Arold v. Supreme Conclave Improved Order of Heptasophs

Stockbridge, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. George J. Arold became a member of the Improved Order of Hepta-sophs on the twelfth of March, 1895, and received a certificate of membership by which, upon his death, his wife Mary was entitled to receive as beneficiary the sum of $1,000. The application for membership contained among'; other matters this provision: “I agree to make punctual payment of all dues and assessments for which I may become liable, and to conform in all respects to the Laws, Rules and Usages of the Order now in force, or which may hereafter be adopted by the same.” Two years later, in 1897, the Order adopted the following by-law: “Sec. 329. Ho action at law or in equity in any Court can be brought or maintained on any cause or claim arising out of any membership or benefit certificate, unless such action is brought within one year from the time when such right of action accrues.

Such right of action accrues sixty days after all proofs called for in case of the death of a member shall have-been furnished. In all cases where no proofs of death have been furnished by a beneficiary, as required, with ⁶⁷⁷ in twelve months after such death, all claims that might have been made shall he regarded as abandoned, and no proofs thereafter shall he received or any claim made thereon accepted; and in all cases where blank proofs of death have been refused by the Supreme Secretary to the beneficiary or beneficiaries, such right of action accrues sixty days from and after the day of the death of a member.” No question is presented of the regularity of the adoption of Section 329 of the by-laws just quoted. On November 26th, 1908, George Arold met his death as the result of a self-inflicted gunshot wound. Proofs of death were promptly made out and forwarded to the Order.

Then ensued a correspondence between Mrs. Arold and the general counsel of the Order, in which the latter took the ground that the beneficiary, Mrs. Arold, by reason of a by-law relating to suicide was not entitled to the $1,000 named in the certificate, but only to the sum of $487. This correspondence continued until the latter part of February, 1909, and was concluded by the payment on March 15th, 1909, to Mrs. Arold of the $487. There the matter rested until January 28th, 3913, when this suit was brought to recover the difference between $1,000 and the amount actually paid. The defendant filed various pleas, among them one setting up as a bar the limitation of time within which suit might be brought as provided in Section 329.

At the trial, on conelnsion of the plaintiff’s case, the defendant offered a prayer to direct a verdict for the defendant upon the ground that the suit had not been brought within the time provided by the by-laws of the Order, and the action of the Court in granting this prayer is the sole ground of appeal in this case. It was alleged that the long inaction of the appellant was induced by the fraud and deceit of the appellee, but there is no evidence whatever tending in the slightest degree to sus tain this allegation. ⁶⁷⁸ The contention of the plaintiff is that the rights of the parties were fixed as of the time when the deceased became a member of the order, that certain vested rights then attached, which could not be in any manner affected by the subsequently adopted by-laws, and that the by-law as adopted contained nothing to show any intent that it should-have a retroactive effect, and so could only be applicable to those who joined the order after the date of its passage. The case was argued with great earnestness on both sides and very voluminous citation of authorities, but in view of two recent decisions of this Court the law of this State is clearly defined, and no good purpose would be served by a discussion of the various cases cited. Suffice it to say, that the decisions elsewhere are very far from being harmonious, nor is it possible in any way to reconcile them.

The first and most important question now presented is, was Section 329 of the by-laws binding upon members of the Order who had become such prior to its adoption ? The same question was before this Court in the case of Mathieu v. Mathieu, 112 Md. 625 , the opinion being written for the Court by the late Judge Schumuckek., and in that it is said: “The mere designation of a person as beneficiary by a member of a mutual benefit society does not confer upon the person so designated any vested