Anderson v. State

Briscoe, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On the 12th of April, 1897, the appellant, Caleb Anderson, was indicted and tried in the Criminal Court of Baltimore City, for violating the lottery law of the State. Upon this trial the jury was not able to agree and was discharged. Afterwards, on the 9th of June, he was again put upon trial on the same indictment.

He filed the following plea : “That the State of Maryland ought not further to prosecute the indictment against him, the said Caleb Anderson, because he saith, that at the January term of the Criminal Court of Baltimore City, to-wit, on the 12th day of April, 1897, ^is Court ordered him to be put upon his trial on the indictment now pending against him ; thereupon a jury was duly sworn to try the issues between the State of Maryland and the defendant, and after said jury heard the testimony in the said cause .they retired in charge of a bailiff sworn to attend them ; that after the jury had retired to consider their verdict, the Court ordered and directed the Clerk to discharge the jury from the further consideration of the case if they were not able to agree by five o'clock, P. M. ; thereupon the Court adjourned until the next morning at 10 A. M. That Hance W. B. Reed, the Deputy Clerk, so instructed as aforesaid by the Court, at the time ordered by the'Court, went to the jury room and inquired if they had agreed upon a verdict, to which they replied that they had not, and said Reed then asked them if it was possible for them to agree upon a verdict, to which they replied it was not. Whereupon the said Hance W. B. Reed discharged the said jury from the further consideration of this case.” The State demurred to this plea and the demurrer was ruled good. The traverser was then tried upon the plea of not guily and being convicted on the fourth and fifth counts of the indictment, has appealed from the judgment entered against him. The principal question then for us to determine is whether the discharge of the jury upon its failure to agree, in this ⁴⁸¹ case, constitutes a legal bar to a future trial.

The law is well settled in this State, since the case of Hoffman v. State, 20 Md. 432 , that the discharge of a jury is a matter of discretion for the Court, and that when in the exercise of a sound discretion, it takes place, it presents no impediment to a second trial. In the case of Simmons v. United States, 142 U. S. 149 , Mr. Justice Gray, speaking for the Supreme Court upon this