Anderson v. Harford County

⁴⁹ Gilbert, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Charles B. Anderson, Jr., served as County Executive of Harford County, Maryland, at and for an annual salary of $27,500. After his term as County Executive, he was indicted by the Grand Jury of Harford County on several charges of misconduct in office and violation of the Harford County Charter. He was not convicted on any of them.

The cost of defending himself against those charges was $57,003.20, a sum in excess of twice the annual salary of the County Executive. Understandably, Mr. Anderson seeks reimbursement for the money he has or will expend to satisfy those costs. Anderson asserts that the successful defense was to the benefit of the County, and "was in furtherance of his duties and responsibilities to ... Harford County... .” Demand was made upon the County by Anderson in the amount of $57,003.20.

When neither that sum nor any part of it was paid by the County, Anderson filed suit in the Circuit Court for Harford County. The County, in turn, responded with a motion raising preliminary objection, Md. Rule 323, in which it asserted the defense of governmental immunity. The circuit court (Higinbothom, J.) dismissed Anderson’s declaration and entered judgment for costs against him. Anderson has now journeyed to this Court where he posits three issues to us, namely: "I. [T]he trial court erred when it held that the Charter for Harford County, providing for the payment of 'subsistence’, did not include the reimbursement of legal expenses incurred by an elected official.

II. [T]he trial court erred when it held that the Corporations and Associations Article ... [of the Code] did not apply to municipal corporations or charter counties. III. [T]he trial court erred in holding that the provisions of the Charter for Harford County and . . . [Corp. Art.] did not expressly or impliedly waive the defense of sovereign immunity.” ⁵⁰ We disagree with the appellant and shall affirm the action taken by Judge Higinbothom. We now explain why we so do. I. The Harford County Charter 1 provides in pertinent part: "Sec. 306.

Compensation of the county executive. The county executive shall receive compensation of not less than twenty-seven thousand five hundred dollars per annum. His compensation may be changed by law passed by an affirmative vote of at least five members of the council. Any increase or decrease in compensation which becomes law during one term of office shall not become effective before the next term.

Sec. 805. Additional Compensation. No officer or employee of the county, elected or appointed, whose compensation is fixed, in whole or in part, by this Charter, the laws of the county or its personnel regulations, shall be entitled to any other compensation from the county for performance of public duties, except expenses for travel and subsistence incident to the performance of his official duties as prescribed by law.” 2 Anderson zeroes in on the words "subsistence incident to the performance of his official duties as prescribed by law,” and then divorces them from the rest of the phrase that appears in the text. The result thus achieved by Anderson is ⁵¹ that the County is liable to him for "subsistence incident” to his duties as County Executive.

He then carries his thought one more step and concludes that the offenses he was charged with having committed occurred in the course of his official duties. Consequently, the expenses incurred by him in defending himself against those charges are part of the "subsistence” to which he is entitled under the Charter, § 805. We read the Charter to say something entirely different. The Charter is read and construed in the same manner as a statute.

Its words are given their natural meaning and are not to be convoluted to reach a particularly desired result. Furthermore, the various sections of the Charter, as is the case with statutes, are to be brought into full accord