Anderson v. United States

HARRELL, J. “What’s in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet.” Romeo and Juliet, William Shakespeare. For most plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions in our State courts, it would not matter whether we denominate Maryland Code (1973, 2006 RepLVol.) Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, § 5-109(a)(l) (addressed to the time within which a medical malpractice claim must be commenced) a statute of limitation or a statute of repose. The time period allowed for bringing a medical malpractice action under § 5-109(a)(l) is five years from the time the injury was committed, after which, the claim is barred by the passage of the time period.

Thus, in a typical situation governed by Maryland law, once five years passes after the plaintiffs alleged injuries (subject to express tolling situations regarding the age of a claimant), the claim is barred whether the statute is considered one of repose or limitation. In the unusual scenario in the present case underlying the Certified Question of Law from the federal Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the label we shall place on the statute is more than an academic exercise. The answer to that query determines whether Appellant Angelia Anderson’s claim against the United States of America may proceed or is barred. Anderson brought a medical malpractice action in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). 1 The FTCA permits a plaintiff to maintain an action against the federal government if that person would have a cause of action under state law against a private person under similar conditions.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2677 (2012). The ¹⁰³ FTCA contains a two-year statute of limitations regarding the timeliness of bringing claims against the government; however, if there is substantive law in the state where the claim arose governing the timeliness of a similar claim, the state provision controls over the FTCA’s statute of limitations. Miller v. United States, 932 F.2d 301, 303 (4th Cir.1991). Ordinarily under the FTCA, a state statute of limitations is considered to be a procedural control that limits an available remedy.

See First United Methodist Church of Hyattsville v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862, 865 (4th Cir.1989). A state statute of repose, which regulates also the timeliness of claims, however, is considered substantive law and prevails over the procedural FTCA statute of limitations. First United, 882 F.2d at 866 . Thus, if we declare § 5-109(a)(l) to be a statute of repose, application of its substantive provisions determine the timeliness of Anderson’s action.

For reasons to be explained, we hold that the plain language of § 5-109(a)(l), confirmed by its legislative history, demonstrates that § 5-109(a)(1) is a statute of limitations, rather than repose. I. FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND This case reaches us as a certified question of law from the Federal Court and, therefore, we are constrained in deciding the question by the facts provided in the Certification Order. Md.Code (1973, 2006 Repl.Yol.) Cts. & Jud. Proc.

Art., § 12-606; see also Guttman v. Wells Fargo Bank, 421 Md. 227, 230 , 26 A.3d 856, 858 (2011) (citing Piselli v. 75th St. Med., 371 Md. 188, 202 , 808 A.2d 508, 516 (2002)). The following factual statement appears in the Certification Order from the federal appellate court: Anderson first visited the VA Hospital [in Baltimore, Maryland] in February 2002, complaining of lower back pain. An MRI revealed scattered bone abnormalities in Anderson’s lumbar spine and a radiologist recommended a bone scan, which was performed in May 2002 and showed abnormal results. Subsequently, a bone marrow biopsy was performed, resulting in a diagnosis of B-cell lymphoproliferative disease in Anderson’s spine.

Anderson was scheduled ¹⁰⁴ to begin chemotherapy in August 2002, but her doctors determined instead that a course of observation was more appropriate. Anderson was given a fentanyl patch to control her pain. Anderson returned to the VA Hospital in September 2002, reporting continuing pain on her left side; her doctors responded by increasing her pain medication. On December 19, 2002, Anderson complained at the VA Hospital of increased pain and new symptoms, including pain and numbness radiating to her foot.

She was discharged and instructed to report to the neurology clinic four days later. Anderson returned to the VA Hospital the next day complaining of increased pain in her back and an inability to move her legs. An MRI revealed no evidence of compression. Anderson again returned to the VA Hospital on December 23, reporting an inability to walk or stand and complaining of numbness up to her breasts.

She was again discharged with instructions to return for another MRI on December 26. Anderson instead sought treatment at another hospital on December 24, where a physical examination and diagnostic tests revealed an epidural spinal tumor compressing her spinal cord. Anderson underwent immediate surgery to relieve the spinal compression and remained hospitalized until December 30. Nearly a year later, on December 17, 2003, Anderson initiated an administrative claim with Veterans Administration in Baltimore by filing a completed Standard Form 95 (Claim for Damage, Injury, or Death).

