Arroyo v. Board of Education

⁶⁴⁹ CATHELL, Judge. This case concerns a decision by the Board of Education of Howard County (“County Board”), respondent, to terminate the employment of Robert Arroyo, petitioner, a guidance counselor employed by the Howard County Public School System (“HCPSS”), 1 and whether the later affirmance of that decision by the Maryland State Board of Education (“State Board”) constituted an exhaustion of petitioner’s administrative remedies. Prior to the instant case, petitioner had previously contested his termination through the administrative procedures available to him under Md.Code (1978, 2001 Repl.Vol., 2003 Supp.), § 6-202 of the Education Article. After a May 28, 1998 decision by the State Board that affirmed the County Board’s decision to terminate petitioner’s employment, petitioner sought judicial review of the State Board’s decision under Md.Code (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 10-222 of the State Government Article.

Upon judicial review, the State Board’s decision was affirmed by the Circuit Court for Howard County on April 8, 1999, and by the Court of Special Appeals on June 14, 2000. 2 On February 8, 2002, petitioner then filed this separate civil complaint sounding in tort against the County Board and Howard County, Maryland, alleging wrongful termination from his employment with HCPSS. 3 In the present case, the County Board filed an answer to petitioner’s February 8, 2002 complaint and, on May 29, 2002, moved for summary judgment, arguing that petitioner’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. On April 15, 2003, the Honorable Lenore Gelfman of the Circuit Court for How ⁶⁵⁰ ard County held a hearing on the motion. On May 5, 2003, Judge Gelfman issued a memorandum opinion and order granting the County Board’s motion for summary judgment, holding that petitioner’s lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitations. Petitioner then appealed this decision to the Court of Special Appeals.

On February 2, 2004, prior to consideration by the Court of Special Appeals, we issued a Writ of Certiorari. Arroyo v. Board of Education, 379 Md. 224 , 841 A.2d 339 (2004). Petitioner presents one question for our review: “Was [the Circuit Court] legally correct in determining that [petitioner’s] administrative remedies were exhausted following the decision of the Maryland State Board of Education rather than after judicial review as provided in Sections 10-222 and 10-223 of the State Government Article, so as to start the statute of limitations running on his tort claim for -wrongful discharge on the earlier date?” [Alterations added.] We hold that the State Board’s May 28, 1998 decision affirming petitioner’s termination from his employment with HCPSS was the final decision of the administrative body and constituted an exhaustion of petitioner’s administrative remedies and, as such, he was free to have his separate action in tort alleging wrongful termination adjudicated at least by that time, and perhaps could, as we note infra, have filed it even sooner subject to the separate action being stayed during the administrative proceedings. 4 Therefore, the three-year statute of limitations on this claim, as provided under § 5-101 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, began to run no later than May 28, 1998. 5 Petitioner’s action of waiting to file ⁶⁵¹ a separate action in tort until February 8, 2002, more than three years after the State Board’s final decision, was thus barred by the statute of limitations. I. Facts Petitioner was a tenured guidance counselor at Oakland Mills High School (“Oakland Mills”) in Columbia, Maryland, and had been employed by HCPSS since 1985.

On January 31, 1997, petitioner was terminated from his employment by the County Board on the grounds of “willful neglect of duty” and “insubordination.” The incident that set in motion the events leading to petitioner’s termination occurred on May 11,1995, when petitioner had a physical altercation with a teacher at Oakland Mills. As a result of the injuries that he suffered at the hands of this teacher, petitioner had to be taken to a hospital emergency room for treatment. After being released from the hospital’s care, petitioner received a disability certificate from his treating physician for the period of May 12-30, 1995. Petitioner did not work during this period and he did not return to work at Oakland Mills after May 30th.

During the summer of 1995, petitioner was transferred to Mt. Hebron High School (“Mt.Hebron”) so as to alleviate any concerns he might have about working in the same building with the other teacher involved in the physical altercation. Petitioner, allegedly still traumatized by the physical altercation that previous May, did not report to work at Mt. Hebron in August 1995 and remained absent from work even after an independent medical examination was conducted at the behest of HCPSS by Dr. Steven W. Siebert, M.D., a psychiatrist.

