Annapolis Roads Property Owners Ass'n v. Lindsay

WATTS, J. This appeal involves conflicting claims of ownership over a ten-foot strip of land (the “Strip”) 1 located between Lots 18, 19, 20, and 21 of the Annapolis Roads subdivision located in Annapolis, Maryland. The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of Thomas C. Lindsay, Sr. and The Thomas C. Lindsay, Sr. Revocable Trust (the “Lindsay Trust”), appellees, and against the Annapolis Roads Property Owners Association (“AR-POA”), Stanley and Barbara Samorajczyk, and Margaret Tal ²⁷⁵ bot, appellants. 2 The circuit court issued two declaratory judgments, both of which are at issue in this appeal. In the first Declaratory Judgment, the circuit court declared that ARPOA holds no right, title, or interest in the Strip “binding” upon Lots 18, 19, 20, and 21 of the Annapolis Roads subdivision. In the second Declaratory Judgment, the circuit court declared that the Lindsay Trust holds all right, title and interest in the Strip “binding” upon Lots 18, 19, 20, and 21 of the Annapolis Roads subdivision, “subject, however, to an easement appurtenant to Lot No. 18, [owned by the Samorajczyks] ... to use the 152' Right of Way for ingress and egress to Carrollton Road.” 3 Appellants noted an appeal raising three issues, which we have rephrased and consolidated into one: 4 I. Whether the circuit court erred in 2009, by granting summary judgment in favor of appellees and declaring that ARPOA owns no interest in the Strip, and in 2010, by granting summary judgment and declaring that the ²⁷⁶ Lindsay Trust holds all right, title and interest in and to the Strip?

We answer this question in the negative, and, as such, we affirm the circuit court’s August 10, 2009, grant of summary judgment and declaratory judgment, and the June 29, 2010, grant of summary judgment and declaratory judgment. Appellees filed a cross-appeal raising four issues, which we have rephrased and consolidated into one: 5 I. Whether the circuit court erred in finding that the Strip is subject to an easement appurtenant to Lot 18 to use the Strip for ingress and egress to Carrollton Road? We answer this question in the negative. We, therefore, affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In 1925, the Annapolis Roads subdivision, then known as “Belmont,” was conveyed to The Armstrong Company by Relia Abell Armstrong. In 1927, The Armstrong Company entered into an agreement with The Munsey Trust Company regarding the Annapolis Roads subdivision. The agreement, dated November 22, 1927, required The Munsey Trust Company to develop the community and make payments on a proposed mortgage in favor of The Equitable Company (“Equitable”). This agreement required that the following lan ²⁷⁷ guage be included in all subsequent deeds for sale of property in the Annapolis Roads subdivision: The ARMSTRONG CORPORATION especially reserves all riparian rights appurtenant to the land as well as the beds of all roads, lakes and ponds, and agrees to construct roadways of approved type as indicated on the plat and survey made by Olmstead Brothers and recorded in the land records of Anne Arundel County, Maryland; and to set aside certain beaches and public parks as indicated on said plat for the perpetual use of the residents of Annapolis Roads.

In 1927, Equitable, as mortgagee, lent the Annapolis Roads Company (“ARC”) $250,000. ARC conveyed fee simple title to Equitable with a grant of possession to ARC, until default of the loan, upon which event Equitable would possess the property. 6 The December 2, 1927, Mortgage contained the following language: This mortgage, made this second day of December in the year nineteen hundred and twenty seven, by and between [ARC], a corporation of the State of Maryland, party of the first part, and the Equitable Company of Washington, a corporation of the State of Delaware, party of the second part; Whereas [ARC] is justly indebted unto [Equitable] in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,-000.00) with interest at the rate of six per cent (6%) per annum, payable semi-annually, in witness whereof [ARC] has given unto [Equitable] one certain promissory note of even date for Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,-000.00), bearing interest at six per cent (6%) per annum, payable semi-annually, principal due and payable five (5) years from date, and wishes to better secure the punctual payment of said note by the execution of this mortgage, which was a condition precedent to the making of said note. ²⁷⁸ Now this mortgage witnesseth that in consideration of the premises and of the sum of Ten Dollars [ARC] does grant unto [Equitable], in fee simple, all that piece or parcel of ground situate, lying and being in Anne Arundel County, State of Maryland, and described as follows, to wit: All that tract of land, containing three hundred and forty one acres, more or less, known as “Belmont,” situated near Annapolis and at or near the mouth of the Severn River, in the Second Election District of Anne Arundel County, Maryland, which was conveyed unto [ARC] by The Armstrong Company, a corporation of the State of Maryland, by deed made and delivered on the Second day of December, 1927, in which deed further reference to the chain of title and to the said property set forth, being also the identical property which was granted and transferred to the said The Armstrong Company by Relia Abell Armstrong, trustee by deed dated December 22, 1925, and recorded among the Land Records of said County in Liber W.M.B. No. 23 folio 32; and being also the identical property which is described by metes and bounds, ... and distances, in the deed thereof from David R. Randall, et al., to Paul Armstrong, dated November 13, 1907, and recorded among the Land Records aforesaid in Liber G.W. No. 57 folio 338, to which deed reference is here made for the purpose of making the said description of these presents as fully as though incorporated herein. Together with the building and improvements thereon and the rights, roads, ways, waters, privileges, appurtenances and advantages, thereto belonging or in anywise appertaining. To Have and to Hold the aforesaid parcel of ground and premises unto and to the proper use and benefit of [Equitable], its successors and assigns forever.

Provided, that if [ARC] or its successors or assigns, shall well and truly pay or cause to be paid the aforesaid sum of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000.00), and all the interest thereon accrued, when and as the same may be due and payable, and shall perform all the covenants herein ²⁷⁹ on their part to be performed, then this mortgage shall be void. And it is agreed that, until default be made in the premises, [ARC] shall possess the aforesaid property when paying in the meantime, all interest, taxes and assessments, public dues and charges of every kind, levied or assessed, or to be levied or assessed on said hereby mortgaged property, which taxes, assessments, interest, public dues, charges, mortgage debt and interest, [ARC] for itself, its successors, and assigns, does hereby covenant to pay when legally demandable. But if default be made in payment of said charges or the interest on said mortgage debt at the time limited for the payment of the same, or in any agreement covenant or condition of this mortgage, then the entire mortgage debt shall be deemed due and demandable, and it shall be lawful for [Equitable], its successors or assigns, or its or their Attorney or Agent, at any time after such default, to sell the property hereby mortgaged or so much thereof as may be necessary, to satisfy and pay said debt, interest and all costs incurred in making such sale, and to grant and convey the said property to the purchaser or purchasers thereof, his her or their heirs or assigns, and which sale shall be made in the manner following, viz: upon giving twenty days notice of the time, place, manner and terms of sale, in some newspaper printed in Anne Arundel County, and such other notice as by the said mortgage, its successors or assigns may be deemed expedient and in the event of a sale of said property under the powers hereby granted, the proceeds, arising from such sale to apply: ... On September 18, 1928, the 1928 Plat was recorded, creating Lots 18, 19, 20, and 21, which are the subject of this appeal.