She alleged that the VA Hospital failed to recognize the symptoms of progressive spinal cord compression due to an epidural spine tumor that developed as a result of her known cancer. She also alleged that the negligent care she received at the VA Hospital necessitated emergency surgery on her spine, and that, notwithstanding the emergency surgery, the VA Hospital’s negligence left her with significant, permanent neurological deficits, severe and permanent disability, and incessant pain and emotional anguish. For nearly four years, Anderson’s claim proceeded through the administrative process, including significant ¹⁰⁵ settlement discussion, until it was denied as not amenable to administrative resolution by letter dated September 26, 2007. Anderson filed suit in the district court on January 2, 2008.

The government moved to dismiss arguing that Anderson had failed to file a claim and an expert certificate with the Maryland Health Care Alternative Dispute Resolution Office (“HCADRO”), as required by Maryland’s Health Care Malpractice Claims Act (codified at Md.Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-2A-04). The district court stayed the case to allow Anderson to file the complaint and certificate with the HCADRO. Anderson complied and the district court lifted the stay.

The government then filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing that Section 5 — 109(a)(1), which it characterized as Maryland’s statute of repose for health care malpractice claims, divested the court of subject matter jurisdiction because Anderson did not file her federal suit within the five-year statutory period. In its order granting the motion, the district court noted that Maryland courts have referred to Section 5-109 as a statute of limitations and that it contains tolling provisions that are generally inconsistent with statutes of repose. However, the district court concluded that, “particularly in light of the recent reference by the Court of Appeals in Burnside [v. Wong, 412 Md. 80, 986 A.2d 437 [427] (2010) ],” it was “constrained to conclude that the state’s highest court views § 5-109(a)(l) as a statute of repose.” [Anderson v. United States, 2010 WL 1346409 , ⁴, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30759 , ¹¹ (D.Md.2010)] (citing Burnside, 986 A.2d at 440 ).

Thus, the district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court denied Anderson’s subsequent motion for reconsideration, and Anderson timely appealed to this Court, assigning error to the district court’s conclusion that Section 5-109(a)(1) is a statute of repose. 1 ¹⁰⁶ Based on these facts, the question certified by the Fourth Circuit, and accepted by this Court, for consideration is: Does Section 5-109(a)(l) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code constitute a statute of limitations or a statute of repose? We hold that Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article § 5-109(a)(1) is a statute of limitations, rather than one of repose. The plain language of the statute indicates to us, and its legislative history confirms, that the Maryland General Assembly did not intend, by its adoption, to create an absolute time bar or a grant of immunity for potential defendants in medical malpractice claims.

II

OUR ANALYSIS A. The History and Judicial Interpretation of § 5-109 As noted by the Fourth Circuit in its Certification Order, our prior decisions sometimes refer to § 5-109 as a statute of limitations and other times as a statute of repose. In order to answer the Certified Question, we step into Mr. Peabody’s time machine 2 to explore the history of the statute and clarify our sometimes confusing declarations characterizing the statute both ways. The original version of the Maryland Health Care Malpractice Claims statute was enacted in 1975 in response to a perceived crisis in Maryland in the medical malpractice insurance industry. See Chapter 545 of the Acts of 1975; Att’y Gen. of Md. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274 , 385 A.2d 57 (1978).

Section 5-109 was added to the Courts Article “[f]or the ¹⁰⁷ purpose of providing the statute of limitations for actions based on malpractice by physicians.” Ch. 545 of the Acts of 1975 (emphasis added). As enacted originally, § 5-109 read: An action for damages for an injury arising out of the rendering of or failure to render professional services by a physician shall be filed (1) within five years of the time the injury was committed or (2) within three years of the date when the injury was discovered, whichever is the shorter. In no event shall this time run against a minor until he has attained majority. Section 5-109 was amended a year later based on recommendations from the Medical Malpractice Insurance Study Committee, which was comprised of legislators; a representative for the Governor; and members of medical, legal, hospital, and insurance interests.

