Argabright v. State

ROBERT M. BELL, Judge. Joseph E. Argabright, appellant, pled not guilty to a charge of fourth degree sexual offense and proceeded on an agreed statement of facts in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. 1 He was convicted and sentenced to a one-year term of imprisonment, which was suspended in favor of three-years probation. In addition to the usual conditions, appellant’s probation contained the special condition that he pay court costs of $127.00. The Division of Parole and Probation, more than a year after commencement of the probation, filed a Supervision Summary in which it notified the court that the victim of the sexual offense, appellant’s former girlfriend, “had received letters and telephone calls from [appellant] threatening her with ‘emotional and mental harassment as long as he lives.’ ” It requested that “the original court order be amended by adding the special condition that Mr. Argabright have no further contact with the victim.” Following a hearing, the court modified the probation order to require that appellant have no contact with the victim except through legal channels.

The sole question presented on this appeal from that judgment is whether the court erred in so modifying the probation order. ⁷⁰⁸ Appellant contends: “The Court did not have the authority to add an additional condition to Appellant's probation because the added condition amounted to an increase in Appellant's sentence.'' He cites as authority Hohensee v. State, 42 Md.App. 829 , 340 n. 21, 400 A.2d 455 (1979). We see it differently. We observed at the outset that Hohensee is simply inapposite. An increase in the term of probation, following revocation, is permissible, Donaldson v. State, 305 Md. 522, 528-530 , 505 A.2d 527 (1986); see Christian v. State, 62 Md.App. 296, 302 , 489 A.2d 64 (1985); Brown v. State, 62 Md.App. 74 , 488 A.2d 502 , cert. denied, 303 Md. 42 , 491 A.2d 1197 (1985), and, therefore, not an increase in the sentence.

In Hohensee, the increase in the term of probation occurred at the initial sentencing proceeding, not after a