Allstate Insurance v. Miller

BLACKWELL, Judge. This automobile insurance case presents two issues. First, we consider whether the circuit court erred by declaring a motorist uninsured as a matter of law under the instant facts. Second, we consider whether that court erred in failing to correct a judgment where the verdict against an insurance company exceeded its uninsured motorist policy limits. ¹⁸⁴ I. Mary Colleen Miller (Miller) was a passenger in her employer’s vehicle when she sustained injuries in a two-car collision.

Gregory Dean Sowell (Sowell), the other driver, allegedly caused the accident. Through Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), Miller’s employer had a policy which covered any passenger injured by an uninsured motorist. 1 Miller sued Sowell and Allstate in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Miller alleged negligence against Sowell, and in a breach of contract count sought damages against Allstate under the terms of the uninsured motorist provision of the policy in question. Prior to trial, an order of default was entered against Sowell, leaving two issues unresolved: whether Sowell was uninsured, and secondly, the amount of damages that plaintiff was entitled to recover.

The second issue, of course, had two aspects: the damages to which Miller was entitled by reason of Sowell’s negligence, and the amount owed Miller by Allstate by reason of the insurance contract. At the conclusion of testimony, the court granted Miller’s motion that the jury be instructed that Sowell was an uninsured motorist as a matter of law. The court also granted Miller’s motion on the issue of liability as to Allstate. The circuit court’s instructions directed the jury to only consider the issue of the plaintiff’s damages.

The jury was directed to consider the elements of damage that typically are involved in a tort case. What was before the jury was ¹⁸⁵ the damages, if any, arising from the tort action of Miller v. Sowell, Sowell’s liability having been determined by the order of default. Md. Rules 2-613(a) and (e). After a bench conference, the court emphasized that the jury was “to bring back one verdict, one amount of money, and not speculate as regards [to] any disbursement between Sowell ... and Allstate Insurance Company.” Neither party excepted to this instruction. 2 The jury returned a verdict in favor of Miller in the amount of $120,000, although the policy only covered $50,-000 of that amount in uninsured motorist coverage.

The declarations page of the policy was not offered in evidence by either party. Allstate timely filed post judgment motions, which were summarily denied. On appeal, Allstate contended the jury instructions improperly indicated that Sowell was an uninsured motorist as a matter of law. Furthermore, the insurer argued that the court erred in denying the post-trial motions where the verdict exceeded the policy limitation.

In an unreported per curiam opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed on both issues. The court observed that Allstate had made a tactical decision not to establish its policy limit before the ¹⁸⁶ jury; the company would have to bear the consequences of that decision. We conclude the trial court properly instructed the jury that Sowell was an uninsured motorist as a matter of law. However, we find that the trial court should have reduced the amount of the judgment against Allstate in keeping with the contractual limitation of the policy.

II

Uninsured Motorist as a Matter of Law Allstate contends that Sowell was not an uninsured motorist as a matter of law because the facts supporting this interpretation were not uncontroverted. We disagree. “A party may move for judgment on any or all of the issues in any action at the close of the evidence offered by an opposing party, and in a jury trial at the close of all the evidence.” Md. Rule 2-519(a). Upon such a motion, the court must consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and interpret every reasonable inference in its favor. DeBleecker v. Montgomery County, 292 Md. 498, 510 , 438 A.2d 1348, 1355 (1982); Impala Platinum v. Impala Sales, 283 Md. 296, 328 , 389 A.2d 887, 905-06 (1978).

The court should not grant a judgment in favor of the moving party on any issue for which that party bears the burden of proof except when (1) the facts are uncontroverted or (2) the parties have agreed to the facts. University Nat’l Bank v. Wolfe, 279 Md. 512, 525 , 369 A.2d 570, 577 (1977); Alexander v. Tingle, 181 Md. 464, 470 , 30 A.2d 737, 740 (1943). In order “for evidentiary facts and inferences to be ‘uncontroverted or undisputed,’ there must be either actual or constructive acquiescence in their truth on the part of all affected parties.” University Nat’l Bank, 279 Md. at 525 , 369 A.2d at 577 -78 (quoting Peroti v. Williams, 258 Md. 663, 669 , 267 A.2d 114, 118 (1970)). While a jury must accept uncontroverted evidence as a matter of law, the jury may disbelieve uncontradicted evidence.

