Anne Arundel Cty. v. Reeves

Anne Arundel County, Maryland and Rodney Price v. Michael H. Reeves, No. 68, September Term, 2019 CIVIL LIABILITY — STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION — MEASURE OF DAMAGES — COMPENSATORY DAMAGES — In light of Md. Code Cts. & Jud. Proc. (“CJP”) § 11-110’s plain language and structure, its relationship with the Wrongful Death Act, and its legislative history, we conclude that the statute defines and caps the recovery of compensatory damages in the case of the tortious death or injury of a pet to the amount specified in the statute. Construing CJP § 11-110 to allow recovery for additional uncapped compensatory damages, including noneconomic damages, would produce illogical results.

CIVIL LIABILITY — GROSS NEGLIGENCE — SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE — Legally sufficient evidence was presented at trial to permit a jury to make the finding that Officer Price was grossly negligent when there were specific facts in evidence at trial that the dog was not attacking the police officer, the police officer shot the dog twice while standing in front of the residence, and there were differing accounts of how the dog was positioned when shot. Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County Case No. C-02-CV-15-002956 Argued: September 11, 2020 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 68 September Term, 2019 ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MARYLAND AND RODNEY PRICE v. MICHAEL H. REEVES Barbera, C.J., McDonald Watts Hotten Getty Booth Biran JJ. Opinion by Barbera, C.J. Hotten, J., dissents. Filed: June 7, 2021 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2021-06-07 09:24-04:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk This case affords us the opportunity to address the scope of compensatory damages available in the case of the tortious injury or death of a pet.

Resolution of that issue requires our examination of the text of Md. Code Cts. & Jud. Proc. (“CJP”) § 11-110. The General Assembly enacted CJP § 11-110 to allow pet owners to recover certain capped damages for the death or injury of their pet as a result of a tort.

We are asked to determine whether a pet owner may recover other forms of compensatory damages not expressly included within that statute. We must also address the separate question of whether there was sufficient evidence of gross negligence in this case. These questions stem from Anne Arundel County Police Officer Rodney Price’s fatal shooting of a family dog while carrying out his duties as a police officer. On February 1, 2014, Officer Price encountered Respondent Michael Reeves’ dog, Vern, a Chesapeake Bay retriever, in the front yard of Mr. Reeves’ home.

Evidently believing he would be attacked, Officer Price shot Vern twice. The dog died soon thereafter. Mr. Reeves subsequently brought suit alleging, inter alia, that by fatally shooting Vern, Officer Price committed a trespass to Mr. Reeves’ chattel, acted with gross negligence, and violated Mr. Reeves’ rights under Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The case went to trial before a jury in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Mr. Reeves, finding that Officer Price committed a trespass to Mr. Reeves’ chattel, acted with gross negligence, and violated Mr. Reeves’ constitutional rights under Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The jury awarded no damages for the constitutional violations, $10,000 for the trespass to chattel claim, and $500,000 in economic damages and $750,000 in noneconomic damages for the gross negligence claim. The circuit court then reduced the gross negligence damages to $200,000 pursuant to the Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”). CJP § 5-301 et seq.

The circuit court also reduced the trespass to chattel damages to $7,500 pursuant to the then-applicable damages cap in CJP § 11-110.1 On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed in part and held in an unreported divided decision that CJP § 11-110 did not bar Mr. Reeves from recovering noneconomic damages related to the death of his dog. The same majority also held that there was legally sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict that Officer Price acted with gross negligence. For reasons that follow we hold that CJP § 11-110 limits the recovery for compensatory damages to the amount specified by that statute and does not allow for recovery of noneconomic compensatory damages stemming from the tortious injury or death of a pet. In addition, we hold that there was legally sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Officer Price was grossly negligent in the fatal shooting of Vern.

However, under the single recovery rule, we also hold that Mr. Reeves may not recover any damages under the gross negligence claim. Accordingly, we reverse in part and affirm in part the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. 1 Since the conduct underlying this case occurred, the Legislature has increased the cap to $10,000. See S. 143, 2017 Leg., 437th Sess. (Md. 2017).

Throughout this opinion, we shall refer to the version of the statute in place at the time of the events of this case. 2 I. Facts and Procedural History The Incident On February 1, 2014, as part of an ongoing investigation into a spate of burglaries in a residential neighborhood in Anne Arundel County, Officer Price was going door-to- door seeking relevant information. Officer Price, the only witness to the events that ensued immediately thereafter, would later testify at trial to the following. At approximately 4:45 p.m., Officer Price approached Mr. Reeves’ residence from the house next door. He saw a light on inside and noticed that some of the windows were open.

