 A.2d 617 (1957), we held that an emancipated child could sue his parent for claims arising after the child reached majority, and, in Hatzinicolas v. Protopapas, 314 Md. 340 , 550 A.2d 947 (1988), we allowed a child to sue the business partner of his parent for negligence committed in the operation of the partnership.

We rejected several entreaties to add an additional exception for actions arising from motor torts, despite the existence of limited compulsory insurance in Maryland. Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542 , 505 A.2d 826 (1986); Warren v. Warren, supra, 336 Md. 618 , 650 A.2d 252 ; Renko v. McLean, supra, 346 Md. 464 , 697 A.2d 468 ; Eagan v. Calhoun, supra, 347 Md. at 81 , 698 A.2d at 1102 . In Frye and Warren , we expressed the beliefs that exclusion of motor torts from the immunity doctrine would inevitably have some impact on the compulsory insurance program mandated by the ²⁸³ Legislature and that, if an exception of that kind was to be made, it should “be created by the General Assembly after an examination of appropriate policy considerations in light of the current statutory scheme.” Frye, supra, 305 Md. at 567 , 505 A.2d at 839 ; Warren, supra, 336 Md. at 627 , 650 A.2d at 257 . 1 Our last rejection of a proposed exception for motor torts came in 1997, in Renko . The Legislature immediately renewed efforts to create such an exception by statute.

Bills were introduced in the 1998 and 1999 sessions, each, as we shall explain, taking a somewhat different approach, but neither passed. Finally, in the 2001 session, the Legislature passed House Bill 183 (2001 Md. Laws, ch. 199). Chapter 199 added a new § 5-806 to the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article — the subtitle dealing with immunities and prohibited actions — and made conforming amendments to § 3-904, which was part of the wrongful death law. Section 5-806(b) provides: “The right of action by a parent or the estate of a parent against a child of the parent, or by a child or the estate of a child against a parent of the child, for wrongful death, personal injury, or property damage arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle ... may not be restricted by the doctrine of parent-child immunity or by any insurance policy provisions, up to the mandatory minimum liability coverage levels required by § 17-103(b) of the Transportation Article.” The Act took effect October 1, 2001, and declared that its provisions “shall apply to any case for wrongful death, personal injury, or property damage arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle filed on or after [that date].” On July 13, 2001, Nathan Ji Hoo Kim, a young child, was a passenger in a motor vehicle being driven by his mother, Hyo Shin Kim.

Nathan somehow managed to get out of his car seat in the back and make his way to the front of the car. ²⁸⁴ Commencing an attempt to return the child to his car seat, Ms. Kim pulled to- the side of the road and opened the driver’s side door. She failed to put the gear lever in Park position, however, and the car began to roll forward. Nathan, unfortunately, fell out of the car while it was in motion and was injured. Kyong Ho Kim, Nathan’s father, incurred medical expenses in the treatment of Nathan’s injuries.

At the time of the accident, Mr. and Ms. Kim had in place a policy of motor vehicle insurance issued on February 25, 2001 by Allstate Insurance Company. The policy provided liability coverage in the amount of $50,000 per person injured. It contained an exclusion, however, for “[bjodily injury to any person related to an insured person by blood, marriage, or adoption and residing in that person’s household, to the extent that the limits of liability for this coverage exceed the limits of liability required by the Maryland Financial Responsibility Law.” Mr. Kim made a claim on the policy, on both his and Nathan’s. behalf, whereupon Allstate filed this declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County to determine whether there was coverage. Allstate acknowledged that, if parent-child immunity was inapplicable to the claim, Allstate would be liable, up to the minimum liability coverage required by § 17 — 103(b) of the Transportation Article, due to the mother’s negligence.