The Strip was first depicted on the 1928 Plat. As shown on the 1928 Plat, Lot 21 had no access to Carrollton Road except over the Strip. Lot 18 had access to Carrollton Road over the Strip and over a similar strip binding the opposite side of Lot 19 running between Lots 16 and 19. As shown on the 1928 Plat, Lots 19 and 20 fronted Carrollton ²⁸⁰ Road, having direct access to it.

The conveyance history of Lots 18, 19, 20, and 21 is set out more specifically below. Lot 18 On December 10, 1928, ARC conveyed Lot 18 to F.K. Mohler. 7 The deed provided, in pertinent part, that: [ARC] does grant and convey unto [Mohler], his heirs and assigns, in fee simple, all that piece or parcel of ground situate, lying and being in the Second Election District of Anne Arundel County, State of Maryland, being part of the same land which [ARC] obtained from The Armstrong Company by deed dated [December 2,1927], ... to wit: Lot numbered Eighteen (18) of Section “D” in the development known as “Annapolis Roads”, as designated on the plat of said Annapolis Roads made by Olmsted Brothers, which said plat is recorded among the Land Records ... Together with the buildings and improvements thereupon erected, made, or being; and all and every, the rights, alleys, ways, privileges, appurtenances and advantages to the same belonging or in anywise appertaining. [ARC], its successors or assigns, reserves and retains all riparian rights appurtenant to the land as well as the beds of all roadways, lakes and ponds, and agrees to set aside certain beaches and public parks as indicated on the plat and survey made by Olmsted Brothers for the perpetual use of the residents of Annapolis Roads. Mohler conveyed Lot 18 back to ARC in early 1929.

On February 20, 1931, ARC conveyed Lot 18 back to Mohler. In 1957, the Powells, 8 the subsequent owners of Lot 18, conveyed a portion of Lot 18 to the owners of Lot 19. In 1961, the Powells conveyed Lot 18 to Thomas F. And Dorothy S. Horton. In 1962, the Hortons conveyed a portion of Lot 18 ²⁸¹ to the owners of Lot 19.

In 1992, the Estate of R.N. Brown sold Lot 18, as well as Lot 17, to appellants, Stanley and Barbara Samorajczyk. Lot 18 is now in combination with Lot 17 and is designated as 2525 Carrollton Road, and is owned by appellants, the Samorajczyks. Lot 19 On October 8, 1928, ARC conveyed Lot 19 to The Homes Improvement Company by deed. Lot 19 was sold by lot reference, and not by metes and bounds description.

The deed contained the following language: Together with the buildings and improvements thereupon erected, made, or being; and all and every, the rights, alleys, ways, privileges, appurtenances and advantages to the same belonging or in anywise appertaining. [ARC], its successors or assigns, reserves and retains all riparian rights, appurtenant to the land as well as the beds of all roadways, lakes and ponds, and agrees to set aside certain beaches and public parks as indicated in the plat and survey made by Olmsted Brothers for the perpetual use of the residents of Annapolis Roads. In 1928, The Homes Improvement Company conveyed Lot 19 to Mr. and Mrs. Clinton Bradley. In 1941, Mrs. Bradley, then a widow, sold Lots 19, 20, and 21 to the Trouchauds. In 1957, Jean Pierre and Margery Dort Trouchaud conveyed Lot 19 to Harry T. and Grace E. Solomon.

In 1957, the Solomons conveyed Lot 19 to Mary Baquol and, on the same day, Baquol conveyed Lot 19 back to the Solomons. In 1977, the Solomons conveyed Lot 19 to John H. Gill, who conveyed it to the Kinneys in 1983. In 2006, the Kinneys conveyed Lot 19 to appellee, the Lindsay Trust. Lot 19 is designated as 2515 Carrollton Road and is owned by appellee, the Lindsay Trust.

Lots 20 & 21 By deed dated June 23,1932, ARC conveyed Lots 20 and 21 to Helen Sagrario. The deed provided, in pertinent part, as follows: ²⁸² [ARC] does hereby grant and convey unto [Sagrario], her heirs and assigns, in fee simple, all those pieces, parcels or tracts of land situate, lying and being in Anne Arundel County, State of Maryland, described as follows: Lots Numbered ... twenty (20) and twenty-one (21) in the subdivision known as “Section D, Annapolis Roads”, as shown on plat recorded in Liber F. S.R. 2 folio 8, one of the Land Records of said County. Together with the buildings and improvements thereupon erected, made or being; and all and every the rights, alleys, ways, waters, privileges, appurtenances and advantages to the some belonging or in anywise appertaining. Lots 20 and 21 were conveyed by lot reference and not by metes and bounds descriptions. 9 This deed included no reservation by ARC of the beds of roadways or any other reservation, restriction, or retention of any kind.

On July 6, 1932, Sagrario conveyed Lots 20 and 21 to Mrs. Bradley using the standard form of contract of sale and deed that previously had been used by ARC, prior to the conveyance to Sagrario. The deed stated: “[ARC], its successors and assigns, reserves and retains all riparian rights appurtenant to the land as well as the beds of all roadways, lakes, and ponds, and[]agrees to set aside certain beaches and public parks ... for the perpetual use of th[e] residents of Annapolis Roads.” In 1941, Mrs. Bradley sold Lots 19, 20, and 21 to the Trouchauds. In 1953, the Trouchauds conveyed Lots 20 and 21 to Paul and Virginia Anderson by deed, including one-half of the 10-foot wide strip that bordered on Lot 20. The deed to the Andersons provided for a use in common of the Strip.

In 1959, the Andersons conveyed Lots 20 and 21 to Edward and Agnes Erdelatz, who sold them to John Talbot and ²⁸³ appellant Margaret Talbot in 1976. By deed dated May 25, 1976, the Talbots conveyed the portion of the Strip binding Lots 20 and 21 to the Solomons. Specifically, “ALL of that 10 foot path or road, lying between Lots 19 and 20 ... including that part of said 10 foot path or road lying contiguous to lots 21 and 18 ... to the end that said path or road may be closed, vesting title thereto in the [owners of Lot 19.]” Lots 20 and 21 are designated as 2509 Carrollton Road, and are owned by appellant, Margaret Talbot. Current Litigation On June 6, 2007, appellants filed a three-count complaint in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County seeking declaratory judgment that title to the Strip vests in ARPOA and not the Lindsay Trust.

The three counts were labeled: (1) declaratory judgment/quiet title; (2) intentional misrepresentation-fraud/unjust enrichment; and (3) negligent misrepresentation. On July 31, 2007, appellees filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing as to count one for declaratory judgment that appellants failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because a deed dated August 27, 1956, between Club Estates, Inc. and ARPOA, 10 did not convey the Strip. As to counts two and ²⁸⁴ three, appellees argued that the counts be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. On August 2, 2007, appellants filed a response, and on August 14, 2007, appellees filed a reply to the response.

