Armes v. Cook

Powers, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This case was initiated by the filing in the Superior Court of Baltimore City, on 17 September 1973, of a declaration claiming damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained in a motor vehicle collision in Fairfax County, Virginia. Plaintiffs were Donald W. Armes, joined by his wife, Mary Armes, and James N. Miller, all of Baltimore. Armes and Miller had been passengers in an automobile driven by William R. Cook, of Baltimore, who was named as one of the defendants.

Other defendants were a truck driver, with an address in Colorado, and the corporate owner of the truck, with an address in Missouri. Defendant Cook was served, and filed a general issue plea. On a preliminary motion, judgment was entered for the trucking company. The driver was never served.

Although the case remained alive against Cook, no proceedings of record had been taken between 11 March 1974, and 24 December 1975, when the clerk of the court sent notification to the parties that as provided by Maryland Rule 530 an Order of Dismissal for Lack of Prosecution would be entered after 30 days, unless a motion were filed under section c. of Rule 530. Through counsel, the plaintiffs invoked the discretion ³⁹¹ given to the court in Rule 530, § c., and filed, on 14 January 1976, a motion to suspend the operation of the Rule. On the same day Judge Shirley B. Jones signed an order which read: “ORDERED that the operation of Rule 530 be and it is hereby suspended in the above captioned case for a period of 90 davs days from the date of this Order. If not tried within said 90 days, the case shall be dismissed.

SBJ” The part of the order which is underlined was handwritten by Judge Jones. Counsel filed with the clerk a request that the case be placed upon the Consolidated Jury Trial Docket. The docket shows this entry, made 20 April 1976: “Dismissed under Rule 530 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure for lack of prosecution. Judgment absolute in favor of the defendants for costs.” On 26 April 1976 the plaintiffs filed a motion to “Overturn the Dismissal” and reinstate the case.

The motion alleged that a trial date of 2 June 1976 had been set. The motion was heard before Judge Jones on 11 May. On 26 May 1976 she denied the motion. In a brief memorandum Judge Jones said: “Plaintiffs’ counsel contends in the present motion that he was advised by the Assignment Office that the case would be assigned in numerical order for trial on June 2, 1976, and that the case would not be dismissed because it had been assigned for trial.

If counsel relied on such advice, as he claims to have done, such reliance was misplaced. The terms of the suspension were made a part of the January 14th order pursuant to Rule 530 c., and were abundantly clear. There is no showing, and indeed no claim that a trial date within the prescribed time could not have been obtained pursuant to that order. The act of simply obtaining any trial date did not comply with the