American Powerlifting Ass'n v. Cotillo

GREENE, Judge. This matter arises from a civil action filed in the Circuit Court for Calvert County by the respondent, Christopher Cotillo, against the petitioners, collectively, William Duncan, the American Powerlifting Association (“the APA”), and the Board of Education of Calvert County (“the Board”), for injuries Mr. Cotillo sustained while participating in a power-lifting competition. Mr. Cotillo asserted various negligence claims, and both sides filed motions for summary judgment. The Circuit Court granted the petitioners’ motions for summary judgment on the grounds that Mr. Cotillo assumed the risk of his injuries.

On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court in part and reversed in part, holding that summary judgment was proper as to all claims except the claim that the spotters were negligently trained. The petitioners ask this Court to decide whether the Circuit Court erred in finding that Mr. Cotillo’s claim, that the spotters were negligently instructed, was barred by assumption of the risk, in light of the trial court’s additional determination that Mr. Cotillo assumed the risk of injury during a lift, and that Mr. Cotillo assumed the risk that the spotters would fail to protect him in the event of a failed lift. ⁶⁶³ We shall hold that there is no genuine issue of material fact that Mr. Cotillo assumed the usual and foreseeable risks of the sport when he voluntarily entered a powerlifting competition, and therefore summary judgment was appropriate. There is no genuine dispute that the immediate cause of the respondent’s injury was his attempt to qualify by bench pressing 530 pounds. As a result, whether any of the petitioners were negligent in failing to prevent the respondent’s injury is of no consequence.

Furthermore, any dispute of fact as to whether the spotters were negligent is immaterial because their mere negligence is insufficient to support a finding of enhanced risk. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On November 8, 2003, Mr. Cotillo, a powerlifter with ten years of experience, was injured during the 2003 Southern Maryland Open Bench Press & Deadlift Meet (“the Meet”), when he attempted to lift 530 pounds. The Meet was sanctioned by the APA, and held at Patuxent High School, which operates under the jurisdiction of the Board. It was organized by Mr. Duncan, the faculty sponsor of Patuxent High School’s weightlifting club, and Scott Taylor, APA president.

Before the Meet, the lifters were informed that they could use their own spotters. 1 Mr. Cotillo did not exercise this option, 2 electing instead to use the spotters provided by the organizers of the Meet. Mr. Duncan recruited Chris Smith and Chris Blair, Patuxent High School students, to act as spotters during the Meet. At the time of the Meet, Mr. Smith was fifteen years old, approximately five feet and eight to ten ⁶⁶⁴ inches tall, and 180 pounds. Mr. Blair, at the time of the Meet, was fourteen years old, approximately six feet tall, and weighed 260 pounds.

Both spotters had some weightlifting experience. On the morning of the Meet, Mr. Duncan spoke with the spotters and told them that, while they should keep their hands close to the bar, they could not touch the bar because it would disqualify the lift. Mr. Taylor further instructed the spotters that if the lifter were to hesitate, without making any downward motion with the bar, they should wait for the referee’s instruction to grab the bar. If the lifter were to hesitate and the bar were to come down, Mr. Taylor instructed the spotters that they should not wait for the referee’s instruction, but instead grab the bar.

During the Meet, Mr. Cotillo wore a “Karin’s Xtreme Power” double denim bench shirt, which allowed him to lift approximately 150 pounds more than he could have without the shirt. The spotters were positioned on either side of the bar, and Mr. Duncan was positioned in the middle. Mr. Cotillo’s first two lifts in the Meet, using the spotters, were uneventful. On his third lift, Mr. Cotillo was attempting to lift 530 pounds.

Mr. Cotillo brought the bar down without any trouble. As he began to lift it, he had some difficulty, 3 at which point Mr. Blair testified that he began to move his own hands closer to the bar. The judge instructed the spotters to grab the bar, but as the spotters closed in, the bar came down, striking Mr: Cotillo in the jaw. The entirety of these events happened within a matter of seconds.

As a result of the incident, Mr. Cotillo suffered a shattered jaw, a laceration, and damage to several teeth, requiring treatment. On January 15, 2004, the respondent filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Calvert County. In his amended complaint, Mr. Cotillo asserted various claims of negligence against Mr. ⁶⁶⁵ Duncan, the APA, and the Board. 4 Each of the parties filed motions for summary judgment and on February 3, 2006, the court denied the respondent’s motion and granted the petitioners’ motions, on the grounds that Mr. Cotillo assumed the risk of his injuries. Mr. Cotillo filed an appeal with the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed in part and reversed in part The Court of Special Appeals held that summary judgment was properly entered on all claims except the negligence claim grounded in allegations of improper preparatory instruction of the spotters.