He also observed two doors at the front entrance to the house. One door was open; a second door, at trial variously described as a screen door and a transparent storm door, was closed. Officer Price determined from those indicators that the house was occupied at the time. He testified that he had no reason to believe that any member of the Reeves family had any involvement with the burglaries and he did not have any “cause for concern” as he approached the house.

Officer Price walked onto the front porch of Mr. Reeves’ home and knocked on the closed door. When no one answered, he left the porch and headed towards Mr. Reeves’ driveway, where he stood with his back to the house. As he was taking notes in his notepad, Officer Price heard the sound of a door behind him. He turned around and saw a dog “coming at” him from about five feet away.

According to Officer Price, the dog was growling and barked once. Officer Price testified that he put his left forearm up at “roughly” the level of his neck as the dog approached. Officer Price stated that the dog placed its front paws on his 3 forearm for about one second. He recalled taking one step back and pushing the dog away from him.

Afraid that the dog was going to attack his face, Officer Price testified that he shot the dog twice while the dog’s paws were still on his left arm. The dog then made a screeching noise and limped across the yard, where the dog collapsed. After the shooting, Officer Price informed dispatch of what happened, saying “a dog came at me.” According to Officer Price, the dog did not bite or scratch him during the incident. Officer Price is 5’8” and, at the time of the incident, weighed about 250 pounds.

He testified that he had a taser, baton, and mace on his person at the time. Furthermore, he admitted that he did not vocalize any commands to the dog. At the time of the incident, Officer Price had been a sworn officer for less than a year. Shortly after the shooting Mr. Reeves exited the house, approached Officer Price, and asked him what had happened.

Officer Price recalled at trial that he responded that the dog had come at him, and he had to shoot it. Mr. Reeves testified that he then stepped forward and Officer Price responded by drawing his firearm. With his hand on the weapon, Officer Price told Mr. Reeves: “Stop. Don’t take another step.” 2 Mr. Reeves then turned around and rushed to where his dog Vern had collapsed on the other side of the yard and was curled up beneath the neighbor’s fence.

Mr. Reeves proceeded to administer CPR to Vern. Mr. Reeves also testified that Officer Price likewise “put[] his hand on his weapon” 2 on two other occasions when Mr. Reeves’ two sons approached Officer Price. 4 Additional officers arrived at the scene, and Officer Price returned to headquarters. Mr. Reeves testified that he believed that Vern died on the scene, but his son, Michael Reeves Jr., drove Vern to a nearby veterinary hospital where the dog was confirmed dead.3 The Lawsuit and Subsequent Trial On September 24, 2015, Mr. Reeves and his sons, Michael Jr. and Timothy, filed a complaint asserting thirteen claims against Anne Arundel County (the “County”), Anne Arundel County Police Chief Kevin Davis, and Officer Price.4 The claims that ultimately proceeded to trial against the County and Officer Price (“Petitioners”) were: (1) trespass to chattel; (2) violation of Mr. Reeves’ constitutional rights under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights for the unlawful shooting of his dog; (3) violation of Mr. Reeves’ constitutional rights under Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights for the unlawful seizure of the dog; and (4) gross negligence. Trial in the circuit court began on May 4, 2017.

Mr. Reeves’ counsel called Officer Price as an adverse witness. Officer Price had previously stated in a deposition that because the dog’s paws were muddy, paw prints covered his uniform. He had also stated during 3 Michael Reeves Jr. testified at trial that the officers on the scene were blocking his truck for twenty to thirty minutes before he was ultimately able to drive to the veterinary hospital. 4 Prior to trial, the circuit court dismissed the claims that Mr. Reeves’ sons had brought, as well as all claims against Chief Davis. In his complaint, Mr. Reeves had also alleged civil conspiracy and a “pattern or practice” claim.

Before trial, the court bifurcated those claims from the four claims that proceeded to trial. After the trial, the court resolved the bifurcated claims by granting summary judgment in favor of the County and Officer Price. 5 the deposition that he had dirt on both of his shoulders and on his badge. At trial, counsel for Mr. Reeves introduced photographs that the police department took shortly after the incident. When shown the photographs, one of which was magnified 300 times, Officer Price admitted that there was no mud or dirt from the dog’s paws on his upper body or badge.