Dr. Siebert declared, in pertinent part, that “[tjhere is no medical basis, from a psychiatric perspective, to support [peti ⁶⁵² tioner] remaining out of work provided [petitioner] is working in another location.” On October 23,1995, Dr. Michael E. Hickey, the superintendent of HCPSS, concerned with petitioner’s failure to return to work, and also aware of Dr. Seibert’s report, informed petitioner that if he did not return to work by October 30th, the superintendent would recommend to the County Board that petitioner be terminated from his position. Although petitioner reported to work on October 30, 1995, after that brief one-day return he proceeded to be absent from work for the remainder to the 1995-96 school year. 6 In a letter dated March 22, 1996, Superintendent Hickey informed petitioner that if he did not report to Mt. Hebron by April 1,1996, or obtain an approved leave of absence, he would recommend to the County Board that petitioner be terminated for neglecting his professional duties. After petitioner failed to report to work on April 1,1996, or, in the alternative, obtain an approved leave of absence, Superintendent Hickey did exactly as he had indicated he would do and recommended that petitioner be terminated.

Following an evidentiary hearing conducted by the County Board’s hearing examiner, 7 who found that there was sufficient cause to recommend petitioner’s termination, the County Board adopted the hearing examiner’s recommendation and issued a decision, dated January 31, 1997, that stated that petitioner was to be terminated for “willful neglect of duty” and “insubordination.” Thereafter, petitioner appealed the County Board’s decision to the State Board, which assigned the matter to an adminis ⁶⁵³ trative law judge (ALJ). After conducting a de novo hearing, the ALJ recommended that petitioner be terminated. Based on the ALJ’s findings and recommendation, the State Board issued an “opinion” on May 28, 1998 that concluded that petitioner was lawfully terminated for “willful neglect of duty.” Petitioner then sought judicial review of the State Board’s decision in the Circuit Court for Howard County. After a hearing, the Circuit Court issued a memorandum opinion and order on April 8, 1999, affirming the administrative decision of the State Board.

Petitioner then filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. On June 14, 2000, in an unreported opinion, the intermediate appellate court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court. On February 8, 2002, petitioner filed this separate civil complaint against both the County Board and Howard County, Maryland. In his complaint, petitioner alleges that he was wrongfully terminated from employment with the County Board because of his action of filing, on August 7, 1995, a workers’ compensation claim. 8 The central dispute at issue, however, is, as presented to this Court, whether this complaint is barred by the general statute of limitations.

II

Standard of Review In reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, we are concerned with whether a dispute of material fact exists. Todd v. MTA, 373 Md. 149, 154-55 , 816 A.2d 930, 933 (2003); Hartford Ins. Co. v. Manor Inn of Bethesda, Inc., 335 Md. 135, 144 , 642 A.2d 219, 224 (1994); Gross v. Sussex, Inc., 332 Md. 247, 255 , 630 A.2d 1156, 1160 (1993); Beatty v. Trailmaster Products, Inc., 330 Md. 726, 737 , 625 A.2d 1005 , ⁶⁵⁴ 1011 (1993); Arnold, Developer, Inc. v. Collins, 318 Md. 259, 262 , 567 A.2d 949, 951 (1990); Bachmann v. Glazer & Glazer, Inc., 316 Md. 405, 408 , 559 A.2d 365, 366 (1989); King v. Bankerd, 303 Md. 98, 110-11 , 492 A.2d 608, 614 (1985) (citations omitted). “A material fact is a fact the resolution of which will somehow affect the outcome of the case.” King, 303 Md. at 111 , 492 A.2d at 614 (citing Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Prods., Inc., 273 Md. 1, 8 , 327 A.2d 502, 509 (1974)). “[A] dispute as to facts relating to grounds upon which the decision is not rested is not a dispute with respect to a material fact and such dispute does not prevent the entry of summary judgment.” Salisbury Beauty Schs. v. State Bd. of Cosmetologists, 268 Md. 32, 40 , 300 A.2d 367, 374 (1973). This Court also has stated that “the standard of review for a grant of summary judgment is whether the trial court was legally correct.” Goodwich v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., 343 Md. 185, 204 , 680 A.2d 1067, 1076 (1996); see also Murphy v. Merzbacher, 346 Md. 525, 530-31 , 697 A.2d 861, 864 (1997); Hartford Ins.