The intermediate appellate court reasoned that because Mr. Cotillo did not know the spotters were improperly trained, 5 and because their improper training presented an enhanced risk not normally incident to the sport, Mr. Cotillo could not have assumed the risk. Cotillo v. Duncan, 172 Md.App. 29, 54 , 912 A.2d 72, 86-87 (2006). The APA and the Board filed petitions for writ of certiorari in this Court, which we granted. 6 American Powerlifting v. Cotillo, 398 Md. 313 , 920 A.2d 1058 (2007). ⁶⁶⁶ DISCUSSION I. Parties’Arguments The petitioners argue that the Court of Special Appeals erred by holding that Mr. Cotillo could not have assumed the risk that the spotters would be negligently trained. They contend that the doctrine of assumption of the risk operates independently from the law of negligence, and therefore it is irrelevant whether they may have been negligent in training the spotters.

The petitioners reason that holding otherwise would create a problem of circular logic, enabling plaintiffs to escape an assumption of the risk defense by claiming that they could not have anticipated the defendants’ negligence. The petitioners further argue that the Court of Special Appeals erred by failing to consider the video footage of the event, which the Circuit Court considered and was part of the record submitted to the Court of Special Appeals. The respondent argues that the petitioners were negligent in training the spotters, and that their negligent training presented an enhanced risk to Mr. Cotillo that he could not have assumed. The respondent contends that he could not have assumed the particular risk that the spotters would be negligently trained because assumption of the risk requires that Mr. Cotillo have particular knowledge of the risks he assumes, and he had no prior knowledge of the training the spotters received before he encountered the risk. ⁶⁶⁷ Further, the respondent contends that the alleged negligent training of the spotters enhanced the risk to Mr. Cotillo, and that this increased risk was not a risk inherent in the sport.

Because the respondent believes that this increased risk creates a dispute as to whether Mr. Cotillo knowingly and voluntarily confronted a particular risk, he argues that summary judgment was inappropriate. 7 Finally, the respondent contends that the Court of Special Appeals properly considered the video footage of the incident, and that further interpretation of the video is a matter for the trier of fact.

II

Standard of Review We are asked in the case sub judice to review the Circuit Court’s entry of summary judgment and we do so de novo. Educational Testing Serv. v. Hildebrant, 399 Md. 128, 139 , 923 A.2d 34, 40 (2007). In a review of a grant of summary judgment, our two-part analysis determines first whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact, and then whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

Where a dispute regarding a fact can have no impact on the outcome of the case, it is not a dispute of material fact such that it can prevent a grant of summary judgment. Miller v. Bay City Property Owners Ass’n, Inc., 393 Md. 620, 631 , 903 A.2d 938, 945 (2006). For purposes of reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we construe the facts before this Court in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Todd v. MTA, 373 Md. 149, 155 , 816 A.2d 930, 933 (2003). ⁶⁶⁸ III.

Assumption of the Risk Assumption of the risk is a doctrine whereby a plaintiff who intentionally and voluntarily exposes himself to a known risk, effectively, consents to relieve the defendant of liability for those risks to which the plaintiff exposes himself. ADM Partnership v. Martin, 348 Md. 84, 91 , 702 A.2d 730, 734 (1997) (quoting Rogers v. Frush, 257 Md. 233, 243 , 262 A.2d 549, 554 (1970)). Assumption of the risk is a defense that completely bars any recovery by the plaintiff. Crews v. Hollenbach, 358 Md. 627, 640 , 751 A.2d 481, 488 (2000).

The doctrine “negates the issue of a defendant’s negligence by virtue of a plaintiffs previous abandonment of his or her right to maintain an action if an accident occurs.” McQuiggan v. Boy Scouts of Am., 73 Md.App. 705, 710 , 536 A.2d 137, 139 (1988) (citing Pfaff v. Yacht Basin Co., 58 Md.App. 348 , 473 A.2d 479 (1984)). In Maryland, there are three requirements that the defendant must prove to establish the defense of assumption of the risk: (1) the plaintiff had knowledge of the risk of danger; (2) the plaintiff appreciated that risk; and (3) the plaintiff voluntarily confronted the risk of danger. ADM Partnership, 348 Md. at 90-91 , 702 A.2d at 734 . In determining whether a plaintiff had the requisite knowledge, an objective standard is applied.