He further acknowledged that the photographs showed mud on the thigh area of his pants. He also admitted that there were no cuts or scratches on his forearm or tears in his uniform. Mr. Reeves’ counsel then played a video deposition of the testimony of an out-of- state witness, Dr. Kevin Lahmers, a veterinary pathologist at the Virginia-Maryland College of Veterinary Medicine. Dr. Lahmers performed the necropsy on Vern’s body.

He could not determine which bullet was fired first. However, he testified that either bullet wound could have been fatal. According to Dr. Lahmers, one of the bullets entered through the dog’s sternum area while the dog was facing the firearm, passed through the heart and lung, and lodged close to the right hip. He further testified that the other bullet entered either the right or left side of the dog’s body near its ribs, “with the animal turned perpendicular to the gun,” and exited the other side.

Dr. Lahmers explained that Vern weighed around 75 pounds and, based on images of the dog, if standing on hind legs Vern would only reach the stomach or mid-abdomen of an adult man of average height. Dr. Lahmer’s testimony was thus at odds with Officer Price’s account that Vern could have reached the height of the officer’s neck while the dog’s front paws were on the officer’s forearm. 6 Mr. Reeves’ son Timothy then took the stand and explained that his father had purchased Vern as a puppy in 2009. According to Timothy, Vern was intelligent, playful, sweet, and a quick learner. He testified that Vern had not displayed aggression towards other pets or people, including children, and Vern had no problems with large crowds in the neighborhood park.

Mr. Reeves’ other son, Michael Jr., testified that Vern was a member of their family. After the testimony of his two sons, Mr. Reeves took the stand. He stated that he became interested in training dogs while stationed in Afghanistan.5 Mr. Reeves explained that he purchased Vern for $3,000 with the goal of eventually breeding Chesapeake Bay retrievers. He took a year off from work to train the dog.

Mr. Reeves taught Vern voice commands, silent commands, and water training. Mr. Reeves testified that Vern “was my best friend in the world, period.” Mr. Reeves also testified that he was taking medication to cope with the loss of Vern. He stated that he no longer had any plans to breed Chesapeake Bay retrievers. Timothy testified that his father moved from Maryland to California after Vern was killed, and that the family “had all left because that incident for my father has just destroyed him.” At the close of trial, the circuit court denied the Petitioners’ motion for judgment as to Mr. Reeves’ claims under Articles 24 and 26.

The court submitted those claims, along with the trespass to chattel and gross negligence claims, to the jury. The circuit court 5 Mr. Reeves testified that, after serving in the Marines, he had worked as a contractor in the power industry. He testified as to the wages that he earned and the fact that he had not worked since the death of Vern. Per Mr. Reeves’ gross negligence claim, he alleged economic damages in the form of lost wages. 7 foreclosed the availability of punitive damages, though, by granting the Petitioners’ motion for judgment on the issue of actual malice and punitive damages.

After deliberating for approximately one hour and thirty minutes, the jury returned the verdict finding that Petitioners had violated Mr. Reeves’ constitutional rights under Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, Officer Price had acted with gross negligence, and he had committed a trespass to Mr. Reeves’ chattel. The jury found a violation of Mr. Reeves’ due process rights under Article 24 by depriving him of his dog. However, the jury awarded him $0 in damages for that constitutional claim. The jury further found that Officer Price had violated Mr. Reeves’ constitutional rights under Article 26 by “seizing” Vern and/or interfering with the use or enjoyment of the dog.

The jury likewise awarded Mr. Reeves $0 in damages for that constitutional claim. As to both constitutional claims, the jury also found that Officer Price did not act with “ill will or improper motivation.”6 The jury then found that Officer Price was grossly negligent and awarded Mr. Reeves $500,000 in economic damages and $750,000 in noneconomic damages, for a total of $1,250,000. Finally, for the trespass to chattel claim, the jury awarded Mr. Reeves 6 This factual finding was relevant to the personal immunity of Officer Price under the LGTCA. Local government employees in Maryland have no immunity if they act with “actual malice,” which is defined as “ill will or improper motivation.” See LGTCA, CJP § 5-301(b) (“‘Actual malice’ means ill will or improper motivation.”); CJP § 5-302(b)(2)(i) (“An employee shall be fully liable for all damages awarded in an action in which it is found that the employee acted with actual malice.”).