Co., 335 Md. at 144 , 642 A.2d at 224 ; Gross, 332 Md. at 255 , 630 A.2d at 1160 ; Heat & Power Corp., Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 320 Md. 584, 592 , 578 A.2d 1202, 1206 (1990) (citations omitted). The trial court, in accordance with Maryland Rule 2-501(e), shall grant a motion for summary judgment “if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that [the moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law” (alteration added). The purpose of the summary judgment procedure is not to try the case or to decide the factual disputes, but to decide whether there is an issue of fact which is sufficiently material to be tried. See Goodwich, 343 Md. at 205-06 , 680 A.2d at 1077 ; Coffey v. Derby Steel Co., 291 Md. 241, 247 , 434 A.2d 564, 567-68 (1981); Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md. 302, 304 , 413 A.2d 170, 171 (1980).

Thus, once the moving party has provided the court with sufficient grounds for summary judgment, the non-moving party must produce sufficient evidence to the trial court that a genuine dispute as to a material fact exists. See, e.g., Hoffman Chevrolet, Inc. v. Washington County Nat’l Sav. Bank, 297 Md. 691, 712 , 467 ⁶⁵⁵ A.2d 758, 769 (1983). This requires “produc[ing] facts under oath, based on the personal knowledge of the affiant to defeat the motion.

Bald, unsupported statements or conclusions of law are insufficient.” Id. (alteration added). With these considerations in mind, we turn to the case sub judice.

III

Discussion Md.Code (1978, 2001 Repl.Vol., 2003 Supp.), § 6-202(a) of the Education Article, sets forth the reasons and procedures by which certain educational employees in this State, including those employed by HCPSS, can be suspended from their employment or dismissed. 9 It states, in pertinent part: “(a) Grounds and procedure for suspension or dismissal. — (1) On the recommendation of the county superintendent, a county board may suspend or dismiss a teacher, principal, supervisor, assistant superintendent, or other professional assistant for: (i) Immorality; (ii) Misconduct in office, including knowingly failing to report suspected child abuse in violation of § 5-704 of the Family Law Article; (iii) Insubordination; (iv) Incompetency; or (v) Willful neglect of duty. ⁶⁵⁶ (2) Before removing an individual, the county board shall send the individual a copy of the charges against him and give him an opportunity within 10 days to request a hearing. (3) If the individual requests a hearing within the 10-day period: (i) The county board promptly shall hold a hearing, but a hearing may not be set within 10 days after the county board sends the individual a notice of the hearing; and (ii) The individual shall have an opportunity to be heard before the county board, in person or by counsel, and to bring witnesses to the hearing. (4) The individual may appeal from the decision of the county board to the State Board.” As is made clear in the plain language of § 6-202(a) of the Education Article, individuals unsatisfied with the outcome of the decision of a county board “may appeal ... to the State Board.” On appeal, the authority of the State Board allows for it to “explain the true intent and meaning of the provisions of ... [the Education Article] that are within its jurisdiction,” and the State Board “shall decide all controversies and disputes under these provisions.” Section 2-205(e) of the Education Article. It is from the decision by the State Board, which is the “final decision” 10 in the administrative procedure ⁶⁵⁷ available in § 6-202(a) of the Education Article, that a party unsatisfied with the outcome can seek judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 11 particularly § 10-222 of the State Government Article.

The reviewing court is generally the “circuit court for the county where any party resides or has a principal place of business.” Section 10-222(c) of the State Government Article. The circuit court’s decision-making authority on judicial review of administrative agency decisions is stated in § 10-222(h) of the State Government Article: “(h) Decision. — In a proceeding under this section, the court may: (1) remand the case for further proceedings; (2) affirm the final [12] decision; or (3) reverse or modify the decision if any substantial right of the petitioner may have been prejudiced because a finding, conclusion, or decision: (i) is unconstitutional; (ii) exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the final decision maker; (iii) results from an unlawful procedure; (iv) is affected by any other error of law; (v) is unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in light of the entire record as submitted; or (vi) is arbitrary or capricious.” [Emphasis added.] [Footnote added.] Under § 10-223(b) of the State Government Article, a “party who is aggrieved by a final judgment of a circuit court under this subtitle may appeal to the Court of Special Appeals ⁶⁵⁸ in the manner that law provides for appeal of civil cases” (emphasis added). The issue raised by petitioner requires us to address the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in respect to administrative agency/court issues and to further examine at what point during this potential chain of administrative decisions, judicial reviews and appeals can there be said to exist an administrative finality, i.e., an “exhaustion” of administrative remedies. Once we have determined when this exhaustion occurred we can then discern when, at the latest, the statute of limitations began to run on petitioner’s related or collateral tort claim of wrongful discharge.

A. Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Western Pacific Railroad Company, 352 U.S. 59 , 77 S.Ct. 161 , 1 L.Ed.2d 126 (1956), described the interplay between the doctrine of exhaustion and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction: “The doctrine of primary jurisdiction, like the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies, is concerned with promoting proper relationships between the courts and administrative agencies charged with particular regulatory duties. ‘Exhaustion’ applies where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an administrative agency alone; judicial interference is withheld until the administrative process has run its course. ‘Primary jurisdiction,’ on the other hand, applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such a case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views. “No fixed formula exists for applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. In every case the question is whether the reasons for the existence of the doctrine are present and ⁶⁵⁹ whether the purposes it serves will be aided by its application in the particular litigation.” Id. at 63-64 , 77 S.Ct. at 165 (citation omitted). We have also discussed, in Board of Education for Dorchester County v. Hubbard, 305 Md. 774 , 506 A.2d 625 (1986), the interplay of exhaustion principles and primary jurisdiction at some length, but, however, left open whether independent suits can be filed while administrative actions are in process where the agency has primary jurisdiction. In that opinion, we examined whether “the courts [should] defer to the State Board of Education under principles of primary jurisdiction, at least until the State Board authoritatively decides whether the classification of teacher’s certificates and class size are subject to collective bargaining and arbitration.” Id. at 785 , 506 A.2d at 630 (alteration added).

We explained that: “ ‘Primary jurisdiction “is a judicially created rule designed to coordinate the allocation of functions between courts and administrative bodies.” The doctrine “comes into play when a court and agency have concurrent jurisdiction over the same matter ... and there is no statutory provision to coordinate the work of the court with that of the agency.” ’ ” ... “Where, however, the administrative remedy is deemed to be primary, this Court has generally held that it must be pursued and exhausted before a court exercises jurisdiction to decide the controversy.” Id. at 786 , 506 A.2d at 630 -31 (quoting Wash. Sub. San. Comm’n v. C.I. Mitchell & Best, 303 Md. 544, 561-62 , 495 A.2d 30, 39 (1985)) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

In Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission v. Crawford, 307 Md. 1 , 511 A.2d 1079 (1986), we stated: “[W]here there is both an administrative remedy and an independent judicial remedy (i.e., a specific judicial remedy exists other than judicial review of the administrative deci ⁶⁶⁰ sion), where the administrative agency may have primary jurisdiction, and where the plaintiff invokes the judicial remedy prior to exhausting the administrative procedures, it has been held that the trial court may retain jurisdiction pending exhaustion of the administrative procedures. Once the administrative procedures are exhausted, the trial court may proceed; the plaintiff whose case is meritorious may be entitled to whatever relief is available under either the independent judicial action or the administrative/judicial review remedy.” Id. at 18 , 511 A.2d at 1087-88 (citations omitted). Thus, we perceive that there is no prohibition against filing an independent judicial action while primary administrative proceedings are under way, but, that there is a prohibition against deciding, ie., adjudicating, the issue in the independent judicial case until a final administrative determination is made. We specifically so noted in our holding in Bell Atlantic of Maryland, Inc. v. Intercom Systems Corporation, 366 Md. 1 , 782 A.2d 791 (2001), a recent case discussing this issue, that “consumers, such as Intercom, do have the ability to pursue an independent judicial action in addition to the administrative remedies ... provided that they exhaust their administrative remedies prior to adjudication of an independent judicial action.” Id. at 28 , 782 A.2d at 807 (emphasis added).