Glenn v. Morelos, 79 Md.App. 90, 92-93 , 555 A.2d 1064, 1066 (1989). The Committee expressed concern about the narrowness of the 1975 version of § 5-109 because it applied only to physicians rather than to a broader class of health care providers, and also that, because the section did not apply to minors, there was a potential for a long “tail” 3 of liability. Glenn, 79 Md.App. at 93 , 555 A.2d at 1066 (citing Issue Report of the Legislative Study Group, 1 (February 18, 1976) (statement of Delegate Martin S. Becker, Chairman of the Committee)). The amendments proposed as the result of the Committee’s recommendations changed the statutory reference to “physician” to “a health care provider, as defined in § 3-2A-01 of this article” and replaced the last sentence of § 5-109 with “If the claimant was under 16 years of age at the time the injury was committed, the time shall commence when he reaches the age of 16.” Ch. 235 of the Acts of 1976.

Also added was the sentence, “Filing of a claim with the Health Claims Arbitration Office in accordance with ¹⁰⁸ § 3-2A-04 of this article shall be deemed the filing of an action for purposes of this section.” Id. In 1985, this Court was presented with a constitutional challenge to § 5-109, which necessitated consideration of whether the “continuous course of medical treatment” doctrine applied to application of the statute and also when the statute of limitation begins to run. Hill v. Fitzgerald, 304 Md. 689, 692 , 501 A.2d 27, 28 (1985). To determine what triggered the statute of limitation in § 5-109 in Hill , the Court plumbed the meaning of “medical injury” under the Health Care Malpractice Claims Act (“HCMCA”).

Hill, 304 Md. at 694 , 501 A.2d at 29 (citing Oxtoby v. McGowan, 294 Md. 83 , 447 A.2d 860 (1982)). We concluded that, when enacting the HCMCA, the “General Assembly obviously was not concerned with invasions of a legally protected interest which do not cause harm in the sense of loss or detriment in fact.... The Act is concerned with the invasion of legally protected interests coupled with harm.” Hill, 304 Md. at 695 , 501 A.2d at 30 (quoting Oxtoby, 294 Md. at 93-94 , 447 A.2d at 860 ) (internal quotations omitted). We synthesized the relevant holding of Oxtoby as “all that is required is that the negligent act be coupled with some harm in order for a legally cognizable wrong — and, therefore, injury — to have occurred.” Hill, 304 Md. at 696 , 501 A.2d at 30 (citing Oxtoby, 294 Md. at 94 , 447 A.2d at 860 ).

Although Oxtoby dealt with “medical injury” under the HCMCA and Hill addressed “injury” under § 5-109, the Court concluded nevertheless that “the legislature ... intended no substantive distinction in the legal application of the two terms.” Hill, 304 Md. at 696-97 , 501 A.2d at 30 . Thus, the limitations periods in § 5-109 are triggered by “injuries which arise out of the rendering of or failure to render professional services by a health care provider,” coupled with a legally cognizable harm. Id. (internal quotations omitted).

In concluding that § 5-109 abrogated the common law “continuing treatment” rule, the Hill court looked to the legislative purpose of the statute. The Court explained that ¹⁰⁹ the words of § 5-109 expressly place an absolute period of limitation on medical malpractice claims calculated on the basis of when the injury was committed, i.e., the date upon which the allegedly negligent act was first coupled with the harm. The purpose of the statute, readily evident from its terms, was to contain the “long-tail” effect of the discovery rule in medical malpractice cases, by restricting, in absolute terms, the amount of time that could lapse between the allegedly negligent treatment of a patient and the filing of a malpractice claim related to that treatment. Hill, 304 Md. at 699-700 , 501 A.2d at 32 .

Although the statute contained an explicit tolling exception for minority, the Hill court concluded that there was no room for implied exceptions because the Legislature enacted the statute in response to the “so-called crisis in the field of medical malpractice claims.” Hill, 304 Md. at 700 , 501 A.2d at 32 . In this same vein of reasoning, the Court concluded that the time periods in § 5-109 must “be calculated in accordance with the literal language” of the statute. Id. The five-year time bar in the statute at that time operated without regard to whether an injury was discoverable readily.

Id. Because § 5-109 was concerned with when the injury was committed, and not when the treatment was concluded finally, the common law “continuous treatment” rule was abrogated. Hill, 304 Md. at 700 , 501 A.2d at 32 . Hill challenged the constitutionality of § 5-109 by alleging that its denial of access to the courts amounted to destruction of his rights in violation of Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 4 Hill, 304 Md. at 700, 501 A.2d at 33 .