On September 20, 2007, appellees filed an Answer to the June 6, 2007, complaint. On October 1, 2007, appellees filed a counterclaim seeking declaratory judgment. On October 31, 2007, appellants filed an answer to the counterclaim. On October 30, 2008, appellees filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment asking the circuit court to find that the Lindsay Trust is the fee simple owner of the Strip, or in the alternative, to find that ARPOA is not the owner of the Strip.

On November 18, 2008, appellants filed an opposition to the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. On December 18, 2008, appellees filed a Reply to appellants’ Opposition to the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. On January 9, 2009, a hearing was held on appellees’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. On August 10, 2009, the circuit court issued a memorandum opinion and order of declaratory judgment, declaring that ARPOA holds no right, title or interest in or to the Strip (the “First Declaratory Judgment”).

In the opinion, the circuit court stated: The September 18, 1928 [P]lat described above designated several rights-of-way in the community as “road(s)” (e.g., Carrollton). By contrast, the 10-Foot Strip has no designation of any kind. That demonstrates that if the original developer (and ARPOA’s predecessor in interest) had considered the 10-Foot Strip to be a road as ARPOA now argues, the developer could easily have designated it as such. It did not. ²⁸⁵ By deed dated October 8, 1928, ARC conveyed LOT 19 to Homes Improvement Company, together with “all ... the rights, alleys, ways ... privileges, and appurtenances and advantages to the same belonging or in anywise appertaining.” In that deed, ARC “reserve[d] and retaine[d] ... the beds of all roadways, lakes and ponds....”[].

Webster’s Dictionary, 1913 Edition (Plaintiffs exhibit # 5) defines “roadway” as a “road; especially, the part traveled by carriages.” The word “road,” in turn, is defined as any “place where one may ride; an open way or public passage for vehicles, persons, and animals; a track for travel, forming a means of communication between one city, town, or place, and another.” It goes on to state the word road “is generally applied to highways, and as a generic term it includes highways, street, and lane” (Emphasis in original). Having considered the arguments of the parties, we find as a matter of law that the plain language of the deed is ambiguous with regard to whether ARC intended to convey the 10-Foot Strip to Homes Improvement Company, its successors and assigns, including the Lindsay Trust. Therefore, we will resolve that ambiguity, keeping in mind that it must be construed against ARPOA’s predecessor in interest, grantor, ARC.... Plaintiffs argument that the 10-Foot Strip is a road because it is a place where one is capable of riding or going from one place to on the other would turn the front yard of every house in the community into a road owned by AR-POA.

Moreover, ARC retained ownership of “the beds of all roadways.” (Emphasis added). Webster’s 1913 Dictionary defined “roadbed” as “material laid in place and ready for travel.” That definition strongly suggests that ARC intended to retain only the beds of the improved roadways such as Carrollton Road. While there was every indication that Carrollton Road had been paved and was ready for travel in 1928, [appellants] offered no proof the same was true of the 10-Foot Strip in 1928 or 1929. ²⁸⁶ Even if one ignores the fact that the September 1928 Plat (prepared one month before ARC conveyed LOT 19 to Homes Improvement Company) did not designate the 10-Foot Strip as a road, if ARC had intended to retain ownership of the 10-Foot Strip, it could have drafted its 1927 and 1928 deeds to do so. For instance,' they could have specifically retained the “10 foot path shown on the September 1928 plat located between lot 19 and 20.” More generally, the deeds could have reserved all “paths,” “alleys,” “ways,” or “shared driveways” along with “beds of roads, lakes and ponds.” We find no clear intention by the grantor, [ARC] to retain the 10-Foot Strip, ARPOA’s self-serving interpretation of the deeds does not alter the logical construction of its words....

Not only did ARC fail to clearly state an intention to retain the 10-Foot Strip, the 1928 and 1929 deeds included a strong indication that ARC intended to convey it to its grantees. Those deeds transferred ownership of, “all ... alleys [and] ways ... and appurtenances and advantages to this same belonging or in anywise appertaining [to the lot].” The 1918 Edition of Webster’s defined a “way” as “[t]hat by, upon, or along, which one passes or processes[.]” That definition more closely describes the 10-Foot Strip in 1928/1929 than any other term used in the deeds or the arguments of [appellants]. In addition, Webster’s defined “alley” as a “narrow passage; especially a walk or passage in a garden or park, bordered by rows of trees or bushes; a bordered way.” We find, therefore, that ARC retained no rights, title, or interest in the 10-Foot Strip when it conveyed LOT 19 to Homes Improvement Company or LOT 18 to F.K. Mohler. That conclusion applies with greater force when ARC conveyed LOTS 20 and 21 to Helen Sagrario in 1932.

In that deed ARC once again conveyed “all ... alleys [and] ways ... and appurtenances and advantages to this same belonging or in anywise appertaining [to LOTS 20 and 21].” However, ARC did not retain the roadbed or, for that matter, anything else in that deed. ²⁸⁷ Finally, for the reasons discussed above, ARC’S 1928, 1929 and 1932 deeds contain no clear manifestation of any intention to retain ownership of the 10-Foot Strip.... (Footnote omitted) (some omissions and alterations in original). In the order of declaratory judgment, the circuit court: DECLARED, that [ARPOA] holds no right, title or interest in or to the strip of land binding upon LOTS 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the Annapolis Roads subdivision, measuring 10 feet by 114-116 feet (+/-) and shown on Annapolis Roads Plat A, filed September 18, 1928 among the land records of Anne Arundel County at Cabinet # 1, Rod # 5, Plat # 8, and it is, DECLARED, that except as specifically provided in the preceding paragraph, this Declaratory Judgment does not declare the rights or obligations of any other person or entity.[ 11 ] On September 9, 2009, appellants, the Samorajczyks and Talbot, filed a Combined Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, asking the circuit court to declare that the owners of Lots 18, 19, 20, and 21 in the Annapolis Roads development own the Strip as tenants in common. On October 6, 2009, appellees filed an amended counterclaim for declaratory relief seeking that the circuit court declare the Lindsay Trust the fee simple owner of the portion of the Strip that lies between Lots 19 and 20, including the triangular point at the end of the Strip that abuts Lots 18 and 21, and to declare that no party to the lawsuit has an easement on or over Lot 19, or on or over either the Strip, to the triangular point at the end of the Strip.

On November 18, 2009, appellants filed an answer to the amended counterclaim. On October 6, 2009, appellees filed a motion for summary judgment as to the amended counterclaim for declaratory relief. On November 18, 2009, appellants filed an opposition to appellees’ motion for summary judgment. On January 21, ²⁸⁸ 2010, appellees filed a reply in support of their motion for summary judgment.