We most recently indicated that independent judicial actions could be filed so long as the independent judicial action was not “permitted to proceed to judgment” pending the final determination of the administrative agency. Foster v. Panoramic Design, Ltd., 376 Md. 118, 137 , 829 A.2d 271, 282 (2003). Petitioner claims that the statute of limitations on his tort claim for wrongful termination did not begin to run until he had exhausted his administrative remedies, which he claims included his appeal to the Court of Special Appeals from the judicial review of the administrative determination. Therefore, petitioner’s contention is that the three-year statute of ⁶⁶¹ limitations on his tort claim 13 did not begin to run before he had appealed the decision of the Circuit Court for Howard County to the intermediate appellate court and that court rendered its decision.

In essence, petitioner is claiming that the administrative remedy provided to an educational employee contesting his or her termination is not exhausted upon a final decision by the State Board, but is only exhausted upon a final decision by a court pursuant to judicial review of final administrative agency action. This contention, for the reasons discussed herein, is wrong. The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine requires that a party must exhaust statutorily prescribed administrative remedies, generally evidenced by a “final decision” by the administrative agency, 14 before the resolution of separate and independent judicial relief in the courts. See, e.g., Bell Atlantic of Maryland, Inc. v. Intercom Systems Corp., supra (holding that public utility consumers “must exhaust the statutory remedies provided [in the Public Utilities Article] before pursuing [to conclusion] available independent judicial relief in the form of common law actions”) (alteration added).

This Court explained the rationale for this doctrine in Soley v. State Commission on Human Relations, 277 Md. 521, 526 , 356 A.2d 254, 257 (1976), where we stated: “[t]he rule requiring exhaustion of administrative or statutory remedies is supported by sound reasoning. The decisions of an administrative agency are often of a discretionary nature, and frequently require an expertise which the agency can bring to bear in sifting the information presented to it. The agency should be afforded the initial opportunity to exercise that discretion and to apply that expertise. ⁶⁶² Furthermore, to permit interruption for purposes of judicial intervention at various stages of the administrative process might well undermine the very efficiency which the Legislature intended to achieve in the first instance. Lastly, the courts might be called upon to decide issues which perhaps would never arise if the prescribed administrative remedies were followed.” The statutory frameworks from which these administrative remedies arise, however, do not always act as a complete bar to the pursuit of alternative judicial relief.

In Zappone v. Liberty Life Insurance Co., 349 Md. 45 , 706 A.2d 1060 (1998), this Court clarified the varying nature of administrative remedies where an aggrieved party has an alternative judicial remedy under another statute or under common law or equitable principles. We explained that the relationship between an administrative remedy provided by statute and a possible alternative judicial remedy will fall into one of three categories, which we described as follows: “First, the administrative remedy may be exclusive, thus precluding any resort to an alternative remedy. Under this scenario, there simply is no alternative cause of action for matters covered by the statutory administrative remedy. “Second, the administrative remedy may be primary but not exclusive. In this situation, a claimant must invoke and exhaust the administrative remedy, and seek judicial review of an adverse administrative decision, before a court can properly adjudicate the merits of the alternative judicial remedy. “Third, the administrative remedy and the alternative judicial remedy may be fully concurrent, with neither remedy being primary, and the plaintiff at his or her option may pursue the judicial remedy without the necessity of invoking and exhausting the administrative remedy.” Zappone, 349 Md. at 60-61 , 706 A.2d at 1067-68 (citations omitted) (some emphasis added).

We further explained in Zappone that, “[w]hile sometimes the Legislature will set forth its intent as to whether an ⁶⁶³ administrative remedy is to be exclusive, or primary, or simply a fully concurrent option, most often statutes fail to specify the category in which an administrative remedy falls,” and emphasized that, “where neither the statutory language nor the legislative history disclose an intent that the administrative remedy is to be exclusive, and where there is an alternative judicial remedy under another statute or under common law or equitable principles, there is no presumption that the administrative remedy was intended to be exclusive.” Id. at 62-63 , 706 A.2d at 1068-69 . Instead, we stated that there exists a rebuttable presumption “that the administrative remedy is intended to be primary, and that a claimant cannot maintain the alternative judicial action without first exhausting the administrative remedy.” Id. at 63, 706 A.2d at 1069 (emphasis added). Petitioner relies on both Zappone and the Court of Special Appeals’ decision in Intercom Systems Corp. v. Bell Atlantic of Maryland, Inc., 135 Md.App. 624 , 763 A.2d 1196 (2000), 15 to support his contention that the administrative remedies provided for by § 6-202 of the Education Article were primary and non-exclusive. We agree.