American Laundry MacHinery Industries v. Horan

Wilner, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a “products liability” case; it is a most unusual one, and also a most tragic one. Timothy Horan was a balloonist — the “up, up, and away” kind. He owned a large hot air balloon that, for fun and profit, he used in various promotional events.

In October, 1976, Mr. Horan was engaged to fly his balloon in order to advertise or promote the Shrine Circus. The person representing the Circus in this was one William Stair, who also happened to own the Up-to-Date Laundry. As an inducement to Mr. Horan, Mr. Stair promised to clean the balloon if it got dirty, which, indeed, it did. Unfortunately, however, Mr. Stair’s laundry did not have a machine large enough to handle the balloon.

It should be explained at this point that the actual balloon part (sans cable and gondola) was made of a urethane coated nylon fabric. Although, when inflated, it was about 55 feet in diameter, and enveloped 5,500 cubic feet of air, it could be folded neatly into a bundle approximately 3% feet wide by lVz feet high and, when so folded, fit into a canvas bag. It weighed about 128 pounds. ⁹⁹ As in most professions, there is a certain camaraderie among laundrymen, and Stair, through his subordinates at Up-to-Date, learned that Sinai Hospital had a machine large enough to wash Horan’s balloon. In return for past favors done by Up-to-Date, Sinai agreed to handle this item; and so, on October 25,1976, Mr. Horan, accompanied by Fred Jessop, a vice-president and manager of Up-to-Date, took the balloon to the laundry room at Sinai Hospital.

A number of Sinai employees were, of course, at work there —- among them Edwin Zimmerman, the laundry manager, Steven Sebree, his assistant, and Ronald Scott, a “washman.” In its collapsed state, the balloon was washed without incident. It was then put in the dryer. This dryer is known in the trade as a Notrux Extractor. It was manufactured and sold to Sinai in 1958 by appellant, the American Laundry Machinery Company, now a division of McGraw Edison.

The design of this machine is a critical element in this case, and will be described in some detail shortly. Suffice it at this point to note that it contained three main elements. The first was the “basket.” This consisted of two semi-circular metal bins into which the wet laundry would be placed. The two bins, each a self-contained unit, would then be coupled together to form one circular receptacle divided along its diameter.

The laundry in one part of the basket was thus kept separate from that in the other part, an important factor in this case. The exterior skin of this “basket” was perforated; through the holes water could (and was supposed to) escape. The basket fit into the second element — a round metal cylinder known as the “curb.” This unit, itself stationary, spun the basket around inside of it at great speed - — 750 RPM — which spinning action created an enormous centrifugal force that expelled the water from the laundry inside the basket. The “curb,” in turn, was suspended from the floor by suspension rods housed in three large pylons or pedestals located equidistant around the curb.

These pedestals were bolted to a steel slab that was itself bolted to the floor. The machine itself was thus immobile. Anyone who has taken a course in high school physics, or has ever seen the family washing machine begin to shake, ¹⁰⁰ rattle, and walk across the floor during the “spin” cycle, knows how powerful centrifugal force can be, and thus how important it is to balance the laundry load evenly. This is especially true with an 8,000-pound machine capable of spinning a 2,000-pound load (1,400 pounds of wet laundry and a 685-pound basket) at 750 revolutions per minute.

Thus, when the wet balloon (128 pounds dry weight) was put into one part of the basket, an equivalent amount of regular laundry was placed in the other part. The top was put on and the machine was started. It immediately “oscillated” — i.e., it vibrated — and it was immediately shut off. The Sinai washman — Mr. Scott — wet down the Sinai laundry to add some weight to it and even out the balance, and the machine was started again.

The same thing happened, and it was again shut down right away. More laundry and water was added, but, when restarted, it again shook and made a racket. Finally, on the fourth try, the “oscillation” tapered off. The machine ran smoothly — for less than a minute — when, without warning, it suddenly, instantaneously, came wildly apart and disintegrated, strewing shrapnel throughout the room.

The parties characterized what happened as an “explosion.” One piece of flying metal virtually amputated Fred Jessop’s left arm, wiping out his wrist completely. Timothy Horan had his abdomen sliced open. The threshold question, of course, is what caused this to happen. In a combined action by Horan and Jessop in the Superior Court of Baltimore City, the court and jury, by their respective decisions, concluded that the accident was attributable to defects in the machine itself, and not to any act or omission of the persons operating it.