Because the jury found that Officer Price did not act with “ill will or improper motivation,” the County is liable. 8 $10,000 in economic damages. The jury also made a factual finding on the verdict sheet that the dog was not attacking Officer Price at the time of the shooting. On May 18, 2017, Petitioners filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, remittitur, and/or a new trial. The circuit court denied the motion in full.

The circuit court then reduced the jury award for trespass to chattel from $10,000 to $7,500, pursuant to CJP § 11-110. The court further reduced the total damages award for the gross negligence claim from $1,250,000 to $200,000 pursuant to the LGTCA, resulting in Mr. Reeves receiving a total of $207,500 in damages. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. The Decision of the Court of Special Appeals The Court of Special Appeals affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the circuit court in a divided unreported opinion.

Reeves v. Davis, No. 1191, Sept. Term 2018, 2019 WL 5606605 (Oct. 30, 2019). The majority held that CJP § 11-110 did not limit Mr. Reeves’ total available damages to the capped amount stated in the statute. The majority reasoned that Brooks v. Jenkins, a reported Court of Special Appeals opinion also addressing the fatal shooting of a dog by a police officer, was controlling. Reeves, 2019 WL 5606605 , at ⁹; see Brooks, 220 Md. App. 444 (2014).

The majority explained that: The County . . . asks that we distinguish Brooks from this case because the jury did not award Reeves any damages for the County’s constitutional violations, whereas the jury in Brooks did. However, . . . Brooks stands for the proposition that CJP § 11-110 does not bar recovery for non-economic damages, at least when the tortfeasor has been grossly negligent. Reeves, 2019 WL 5606605 , at ⁹.

The majority also held that the jury was provided legally sufficient evidence to support its finding that Officer Price had acted with gross negligence. 9 Id. at ¹³. Judge Friedman dissented, disagreeing with the majority on both issues. He interpreted CJP § 11-110 as limiting all available compensatory damages, including noneconomic damages, to the capped amount provided in the statute when the injury is to a pet. Id. at ¹⁴ (Friedman, J., dissenting).

Given that the jury awarded no damages for the constitutional violations, under the one injury, one recovery rule, the only injury for which Mr. Reeves could recover compensatory damages was the death of his dog Vern, which is capped by the statute. Id. at ¹³–14 (“Calling Mr. Reeves’ claims by different names—trespass to chattel, negligence, gross negligence, or even an intentional tort— doesn’t change the analysis: there is still just one injury.”) (citation omitted). Judge Friedman also would not have found that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of gross negligence. Id. at ¹⁴ n.2.

On appeal to this Court, Petitioners present the following questions for review: 1) As a matter of first impression, does [CJP § 11-110] limit the amount of damages recoverable for negligently causing the death of a pet? 2) Did the Court of Special Appeals err in finding sufficient evidence of gross negligence? We affirm the holding of the Court of Special Appeals that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of gross negligence. However, we reverse on the statutory construction issue and hold that CJP § 11-110 limits the recovery for compensatory damages to the amount specified by the statute and does not allow recovery for noneconomic damages stemming from the tortious injury or death of a pet. 10 II. Discussion A. Statutory Construction of CJP § 11-110 We are tasked with construing CJP § 11-110 to determine whether, as a matter of first impression before this Court, at the time of the incident the statute limited the recovery of all compensatory damages to $7,500 when a pet is tortiously injured or killed.

Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo by this Court. Brown v. State, 454 Md. 546, 550 (2017). We apply the well-established rules of statutory construction in Maryland: The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the real and actual intent of the Legislature. A court’s primary goal in interpreting statutory language is to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by the statutory provision under scrutiny.

To ascertain the intent of the General Assembly, we begin with the normal, plain meaning of the statute. If the language of the statute is unambiguous and clearly consistent with the statute’s apparent purpose, our inquiry as to the legislative intent ends ordinarily and we apply the statute as written without resort to other rules of construction. We neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, and we do not construe a statute with “forced or subtle interpretations” that limit or extend its application. We, however, do not read statutory language in a vacuum, nor do we confine strictly our interpretation of a statute’s plain language to the isolated section alone.