On March 12, 2010, the circuit court held a combined motions hearing on appellants’ September 9, 2009, motion for partial summary judgment and appellees’ October 6, 2009, motion for summary judgment. On June 29, 2010, the circuit court issued a second declaratory judgment (the “Second Declaratory Judgment”) stating: DECLARED, that [appellee], the [Lindsay Trust], holds all right, title and interest in and to the strip of land binding upon lots 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the Annapolis Roads subdivision, measuring 10 foot by 116.61 foot (+/-) and the 5 foot by 35.38 foot extension thereto binding upon Lot 18, 19 and 21, according to a survey and plat made by James D. Hicks & Associates Dated August, 1957 ... subject, however, to an easement appurtenant to Lot No. 18 ... to use the 152' Right of Way for ingress and egress to Carrollton Road. DECLARED, that except as specifically provided in the preceding paragraph, this Second Declaratory Judgment does not declare the rights or obligations of any other person or entity and all other pending requests for relief are hereby deniedf.] On June 30, 2010, the circuit court issued an opinion explaining the findings which formed the basis of the June 29, 2010, second declaratory judgment. In the opinion, the circuit court stated: With regard to The Lindsay Trust’s argument that it has exclusive title to the 10 Foot Strip, the most significant conveyances are: (1) Mr. and Mrs. Trouehauds’ 1957 conveyance of Lot 19 to the Solomons; (2) the Solomons’ 1962 acquisition of Mr. and Mrs. Hortons’ title to the 35.38' by 5' portion of Lot 18; and, (3) the Solomons’ 1976 purchase of Mr. and Mrs. Talbots’ title to Lot 20 and 21 part of the 1925,10 Foot Strip binding Lots 20 and 21.

When they purchased Lot 19 in 1957, the Solomons took title to the portion of the strip binding that lot, to the 10 Foot Strip’s midpoint. See, former Art. 21, § 5-[114], In ²⁸⁹ 1962, the Solomons acquired by express grant from Mr. and Mrs. Horton, title to the 35.38' by 5' piece of land, which, until that grant, had been part of Lot 18. In 1976, the Solomons acquired by express grant from Mr. and Mrs. Talbot, title to the remaining portion of the 10 Foot Strip; that is, the portion binding Lots 20 and 21. As a result of the 1957, 1962 and 1976 conveyances, Mr. and Mrs. Solomon became the fee simple owners of the entire strip, including the 1962 Extension.

In 2006, they conveyed their right, title and interest in Lot 19, and then the entire strip, to The Lindsay Trust. In the opinion, as to the Strip being subject to an easement to Lot 18, the circuit court stated: The fact that The Lindsay Trust holds title to the entire 10 Foot Strip does not invalidate Lot 18 owners’ easement. In 1976, when the Talbots conveyed their right, title and interest to the Lot 20 and 21 portions of the Strip, they did not (and could not) extinguish the Lot 18 owners’ right to use the Strip to access Carrollton Road. Instead, the Solomons purchased title to the Lot 20 and 21 portions of the 10 Foot Strip from the Talbots subject to that easement.

The Solomons’ several purchases merely reduced the number of servient tenements from four to one. [W]e find that [appellees] did not rebut the presumption that the reference to the 1928 Plat included in the 1928 Deed demonstrated ARC’s intention to convey Lot 18’s original grantee, an easement to use the 10 Foot Strip for access to Carrollton Road. That easement thereby became appurtenant to Lot 18 in 1928 and, as a result, passed to all subsequent owners of the property, including Mr. and Mrs. Samorajezyk. The circuit court found that the original conveyance of Lot 18 occurred on December 10, 1928, and, based on the land records, the court stated that “the reference in the December 10, 1928 ARC-to-Mohler deed to Lot numbered Eighteen (18) of Section ‘D’ in a development known as ‘Annapolis Roads’, ²⁹⁰ as designated on the plat of said Annapolis Roads made by Olmstead Brothers, which said plat is recorded among the Land Records of Anne Arundel County in Plat Book W.N.U. No. 2 folio 8” (emphasis added), refers to the 1928 Plat. As indicated above, it clearly depicts the 10 Foot Strip.” (Some internal quotation marks omitted).

The circuit court rejected appellees’ argument that “the first Lot 18 deed did not refer to a plat that established the 10 Foot Strip and, as a result, created no presumption that the parties intended to incorporate the use of the Strip as part of the conveyance.” The circuit court stated that “[t]he critical point ... is whether the first deed conveying the property refers to a plat ‘depicting’ the easement; not whether the plat referred to was the first plat on which the right of way was drawn.” The circuit court found that: “[A] reference to a plat filed after the establishment of a right-of-way may go to the weight of the inference to be drawn from that reference.” The circuit court rejected appellees’ argument that the deed’s reference to the plat cannot be interpreted to convey an easement because the plat contains no legend identifying the Strip as a right of way, finding that the lack of a legend is not conclusive evidence that the parties did not intend to establish an easement. On June 30, 2010, the circuit court issued an order denying appellants’ motion for partial summary judgment and the motion to strike appellees’ amended counterclaim. On August 5, 2010, appellants noted an appeal and on August 9, 2010, appellees noted an appeal. DISCUSSION I.

(1) First Declaratory Judgment A. Contentions Appellants argue that the circuit court erred in August 2009, by granting summary judgment in favor of appellees, finding that ARPOA owns no interest in the Strip. Appellants contend that the circuit court misapplied Md.Code Ann., Real ²⁹¹ Property Art. (“R.P.”) § 2-114, and wrongly concluded that the 1928 deed of Lot 19 in which ARC reserved all rights “in the beds of all roadways” was not an express and written reservation to the transferor of “all the right, title, and interest to the” Strip. Appellants argue that the “essential question, in construing the 1928 deed of Lot 19 is whether ARC’s reservation of rights ‘in the beds of all roadways’ was an ‘express’ and written reservation to the transferor of ‘all the right, title, and interest to the street or highway’ in question,” ie. the Strip. Appellants contend that the circuit court must have concluded that the Strip was a not a roadway within the meaning of the term as it was used in the 1928 ARC deed of Lot 19.

Conversely, appellants argue that the circuit court must have concluded that the Strip was a “street” or “highway” or R.P. § 2-114 would have been inapplicable. Appellants maintain that the plain language and definition of “roadway” demonstrate that the circuit court erred in concluding that the Strip was not a roadway. Appellants contend that “to suggest that the reservation in the 1928 ARC deed of Lot 19 in the ‘beds of all roadways’ was in any way ‘ambiguous,’ or that it did not apply to the [Strip], which the circuit court must have found to be a ‘street’ or ‘highway,’ stretches these common words beyond recognition.” Appellants argue that if the Strip was found to be a street or highway for the purpose of R.P. § 2-114, the reservation in the 1928 ARC deed of Lot 19 in the “beds of all roadways” was an express and written reservation of ARC’s rights in all of that street or highway. Appellants contend that the circuit court erred in finding that “the definition of ‘roadbed’ strongly suggests that ARC intended to retain only the beds of the improved roadways such as Carrollton Road,” and in finding that “there was every indication that Carrollton Road had been paved and was ready for travel in 1928, [appellants] offered no proof that the same was true of the ... [S]trip in 1928 or 1929.” Appellants argue that appellees produced no evidence prior to the August 2009 Order showing that Carrollton Road was paved in 1928.