It contended, however, that Chapter 199, abrogating the immunity in motor tort cases, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and other unspecified provisions of the U.S. and Maryland Constitutions, and that, even if Constitutional, it was not intended to be applied and could not validly be applied to claims or causes of action that arose before its effective date (October 1, 2001). Retroactive application, it averred, would constitute an unlawful impairment of the obligation of contracts and would violáte the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Articles 19 and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Allstate asked the court to make declarations consistent with those arguments — in effect, to declare Chapter 199 invalid or inapplicable. ²⁸⁵ The court found no merit in Allstate’s contentions. On July 1, 2002, it entered a declaratory judgment that Chapter 199 “applies retroactively to any claims filed on or after October 1, 2001, irrespective of whether the cause of action giving rise to such claims arose prior to or after that date” and that the statute was “constitutional in all respects.” Allstate appealed, and we granted certiorari prior to any proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals to consider (1) whether the Legislature intended for Chapter 199 to apply to claims filed on or after October 1, 2001, regardless of when the cause of action arose; (2) if so, whether, as to Allstate, such application violates the due process and “taking” provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions or constitutes an unlawful impairment of contract; and (3) whether abolition of parent-child immunity only for motor torts violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

We shall affirm the judgment entered below. DISCUSSION Equal Protection Chapter 199 abrogates parent-child immunity only with respect to tort claims arising from automobile accidents and, as to those claims, only up to the minimum amount of insurance required by State law ($20,000 per person injured up to a maximum of $40,000 per accident). Allstate contends that there is no rational basis for distinguishing those kinds of claims from other tort claims and that, as a result, the partial abrogation violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For that proposition, Allstate relies entirely on a 1980 South Carolina case, Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132, 268 S.E.2d 109 (1980), which we find unpersuasive and decline to follow.

Elam presented two issues — whether a South Carolina statute that, like Chapter 199, abrogated parent-child immunity only in motor tort cases violated equal protection guarantees in the Federal and South Carolina Constitutions and whether the court, by judicial decision, should abrogate the common ²⁸⁶ law immunity in its entirety. In holding that the statute violated equal protection guarantees, the court relied on an earlier case, Marley v. Kirby, 271 S.C. 122 , 245 S.E.2d 604 (1978), in which it had declared a comparative negligence statute in violation of equal protection because it applied only to motor vehicle accidents. The entire analysis in Elam was embodied in the single statement: “There is no rational justification for singling out persons injured in automobile accidents for purposes of comparative negligence; similarly, there is no valid reason to treat unemancipated minors injured in automobile accidents differently from their peers tortiously injured in other ways.” Id. at 110. The court then went on to abolish the doctrine in its entirety as a matter of common law, thereby making its conclusion regarding the statute of little or no import.

To the best of our knowledge, the South Carolina court stands alone in its equal protection conclusion. The North Carolina court found no equal protection problem with a similar statute, noting that the motor vehicle problem in the State was such that the Legislature “should be free to attack the evils brought about by accidents on the highways without addressing the whole field of negligence actions.” Ledwell v. Berry, 39 N.C.App. 224 , 249 S.E.2d 862, 864 (N.C.Ct.App. 1978), rev. denied, 296 N.C. 585 , 254 S.E.2d 35 (1979). As we observed in Warren v. Warren, supra, 336 Md. at 627, n. 2 , 650 A.2d at 257, n. 2 , many States, by statute or by judicial decision, have abrogated parent-child immunity in motor tort cases, either entirely or to the extent that liability is covered by insurance. In Fields v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins.

Co., 350 Ark. 75 , 87 S.W.3d 224, 229 (2002), the Arkansas court noted that 21 States had partially abrogated the doctrine in that manner, most of them by judicial decision. Those courts, obviously perceived no equal protection problem with their partial abrogation. Allstate agrees that the classification it attacks is to be judged under the “rational basis” standard. Under that test, a statutory classification “enjoys a strong presumption of ²⁸⁷ constitutionality and will be invalidated only if the classification is clearly arbitrary.” Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 356 , 601 A.2d 102, 108 (1992).