Crews, 358 Md. at 644 , 751 A.2d at 490 . Although the determination as to whether a plaintiff has assumed a risk will often be a question for the jury, “where it is clear that any person of normal intelligence in his position must have understood the danger, the issue must be decided by the court.” Gibson v. Beaver, 245 Md. 418, 421 , 226 A.2d 273, 275 (1967) (quoting W. Prosser, Handbook of the Laws of Torts § 55 at 310 (2nd ed.)); see also Crews, 358 Md. at 644 , 751 A.2d at 490 . The question of whether the plaintiff had the requisite knowledge and appreciation of the risk in order to assume the risk is determined by an objective standard. Gibson, 245 Md. at 421 , 226 A.2d at 275 .

By this standard, “a plaintiff will not be heard to say that he did not comprehend a risk which must have been obvious to him.” Id. In this case, Mr. Cotillo ⁶⁶⁹ knew and appreciated the risk of danger, and voluntarily confronted that risk. At the time of his injury, Mr. Cotillo had been powerlifting for approximately 10 years. Prior to the Meet, he had successfully competed in several competitions at the local, national and international level, while setting several records in the process.

Mr. Cotillo had also signed documents at past competitions containing waivers, which indicated the risks of participating in powerlifting, including the risk of equipment malfunction. 8 These facts show that Mr. Cotillo was aware of the risk of injury by participating in a powerlifting competition. Not only did Mr. Cotillo have direct knowledge of the inherent risks of powerlifting, but it is clear to any person of normal intelligence that one of the risks inherent in powerlifting is that the bar may fall and injure the participant. That this is clear to any person of normal intelligence is evidenced by the fact that the nature of the sport is to attempt to lift great amounts of weight above the lifter’s body. If the participant were to fail to lift the weight, the obvious conclusion is that gravity would cause the bar to come down on the person beneath it.

The apparent necessity of spotters in the sport only reinforces the inescapable conclusion that there is a risk that the bar might fall and injure the participant. We find persuasive the reasoning of the court in Lee v. Maloney, 180 Misc.2d 992 , 692 N.Y.S.2d 590, 591-92 (Sup.Ct.1999), aff 'd, 270 A.D.2d 689 , 704 N.Y.S.2d 729 (2000), concluding that the risk of a lift bar falling and striking a participant in a weightlifting competition is “ ‘perfectly obvious,’ from the nature of the activity itself.” Id. In Lee, a weightlifter was injured in competition during an attempt to bench press 565 pounds. Id. at 591.

Mr. Lee claimed that the spotter was negligent for failing to catch the bar in a timely manner that would have prevented injury entirely. Id. As an experienced weightlifter, with 14 years of experience, Mr. Lee was familiar with the rules of the sport and the safety precautions that ⁶⁷⁰ were commonly taken. Id.

The court determined, as a matter of law, that Mr. Lee voluntarily assumed the risk of injury by participating in the weightlifting competition, including the risk that the spotter may fail to catch the bar quickly enough to prevent injury. Id. In sports, there are some risks, “as for example the risk of injury if one is hit by a baseball driven on a line, which are so far a matter of common knowledge in the community, that in the absence of some satisfactory explanation a denial of such knowledge simply is not to be believed.” Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton, & David G. Owen, Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 68, at 488 (5th ed.1984). Furthermore, “voluntary participants in sports activities may be held to have consented, by their participation, to those injury-causing events which are known, apparent, or reasonably foreseeable consequences of their participation.” Conway v. Deer Park Union Free School Dist.

No. 7, 234 A.D.2d 332 , 651 N.Y.S.2d 96, 97 (1996) (finding that summary judgment in favor of the defendants was appropriate because the plaintiff, an experienced softball player who had previously observed a sewer lid in the vicinity, assumed the risk of injury of slipping on that sewer lid while running for a fly ball). Although a sporting event participant does not consent to all possible injuries, he consents to the “foreseeable dangers” that are “an integral part of the sport as it is typically played.” Kelly v. McCarrick, 155 Md.App. 82, 97 , 841 A.2d 869, 877 (2004) (holding that a softball player assumed the risk of injury from colliding with another player). Such risks, that are inherent to a particular sport, are all foreseeable consequences of participating in that sport, and as they are obvious to a person of normal intelligence, voluntary