Appellants contend that the fact that the Strip was or was not ²⁹² paved was clearly material to the First Declaratory Judgment, and as such, a genuine dispute of material fact exists. Appellants argue that the facts show a clear intention of ARC to reserve rights in the Strip. Appellants maintain that ARC, in the 1920s intended to create a common scheme and plan for the development of the community and, in the 1920s, owners of land would dedicate portions of their land to common use. Appellants argue that the Strip was dedicated to be used as a roadway by the community, including the four lot owners whose properties bound the Strip. 12 In contrast, appellees contend that the circuit court correctly determined that ARPOA retains no interest in the Strip.

Appellees argue that R.P. § 2-114 “creates a presumption that a conveyance by a grantor who owns property on either side of a street conveys to the center of the street, and the burden to prove otherwise is on the person claiming that the conveyance did not convey to the center of the streetf,]” ie. ARPOA. Appellees assert that reservations of rights in land ²⁹³ under R.P. § 2-114 are strictly construed. Appellees contend, pursuant to R.P. § 2-114(b), that ARC conveyed to the center of the Strip when it first conveyed Lots 19 and 20 because, in 1928, ARC owned the properties on both sides of the Strip.

Appellees point out that in 1932, the conveyance of Lots 20 and 21 from ARC to Sagrario expressly conveyed all alleys and ways, and the deed did not contain any reservation of the beds of the roadways. 13 Appellees contend that the lack of an express reservation in the 1932 deed conveying Lots 20 and 21 from ARC to Sagrario rebuts appellants’ argument that AR-POA reserved interest in the Strip. Appellees contend that the reservation of “the beds of all roadways” in the 1928 deed to Lot 19 “is not sufficiently clear and specific to constitute an ‘express reservation’ of a strip of land designed to provide driveway access to two lots.” Appellees discount appellants’ argument that there are “overwhelming contemporaneous facts [to] demonstrate that ARC intended to reserve all rights to the Strip when it reserved its right to the beds of all roadways.” Appellees assert that these facts are irrelevant because the plain language of the deeds did not contain an express reservation of rights in the Strip. Appellees maintain that “[i]t is not at all inconsistent to conclude that the Strip is not a ‘roadway’ for purposes of an ‘express reservation’ in a deed but that it is a ‘street’ for purposes of [R.P.] § 2-114.” Appellees argue that a “shared access driveway for several lots is not, by definition, a road or roadway—it is a shared driveway.” Appellees assert that a street is “construed broadly under State law because the policy behind [R.P.] § 2-114, is to ensure that all land that could potentially be retained by a developer instead be conveyed out to adjoining land owners.” Alternatively, appellees argue that if this Court were to look beyond the plain language of the deeds, there is no evidence ²⁹⁴ that ARC intended to reserve all rights to the Strip. Appellees contend that: (1) Lot 19 is not shown on various plats as including the Strip because title to the Strip was conveyed by operation of law and not by way of deed; (2) it is illogical that ARC would have dedicated the Strip to public use given that the purpose of the Strip was to provide access to Carrollton Road for only two lots; (3) the circuit court correctly concluded that the Strip is not a roadway for purposes of an express reservation under state law; (4) Carrollton Road is a road within the ordinary meaning of that term, and it is designated as such on the 1928 Plat and the Strip is a shared driveway, with no label or designation on the 1928 Plat, thus the Strip and Carrollton Road are different; (5) the Strip is closer in nature to an alley or way than a road.

Appellees argue that there is “ ‘overwhelming’ evidence that ARC did not reserve any rights in the Strip or dedicate it to public use.” Appellees contend that: (1) ARC made no attempt to reserve any rights to the Strip in connection with the first conveyance of Lots 20 and 21; (2) the owners of Lot 20 and 21 have acted as the owners of the Strip, and by deeds in 1950, 1953, and 1959, the owners of Lot 20 conveyed one-half of the Strip to their grantees; and (3) the 1950 deed, in which the Trouchauds conveyed to the Andersons one-half of the Strip, reserved a “use in common” over the Strip, indicating that the Strip was intended to be, and was treated as, a common driveway and not as a roadway. Appellees argue that even if the reservation of title to the “beds of all roadways” somehow served as an express reservation of interest in the Strip, the 1932 deed to Sagrario conveyed ARC’s rights in the Strip. Appellees point out that, in 1928, ARC conveyed Lot 19 to The Homes Improvement Company and, therefore, in 1932, when ARC conveyed Lots 20 and 21 to Sagrario, it did not own Lot 19. Appellees contend, pursuant to R.P. § 2-114, that “[i]f the grantor of property does not own property on the opposite side of the street, the deed passes to the grantee all of the grantor’s ownership interest in the street to the grantee.” Therefore, appellees maintain that the Talbots, as owners of Lots 20 and 21, held ²⁹⁵ an interest in their one-half of the Strip, and in 1976, the Talbots conveyed all of their interest in the Strip to the owner of Lot 19.

B. Standard of Review In Catalyst Health Solutions, Inc. v. Magill, 414 Md. 457, 471-72 , 995 A.2d 960 (2010), the Court of Appeals stated: The standard of review for a declaratory judgment entered as a result of the grant of a motion for summary judgment is whether that declaration was correct as a matter of law. We have held that [wjhile it is permissible for trial courts to resolve matters of law by summary judgment in declaratory judgment actions, the court must, in a separate document and in writing, define the rights and obligations of the parties or the status of the thing in controversy. This requirement is applicable even if the action is not decided in favor of the party seeking the declaratory judgment/ 14 1 (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). “That, as a general rule, the construction or interpretation of all written instruments is a question of law for the court is a principle of law that does not admit of doubt.” Olde Severna Park Improvement Ass’n v. Gunby, 402 Md. 317, 329 , 936 A.2d 365 (2007) (citations omitted). “In construing the language of a deed, the basic principles of contract interpretation apply.” Miller v. Kirkpatrick, 377 Md. 335, 351, 833 A.2d 536 (2003). In Gunby v. Olde Severna Park Improvement Ass’n, 174 Md.App. 189, 243-44 , 921 A.2d 292 , aff'd, 402 Md. 317 , 936 A.2d 365 (2007), we explained: ²⁹⁶ We construe a deed without resort to extrinsic evidence, if the deed is not ambiguous.