Generally, a court will not overturn a legislative classification under a rational basis standard ‘unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that [the court] can only conclude that the [governmental] actions were irrational.’ Id., at 355 , 601 A.2d at 108 , quoting from Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 471 , 111 S.Ct. 2395, 2406 , 115 L.Ed.2d 410, 430 (1991), quoting, in turn, Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 , 99 S.Ct. 939, 943 , 59 L.Ed.2d 171, 176 (1979). See also Waters v. Montgomery County, 337 Md. 15, 33-34 , 650 A.2d 712, 720-21 (1994). As most recently stated by the Supreme Court: “[T]he Equal Protection Clause is satisfied so long as there is a plausible policy reason for the classification, the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based rationally may have been considered to be true by the governmental decisionmaker, and the relationship of the classification to its goal is not so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.” Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n, (No. 02-695, 2003), — U.S. — , 123 S.Ct. 2156, 2159 , 156 L.Ed.2d 97 (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11-12 , 112 S.Ct. 2326, 2332 , 120 L.Ed.2d 1, 13 (1992) (citations omitted)). In Warren v. Warren, supra, 336 Md. at 627-28 , 650 A.2d at 257 , we signaled our belief that it would not be irrational or arbitrary for the Legislature to abrogate parent-child immunity in motor tort cases, noting that such an exception could “be created by the General Assembly after an examination of appropriate policy considerations in light of the current statutory scheme.” There are a number of social and economic realities which make the limited abrogation under Chapter 199 entirely rational.

Automobile accidents are common, and they can cause serious injuries which, if not at least partially compensable, can truly deplete family resources and lead to the very family disharmony and disruption that the immunity doctrine was designed to prevent. Indeed, we expect that ²⁸⁸ automobile accidents are a prime source of injuries suffered by a parent or a child due to the negligence of the other. Providing some measure of redress for such injuries, while at the same time preserving parent-child immunity in other contexts, is an entirely reasonable policy for the Legislature to adopt. In inviting a legislative response, we certainly had in mind that, due to the compulsory insurance law in Maryland, there is ordinarily some insurance or other coverage in most motor tort cases-liability insurance protecting the tortfeasor, uninsured motorist coverage protecting the victim, or a claim against the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund.

Because the abrogation under Chapter 199 is limited to the amount of mandatory insurance coverage, there is little likelihood that it will result in any depletion or dislocation of family resources. See Glaskox By and Through Denton v. Glaskox, 614 So.2d 906, 911-12 (Miss.1992): “In the area of automobile accident cases, the almost universal existence of liability insurance cannot be ignored. Where liability insurance exists, the domestic tranquility argument is no longer valid; in fact it is quite hollow, for in reality the sought after litigation is between the child and the parent’s insurance carrier; not the child [and] the parent ... Quite to the contrary of the fears of the defendants. where insurance is available to compensate the child for injuries, the possibility of disruption of the family unit is negligible.” See also Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181 , 183 S.E.2d 190, 194 (1971).

In that limited context, abrogation serves more to eliminate than to create a classification: it removes a bar to redress that was applicable only to parents and unemancipated minor children and treats them like all other victims of automobile negligence. As the chief sponsor, Delegate Vallario, pointed out in testimony on the bill, if two children, one 18 and one 17, are injured due to the negligent driving of their parent, the 18-year-old child could seek legal redress but not his/her ²⁸⁹ brother or sister. We find no violation of equal protection in Chapter 199. Retroactive Application We have, over the years, stated a number of rules regarding the application of statutes to events that occurred prior to their effective date, and, although we have generally applied those rules consistently, we have not always been consistent in articulating them.

In WSSC v. Riverdale Heights Fire Co., 308 Md. 556, 563-64 , 520 A.2d 1319, 1323 (1987), we confirmed four basic principles of Maryland law: (1) statutes are presumed to operate prospectively unless a contrary intent appears; (2) a statute governing procedure or remedy will be applied to cases pending in court when the statute becomes effective; (3) a statute will be given retroactive effect if that is the legislative intent; but (4) even if intended to apply retroactively, a statute will not be given that effect if it would impair vested rights, deny due process, or violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws. We have restated several of those principles in subsequent cases, and they remain the framework for analysis. When an issue is raised regarding whether a statute may be given retroactive effect, we engage in a two-part analysis. First, we must determine whether the Legislature intended the statute to have the kind of retroactive effect that is asserted.

