Anne Arundel County v. Halle Development, Inc.

ADKINS, Judge. The respondents in this appeal, Halle Development, Inc., et al., are representative plaintiffs in a class action of current property owners (“the Owners”) that seek to recover development impact fees collected by Anne Arundel County, Maryland (“the County”), petitioner, for the fiscal years 1988 through 1996. The Circuit Court determined that because (1) $4,719,359 in impact fees 1 collected from property owners were not thereafter timely paid or encumbered for capital improvements within the applicable district, and (2) the period to make capital improvements was not properly extended, the Owners were entitled to refunds. The County appeals a judgment permitting the respondents to proceed with a class action to obtain a refund of fees that the County did not expend or encumber by the end of the sixth fiscal year following collection.

We shall affirm the judgment below, concluding that a class action is a proper means for the Owners’ claims. The County Impact Fee Ordinance The County is authorized to levy fees under Anne Arundel County Code (“AACC”), Article 17, Title 11, Section 203, which states: “Any person who improves real property and ⁵⁴⁴ thereby causes an impact upon public schools, transportation, or public safety facilities shall pay development impact fees[.]” 2 The amount of the fee varies according to the land use and is computed by reference to a fee schedule. See AACC § 17-11-204. The stated purpose for the impact fees is to promote the health, safety, and general welfare of County residents by (1) requiring all new development to pay its proportionate fair share of the costs for land, capital facilities, and other expenses necessary to accommodate development impacts on public school, transportation, and public safety facilities; (2) complementing the provisions of Title 5 by requiring that all new development pay its share of costs for reasonably attributable impacts; and (3) helping to implement the General Development Plan to help ensure that adequate public facilities for schools, transportation, and public safety are available in a timely and well planned manner.

AACC § 17-11-202. 3 There are separate special funds for transportation impact fees and for school impact fees. AACC § 17-11-208. Collected impact fees are to be deposited “in the appropriate special fund to ensure that the fees and all interest accruing to the special fund are designated for improvements reasonably attributable to new development and are expended to reasonably benefit the new development.” Id. Under Section 17- ⁵⁴⁵ ll-209(c), the County is divided into school impact fee districts and transportation impact fee districts by way of maps prepared by the Office of Planning and Zoning (“PZO”) and adopted by the County Council.

Section 17 — 11—209(d) states that collected development impact fees “shall be used for capital improvements within the development impact fee district from which they are collected, so as to reasonably benefit the property against which the fees were charged.” The principal impact fee ordinance provision at issue in this appeal is Section 17-11-210 which governs impact fee refunds. It provides in pertinent part: (a) Notice of refund availability. If fees collected in any district during a fiscal year have not been expended or encumbered by the end of the sixth fiscal year following collection, the Office of Finance shall give notice of the availability of a refund of the fees and refund the lees as provided in this section. (b) Publication of notice.

Within 60 days from the end of a fiscal year during which fees become available for refund, the Controller shall cause to be published once a week for two successive weeks in one or more newspapers that have a general circulation in the County, a notice that development impact fees collected within a particular district for a preceding fiscal year are available for refund on application by the current owner of the property for which the fee was originally paid. The notice shall set forth the time and manner for making application for the refund. (c) Refund application deadline. An eligible property owner shall file an application for a refund within 60 days of the last publication of notice.

On proper application and demonstration that the fee was paid, the Controller shall refund the fees to the property owner with interest at the rate of 5% per year. (d) Refund on pro rata basis. If only a portion of the fees collected in a district during a fiscal year have been expended or encumbered, the portion not expended or encumbered shall be made available for refund on a pro rata ⁵⁴⁶ basis to property owners. Each eligible property owner who has properly applied for a refund shall receive a refund in an amount equal to the portion of the original fee that was not expended or encumbered.