In “interpreting a deed whose language is clear and unambiguous on its face, the plain meaning of the words used shall govern without the assistance of extrinsic evidence.” Drolsum v. Horne, 114 Md. App. 704, 709 , 691 A.2d 742 , cert. denied, 346 Md. 239 , 695 A.2d 1227 (1997). We also consider the language of the deed “in light of the facts and circumstances of the transaction at issue as well as the governing law at the time of conveyance.” Chevy Chase [Land Co. v. U.S.], 355 Md. [110] at 123 [ 733 A.2d 1055 (1999) ]. Thus, the intention of a grantor is to be determined from the four corners of his deed, if possible, and if from an attempt to make such determination an irreconcilable conflict arises because of contradictions within the deed other means must be employed to ascertain the correct interpretation to be placed upon it. Words used in a deed should be construed in pari materia and a construction should be adopted which will give effect to all words.

Each word and provision of the instrument should be given that significance which is consistent with, and will effectuate, the intention of the parties. 4 HERBERT T. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 981 at 112 (3d ed. 1975, 2007 Cum.Supp.). Language in a deed is considered ambiguous, however, “if, when read by a reasonably prudent person, it is susceptible of more than one meaning.” Calomiris [v. Woods], 353 Md. [425] at 436 [ 727 A.2d 358 ]; see Gregg Neck Yacht Club, Inc. [v. County Com’rs of Kent County], 137 Md.App. [732] at 760, 769 A.2d 982 [ (2001) ]. The determination of ambiguity is a question of law, subject to de novo review. See [Auction & Estate Representatives, Inc. v.] Ashton, 354 Md. [333] at 341 [ 731 A.2d 441 (1999) ]; Calomiris, 353 Md. at 434 [ 727 A.2d 358 ].

And, when the words in a deed “ ‘are susceptible of more than one construction,’” the deed is “ ‘construed against the grantor and in favor of the grantee.... ’” Morrison v. Brashear, 38 Md.App. 693, 698 , 382 ²⁹⁷ A.2d 353 (1978) (citation omitted); see Gregg Neck Yacht Club, Inc., 137 Md.App. at 760 [ 769 A.2d 982 ]. C. Roadway v. Alley/Way-Definitions Webster’s Dictionary, 1913 Edition, defined “roadway” as a “road; especially, the part traveled by carriages.” The word “road,” in turn, is defined as any “place where one may ride; an open way or public passage for vehicles, persons, and animals; a track for travel, forming a means of communication between one city, town, or place, and another.” Webster’s states that the word “road” “is generally applied to highways, and as a generic term it includes highways, street, and lane.” (Emphasis omitted). The 1913 Edition of Webster’s defined a “way” as “[t]hat by, upon, or along, which one passes or processes ...; passage; road, street track, or path of any kind[.]” The 1913 Edition of Webster’s defined an “alley” as a “narrow passage; especially a walk or passage in a garden or park, bordered by rows of trees or bushes; a bordered way.” The current definition of the word “road” is “an open way for vehicles, persons, and animals; esp: one lying outside of an urban district: highway.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1076 (11th ed. 2003). The current definition of the word “way” is “a thoroughfare for travel or transportation from place to place.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1415 (11th ed. 2003).

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “way” as “[a] passage or path.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1623 (8th ed. 2004). The current definition of the word “alley” is “a narrow street; esp: a thoroughfare through the middle of a block giving access to the rear of lots or buildings.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 32 (11th ed. 2003). D. R.P. § 2-114 Md. Ann.Code, Art. 21 § 5-114 (1957, 1973 RepLVol.) provides: Any deed, will, or other instrument which conveys land in this State, binding on any street or highway, or when any street or highway shall be one or more of the lines thereof, shall be construed to pass to the devisee, donee or grantee therein, all the right, title, and interest of the devisor, donor, ²⁹⁸ or grantor in the street or highway; provided, however, to the extent the devisor, donor or grantor owns other land on the opposite side of the street or highway, then the deed, will, or other instrument shall be construed to pass the right, title, and interest of the devisor, donor, or grantor only to the center of that portion of the street or highway upon which the two (or more) tracts co-extensively bind. The foregoing provisions shall be inapplicable in either of the above instances if the devisor, donor or grantor shall in express terms in the writing by which the devise, gift or conveyance is made, reserve to himself all the right, title and interest to the said street or highway.

See Boucher v. Boyer, 301 Md. 679, 687 , 484 A.2d 630 (1984) (“This statute, which applies to private and public streets, extends the common law presumption that title to the center of a binding street passes to the grantee.”) (citations omitted). This statute was later recodified at Md.Code (1981 Repl.Vol.), R.P. § 2-114, effective July 1, 1974, which provided as follows: Unless a contrary intention appears in the deed, will, or other instrument, if any deed, will, or other instrument grants or bequeaths land binding on any street or highway, or if any street or highway is one or more of the lines of the land, the deed, will, or other instrument passes to the legatee, donee, or grantee, all the right, title, and interest of the testator, donor or grantor in the street or highway. Except that to the extent the testator, donor, or grantor owns other land on the opposite side of the street or highway, the deed, will, or other instrument passes the right, title, and interest of the testator, donor, or grantor only to the center of that portion of the street or highway on which the two or more tracts coextensively bind.[ 15 ] See Boucher, 301 Md. at 686 n. 1, 484 A.2d 630 . In Callahan v. Clemens, 184 Md. 520, 526 , 41 A.2d 473 (1945), the Court of Appeals explained that Art. 21, § 5-114, “provides that any conveyance binding upon a highway carries ²⁹⁹ to the grantee title to the center thereof, in the absence of an express provision to the contrary.

This applies to a private as well as a public way. The statute merely extends a presumption that was recognized at common law.” 16 (Citations omitted). In Bowie v. W. Md. R.R. Terminal Co., 133 Md. 1, 11-12 , 104 A. 461 (1918), the Court of Appeals explained: ³⁰⁰ “Reasons for These Rules—The natural presumption where a deed conveys land bordering on a stream or highway is, that the grantor means to convey what he owns, and not to reserve a strip of land of no value to him, but the loss of which to the grantee might be productive of great injury. He has power by apt words to reserve what and as much as he pleases, or so to frame the language of his conveyance as to limit the land conveyed to the line of the stream or highway, without extending further, and in all such cases, courts are bound to give effect to his expressed intention.

But in the absence of words showing such an intention, it is not presumed that the grantor intended to retain in himself the fee to the street or stream when he has parted with the adjoining land. Therefore it may be said to be a universal rule, that a deed giving a stream as a boundary will convey title to the center of the stream or to low or high water mark, depending upon how far the grantor’s title extends. By such a description the grantor will convey all that he owns, unless a contrary intent appears from the language of the deed. The deed is taken most strongly against the grantor in the application of this rule and courts will not favor the presumption that he has retained title to the bed of the stream.” E. Analysis (1) Road v. Shared Driveway Prehminarily, we must determine whether the Strip is a roadway.