That implicates the first and third principles. Applying the presumption of prospectivity, a statute will be found to operate retroactively only when the Legislature “clearly expresses an intent that the statute apply retroactively.” Waters v. Montgomery County, supra, 337 Md. at 28 , 650 A.2d at 718 . The issue of intent sometimes becomes clouded when, as here, a statute can be regarded as being prospective in one sense and retroactive in another. As noted in State Comm’n on Human Rel. v. Amecom Div., 278 Md. 120, 123 , 360 A.2d 1, 3-4 (1976), “a statute, though applied only in legal proceedings subsequent to its effective date and in that sense, at least, prospective, is, when applied so as to determine the legal significance of acts or events that occurred prior to its ²⁹⁰ effective date, applied retroactively.” Context becomes important.

If we conclude that the Legislature did intend for the statute to have retroactive effect, we must then examine whether such effect would contravene some Constitutional right or prohibition. That implicates the second and fourth principles. As we pointed out recently in Dua v. Comcast Cable, 370 Md. 604 , 805 A.2d 1061 (2002), that analysis must take into account both Federal and Maryland provisions, as to which the standards differ. Legislative Intent In determining legislative intent, we begin with the plain meaning of the statutory language.

If the intent is clear from that language, there is no need to search further. If the intent for which we search cannot be gleaned from the statutory language alone, we may, and often must, look for evidence of intent from legislative history or other sources. See Medex v. McCabe, 372 Md. 28, 38 , 811 A.2d 297, 303 (2002); MVA v. Lytle, 374 Md. 37, 57 , 821 A.2d 62, 73-74 (2003). As we indicated, the Legislature attempted to state its intent in Chapter 199.

Section 2 provided that the Act shall apply to “any case for wrongful death, personal injury, or property damage arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle filed on or after [October 1, 2001].” (Emphasis added). In one sense, as observed in State Comm’n on Human Rel. v. Amecom Div., supra, 278 Md. at 123 , 360 A.2d at 3-4 , that constitutes a purely prospective intent: the Act, which eliminated an existing defense, would apply only to cases filed in court after its effective date. In its Bill Analysis, the House Judiciary Committee noted that HB 183 “applies prospectively to any case for wrongful death, personal injury or property damage arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle filed on or after October 1, 2001.” (Emphasis added). Allstate, understandably, focuses not just on the prospective context of when the case was filed but on the fact that some cases filed after October 1, 2001, like this one, involve causes ²⁹¹ of action arising before that date, to which, at the time the action arose, a defense of parent-child immunity existed.

It posits that, because there is no clear expression in the statute that it was intended to apply to cases of that kind — the only category that raises the specter of retroactive application — it must be presumed that the statute was not intended to apply to them. Allstate finds support for that presumption in the use of the word “prospectively” in the House Judiciary Committee Bill Analysis, which Allstate contends constitutes an affirmative expression of intent that the Act not apply to such claims. Allstate’s argument finds no support in logic, in the words of the statute, or in the legislative history. Although an intent to have a statute operate retroactively must be clearly expressed to be given effect, there is no mandated form for its articulation, and the expression may be found by necessary implication.

In declaring, without limitation, that the Act would apply to “any case” filed on or after its effective date, the Legislature must have recognized that cases filed on that date, or even within the applicable period of limitations thereafter, may, and in some instances necessarily must, have arisen from automobile accidents that occurred before October 1, 2001. Having stated that the Act was to apply to “any case” filed after October 1, 2001, the Legislature was not required to engage in the redundancy of stating that, by “any case,” it meant “every case.” To the extent that use of the filing date of the action as the criterion results in a retroactive application of the statute, therefore, it is clearly one that the Legislature must have intended. See Jenkins v. County of Los Angeles, 74 Cal.App.4th 524, 536 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 149 (Cal.Ct.App.1999). That conclusion, drawn as a necessary inference from the statutory language itself, is supported, as well, by the legislative history.

Our most recent rejection of any further change in