Ash v. State

Sybert, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On September 30, 1963, Boysie E. Ash, Jr. was tried in the Criminal Court of Baltimore before Judge Grady, without a jury, under an indictment charging robbery, assault with intent to rob, assault, larceny and receiving. He was represented by counsel appointed for him as an indigent defendant. The judge returned a verdict of not guilty in regard to the receiving count and then recessed the trial to allow substantiation of the alibi testimony of a defense witness.

The trial was resumed on October 24, 1963, at which time Judge Grady returned a verdict of guilty generally and imposed a sentence of not more than 6 years in the Maryland Institution for Men, to run from the date of arrest. On October 27, 1963, Judge Grady “struck out” the sentence to allow the filing of a motion for a new trial. (We held in a recent case that such action had the effect of suspending the execution of the sentence. Brown v. State, 237 Md. 492 , 207 A. 2d 103 (1965)).

The motion was filed on the same day. On November 6, 1963, an order was signed transferring the de ³¹⁹ fendant from the Maryland Institution for Men to the Baltimore City Jail pending the disposition of the motion. Since under the rules of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City (which hears all motions for new trials arising from its criminal courts), a copy of the transcript of testimony taken in the Criminal Court must be filed with the Supreme Bench before it will hear the motion, and a free copy of the transcript must be furnished to an indigent defendant if he requests it in seeking a new trial, Johnson v. State, 219 Md. 481 , 150 A. 2d 446 (1959), the defendant ordered the preparation of the transcript in his case. However, the court stenographer was delayed (presumably by the press of other work) in transcribing his notes.

The defendant testified that he wrote to Judge Grady in an attempt to hasten the transcription but was informed that he should contact the clerk of the Criminal Court. We found no such correspondence in the record. However, the State conceded that the appellant, his mother and his counsel made approximately ten attempts to obtain the transcript, without success. On March 31, 1964, Ash filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, alleging that the delay in the preparation of the transcript denied him his constitutional right to a speedy trial.

When no action was taken on his motion to dismiss, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Baltimore City Court. On April 9, 1964, most of the transcript was filed with the clerk of the Supreme Bench and on April 21 the remaining portion was filed. On the latter date the petition for the writ of habeas corpus came on for hearing before Judge Jones. The appellant based his petition on the contention that the delay in the preparation of the transcript which prevented the hearing on his motion for a new trial denied him his right to a speedy trial.

Since at the time of the habeas corpus proceeding the transcript had been delivered to the Supreme Bench, Judge Jones denied his petition. On May 27, 1964, the Supreme Bench heard the appellant’s motion to dismiss and motion for a new trial and denied both. Finally, on June 17, 1964, Judge Grady reinstated the sentence that he had previously imposed. This is an appeal from the June 17 judgment and sentence.

The appellant raises only one question: whether the fact that seven months elapsed from the filing of his motion for a new ³²⁰ trial to the time it was heard amounted to a denial of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Art. 21, Maryland Declaration of Rights. Although there is no question but that the appellant was entitled to a speedy trial, we hold that this right has no application to a hearing on a motion for a new trial. We think the language used by the drafters of Art. 21 clearly imports guarantees applicable to the processes leading to and ending with the criminal trial itself, and we do not believe that