By deed dated October 8, 1928, ARC conveyed Lot 19 to The Homes Improvement Company, together with “all ... the rights, alleys, ways, privileges, appurtenances and advantages to the same belonging or in anywise appertaining.” (Emphasis added). In the deed, ARC “reserve[d] and retained] ... the beds of all roadways, lakes and ponds[.]” (Emphasis added). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the Strip is not a roadway, but rather it is a shared driveway. A review of the September 18, 1928, Plat clearly indicates that certain ³⁰¹ rights of way were specifically designated as roads in the Annapolis Roads Community, demonstrated predominantly by the right-of-way labeled “Carrol[l]ton Road.” By contrast, the Strip has no designation as a road of any kind.

Rather the 1928 Plat labels the Strip “10'.” A view of the 1928 Plat reveals that the Strip does not extend to Lake Ogleton, but rather ends at the top of Lots 18 and 21. A review of the 1928 Plat indicates that the Strip was shared access between Lots 18,19, 20, and 21. Looking at the plain language of the deeds, ARC only retained rights and interests in the beds of roadways, conveying “all ... alleys [and] ways, privileges, appurtenances and advantages to the same belonging or in anywise appertaining [to the lot].” The 1913 Edition of Webster’s Dictionary defined a “way” as “[t]hat by, upon, or along, which one passes or processes[.]” That definition more closely matches the description of the Strip set forth in the 1928 and 1929 deeds. Thus, on October 8, 1928, ARC’s conveyance by deed Lot 19 to The Homes Improvement Company, “[t]ogether with the buildings and improvements thereupon erected, made or being; and all and every, the rights, alleys, ways, privileged, appurtenances and advantages to the same belonging or in anywise appertaining[,]” included the Strip.

In our view, the circuit court correctly determined that, if “the [Strip] is a road because it is a place where one is capable of riding or going from one place to on the other[, then that] would turn the front yard of every house in the community into a road owned by ARPOA.” In 1913, a roadway was defined by Webster’s Dictionary as a “road; especially, the part traveled by carriages.” “Road,” in turn, was defined in 1913 by Webster’s Dictionary as any “place where one may ride; an open way or public passage for vehicles, persons, and animals; a track for travel, forming a means of communication between one city, town, or place, and another.” A review of the record reveals that the Strip obviously did not provide a track for travel between cities or towns, but rather allowed the owners of Lots 18, 19, 20, and 21 to access Carrollton Road as a “way.” As such, the Strip was a part of the lots binding it, ³⁰² and when lots were conveyed, the portion of the Strip binding the lots was also conveyed. 17 (2) Even if the Strip is a “Road” for the Purposes of R.P. § 2-114, There is No Express Reservation Having determined that the Strip is a not road, we conclude that ARC’s reservation in the “beds of all roadways” failed to expressly reserve any right to the Strip. Pursuant to Art. 21 § 5-114, a deed that conveys land binding on a street or highway “shall be construed to pass” to the grantee all of the grantor’s right, title, and interest in the street or highway unless the grantor “shall in express terms in the writing by which the devise, gift or conveyance is made, reserve to himself all the right, title and interest to the said street or highway.” (Emphasis added). We agree with appellees that “[i]t is not at all inconsistent to conclude that the Strip is not a ‘roadway’ for purposes of an ‘express reservation’ in a deed but that it is a ‘street’ for purposes” of Art. 21 § 5-114 or R.P. § 2-114. The purpose of Art. 21 § 5-114 is for a grantor to convey all interest that the grantor has in the highway binding land, as reserving the strip of land would be of no value to the grantor, but would greatly hinder the grantee.

See Bowie, 133 Md. at 11 , 104 A. 461 (“The natural presumption where a deed conveys land bordering on a stream or highway is, that the grantor means to convey what he owns, and not to reserve a strip of land of no value to him, but the loss of which to the grantee might be productive of great injury.”). Applying the principles discussed above, as to Lots 18 and 19, ARC’s reservation in “the beds of all roadways” was not sufficient to constitute an “express reservation” in the Strip. The language of the deeds reserving the “beds of all road ³⁰³ ways” does not demonstrate a specific and express intent to reserve interest in the Strip. “The test for ambiguity is whether the terms are reasonably susceptible to two or more meanings.” Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Promenade Towers Mut.

Housing Corp., 84 Md.App. 702, 717 , 581 A.2d 846 (1990), aff'd, 324 Md. 588 , 597 A.2d 1377 (1991) (citation omitted). The deeds conveyed to the grantees the “alleys” and “ways,” while reserving the interest in the “beds of all roadways”; because the Strip was not labeled as a road on the 1928 Plat nor specified in the deed as a road, it is unclear whether the deed reserving the grantor’s interest in the “beds of all roadways” included an express reservation in the Strip. The burden is on the grantor to demonstrate an express intention to reserve the street after conveying the land bordering the street. As the Court of Appeals stated in Bowie, 133 Md. at 11 , 104 A. 461 : [The grantor] has power by apt words to reserve what and as much as he pleases, or so to frame the language of his conveyance as to limit the land conveyed to the line of the stream or highway, without extending further, and in all such cases, courts are bound to give effect to his expressed intention.

But in the absence of words showing such an intention, it is not presumed that the grantor intended to retain in himself the fee to the street or stream when he has parted with the adjoining land. Upon de novo review, we construe any words in the deed susceptible of more than one construction against the grantor and in favor of the grantee, and we conclude, therefore, that ARC failed to expressly reserve any interest in the Strip. See Gunby, 174 Md.App. at 243-44 , 921 A.2d 292 . Applying this principle, and construing the language in favor of the grantees, the October 8, 1928, conveyance of Lot 19 to The Homes Improvement Company and the February 20, 1931, conveyance of Lot 18 to Mohler, conveyed with those Lots “to the center of’ the Strip.

As to Lots 20 and 21, dispositive is appellants’ concession that “every deed relating to ‘Belmont Farms,’ with the excep ³⁰⁴ tion of the 1932 S[a]grario deed [conveying Lots 20 and 21] and the 1944 Equitable deed of ‘S[a]grario’ property, contained an explicit reservation of rights in the ‘beds of all roadways.’ ” When ARC conveyed Lots 20 and 21 to Sagrario on June 23, 1932, ARC failed to expressly reserve a right to the beds of all roadways. Nothing in the June 1932, deed to Sagrario reserved the right to any road or way or retained the rights in a roadbed, or anything else, for that matter. The June 1932 conveyance of Lots 20 and 21 conveyed, by operation of law, any interest that ARC had in the Strip. Appellants contend that in the July 6, 1932, transaction, Sagrario put ARC’S reservation back in the deed when she transferred Lots 20 and 21 to Mrs. Bradley using the standard form of contract sale and deed previously used by ARC prior to the conveyance to her.