Rather, the plain language must be viewed within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the Legislature in enacting the statute. We presume that the Legislature intends its enactments to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law, and, thus, we seek to reconcile and harmonize the parts of a statute, to the extent possible consistent with the statute’s object and scope. 11 Where the words of a statute are ambiguous and subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, or where the words are clear and unambiguous when viewed in isolation, but become ambiguous when read as part of a larger statutory scheme, a court must resolve the ambiguity by searching for legislative intent in other indicia, including the history of the legislation or other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the legislative process. In resolving ambiguities, a court considers the structure of the statute, how it relates to other laws, its general purpose and relative rationality and legal effect of various competing constructions. In every case, the statute must be given a reasonable interpretation, not one that is absurd, illogical or incompatible with common sense.

State v. Bey, 452 Md. 255 , 265–66 (2017) (quoting State v. Johnson, 415 Md. 413 , 421–22 (2010)). 1. Plain Meaning We start with the text of CJP § 11-110. At the time of the incident, the statute provided in full: (a) Definitions. — (1) In this section the following words have the meanings indicated. (2) “Compensatory damages” means: (i) In the case of the death of a pet, the fair market value of the pet before death and the reasonable and necessary cost of veterinary care; and (ii) In the case of an injury to a pet, the reasonable and necessary cost of veterinary care.

(3) (i) “Pet” means a domesticated animal. (ii) “Pet” does not include livestock. (b) Measure of damages. — (1) A person who tortiously causes an injury to or death of a pet while acting individually or through an animal under the person’s direction or control is liable to the owner of the pet for compensatory damages. 12 (2) The damages awarded under paragraph (1) of this subsection may not exceed $7,500. Petitioners contend that CJP § 11-110 applies to all torts, defines the types of compensatory damages a pet owner can recover, and limits those damages to the capped amount.

In support of this argument, Petitioners refer to the statute’s structure, which defines compensatory damages in the case of the death or injury of a pet, provides when a pet owner is entitled to those compensatory damages, and caps damages recoverable under the statute. Mr. Reeves argues that, given the statute’s unique definition of compensatory damages, the damages cap pertains only to reasonable and necessary veterinary care expenses and the pet’s fair market value. Mr. Reeves asserts that nothing in the statute expressly limits the recovery of other possible types of damages, including pain and suffering or lost wages. He notes that the 2005 amendment removed the words “[t]he measure of damages . . . is” from the 1999 version and replaced them with “[a] person who tortiously causes an injury to or death of a pet . . . is liable to the owner of the pet for compensatory damages,” as defined in the statute.

Mr. Reeves argues that this indicates that the Legislature amended the statute in 2005 to allow for the recovery of noneconomic damages. We disagree with Mr. Reeves’ reading of the statute. The meaning of CJP § 11-110 is plain. CJP § 11-110(b)(1) provides that “[a] person who tortiously causes an injury to or death of a pet while acting individually or through an animal under the person’s direction or control is liable to the owner of the pet for compensatory damages.” Although 13 “tortiously” is not defined in the statute, negligence, gross negligence, and trespass to chattel are torts.

As such, the statute applies to cases of gross negligence and trespass to chattel where the injury is to a pet. “Maryland has long accepted the doctrine of expressio (or inclusio) unius est exclusio alterius, or the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.” Comptroller v. Blanton, 390 Md. 528, 537 (2006). Under the statute, “‘Pet’ means a domesticated animal” and “does not include livestock.” CJP § 11-110(a)(3)(i)–(ii). The statute’s definition of “Compensatory damages” in the case of the death of a “Pet” expressly states two things: “the fair market value of the pet before death” and “the reasonable and necessary cost of veterinary care.” Id. § 11-110(a)(2)(i). Additionally, the definition uses the word “means,” indicating that the Legislature intended for the list to be exhaustive.

Id. § 11-110(a)(2); see Hackley v. State, 389 Md. 387, 393 (2005) (“[T]he Maryland Style Manual for Statutory Law prepared by the Department of Legislative Services . . . directs legislative drafters to ‘[u]se “means” if the definition is intended to be exhaustive’ . . . and to ‘[u]se “includes” if the definition is intended to be partial or illustrative . . . .’”) (second and third alterations in original). The text evinces legislative intent to allow for certain, defined compensatory damages in the case of the tortious death or injury of a pet. Noneconomic damages, such as mental anguish and loss of companionship, are not included in the exhaustive definition of compensatory damages. As such, noneconomic damages are unavailable under the plain meaning of CJP § 11-110.