(e) Extension. The Planning and Zoning Officer may extend for up to. three years the date at which the funds must be expended or encumbered under subsection (a). An extension shall be made only on a written finding that within a three-year period certain capital improvements are planned to be constructed that will be of direct benefit to the property against which the fees were charged. AACC § 17-11-210 (emphasis added).

The County’s Extensions The County began collecting impact fees in fiscal year 1988. The County’s fiscal year runs from July 1 through June 30. Beginning in 1994, the County PZO purported to grant several three-year extensions to the period in which the County was required to expend or encumber collected impact fees as provided in Section 17-ll-210(e). The County purported to effectuate the first extension in the following March 21, 1994 inter-office correspondence from the County’s director of planning and code enforcement, entitled “Extension of Time to Use Impact Fees[,]” to the County’s financial officer: We have determined that impact fees collected in Road Districts 2 and 4 will not' be expended or encumbered within the sixth year following collections, as required in [Section 17-ll-210(a) ].

In accordance with Section [ 17-ll-210(e) ] I hereby extend use of funds collected in 1988 and 1989 for three years beyond the sixth year requirement. Capital projects in district 2 (Solley Road) and district 4 (Md 170 Odenton Junction) (Towncenter to MD 175) and (Towncenter to Reece) (Patuxent Conway Road) are programmed and are expected to be constructed as capital projects. These projects are identified in the FY94 and proposed FY95 capital program. ⁵⁴⁷ The County issued extension decisions in 199(5, 1997, 2001, 2002, and 2003 by way of interoffice memoranda in a format substantially the same as the correspondence above. The County now concedes that the extension decisions all failed to (1) identify the properties that would be directly benefitted by the planned improvements and (2) comply with the Section 17-11 — 210(e) limitation that extensions be granted only to expend or encumber fees paid with respect to these properties.

It is also undisputed that the County did not advertise that any refunds were available, because it considered the extensions effective at the time they were made. The Proceedings Below The Owners filed a class action in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County in February of 2001 on behalf of representative plaintiffs and others who are “current owners of real property located within the boundaries of Anne Arundel County ... who have been deprived of refunds for ‘developers impact fees[.]’ ” 4 The Owners alleged three causes of action: the County’s failure to refund the fees (1) constituted an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, (2) violated the Owners rights under the Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and (3) unjustly enriched the County, creating the basis for a constructive trust. 5 The Dismissal And First Appeal On July 26, 2001, the Circuit Court dismissed the Owners’ complaint for failing to exhaust administrative remedies provided in Maryland Code (1957, 2001 RepLYol.), Article 24, ⁵⁴⁸ Sections 9-710 through 9-713 for actions involving county tax refunds. The Owners appealed (“Appeal I”) and the Court of Special Appeals (“COSA”), in an August 21, 2002 unreported opinion, reversed. The intermediate appellate court held that there were no express or implied administrative remedies for the Owners to exhaust.

It observed that there is no provision in the county code to compel the refund of fees absent an advertisement and that the Article 24 remedy for tax refund claims was unavailable because the Owners’ claims could not ripen until at least six years have passed since collection. The court noted that Article 24, Section 9-724 required that refund claims be made within three years from the date the tax was paid. The COSA then ruled, citing Apostol v. Anne Arundel County, 288 Md. 667, 672 , 421 A.2d 582 (1980) and Frankel v. Bd. of Regents, 361 Md. 298, 309 , 761 A.2d 324 (2000), that the Owners could maintain an action in assumpsit because there is a statutory provision providing for a refund, but no particular statutory remedy for obtaining a refund unless the County publishes a refund notice. Class Certification, A Statute Of Limitations Challenge, A Request For Remand, And A Second Appeal Finding that the case satisfied all of the Maryland Rule 2-231 criteria, the Circuit Court conditionally certified it as a class action on February 26, 2003.