In resolving that § 5-109 was constitutional, the Court in Hill considered the reasonableness of the statute’s denial of access to the courts by looking to other cases where statutes of ¹¹⁰ limitations were challenged. 304 Md. at 702 , 501 A.2d at 34 . The Court concluded that, by imposing an absolute five-year time bar, the Legislature struck a fair balance that furthered the legitimate State purpose of maintaining control of medical malpractice insurance rates and the continuing availability of such coverage, and, at the same time, “affording protection to individuals who sustain injuries by reason of medical malpractice.” Id. The Court considered also that in 1867, when Article 19 was adopted, the prevailing law dictated that a right or cause of action was generated from an alleged wrong, and statutes of limitation were measured from the date of the wrong. Hill, 304 Md. at 704 , 501 A.2d at 35 (citing Goldstein v. Potomac Elec.

Power Co., 285 Md. 673 , 404 A.2d 1064 (1979); Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137, 139 , 215 A.2d 825, 827 (1966)). It was not until 1917 that the discovery rule was adopted for medical malpractice cases, thus changing the triggering event (and thus the time) from which the statute of limitations began to run. Id. (citing Hahn v. Claybrook, 130 Md. 179 , 100 A. 83 (1917)).

The Court concluded that the limitation period in § 5-109 was a reasonable restriction on access to the courts. Id. Section 5-109 was amended again in 1987, partly in response to this Court’s decision in Hill . The relevant portion of the Senate Bill 225 of 1987, as introduced, read: (a) Limitations. — An action for damages for an injury arising out of the rendering of or failure to render professional services by a health care provider, as defined in §§ 3-2A-01 of this article, shall be filed within the earlier of: (1) Five years of the allegedly wrongful act or omission (Emphasis added.) The Governor, through his Legislative Office, was concerned that the Hill court’s interpretation of “injury,” as meaning “the date that the allegedly negligent act was first coupled -with harm,” was too expansive.

Governor’s Legislative Office, Briefing Paper, H.B. 245/S.B. 225, at 3 (1987). The concern was explicated as ¹¹¹ it would be possible under this interpretation to bring an action for a harm that had not manifested itself for years after the negligent act. In some cases, this interpretation effectively negates the limitations period. Such unexpected expansions of risk exposure diminish predictability and pricing stability and, generally, contribute to the soaring premiums in the Maryland malpractice insurance marketplace.

Id. The provision in the proposed bill abrogating the decision in Hill , substituting “allegedly wrongful act or omission” for “the injury was committed,” was deleted from the bill by amendment before passage; thus, the ultimate language of the enacted statute did not change our interpretation of “injury.” 5 See Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, Summary of Committee Report, S.B. 225 (1987). The 1987 amendments to § 5-109 added explicit provisions allowing for § 5-201 (tolling the limitation period for persons under a disability) and § 5-203 (tolling the limitation period for fraud) to apply to medical malpractice actions. Ch. 592 of the Acts of 1987.

After the 1987 amendments, and as it exists today, § 5-109(a) reads: (a) Limitations — An action for damages for an injury arising out of the rendering of or failure to render professional services by a health care provider, as defined in § 3-2A-01 of this article, shall be filed within the earlier of: (1) Five years of the time the injury was committed; or (2) Three years of the date the injury was discovered. ¹¹² In Jones v. Speed, 320 Md. 249, 253 , 577 A.2d 64, 66 (1990), we affirmed once again the constitutionality of § 5-109 (with its 1987 amendments) in our answer to a question similar to the one posed in Hill . Elizabeth Jones suffered from chronic headaches. Jones, 320 Md. at 254 , 577 A.2d at 66 . She sought treatment from Dr. Speed in July of 1978.

Id. Dr. Speed treated Jones for the headaches until February 1986, but did not order a CAT scan during any visit, despite requests from Jones for such scans. Id. In February 1986, Jones, after suffering a seizure, was diagnosed with a brain tumor.

Id. Jones argued that each individual medical appointment with Dr. Speed, where he failed to order the proper diagnostic tests, was a separate act of negligence, rather than a continuing course of treatment. Id. Therefore, her more recent appointments with Dr. Speed, which fell within the five-year window preceding filing formally her claim, were sufficient to satisfy the statute.

