Maryland case law › Anglin v. State

Anglin v. State

38 Md. App. 250 (1977) · Maryland Court of Special Appeals
Maryland Court of Special AppealsDisposition: AffirmedMorton, J.✓ Good law
HoldingFollowing guilty pleas, appellant was convicted in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County of larceny and receiving stolen goods and sentenced to concurrent 10-year terms.

Morton, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Following the entering of guilty pleas, appellant was convicted in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County (Woods, J., presiding) of larceny and receiving stolen goods. Concurrent 10 year terms were imposed. In this appeal it is contended that the trial judge’s acceptance of appellant’s guilty pleas was a “nullity” because the court had lost jurisdiction as a result of the State’s noncompliance with the Intrastate Detainers Act.

Maryland Code, art. 27, § 616S. The record reveals that on November 14, 1974, appellant was convicted in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County of housebreaking, larceny and receiving stolen goods and sentenced to a total of 25 years imprisonment. The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal, Anglin v. State, 28 Md. App. 150 (1975), cert. denied, 276 Md. 737 (1976). On September 22, 1976, appellant’s petition for post conviction relief was granted and he was awarded a new trial on the convictions.

Both parties filed applications with this Court for leave to appeal that decision. On December 1,1976, we remanded the case to the trial court for findings of fact which were subsequently filed with this Court on January 31, 1977. On February 17,1977, this Court denied the applications for leave to appeal in an unreported per curiam opinion, State 252 v. Anglin and Anglin v. State, Post Conviction Docket, No. 125, September Term, 1976, thus leaving undisturbed the trial court’s order granting a new trial. The convictions which presently are being appealed were entered on March 3,1977, pursuant to the new trial'order.

At the time appellant was awarded a new trial he was serving a 10 year sentence on an unrelated conviction. The state’s attorney filed a detainer against him with the Maryland Penitentiary. Appellant received, notice of the detainer on October 27, 1976, and on October 28, 1976, filed his demand for a speedy trial in accordance with the provisions of the Intrastate Detainers Act. The motion was received by the appropriate court and state’s attorney’s office on November 1,, 1976.

On February 18, 1977, a hearing was held before Judge Woods on the State’s petition to extend the 120 day period within which appellant was required to be given a trial under the terms of the act. Appellant and his counsel participated in the hearing. The State pointed out that the 120 day period expired on February 28, 1977, and that because of the pending post conviction proceedings in this Court, appellant could not be tried within the 120 day period. It turned out that the State learned during the course of the hearing that the post conviction proceedings in this Court had just terminated.

The State argued, however, that since the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County had no jurisdiction over appellant during at least 110 days of the 120 day period, i.e., the time during which the matter was pending in this Court, “good cause,” within the meaning of the act, to grant an extension of the 120 day period was thus demonstrated. The act provides, inter alia: “For good cause shown in open court, with the prisoner or his counsel present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.” Judge Woods, after listening to arguments from both the State and appellant, concluded that the State’s request to enlarge the 120 day period was reasonable and scheduled the 253 trial of appellant for March 3, 1977, on which date the trial was held. As the State points out, this Court apparently has never been called upon to make an appraisal of what constitutes “good cause” for the granting of a continuance as provided for in the Intrastate Detainers Act. 1 Determining what constitutes “good cause” is, of course, a judgment call and initially it is made by the trial judge before whom the request for a continuance is pending. In this respect, the Court of Appeals has said: “Speaking generally there can be no doubt that the disposition of petitions for a continuance are within the sound discretion of the trial judge and his rulings in this regard will not

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