On October 23, 2003, the Circuit Court ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment. The County argued that the Owners’ assumpsit claims for fees collected in FYs 1988 through 1991 were barred by the three-year statute of limitations in Md.Code (1974, 2006 RepLVol., 2008 Supp.), Section 5-101 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”). The County maintained that the Owners, by filing suit in February 2001, did not meet the standard for reasonably prudent investigation because the “ ‘information as to the [impact fee ordinance’s] revenues and expenditures are public records[.]’ ” The court disagreed with the County’s inquiry notice argument, finding that “it exceeds a ‘reasonable person’ standard to require that taxpayers initiate public records requests promptly whenever a statutory dead ⁵⁴⁹ line approaches that might entitle them to a refund.” The court considered this particularly true in light of an evidentiary presumption that officials perform their duties with regularity and the impact fee ordinance’s requirement that the County provide public notice of refundable fees. It then concluded that “[ijn the absence of any other evidence proffered which would have put [the Owners] on notice, [it] will deny the motion for summary judgment on this limitations basis.” The Circuit Court, on December 8, 2003, ruled on one of the County’s extension decisions and concluded that it was ineffective because the PZO failed to make explicit reference to any specific property that would be directly benefitted by the planned capital improvement.

In the wake of this decision which, by implication, rendered invalid the County’s other extension decisions, the County filed another motion to dismiss, requesting that the court remand the case to the PZO for new extension decisions under the correct legal standard. Relying on Frankel , the County contended that dismissal was warranted because the Owners’ assumpsit claim was premature until the PZO rendered administrative decisions under the correct standard. The Circuit Court denied the County’s motion on October 4, 2004, concluding (1) that the COSA had already decided in the first appeal that the impact fee ordinance did not provide an administrative remedy and that an action in assumpsit was available and (2) that the Owners became vested with a contingent property right to receive a refund under the statute when the County failed to timely and effectively extend the time for expending or encumbering the collected fees. On December 30, 2004, the Circuit Court ordered the County to identify the members of the class for the purpose of providing notice as required by Maryland Rule 2-231(e).

By its order, the court rejected the County’s request that it be permitted to advertise belatedly by publication the availability of impact fee refunds as contemplated by AACC, Section 17-ll-210(b). The County argued that “maintaining the class action [was] not a superior mechanism in which to proceed in this case as proper notice of the impact fee refunds would ⁵⁵⁰ benefit all property owners in the affected districts [in] ‘that a class action seeking to compel the payment of a governmental benefit is not ripe until the [Owners] have followed the statutory procedure to receive benefits.’ ” The court declined the County’s invitation to dismiss the action on this basis. The County appealed the December 30 order (“Appeal II”), arguing that it was error for the court to order the County to bear the expense of (1) providing class notice and (2) compiling the list of class members. The COSA reviewed the order under the collateral order rule and affirmed, reasoning that any difficulty and expense the County may face in identifying and notifying class members due to its record-keeping practices should be borne by the County.

Anne Arundel County v. Cambridge Commons, 167 Md.App. 219, 231, 235-36 , 892 A.2d 593, 600, 603 (2005), cert. denied, 393 Md. 242 , 900 A.2d 749 (2006). A Final Judgment And A Third Appeal The Circuit Court issued an order on December 15, 2006 intended to resolve all material issues and certified it as final pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-602. In its order, the court found that “impact fee refunds are due to the current owners of specified impact fee paying properties ... in the total amount of $4,719,359, subject to the addition of 5% interest to the amount of refunds due from the date of each initial fee’s payment[.]” This figure included impact fees collected in 1988 through 1996. The court then directed the County to “compile the names and addresses of all current owners of refund-eligible properties within 90 days ... and that the County must issue a notice to the current owner(s) of each refund-eligible property within 120 days[.]” The County noticed its third appeal to the COSA (“Appeal III”) and the Owners noticed a cross-appeal. 6 On appeal, the ⁵⁵¹ County asserted, inter alia, that (1) the proper remedy for the County’s failure to effectively extend the time for expending or encumbering transportation impact fees is a remand to the PZO to make new findings under a correct standard; (2) the Owners’ claims are barred by limitations; and (3) the procedure under AACC, Section 17-11-210, by which owners must claim refunds after public notice, is superior to the ordered class action procedure, requiring the County to identify and individually notify owners entitled to a refund.