Id. at 525, 369 A.2d at 577 . Miller produced the following evidence at trial to prove that the defendant driver was an uninsured motorist. Leno ¹⁸⁷ ra Eileen Sowell (Mrs. Sowell) testified that she owned the car which her husband was driving at the time of the collision. The ear was not insured.

Moreover, to the best of her knowledge, her husband had no other type of insurance coverage which would provide for damages arising from the accident. Charles Pacholkiw, a representative of Nationwide Insurance Company, testified that he had sold automobile insurance to Mrs. Sowell for the car in question; however he also produced a “Notice of Cancellation” of insurance, which was admitted into evidence. That notice had been mailed to Mrs. Sowell and stated that her policy had been terminated on January 5, 1983 for nonpayment of the premium. The accident occurred on January 29, 1983.

Deborah Ritter (Ritter), a casualty claims adjuster for Allstate, investigated Miller’s accident and testified that she received a letter from Nationwide Insurance. The letter, which was admitted into evidence, stated that Sowell was uninsured at the time of the accident. Ritter also testified that she knew of no other efforts made by Allstate to ascertain whether Sowell or the vehicle he was driving had insurance at the time of the accident. Stephen Leslie Kind, the driver of the vehicle in which Miller rode, stated that he had obtained the name of So-well’s insurance agent as well as their policy number from the Department of Motor Vehicles; the agent informed him that Sowell’s policy had lapsed. 3 Finally, records from the Maryland Department of Transportation were introduced into evidence.

These records indicated that the Sowells were the owners of the car that had collided with Miller and Kind’s vehicle and that the vehicle’s insurance was cancelled on January 5, 1983. ¹⁸⁸ Although Allstate denied liability, the company offered no evidence to prove that Sowell had insurance at the time of the accident. 4 Nor did Allstate offer evidence to impeach Miller’s witnesses or to contradict Miller’s evidence. During a bench conference at trial, the judge asked counsel for Allstate, “What evidence is there that you can point to that there was any insurance, other than a vague hope that somebody might think that he was insured?” Counsel for Allstate responded, “None, your Honor, except for the fact that he very well could have had a personal policy.” Where a plaintiff provides extensive evidence that a motorist is uninsured and the plaintiff’s carrier makes no attempt to rebut that evidence or to prove that the motorist was insured, the court should, upon proper motion, rule that the motorist was uninsured as a matter of law. In essence, the plaintiff’s uncontradicted evidence becomes uncontroverted on the basis of the plaintiff’s thorough documentation and the defendant’s complete inaction. The mere suggestion by the carrier that the motorist might have had a “personal policy” is not sufficient to prevent the court from reaching this conclusion.

In reviewing the evidence presented in a light most favorable to Allstate, we conclude that the facts concerning Sowell’s status as an uninsured motorist are uncontroverted. We agree with the Court of Special Appeals that the trial court properly instructed the jury that Sowell was an uninsured motorist as a matter of law.

III

Correct Entry of Judgment The descriptive title which Allstate placed on its post judgment motion was “MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NON OBSTANTE VEREDICTO, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, A NEW TRIAL OR A REMITTITUR.” That motion raised several grounds. Allstate’s motion was filed within ten ¹⁸⁹ days of the entry of judgment. 5 Under former Md. Rule 1012(d) (now Rule 8-202(c)) it operated to extend the time for noting an appeal until thirty days after its denial. Allstate’s post judgment motion included the assertion that the trial court had “erred in permitting the jury to return a verdict against this defendant in excess of the limit set forth in said insurance policy.” This ground of the motion sought a reduction of the judgment entered on the count of Miller’s complaint sounding in contract. Under Md. Rule 2-532(a), a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict does not lie because Allstate had not moved for a judgment at the close of all of the evidence on the issue that Allstate had no liability for any amount in excess of the limits of uninsured motorist coverage.

Cfi Md. Rule 2-519(a) (“A party may move for judgment on any or all of the issues ... in a jury trial at the close of all the evidence.”). Nevertheless, Allstate’s motion sought a revision of the judgment and was sufficient to invoke the court’s revisory power under Md. Rule 2-5S5(a). 6 Allstate attached the portion of the policy setting out the policy limits to its motion for reconsideration of the denial of the post judgment motion. That reconsideration was denied before the order for appeal was filed. Because judgment on the contract claim exceeding the $50,000 limit in the policy was erroneous as a matter of law, the circuit court erred in failing to revise the judgment.

Review of the denial of revision is available on this timely appeal from the judgment. ¹⁹⁰ Allstate argues that a jury verdict against an insurer which exceeds its uninsured third party