The statute goes on to limit the recovery of damages under the statute to the capped amount. CJP § 11-110(b)(2). 14 We do not read the plain language of CJP § 11-110 in a vacuum. Analogous damages cap provisions in Title 11 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article confirm our understanding of the text’s plain meaning. Maryland’s Wrongful Death Act provides a statutory cause of action for the recovery of certain economic and noneconomic compensatory damages in the case of the wrongful death of a person and strictly limits beneficiaries to spouses, parents, and children.

See CJP § 3-904. CJP §§ 11-108 and 11-109 define and cap the availability of noneconomic and economic damages in the case of wrongful death or personal injury. The General Assembly has thus expressly provided for the recovery of noneconomic damages when a person has been wrongfully killed. See CJP § 11-108(a)(2)(i) (“‘Noneconomic damages’ means: . . .

In an action for wrongful death, mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering, loss of society, companionship, comfort, protection, care . . . or other noneconomic damages authorized under Title 3, Subtitle 9 of this article.”). In contrast, CJP § 11-110 does not expressly provide for similar damages in the case of the wrongful death of a pet. Mr. Reeves argues that pet owners are most like the class of people that are permitted to recover noneconomic damages under the Wrongful Death Act because of the close, familial bond between pet owners and their pets. Nevertheless, CJP § 11-110 is silent on the availability of noneconomic damages to pet owners whose pets are wrongfully killed.

The Wrongful Death Act, by contrast, expressly provides for and caps the recovery of noneconomic damages when a person’s spouse, child, or parent is killed. CJP §§ 3-904, 11-108. In other words, CJP § 11-110’s relationship with other laws in Title 11 of the same Article does not support the anomalous result that legislative silence on the recovery of 15 noneconomic damages for the wrongful death of pets means that they are available when the Legislature has capped recovery of those damages in the case of the wrongful death of people. Mr. Reeves’ reading of the statute would allow, for example, for the recovery of millions of dollars in uncapped noneconomic damages in a case involving veterinary malpractice, while noneconomic damages in a medical malpractice case remain capped.

To read CJP § 11-110 in this way would produce absurd results.7 See Bey, 452 Md. at 266 (“In every case, the statute must be given a reasonable interpretation, not one that is absurd, illogical or incompatible with common sense.”) (citation omitted). It would also be illogical for CJP § 11-110 to apply a cap solely on damages related to fair market value and reasonable and necessary veterinary expenses, while allowing pet owners to recover an unlimited amount of other compensatory damages for their emotional loss. Fair market value and veterinary expenses are much more easily susceptible to calculation in monetary terms than are seemingly unlimited damages for emotional pain and suffering. Indeed, in this case the jury awarded Mr. Reeves, in addition to the maximum amount allowable under CJP § 11-110 of $7,500, noneconomic damages equal to 100 times that amount.8 7 One such result would be that a pet owner could recover noneconomic damages for the death of a pet, while that same person could not receive such damages for the loss of a best friend, sibling, fiancé(e), or grandparent.

We do not dispute that the Legislature could create such a scheme, but we will not interpret it as doing so through mere silence and in the face of the statute’s plain meaning. 8 Mr. Reeves argues that recovery of other economic and noneconomic damages under CJP § 11-110 would not be limitless in this case because, at the time of the incident, the LGTCA capped those damages at $200,000. CJP § 5-303(a)(1) (2013). The LGTCA, however, would not apply in the case of veterinary malpractice, a person’s dog attacking a 16 If the General Assembly’s goal was to cap compensatory damages for pet owners, how strange for it to do so exclusively with respect to such a narrowly defined subset thereof. Doing so would have left all other forms of compensatory damages both uncapped and without guidelines for calculation.

Unlike the Wrongful Death Act, the General Assembly did not provide a formula in CJP § 11-110 for quantifying emotional loss in the situation of the wrongful death of a pet. Our reading of CJP § 11-110 in light of the Wrongful Death Act provisions confirms our understanding that such damages are unavailable in the case of the tortious injury to or death of a pet. Certainly, the General Assembly knows how to expressly provide for noneconomic damages when it wants to, as it did with respect to the damages under the Wrongful Death Act. We also consider CJP § 11-110’s use of the term “compensatory damages” in the context of its broader meaning.