The intermediate appellate court, in an unreported opinion, disagreed and affirmed the Circuit Court judgment on these issues. We issued a writ of certiorari to consider the County’s following three questions: I. After the Circuit Court ruled that the County PZO had applied the wrong legal standard in making administrative decisions to extend the period for encumbering or expending impact fees, did the Circuit Court err by ⁵⁵² refusing to remand this case to the PZO for new decisions under the correct standard of law on grounds that the statutory time period for making the decisions had expired and thus current property owners had vested rights in refunds totaling $4.7 million, plus interest from the date of payment? .

II

Do causes of action seeking judicial review of the administrative decisions of the County PZO and Office of Finance (“FO”) as to whether impact fees are available for refund accrue for purposes of the statute of limitations in [CJP Section 5-101] on the date on which the County was required by law to make the decisions, even though there is no public notice of the decisions?

III

Should this action to recover refunds of impact fees that have not been expended or encumbered in the prescribed period have been certified as a class action for damages under Maryland Rule 2 — 231(b)(3) even though there is a detailed administrative procedure in [Section] 17-11-210 of the County Code for making refunds that is much less difficult and costly to administer and will afford complete relief? DISCUSSION I. The County’s Remand Request The County contends that the courts below erred by declining to remand the case to County administrative officials for new decisions under AACC, Section 17-11-210 after ruling that the County PZO applied the wrong standard of law in granting extensions. The County asserts that the case must be remanded so that the PZO can grant extensions, validly and retroactively, by making the requisite findings that particular properties, for which fees were collected, would be benefitted directly by a planned project. The County argues that our decision in Frankel, 361 Md. at 307-11 , 761 A.2d at 328 -30 provides the analytical model for the Owners’ claims in this ⁵⁵³ case.

According to the County, Frankel compels a remand to the County PZO and FO under the settled administrative law principles that the County articulates as follows: (1) even in the absence of a statutory provision authorizing an appeal, the Circuit Court has inherent authority to review a quasi-judicial decision of an administrative agency to determine if it was arbitrary, capricious or illegal ... and (2) once the Circuit Court determines that an agency has applied the wrong standard of law, the function of the Court is at an end and it may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency, but must remand the case for a new decision under the correct standard. In Frankel , we considered whether the University of Maryland, College Park (“the University”) violated a student’s due process and equal protection rights by requiring him, a Maryland resident, to pay higher tuition fees than other Maryland residents for being “ ‘financially dependent’ upon an out-of-state benefactor!.]” Id. at 301 , 761 A.2d at 325 . We concluded that the University’s policy violated the student’s rights under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights because it arbitrarily and irrationally discriminated against many bona fide Maryland residents. Id. at 318 , 761 A.2d at 334 .

In the course of discussing an issue raised by the County relating to Frankel’s abandonment of his right to a refund claim, we explained why a remand to the University’s hearing board that made the decision to deny Frankel in-state status was appropriate: Under the Policy and the procedures therein set forth, a student is obligated to pay the higher out-of-state tuition during the pendency of a request for re-evaluation and all appeals. Until there is a proper re-evaluation, approval of the request, and a change in status, there would appear to be no entitlement to a credit or a refund. If, as we shall hold, the Policy provided for, and the administrative officials used, legally impermissible criteria in denying [Frankel’s] request for in-state status and claim for a refund, those officials will be obligated to reconsider ⁵⁵⁴ his request and claim using permissible criteria. A refund under the Policy cannot be made until the appropriate officials properly rule upon [Frankel’s] request for in-state status, employing legally permissible criteria.

