Anderson v. Sheffield

Morton, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal arises from a paternity suit brought by appellant Brenda Anderson against appellee Johnny Sheffield on July 24, 1980. On November 18, 1981, the Circuit Court for Dorchester County (Edmondson, J.) found that the action was barred by the statute of limitations and accordingly dismissed the petition. We shall affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reflects that appellant and appellee began living together in 1974. Shortly thereafter, appellant informed appellee that she was pregnant. Appellee left appellant prior to the birth of a baby girl on February 4, 1975. After her birth, appellee visited appellant several times and on at least one occasion gave the little girl small amounts of money.

On July 24, 1980, when the child was five years old, appellant filed a paternity petition against appellee in the Circuit Court for Dorchester County. On September 25, 1980, appellee entered a general denial, stating only that he was not the father of the child, and on November 18, 1981, he appeared for trial without counsel. During the hearing on the merits, the trial judge raised sua sponte the issue of limitations and dismissed the petition as being barred by the two year statute of limitations for paternity cases under Md. Ann. Code art. 16, § 66 (e). 1 ⁵⁸⁵ I. The first issue appellant raises is whether appellee waived his right to claim the defense of limitations by failing to raise it in his answer to the petition. Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in raising the limitations issue sua sponte.

Appellant relies upon Md. Rule 371 (b), which provides that in equity cases "[a]ny defense to any bill or petition, which appears on the face thereof, shall be made either by demurrer or by answer.” Unless timely raised, the defense is deemed to be waived. Foos v. Steinberg, 247 Md. 35 (1967). Contrary to appellant’s position, however, we find that Rule 371, generally applicable to equity action defenses, is not controlling on this issue. Before the Maryland General Assembly created, in 1963, the current paternity statute set out at Md. Ann. Code art. 16, §§ 66-66P, paternity actions were considered criminal in nature, one object being to "punish the offense of fornication.” Bake v. State, 21 Md. 422, 426 (1864).

Consequently, the one year statute of limitations applicable to criminal offenses was held to be applicable to a prosecution for bastardy. Bake v. State, supra; Neff v. State, 57 Md. 385 (1882). The thrust of paternity actions changed dramatically in 1963 with the passage of the paternity statute. The legislature eliminated the criminal aspect of bastardy, Corley v. Moore, 236 Md. 241, 242 (1964), and, instead, focused on the public interest in the social and economic status of the children.

Md. Ann. Code art. 16, § 66A; Buford v. Bunn, 247 Md. 203 (1967). The new proceeding, in equity, was "predicated upon the traditional concern of chancery with custody, guardianship and support of minor children.” Baker v. Lease, 236 Md. 246, 248 (1964). Incorporated into this new, civil cause of action is a provision which specifically limits the time during which an action may be brought. Article 16, § 66 (e) provides, in part: ⁵⁸⁶ "Proceedings to establish paternity under the subtitle 'Paternity Proceedings’ of this article and to charge the putative father of an illegitimate child with the child’s support and maintenance shall be commenced: (1) During the pregnancy of the illegitimate child’s mother or within 2 years after the birth of the child; (2) If the putative father of the illegitimate child has acknowledged the paternity of the child in writing or has made payment or otherwise provided for the support and maintenance of the child, within 2 years of the date of that acknowledgment or the last payment or provision . ...” 2 An ordinary procedural statute of limitations must, under Rule 371,