Two types of damages can be recovered from a tortfeasor: compensatory damages and punitive damages. See Beall v. Holloway-Johnson, 446 Md. 48 , 70–72 (2016). An award of compensatory damages is an “attempt to make the plaintiff whole again by monetary compensation.” Id. at 70 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Albright, 433 Md. 303, 414 (2013)). Compensatory damages “are not intended to grant to the plaintiff a windfall as a result of the defendant’s tortious conduct.

Thus, an award for compensatory damages must be anchored to a rational basis on which to ensure that the awards are not merely speculative.” Id. (quoting Albright, 433 Md. at 414 ). neighbor’s cat, or numerous other situations covered under the statute where a private individual and not a local government is at fault. CJP § 11-110 does not distinguish between tort claims against local governments and claims against private individuals. 17 Punitive damages are designed to accomplish another goal entirely—to punish the wrongdoer for particularly egregious or heinous conduct and to deter others from following suit. See id. at 71–72.

When the trial court in this case granted the Petitioners’ motion on the issue of actual malice and punitive damages, it precluded the jury from awarding them to Mr. Reeves.9 As a result, the only type of damages available to Mr. Reeves for the grossly negligent shooting of his dog and the trespass to his chattel are compensatory damages, which are exhaustively defined and limited by the express terms of CJP § 11-110.10 9 The Dissent states that our reading of CJP § 11-110 would “limit all possible recovery” to a complainant in the case of the “injury or death of a pet.” Dissent Slip Op. at 2–3. However, this case does not deal with “all possible recovery” in such cases. Rather, it deals solely with compensatory damages, as distinguished from punitive damages, and as they are defined in the statute. The statute, by its own terms, does not address punitive damages, and they are also not at issue in this case.

Also not at issue here is the exception to the common law rule that allows for certain forms of noneconomic damages when property is damaged by a tortfeasor whose acts are “inspired by fraud, malice, or like motives.” See Zeigler v. F St. Corp., 248 Md. 223 , 225–26 (1967); Dobbins v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 338 Md. 341, 351 (1995). This case clearly does not involve fraud, and the jury expressly found that Officer Price did not act with actual malice, i.e. “ill will or improper motivation.” 10 CJP § 11-110 was not enacted upon tabula rasa. Rather, it augmented well- established common law principles of recovery in cases of tortious injury to personal property. Under the common law, domestic animals such as pets have been legally classified as personal property.

E.g., Moore v. Myers, 161 Md. App. 349, 368 (2005). Furthermore, under the common law, “[t]he rule is well established that the measure of damages for the conversion or destruction of a chattel is the market value of the chattel at the time and place of the conversion or destruction.” Weishaar v. Canestrale, 241 Md. 676, 684 (1966) (citation omitted); Bastian v. Laffin, 54 Md. App. 703, 714 (1983) (“The measure of damages for tortious injury to personal property is the lesser of the difference between the value of the property immediately before the harm has been done and its value immediately thereafter or the reasonable cost of repairs.”). CJP § 11-110 did not alter the common law rules of this State that pets are personal property or that noneconomic damages are generally unavailable in cases involving injury 18 Additionally, there can be only one recovery of damages for each injury under Maryland law. Beall, 446 Md. at 70 ; see also Smallwood v. Bradford, 352 Md. 8, 24 (1998) (“Duplicative or overlapping recoveries in a tort action are not permissible.”); Francis v. Johnson, 219 Md. App. 531, 561 (2014) (“The Maryland appellate courts have made clear that there can be only one recovery of damages for one wrong or injury.”).

We have explained that “[u]nder the Maryland rules, [d]ifferent legal theories for the same recovery, based on the same facts or transaction, do not create separate claims.” Beall, 446 Md. at 70 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The existence of multiple claims ultimately depends upon whether the ‘aggregate of the operative facts’ presented states more than one claim which can be separately enforced.” Id. at 70–71 (citation omitted). Here, Mr. Reeves’ gross negligence and trespass to chattel claims are premised on the same set of operative facts. They are thus alternative legal theories for the same recovery. Therefore, Mr. Reeves is entitled to one recovery as compensation.

Notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Reeves suffered a tragic loss, the only injury before us for which Mr. Reeves can recover is the death of his dog, because the jury awarded no damages for the constitutional harms. to personal property. See Robinson v. State, 353 Md. 683, 693 (1999) (“It is a generally accepted rule of law that statutes are not presumed to repeal the common law ‘further than is expressly declared, and that a statute, made in the affirmative without any negative expressed or implied, does not take away the common law.’”) (citation omitted). Rather, CJP § 11-110 merely codified the existing recovery rule in cases involving pets, allowed for an additional and limited form of damages in the way of defined veterinary expenses, including veterinary expenses that exceed the pet’s fair market value, and capped all available compensatory damages. 19 In this way, this case is distinguishable from the decision in Brooks v. Jenkins, on which Mr. Reeves relies. In Brooks, the Court of Special Appeals explained the scope of its holding as follows: “We hold only that [CJP § 11-110] does not limit the Jenkinses’ total recovery for the constitutional tort to the capped value of their pet’s vet bills.” 220 Md. App. at 471 .

Here, CJP § 11-110 did not work to cap Mr. Reeves’ constitutional claim damages to the value of veterinary bills or Vern’s fair market value. Rather, the jury awarded no damages at all for those claims. See Reeves, 2019 WL 5606605 , at ¹³ (Friedman, J., dissenting) (“The jury assigned no value to the denial of Mr. Reeves’ constitutional rights. The jury did, however, assign a value to the destruction of Mr. Reeves’ dog.

Therefore, the injury to the dog is the only injury upon which Mr. Reeves can recover.”). As a result, the analysis of Brooks is inapposite,11 and the only injury for which Mr. Reeves can recover is the death of his dog, which is limited to the capped amount in CJP § 11-110. 11 In the 2020 and 2021 legislative sessions, “Buddy’s Law” was cross-filed in the House and Senate. The bills propose to increase the current damages cap in CJP § 11-110 from its current amount of $10,000 to $25,000. S. 292, 2021 Leg., 442nd Sess.

(Md. 2021); H.D. 154, 2021 Leg., 442nd Sess. (Md. 2021); S. 997, 2020 Leg., 441st Sess. (Md. 2020); H.D. 992, 2020 Leg., 441st Sess. (Md. 2020).

On March 2, 2021, after oral argument, Mr. Reeves’ counsel submitted a letter to this Court regarding committee hearings in the 2021 legislative session on the proposed amendments. Mr. Reeves’ counsel wrote that certain comments made “demonstrate conclusively that the legislature is well aware of the Brooks case” and “[n]o effort has been made this session, or at any other time since 2014, to legislatively overturn Brooks.” Even if, for the sake of argument, we were to view the Legislature as acquiescing to Brooks, the holding in Brooks deals with damages awarded to pet owners for the violations of their constitutional rights, which the jury did not award in this case. 20 The Dissent contends that we have passed on the opportunity to change Maryland’s common law to expand the damages available in the case of the tortious death or injury of a pet, in line with a minority modern trend. See Dissent Slip Op. at 5–6, 9–13. However, no such opportunity is before us.

The issue in this case is not whether our common law is or should be in line with modern sensibilities regarding pets. Also not before us is the issue of whether Maryland law classifying pets as personal property should be changed. See Dissent Slip Op. at 14–15. Rather, this case presents the narrow issue of whether CJP § 11-110, which defines all compensatory damages in cases involving the injury to or death of a pet, can also be read to allow for types of damages it leaves out of that exhaustive definition.

We conclude that the statute cannot be read in such a manner. The Legislature may wish to amend CJP § 11-110 in response to the various policy arguments in this case in order to allow for other forms of compensatory damages in cases involving the tortious injury or death of pets.12 However, under the statute in its current form, such damages are strictly limited to the two forms provided. If the Legislature intended to compensate pet owners for noneconomic damages associated with the tortious death of their pets, it would have stated so plainly in the language of CJP § 11-110. 12 One such policy argument is that advanced by the Maryland Veterinary Medical Association, the American Kennel Club, the Cat Fanciers’ Association, the Animal Health Institute, the American Veterinary Medical Association, the National Animal Interest Alliance, the American Pet Products Association, the American Animal Hospital Association, and the Pet Industry Joint Advisory Council, who submitted an amici curiae brief with this Court. Therein, they stated that if awards of noneconomic damages are permitted for negligence, the cost of veterinary care, pet food and other products, and other pet services would increase to accommodate the new liability, and pet owners might not be able to afford these necessary products and services.

Such policy considerations are the proper province of the Legislature. 21 In sum, the plain meaning of CJP § 11-110 is that it defines what compensatory damages are available in the case of the tortious injury to or death of a pet and limits the total amount that may be recovered. It does not allow for recovery of other forms of compensatory damages not expressly included therein. 2. Legislative