Id. at 307 , 761 A.2d at 329 (emphasis added). We added that “nothing in the Policy provid[ed] that the entitlement to a refund cease[d] immediately upon the student’s graduation.” Id. The Policy provided, in reference to a student’s request for a re-evaluation of his or her residency status, that “ ‘[i]f an approval is granted, then the Bursar’s Office [would] credit the student’s account for any excess tuition paid.” Id. at 304 , 761 A.2d at 327 . The Policy then stated that “[t]he student may also request a refund directly from the Bursar’s Office.” Id.

These alternative Policy provisions for a credit or a refund suggested that a refund was the appropriate remedy when the student was no longer enrolled at the University and thus no longer had a University account that could be credited. Id. at 307-08 , 761 A.2d at 329 . We noted, furthermore, that “the General Assembly has now provided broad ... refund remedies covering every type of tax, fee, or charge improperly collected by a Maryland governmental entity.” Bowman v. Goad, 348 Md. 199, 204 , 703 A.2d 144, 146 (1997). Although one must follow the appropriate administrative remedy to be entitled to a refund, Bowman v. Goad, supra, 348 Md. at 204 , 703 A.2d at 146 , [Frankel] [had] meticulously followed the applicable administrative procedures required by the University.

Id. at 308 , 726 A.2d at 329. We observed that Maryland Code (1988, 1997 Repl.Vol., 1999 Supp.), Section 13-901(a) of the Tax General Article may be applicable when a state college or university charges a student more for tuition than is legally payable: That section broadly authorizes a refund claim against the State by a claimant who “(1) erroneously pays to the State a greater amount of ... fee, [or] charge ... than is properly and legally payable.” Under § 13-1104(a), a claimant has ⁵⁵⁵ three years from the date of payment to file “a claim for refund under this article ...,” and [Frankel] clearly filed his claim and brought this action within that time. Id. Frankel could also maintain an action in assumpsit “if the statutory refund remedy in § § 3 8 — 90L(a) (1) and 13-1104(a) of the Tax General Article [was] inapplicable to [the] case[.]” Id. at 308-09, 761 A.2d at 329 .

We explained: The General Assembly delegated to the Board very broad authority over tuition and fees (§ 12-109(e)(7) of the Education Article), and the Board adopted a Policy and regulations entitling a student to a credit or refund of tuition upon re-classification from out-of-state status to in-state status. It has long been settled in Maryland that when one pays to a state government agency or a local government more in taxes, fees, or charges than the government is entitled to, and when the law specifically authorizes “a refund, although no particular statutory remedy is provided,” a common law contract “action ... is available Id. at 309, 761 A.2d at 329-30 (citation omitted, emphasis added). The County acknowledges the rule that “where a refund of fees paid to the government is sanctioned by law, but no procedure is provided for obtaining a refund, an action in assumpsit lies against the government to obtain the refund.” Yet it seizes on our analysis of the defenses asserted in Frankel for the proposition that an assumpsit claim is not ripe until there is a remand and administrative officials have rendered a decision according to the correct legal standard. This proposition, it argues, is consistent with settled principles of administrative law addressed in, inter alia, Department of Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211 , 334 A.2d 514 (1975) and Belvoir Farms Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. North, 355 Md. 259 , 734 A.2d 227 (1999).

In Linchester, we considered the constitutionality of a statute, under the separation of powers doctrine, that permitted a de novo jury trial on the reasonableness of administrative action in granting or denying a permit to build in wetlands. ⁵⁵⁶ 274 Md. at 214-15, 217-18 , 334 A.2d at 518-20 . In considering this question, we contrasted the relative role of the administrative agency with that of the judiciary and indicated that agencies perform quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial duties. Id. at 221-22 , 334 A.2d at 521-22 . We distinguished the quasi-judicial authority of administrative agencies “from the exercising of the ‘judicial powers’ of this State, which by Section I, Article IV of the Maryland Constitution is reserved exclusively to designated courts” and indicated that courts have an inherent power to review administrative agency decisions: While administrative agencies, in the proper performance of duties which the Legislature permissibly delegates to them, may use discretion to formulate policy, promulgate rules and adjudicate in order to determine specific questions of fact, they, nevertheless, in doing so are performing nonjudicial functions; on the other hand, the role of the courts in regard to these administrative agency functions is to see that these responsibilities were properly empowered to the agency and have been performed within the confines of the traditional standards of procedural and substantive fair play.

