Andrade v. Housein

JAMES S. GETTY, Judge, Retired, Specially Assigned. In this non-jury trial, the judge in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County concluded that the testimony established that an accident occurred, but that the mere happening of an accident is not evidence of negligence. We agree with the general proposition recited by the court, but it is inapplicable to this case. This is not a “mere happening of an accident” scenario.

Facts The undisputed facts establish that José Andrade, appellant herein, stopped his vehicle at an intersection, waiting for traffic to clear before making a right turn. He was stopped for twenty to thirty seconds when his vehicle was struck in the rear by a vehicle driven by Ciro Panemeno, the appellee, who was following appellant. Appellant and appellee were friends and their destination was a shopping center. The impact drove appellant’s vehicle four to six feet into the intersecting road.

Appellant’s vehicle was damaged in the rear, and appellee had damage to the front of his vehicle. After the collision, appellee backed into the car directly behind him, driven by Shanaz Housein. The court dismissed Housein as a defendant after she testified that the damage to the front of her car was from an earlier accident, not from Panemeno backing into her. 1 She was not involved in the collision between appellant and appellee. In her deposition, Housein stated that she thought appellee and appellant were “playing around” at the intersection.

Appellant denied that he was engaged in such conduct. He ⁶²⁰ testified that he had neck injuries and received medical treatment for several months. Appellee did not appear at trial. His counsel filed a motion for judgment at the conclusion of appellant’s case, which the court initially granted, stating: Clearly, what happened was an accident.

There is not evidence of negligence. As far as the court is concerned, there has been no proof of negligence at all. Nobody saw what happened. The only thing I have is a rear end collision between Mr. Andrade’s car in the front and Mr. Panemeno’s car to the rear of him.

They did bump one another, or actually Mr. Panemeno did bump Mr. Andrade. That is the state of the evidence at this time, but all that has shown to me is that an accident occurred, and I have nothing else. Nobody saw him following too closely, we do not have any skid marks indicating perhaps speed. I do not know the distance that these cars were following one another.

I have no indicia of negligence whatever. All we have is the happening of an accident. I will grant the motion. Thereafter, following additional argument, the court “reserved on the judgment.” The defendant, Panemeno, did not present any evidence, and the court granted the motion to dismiss a second time without further explanation.

Discussion In considering the trial court’s ruling on a motion for judgment at the end of the plaintiffs case, or at the end of the entire case, this Court is required to assume the truth of all evidence tending to sustain the party against whom the motion is granted, as well as all inferences of fact reasonably and fairly deducible therefrom. The trial court’s conclusion that “all we have is the happening of an accident,” as an abstract proposition, is not incorrect. Applying that conclusion to the unexplained collision of two motor vehicles, however, is valid only when considered in a factual vacuum giving no consider ⁶²¹ ation to the surrounding facts and circumstances. The known facts of this case give rise to a presumption of negligence, which was not rebutted.

The Law Having reviewed the case law relevant to the known facts herein, we find that automobile collision cases dealing with presumptions and inferences frequently become embroiled in discussions of whether the term res ipsa loquitur is applicable. The expression has been referred to as a “maxim,” a “doctrine,” and “merely a common argumentative expression of ancient Latin .... Nowhere does it mean more than the colloquial English expression that the facts speak for themselves .... ” The latter definition comes from Chief Judge Bond’s dissent in Potomac Edison Co. v. Johnson, 160 Md. 33, 40 , 152 A. 633 (1930). Lest there be any confusion, our decision in this case does not rest upon the application of res ipsa.

Ristaino v. Flannery, 317 Md. 452 , 564 A.2d 790 (1989), while factually inapposite, is instructive. The issue in Ristai-no was whether it was reversible error to instruct the jury that the mere happening of an accident creates no presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant when the manner