Jones, 320 Md. at 256 , 577 A.2d at 67 . The Court agreed with Jones and concluded that she was permitted to split her claim in such a way as to allow her to pursue allegations of negligence against Dr. Speed that were related to appointments that occurred within the pertinent five year time period. Jones, 320 Md. at 261 , 577 A.2d at 70 . The Court reached this conclusion despite Dr. Speed’s protestation that “acceptance of the plaintiffs’ theory would frustrate the legislative intent to provide absolute protection to health care providers for acts of negligence occurring more than five years before the bringing of an action.” Jones, 320 Md. at 257 , 577 A.2d at 67 (emphasis added).

The Court responded that “plaintiffs ... will be entitled to recover damages only for acts of negligence occurring within five years of the filing of their claim,” an interpretation that does not “offend the language or the spirit” of § 5-109. Jones, 320 Md. at 257, 260 , 577 A.2d at 67, 69 . It was not until Newell v. Richards that it appears to us that we first referred, in an opinion of the Court, to § 5-109 as a “special statute of repose,” rather than a statute of limitations. 323 Md. 717, 724 , 594 A.2d 1152, 1156 (1991). The question in Newell was which party in such an action bears the ¹¹³ burden of proving that the three-year “discovery” provision in § 5-109(a)(2) did not bar a claim brought within the five-year limitation period in § 5 — 109(a)(1).

Id. Analyzing the statute, the Court noted that [i]rom the plain language of the statute, it is not clear whether the General Assembly intended § 5-109 to be either (A) a five-year statute of repose with a provision that allows a defendant to cut that period short by up to two years if the defendant can show that the plaintiff did not comply with the three-year discovery provision, or (B) a three-year statute of limitations with a provision that could allow the plaintiff to extend that period up to five years if the plaintiff can show that he or she filed the claim within the three-year discovery provision. Newell, 323 Md. at 725 , 594 A.2d at 1157 . The Court in Newell looked to Hill for guidance, concluding that the General Assembly intended § 5-109 to curtail the common law discovery rule and bar any claim, discoverable or not, after five years, with the objective of promoting “society’s interest in maintaining malpractice insurance coverage and managing the costs of malpractice litigation.” Newell, 323 Md. at 727-28 , 594 A.2d at 1157 .

The Court concluded that, because the Legislature intended § 5-109 to “create a total bar to malpractice actions brought after five years from the date of the alleged negligent treatment,” the medical provider bore the burden of proof to show whether a claimant’s action falls under § 5-109(a)(l) or (2). Newell, 323 Md. at 728 , 594 A.2d at 1157-58 . The Court of Special Appeals (“COSA”), in Edmonds v. Cytology Services of Maryland, Inc., 111 Md.App. 233 , 681 A.2d 546 (1996), discussed in depth the application of § 5-109. In 1980, Debra Edmonds sought treatment from a gynecologist, Dr. Murgalo, for cervical problems.

Edmonds, 111 Md.App. at 236 , 681 A.2d at 547 . After three years of various treatments, Edmonds was diagnosed with cervical cancer. Edmonds, 111 Md.App. at 237 , 681 A.2d at 548 . Dr. Murgalo conducted a procedure to treat the cancer.

Edmonds, 111 Md.App. at 238 , 681 A.2d at 548 . A biopsy of Edmond’s cervix ¹¹⁴ from that procedure indicated that “[a]ll margins are free-5.” Id. No further treatment was given to Edmonds for the cancer. Id.

She underwent subsequent Pap smears over the next five years, with no abnormal results. Id. In 1989, Edmonds complained of severe back pain and was referred to an orthopedist who treated her, without positive results. Id.

Later that year, a tumor was discovered in Edmond’s abdomen and, despite treatment, she died on 5 April 1990. Edmonds, 111 Md.App. at 240 , 681 A.2d at 549 . Her relatives filed wrongful death and survival actions against the pathologist and other doctors for failing negligently to diagnose earlier her invasive cervical cancer. Id.

The doctors asserted that Edmond’s claims were time barred by § 5-109(a). Edmonds, 111 Md.App. at 242 , 681 A.2d at 550 . The intermediate appellate court looked to the history of the statute and this Court’s past opinions to determine when Edmonds suffered an actionable “injury.” Edmonds, 111 Md.App. at 246 , 681 A.2d at 552 . Edmonds’s relatives argued that the trial court erred when it determined, as a matter of law, that her “injury” occurred in 1983 with the misdiagnosis of the pathology sample.