In order to perform this essential duty, the courts may be provided with specific authorization to do so by the Legislature through statutory provision, but, even absent such authority, the judiciary has an undeniable constitutionally-inherent power to review, within limits, the decisions of these administrative agencies. Id. at 222-23 , 334 A.2d at 522-23 . “This power of review, whether authorized by statute or assumed inherently, cannot be a substitution of the court’s judgment for that of the agency” and is limited to determining whether the contested quasi-judicial decision “was rendered in an illegal, arbitrary, capricious, oppressive or fraudulent manner.” Id. at 224 , 334 A.2d at 523 . In Belvoir Farms, we discussed the role of a reviewing court when confronted with an agency conclusion based upon an error of law. There, the Circuit Court properly ⁵⁵⁷ concluded that the agency applied the wrong legal standard in granting a critical area zoning variance, but erred in reversing the decision without a remand to the agency.

We explained: “Generally, when an administrative agency utilizes an erroneous standard and some evidence exists, however minimal, that could be considered appropriately under the correct standard, the case should be remanded so the agency can reconsider the evidence using the correct standard.” Belvoir Farms, 355 Md. at 270 , 734 A.2d at 234 . The reviewing court must remand the matter so that it will not usurp an administrative function: “It is a fundamental principle of administrative law that a reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for the expertise of the administrative agency from which the appeal is taken. This principle underlies the rule that if an administrative function remains to be performed after a reviewing court has determined that an administrative agency has made an error of law, the court ordinarily may not modify the agency order. Under such circumstances, the court should remand the matter to the administrative agency without modifícation[.] ...

Finally, if an administrative function remains to be performed, a reviewing court may not modify the administrative agency’s action even when a statute provides that the court may ‘affirm, modify or set aside’ because a court may not usurp administrative functions.” Id. at 268 , 734 A.2d at 232 (quoting O’Donnell v. Bassler, 289 Md. 501, 509-11 , 425 A.2d 1003, 1008 (1981) (citations, footnote omitted)). The County’s appeal to Franked and general administrative law principles in arguing for a remand presumes, erroneously, that there is an administrative procedure and function that remains to be performed in this case. In Franked, a remand to the University was the proper disposition because the University had an established administrative procedure for Frankel’s tuition refund request: Under the “Procedures Established by the University of Maryland at College Park,” ... residency is first deter ⁵⁵⁸ mined when a student applies for admission. If a student is dissatisfied with the initial residency classification, or if circumstances subsequently change, he or she “may request a re-evaluation of his or her residency status.” If the request for re-evaluation is denied, the student may appeal to the Director of the “Residency Classification Office,” and finally to the “Residency Review Committee.” While a request for re-evaluation and the appeals are pending, a student is “still obligated to pay the out-of-state tuition.” The Policy goes on to provide that “[i]f an approval is granted, then the Bursar’s Office will credit the student’s account for any excess tuition paid.

The student may also request a refund directly from the Bursar’s Office.” Frankel, 361 Md. at 304 , 761 A.2d at 327 . The Board of Regents for the University System was empowered by statute to prescribe the policies and procedures set forth above. Id. at 301 , 761 A.2d at 326 . The University president, in turn, had a statutory authority, subject to the regulations and policies set by the Board, to set tuition and fees.

Id. at 302 , 761 A.2d at 326 . Our decision left the University with an unperformed administrative function because the University, in denying the Frankel’s refund request on the ground that Frankel was a financially dependent non-resident, did not fully consider Frankel’s claim that he was a resident based on eight domicile factors set forth in the Policy. Id. at 302-03, 305, 318 , 761 A.2d at 326-27, 334-35 . This case shares in common with Frankel the characteristic that there is an administrative agency or office empowered by statute to process refund claims.

