Apostoledes v. State

FISCHER, Judge. Marie Delores Apostoledes appeals a decision by the Circuit Court for Baltimore County denying her motion to dismiss a criminal indictment in which she is named as a defendant. Appellant insists that the charges listed in the indictment are barred by double jeopardy principles. As we disagree with appellant’s contention, we will affirm the ruling of the trial court.

This scenario unfolded on August 5, 1988 when Stephen Apostoledes, appellant’s husband, was shot and killed. At the time of the shooting, Mr. Apostoledes was home with appellant and appellant’s son, John Lacey. Both appellant and Lacey were subsequently indicted for the murder and for other related offenses. Lacey pleaded guilty to second degree murder, and appellant proceeded with a jury trial on charges of first degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, unlawful use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or crime of violence, and accessory after the fact to murder. ⁵²¹ After the close of the State’s case, the court granted appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal with respect to conspiracy to commit murder.

In so doing, the court concluded that there was no evidence “indicating a conspiracy before the fact.” At the close of all the evidence, the judge granted appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of accessory after the fact. The court also responded to appellant’s collateral estoppel argument: [Defense counsel]: Your Honor, we understood the Court to rule that based on the evidence in this case, there was insufficient evidence to find that there was any agreement prior to the shooting between Mrs. Apostoledes and John Lacey. What we are trying to direct the Court’s attention to is if there was no evidence of an agreement, it is hard to logically see how she could have done anything to encourage or to aid or solicit this conduct on his part. THE COURT: Well, I don’t agree with that particular situation.

Conspiracy is something that is formulated in advance. Just because an individual is not guilty of conspiracy doesn’t mean that the individual cannot be guilty of aiding or abetting. The jury was subsequently instructed, without exception, on first degree murder, second degree murder, use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, and aiding and abetting. As the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict, the court declared a mistrial.

The State now seeks to retry appellant on the murder and handgun charges. In contending that a second trial is barred by double jeopardy principles, appellant advances a two-prong argument. She first claims that collateral estoppel precludes retrial on the murder and handgun charges, because “a second trial will necessarily require the State to relitigate a common, ultimate fact that was previously litigated in [appellant’s] favor at her May, 1989 trial.” Second, appellant maintains that a subsequent proceeding “would constitute a trial for the ‘same offense’ for which she has been previous ⁵²² ly acquitted.” In support of both aspects of her argument, appellant points to her acquittal on the conspiracy charges as the factor which bars retrial on the murder and handgun counts. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Maryland common law provide that no person should be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.

Embodied in this prohibition is the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970); Robinson v. State, 307 Md. 738, 741-743 , 517 A.2d 94 (1986). Collateral estoppel “means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated in any future lawsuit.” Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443 , 90 S.Ct. at 1194 . Assuming that collateral estoppel may apply to counts in a single indictment, Ferrell v. State, 318 Md. 235, 248-256 , 567 A.2d 937 (1990), petition for