This was made manifest when (1) a directed verdict was entered by the court in favor of Sinai and its employees, as defendants in the original actions by Horan and Jessop, and in favor of Horan, Jessop, and Up-to-Date Laundry, as defendants in a third-party action brought by appellant; (2) the jury returned a verdict in favor of Horan against appellant for $335,425 ($210,425 in compensatory damages and $125,000 in punitive damages); and (3) it also returned a verdict in favor of Jessop against appellant in the amount of $874,637 ($674,637 in ¹⁰¹ compensatory damages and $200,000 in punitive damages). 1 The case against appellant was submitted to the jury on issues; and, with respect to each plaintiff, it found liability on the basis of both negligence and strict liability. Appellant is obviously displeased with this result, and so it has appealed. It claims: “I. There Was Insufficient Evidence of Negligence To Allow The Jury To Consider That Issue.

II

The Doctrine of Strict Liability Is Unconstitutional Generally And, As Applied Here, Specifically.

III

Even Assuming That Strict Liability Is A Constitutionally Permissible Doctrine It Is Not Applicable In This Case.

IV

Directed Verdicts Should Not Have Been Entered In Favor Of Sinai Hospital, Frederick . Jessop and Up-To-Date Laundry. V. Punitive Damages Could Not Be Properly Assessed In This Case.

VI

The Jury Was Allowed To Consider Financial Resources Not Relevant To The Case.

VII

The Court’s Rulings On The Admissibility Of Evidence Were Improper.” We shall deal with these in the order presented, although, as will soon become apparent, it will not be necessary to decide the second, third, or sixth issues. (1) Evidence of Negligence In Moran v. Fabergé, 273 Md. 538 (1975), the Court of Appeals concluded (p. 543) that “a manufacturer’s duty to produce a safe product, with appropriate warnings and instructions when necessary, is no different from the ¹⁰² responsibility each of us bears to exercise due care to avoid unreasonable risk of harm to others.” As a result, the Court noted that “consumer suits” have been permitted against manufacturers based “purely on negligence concepts” for “defective design, negligent production, and failure to warn (or adequately warn) of latent dangers.” Id., at 543 . The actions by Horan and Jessop against appellant were indeed based in part upon a negligence theory, the particular negligence alleged being that of defective design and failure to warn of latent danger. Appellant claims that the evidence adduced in support of that theory was insufficient to permit it to be considered by the jury — in other words, that the court erred in denying itis motion for directed verdict.

The standard to be applied in this regard is that stated in Fowler v. Smith, 240 Md. 240 (1965), as restated in Curley v. General Valet Service, 270 Md. 248 (1973), and confirmed in Beahm v. Shortall, 279 Md. 321 (1977); namely: “... [Njegligence is a relative term, to be decided upon the facts of each particular case; that ordinarily it is a question of fact to be determined by the jury; that before it can be determined as a matter of law that one has not been guilty of negligence, the truth of all the credible evidence tending to sustain the claim of negligence must be assumed and all favorable inferences of fact fairly deducible therefrom tending to establish negligence drawn; that ‘Maryland has gone almost as far as any jurisdiction that we know of in holding that meager evidence of negligence is sufficient to carry the case to the jury;’ that the rule requires submission of the case to the jury if there be any evidence, however slight, legally sufficient as tending to prove negligence, the weight and value of such evidence being left to the jury---- The test of legal sufficiency, we have held, ‘is whether the evidence serves to prove a fact or permits an inference of fact that could enable an ordinarily intelligent mind to draw a rational conclusion therefrom in support of ¹⁰³ the right of the plaintiff to recover.’ [citation omitted].” See also Impala Platinum v. Impala Sales, 283 Md. 296, 329 (1978); Summit Loans, Inc. v. Pecola, 265 Md. 43 (1972). The evidence in support of appellees’ theories of negligence came primarily from their “expert” witness, Simon Tamny, whose testimony covered three principal elements: causation, foreseeability, and preventability of the accident. (a) Causation In a nutshell, Mr. Tamny described what amounts to a three-step process that caused the extractor to disintegrate. First, he pointed out that the balloon was made of an essentially waterproof, or nonabsorbent, material, which would make the extraction (through centrifugal force) of water retained in it considerably more difficult than the extraction of water from ordinary laundry.

Thus, although the load may have been fairly well balanced, as to weight, when the balloon and the other laundry were initially put into the basket, it would quickly become out of balance once the spinning action commenced. The water would rapidly be expelled from the side of the basket containing the ordinary laundry, because it could be pushed through the fabric itself; but, as to the balloon, the water would escape more slowly because of the more impervious nature of the fabric. This differential in the rate of expulsion (and, conversely, in the amount of water retained) created an increasingly significant weight differential, or imbalance, in the basket and thus as well in the “curb.” This developing imbalance, Mr. Tamny said, would, through the effect of centrifugal force, create a correspondingly increased amount of pressure within the machine, as it continued to pick up speed. This force, or pressure, may be considered the second step in the process; it manifested itself in the oscillation or vibration described by the various witnesses on the scene.