Id. They asserted that she did not suffer any “discernible effect” from the undiscovered disease until 1988 when she experienced back pain, and that was the time when the doctor’s negligence harmed or “injured” Edmonds. Id. The COSA looked to other jurisdictions with medical malpractice claims statutes of limitation similar to Maryland’s to determine when an “injury” occurs.

Edmonds, 111 Md.App. at 247 , 681 A.2d at 553 . The Edmonds court rejected the California view that “injury” occurs when the patient discovers the harm because this would embrace essentially the discovery rule, which had been rejected by enaction of § 5-109. 6 Edmonds, 111 Md.App. at ¹¹⁵ 250-51 , 681 A.2d at 554 . The California view, applied to § 5-109, would also “render meaningless the dichotomy between C.J. § 5 — 109(a)(1) and C.J. § 5-109(a)(2),” and be contrary to this Court’s statement in Hill that § 5-109(a)(l) runs “without regard to whether the injury was reasonably discoverable.” Edmonds, 111 Md.App. at 251 , 681 A.2d at 554-55 . The COSA rejected also Delaware’s view that “injury” occurs at the time of the wrongful act or omission. 7 Edmonds, 111 Md.App. at 255 , 681 A.2d at 557 .

In rejecting Delaware’s approach, the intermediate appellate court opined that Maryland could have followed, but did not, the majority of jurisdictions with medical malpractice claims statutes of limitations that commence upon the occurrence of the negligent act or omission. Id. In fact, the Maryland General Assembly rejected an attempt to bring its medical malpractice claims statute of limitation more in line with these other jurisdictions in 1987. Id.

Noting the stated purpose of the 1987 rejected amendments to S.B. 225, “to overturn the decision of the Court of Appeals in Hill,” the intermediate appellate court concluded that “[tjhis history provides strong evidence that the General Assembly did not intend to create an ironclad rule that a medical malpractice claim would be barred if filed more than five years after the health care provider’s act.” Edmonds, 111 Md.App. at 256 , 681 A.2d at 557 . The court discerned that the ¹¹⁶ General Assembly, concerned with the competing interests of patients who suffered medical malpractice and the public interest in keeping malpractice insurance rates low, struck a balance by “providing that the five year ‘cutoff period in C.J. § 5-109(a)(l) would begin to run on the date when the ‘injury’ resulting from the health care provider’s wrongful act or omission occurred, rather than from the date of that act or omission.” Edmonds, 111 Md.App. at 257 , 681 A.2d at 557-58 . Reiterating the holdings of Hill and Oxtoby , the COSA stated that an “injury” occurs when a patient suffers a legally cognizable harm. Edmonds, 111 Md.App. at 259 , 681 A.2d at 558 .

The Edmonds court noted also the comparison to Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article § 5-108(b), a generally accepted statute of repose, to show that the General Assembly was cognizant of how to create a statute where the limitations period was triggered by a negligent act or omission, rather than an “injury.” Edmonds, 111 Md.App. at 268-69 , 681 A.2d at 563 . This Court affirmed Edmonds in Rivera v. Edmonds, 347 Md. 208, 209 , 699 A.2d 1194, 1195 (1997), but, in doing so, referred notably to § 5-109 as a statute of repose. In Piselli, 371 Md. at 193 , 808 A.2d at 510 , we pondered, in the context of another certified question of law from the Fourth Circuit, whether the three-year time limit of § 5-109(a)(2) begins to accrue when a minor child discovers an injury or when the parents of the child discover the injury. We determined that the child’s claim did not accrue until he reached the age of majority, and in reaching that epiphany, looked to the legislative history of the medical malpractice claims statute to determine its proper effect.

Piselli, 371 Md. at 203 , 808 A.2d at 517 . This Court concluded that § 5-109(a)(2) reflects Maryland’s traditional discovery rule. Id. In determining the reasonableness of restrictions on access to the courts, we considered our previous opinions upholding “the five-year statute of repose for medical malpractice actions set forth in § 5-109(a) and the 10 and 20-year statutes of repose for actions