This contention is without merit. Once ARC conveyed the lots to Sagrario without the reservation, the original reservation as to the beds of roadways, or any other reservation omitted by ARC, was extinguished. In the deed from Sagrario to Mrs. Bradley, the following language appears: “[ARC] its successors or assigns, reserves and retains all riparian rights appurtenant to the land as well as the beds of all roadways ... for the perpetual use of th[e] residents of Annapolis Roads.” ARC, however, was not the grantor—or even a party to the transaction—and therefore, by its plain language the deed effectively failed to create an easement by express reservation for ARC. Parties may create a deed of easement for the benefit of a third party, see generally Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., — Md.App.-(2012), but that was not done in this case.

Here, Sagrario and Mrs. Bradley did not create and reserve an easement on behalf of ARC, but rather inserted ARC’S name into the deed, as ARC reserving an easement for itself even though it was not the grantor in the conveyance and had no interest in the property. Based on the conveyances discussed above, we conclude that the circuit court properly determined in its August 10, 2009, ³⁰⁵ Declaratory Judgment Order that ARPOA holds no right, title or interest in the Strip. (2) Equitable’s Mortgage on the Annapolis Roads Subdivision A. Contentions Appellants argue that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellees and “ignoring] the effect of Equitable’s mortgage on [the Annapolis Roads subdivision], which applied to the [Strip] and which was never released prior to the first conveyances of Lots 19 and 20.” Appellants contend that in 1928, at the time of the first conveyance of Lot 19, Equitable owned fee simple title to all of the land in the Annapolis Roads subdivision because “in 1927, at the start of development of ‘Belmont Farms,’ the Equitable Company of Washington, as Mortgagee], lent ARC some $250,000, subject to Equitable’s mortgage [and,] [a]s part of the same transaction, ARC conveyed fee simple title to The Equitable Company with a grant of possession to ARC, until default of the loan, upon which event the Equitable Company would possess the property.” 18 Appellants maintain that the Strip was not a part of Lots 19 and 20. Appellants contend that the 1932 conveyance of the twelve unsold lots to Sagrar ³⁰⁶ io—whom appellants maintain was a strawman—did not convey any interest in the Strip, as the Strip was not part of any of the lots.

Appellants argue that when the lots were conveyed to Sagrario, Equitable executed a Deed of Release, in favor of ARC, that released Equitable’s mortgage on those twelve lots, but only those lots. Appellants point out that the release, however, provided that Equitable’s lien mortgage would remain as to the remainder of the property therein described, which appellants contend included the Strip. Appellants maintain that “neither the first conveyance of Lot 19 (the Lindsay property) in 1928, nor the first conveyances of the adjacent Lot 20 in the 1932 S[a]grario transactions, resulted in a release or extinguishment of Equitable’s title and mortgage interests in both the main part of Carroll-ton Road and the [Strip].” Appellants argue that “Equitable specifically retained its rights in all property (other than the lots themselves), whenever a conveyance occurred, and it asserted the same reservation of rights in the ‘beds of all roadways’ found in all other deeds, in the 1932 conveyance of Lot 20 by its strawman, S[a]grario, to Bradley.” Appellants contend that “every reason existed for Equitable, the true owner of all of Carrollton Road [including the Strip], to maintain the common scheme and plan in force throughout the rest of Annapolis Roads, and to preserve its unreleased rights in all land that it owned, including the [Strip].” Appellants argue that this issue was not cured when the foreclosure proceedings were completed and legal and equitable title merged in Equitable. Appellants contend that R.P. § 2-114 does not operate to defeat a mortgage interest when there is an absence of any release of the interest in land that could have been affected by the statute, and in the face of specific language retaining Equitable’s mortgage lien “as to the remainder of the property therein described.” Appellants argue that because legal and equitable title merged at the conclusion of foreclosure proceedings, this strengthens Equitable’s complete ownership of the Strip, which was conveyed to Club Estates, and thereafter to ARPOA, which remains the owner of the Strip today. ³⁰⁷ Appellants contend that Deeds of Release must be strictly construed against the benefitting party.

Appellants argue that ARC was the first beneficiary of the Deed of Release as to Lot 19 and, as such, the Deed of Release must be construed in Equitable’s favor, not ARC’s. Appellants point out that applying this logic, “Equitable released its mortgage interest only in what was described on the ‘foundational’ plats as Lot 19, and nothing else.” Appellants contend that the other Deed of Release from Equitable to Sagrario released only Equitable’s mortgage as to the Lots themselves and nothing more. 19 In contrast, appellees argue that “Equitable’s release of the lien of the mortgage on Lots 19 and 20 released the lien of the mortgagé on the Strip because the release is a grant of Equitable’s entire interest in each lot and that interest included the Strip.” Appellees contend that Equitable’s fee simple ownership of the land has no effect on title to the Strip, as “Maryland law has long held that a conveyance of title to a mortgagee in a mortgage or deed of trust gives the mortgagee nothing more than a security interest in the property and the mortgagor is recognized as the true owner despite the conveyance of bare legal title to the mortgagee.” Appellees, therefore, maintain that ARC was the true owner of the lots and the Strip and had the power to convey Lots 19 and 20. Appellees point out that appellants concede that the deeds by ARC of fee simple title to Lots 19 and 20 were valid conveyances of those lots, and as such, “[i]f ARC had the conceded power to convey fee simple title to the lots, then ARC necessarily had the power and duty to convey title to the Strip, as required by State law.” Appellees contend that “[h]ere, because the Deeds of Release expressly released the individual ³⁰⁸ lots from the mortgage and those lots included an interest in the Strip by virtue of State law, the releases included a release of the Strip.” Appellees argue that reference in the Deeds of Release to Equitable’s retention of the mortgage lien “as to the remainder of the property” was insufficient to retain a lien on the Strip. B. The Relevant Deeds of Release The Deed of Release executed October 6, 1928, with respect to Lot 19, provided, in pertinent part: Now, Therefore, This Deed of Release Witnesseth That in consideration of the premises and the sum of Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other good and valuable considerations, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the above named Releasor [i.e.

Equitable] does hereby grant, convey and release unto the said Releasee [i.e. ARC], its successors and assigns, all that lot or parcel of ground located in the development known as “Annapolis Roads” in the Second Election District of Anne Arundel County, Maryland, which is designated as Lot No. Nineteen (19) of Section “D” on the plat of said “Annapolis Roads” made by the Olmsted Brothers, and duly recorded among the Land Records of Anne Arundel County in Plat Book F.S.R. No. 1, Folio 45; Free, clear and discharged of the lien of the aforesaid mortgage and as fully as though the same had never been executed, the said Releasor retaining, however, the lien of said mortgage as to the remainder of the property therein described. The Deed of Release executed February 19, 1931, with respect to Lot 18, provided, in pertinent part: NOW THEREFORE THIS DEED OF RELEASE WITNESSETH that in consideration of the premises and of the sum of Ten Dollars and other good and valuable considerations the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, the above named Releasor [i.e. Equitable]