Tamny then described the machine itself, noting that there ¹⁰⁴ was only a one-inch tolerance between the closest projection of the “curb” and the pedestals housing the suspension rods. With the build-up of enormous centrifugal force caused by the increasing weight imbalance, the “curb” would tend to move toward the pedestals. What occurred, the expert said, was that when the pressure reached a certain point, “the whole thing just walked to the point where the suspension wouldn’t handle it any more, and the curb slammed into the pedestals and just proceeded to rip them apart, one, two, three.” (b) Foreseeability — Intended Use In Moran, supra, 273 Md. at 545 , the Court considered a manufacturer’s duty to warn of latent dangers as extending “to all [uses] which are reasonably foreseeable,” but presumably not to uses that are not reasonably foreseeable. The same principle would also apply to his duty to design and manufacture a safe product.

See Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337 (1976); Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co., 41 Md. App. 579 (1979), rev’d on other grounds 286 Md. 714 . 2 The pertinent inquiry, in this instance, is not whether the harm that occurred — the actual use — was itself foreseeable, but rather whether it fell “within a general field of danger which should have been anticipated.” Segerman v. Jones, 256 Md. 109 (1969), quoting from McLeod v. Grant County School Dist. No. 128, 255 P.2d 360 (Wash. 1953); also Moran, supra, at 551 . This becomes particularly significant in light of appellant’s contention in this case. It complains that the machine in question was neither designed, nor expected to be used, to dry large balloons — that such a use was therefore an entirely unforeseeable one. ¹⁰⁵ In this regard, there was evidence adduced from two Sinai employees that, although they had never had occasion to wash and dry a balloon before, items made of the same or similar types of waterproof, nonabsorbent materials were routinely put through the extractor as part of the hospital’s regular laundry.

Items such as cubicle curtains, “rubber” sheets, laundry bags, and “slings” — some of which were quite large — were so processed without prior mishap. Mr. Tamny stated that, in terms of their potential effect on the extractor, these items were not substantially different than the balloon. Indeed, in discussing appellant’s theory of what caused the accident (the balloon clogged up all the holes in the basket preventing any water from escaping), Mr. Tamny said that “these items that have been commonly extracted in the machine are just as capable of plastering up all the holes in the side of the half container as the balloon. The balloon material is not really much different from some of those materials.” One curtain, he said, could have the same effect.

Appellant has not contended that the drying of these other items represented an impermissible or unforeseeable use of the machine. Given the foreseeability of imbalances developing even from normal use, Tamny stated “obviously the design of this machine, it was capable of tearing itself apart.” Recalling that the unit was bolted to the floor, this colloquy with Mr. Tamny is significant: “Q How about commercial equipment where it is bolted to the floor? A In a large unit that is tied to the floor, the expectable thing is that the machine is going to tear itself apart. These are very large heavy parts that are vibrating.

Q So that to that extent, are you able to say whether such as happened here was foreseeable by the manufacturer? A Yes, certainly. I mean, I did a basic calculation of the amount of engineering that’s tied up in this machine, just from the sizes of the parts and how ¹⁰⁶ fast they’re moving, and it’s immediately obvious that the machine has the capacity for self-destruction.” (Emphasis supplied.) In this same vein, Tamny later said: “Q You use the word capable of destroying itself. Based upon your investigation, is it reasonable to assume that what did happen, in fact, would happen in a hundred per cent of the cases if it were not capable of being shut off by a safety device?

A Well, with the amount of unbalance that occurred in this machine, any time you repeated those conditions of unbalance at that speed, the machine would do the same thing, tear itself apart.” (Emphasis supplied.) (c) Preventability As noted, the plaintiffs alleged both a defective design and an omission to warn of latent danger. These are quite different things, and will be considered separately. With respect to defective design, it was shown that in 1926 — some 32 years before the manufacture and sale of the machine in question — appellant obtained a patent on an automatic cut-off device designed for use on an extractor of a type similar to the Notrux. The patent states, in part: “This invention relates to improvements in centrifugal extractors. “The objects of this invention are to provide means for limiting the oscillation of the rotating basket of the extractor; to provide automatic means for cutting out the motor should the amplitude of oscillation of the basket exceed a predetermined amount; and furthermore to provide dynamic braking means for slowing down and stopping the motor upon being automatically cut out by excessive oscillation of the basket.” This device, Tamny said, is commonly used by other ¹⁰⁷ manufacturers, but has never been used by appellant.