The County impact fee ordinance designates to the County FO and Controller the tasks of notifying owners of the availability of a refund and reviewing refund applications. AACC § 17-ll-210(a), (b), and (c). The ordinance also designates to the County PZO the task of extending the time in which fees must be expended or encumbered. § 17-ll-210(e). But unlike Frankel, the County is required to perform its administrative functions within a prescribed time period.

In the absence df validly executed extensions under Section 17-ll-210(e), the County ⁵⁵⁹ FO was required to publish notice of the availability of fee refunds within sixty days from the end of the sixth fiscal year following collection. § 17-ll-210(a), (b). The ordinance then required the eligible property owners to file an application for a refund within sixty days of the last publication of notice. § 17-11-210(c). The County contends that the Owners did not become vested with a right to a refund just because the PZO failed to execute a valid extension and cites a series of cases in support of its position that the Owners merely have a contingent right to a refund. It maintains that the Owners’ refund rights do not vest or accrue until the County officials perform their Section 17-11-210 administrative functions on remand, such as (1) determining whether the period for expending or encumbering impact fees should be extended, (2) determining that there are fees available for a refund, and (3) publishing notice that there are fees available for refund in connection with specified districts and years.

This case is not about vesting. It is about the PZO’s lack of authority under the impact fee ordinance to go back and make administrative decisions that it failed to effectively execute when permitted. Indeed, the Owners may not be vested in their right to a refund. Whether they are entitled to a refund and in what amount will be determined by the Circuit Court on remand.

The full refund amount determined by the Circuit Court may be reduced if the County is able to prove that it, in fact, encumbered the impact fee funds within six years. 7 Judge Rodowsky, writing for the COSA (specially designated) in Appeal III, explained: ⁵⁶⁰ Here, the onus was on the County validly to extend the time before the right to refunds accrued, and the Code set a time limit for effecting that extension in the prescribed manner. This the County failed to do. There is nothing that the County can do now to correct what it failed to do by the end of the sixth year after collection of the impact fees. Once the window for effecting a valid extension closed, the right to a refund arose in all of the Owners in any district in which fees collected had not been timely expended or encumbered.

See § 7-11-210. Under the refund format adopted by the County, all owners in districts where refunds are to be made for a given year share in the refund pro rata. There is no need for an administrator now to choose, from among properties for which impact fees had been paid, those properties which would benefit directly by a planned improvement and those that would not. Nevertheless, although the Circuit Court may modify, on remand, the amount determined to be owing as a refund, this is not an administrative process, and there remains no administrative process to be completed. 8 Instead, the County wants to go backwards in time, and make determinations and perhaps, expenditures, that are time barred.

Section 17 — 11—210(d) states that the “fees collected in a district during a fiscal year ... not expended or encumbered shall be made available for refundí]” (Emphasis added.) We see the County impact fee ordinance as a compromise, perhaps a politically sensitive one. The County Council could have passed an ordinance simply requiring that certain impact fees be paid when real property was developed, without any ⁵⁶¹ requirement for a refund. 9 This would impose the burden for the expense of county infrastructure on property developers and ultimately those who purchased from them. Instead, the law tempers the effect of a straight non-refundable impact fee by providing for the refund. In doing so, it places a time limit on the County’s retention of the impact fee before expenditure or encumbrance for one of the stated uses to benefit properties within the applicable “impact fee district.” AACC § 17-11 — 209(d) and 210.

The plain words of the ordinance make clear that the lawmakers did not intend that the County be able to utilize the impact fee revenue as a general unrestricted fund for county infrastructure for an unlimited time. The ordinance specifically authoiized a refund, absent an effective extension, at the close of the sixth fiscal year following collection. Frankel makes clear that,