It would have cut off the power to the machine, and thus immediately commenced to slow it down, before the oscillation built up to the point of causing the machine to disintegrate. Tamny stated, in particular: “... [T]hese switches are typically set to kick out at about fifteen percent of the dry weight capacity in unbalance. As the cut out switch doesn’t wait until the machine is swung one inch off center before it kicks out, it will kick out at relatively smaller levels of vibration. What it does is it catches the problem early enough that you can shut the machine down, bring it to a stop without tearing it apart.” His ultimate conclusion was that, had this device, costing $50 or less, been placed on the Notrux, “it would have prevented what happened.

That’s what it is designed to do and that’s what this type of device does millions of times a year on home washing machines when the loads go out of balance. It shuts the machine down.” It was conceded that appellant gave no warnings with respect to nonabsorbent materials in any of the manuals it published relating to the machine. Customers were not told to refrain from putting such materials in the extractor; nor were they warned to balance such items with similar items, rather than with ordinary laundry. In no way were they alerted to the danger inherent in placing nonabsorbent items in one part of the basket and absorbent items in the other.

Mr. Tamny’s comment: “Well, you know, obviously the very least they could have done was to warn people about the inherent danger of the machine, the fact that under certain kinds of conditions it was capable of destroying itself and what to do about preventing those conditions from happening.” Having summarized the evidence in support of appellees’ claim, we return once more to Moran, 273 Md. at 552 : “Based on this negligence law we think that in the products liability domain a duty to warn is imposed on a manufacturer if the item it produces has an inherent and hidden danger about which the ¹⁰⁸ producer knows, or should know, could be a substantial factor in bringing injury to an individual or his property when the manufacturer’s product comes near to or in contact with the elements which are present normally in the environment where the product can reasonably be expected to be brought or used.” In the context of the rules laid down in Fowler v. Smith, supra, 240 Md. 240 , and its “progeny,” there was surely sufficient evidence here to overcome appellant’s motion for directed verdict, and thus to require the issue of negligence to be resolved by the jury. The evidence recounted above, if believed, sufficed to establish that the accident (and thus the injuries) resulted from appellant’s negligence in designing and selling a machine that, absent an automatic cut-off switch, would, under foreseeable circumstances, become a dangerous instrument, as well as in failing to warn customers of that foreseeable potential danger. (2) (3) Strict Liability As its second and third issues, appellant contends that the doctrine of “strict liability” is unconstitutional, and that, even if it is constitutional, the evidence was insufficient to establish its liability under that theory. Because the jury based its verdicts independently upon a finding of appellant’s negligence — a finding that we have concluded was entirely permissible — the questions raised as to strict liability are moot.

Even if we concurred with appellant on these two issues, or either of them, the judgments appealed from would be unaffected. We therefore find no need to consider the second and third issues. See, however, Phipps v. General Motors Corp., supra, 278 Md. 337 , in which the Court of Appeals, after an exhaustive analysis of the doctrine, stated flatly, at p. 353: “Therefore, we adopt the theory of strict liability as expressed in § 402A of the ¹⁰⁹ Restatement (Second) of Torts.” Also Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co., supra, 41 Md. App. 579 . 3 (4) Negligence of Sinai Hospital, Jessop, and Up-to-Date Laundry We are told by appellant in its brief that it filed a third-party action against Jessop and Up-to-Date Laundry, although, as that pleading was not included in the record extract, it is not entirely clear upon what basis this was done — what acts or omissions on their part appellant asserted would render them liable to it. Appellant says nothing about a third-party action or cross-claim against Sinai or any of its employees, although they were initially sued by Horan and Jessop.

Notwithstanding these omissions, it now asserts that the court erred in directing verdicts in favor of these defendants, or third-party defendants. Its contention is that, by putting the balloon in the extractor without inquiring whether it was proper to do so, and by failing to remove it after the machine began vibrating on the first two or three attempts, these defendants also exhibited varying degrees of negligence contributing to the accident, and that the jury was entitled to consider the question of their relative culpability. In the first place, there was no evidence that any of these individuals had any prior knowledge that the extractor was incapable of safely drying the balloon. As noted, there were no warnings to that effect given in any of appellant’s manuals.

The machine had been routinely used in the past to dry similar types of material. What is even more telling, however, is that appellant’s own expert witness, Ralph Barnett, absolved these people of any responsibility for the accident. On cross-examination, he said, in relevant part: “Q Mr. Barnett, at the time of your deposition you