Atkinson v. Anne Arundel Cnty.

Panel: Nazarian, Leahy, Beachley, JJ. Leahy, J. ^{836 142} This is the second case in recent years in which public safety employees in Anne Arundel County have challenged the County Council's legislative restriction on collective bargaining. See Atkinson v. Anne Arundel Cty. , 428 Md. 723 , 53 A.3d 1184 (2012) [hereinafter " Atkinson I "]. The Charter for Anne Arundel County ("Charter") grants public safety employees the right to bargain collectively and submit to binding arbitration any resulting labor disputes concerning the "terms and conditions of employment." In 2014, the Anne Arundel County Council ("County Council" or "Council") adopted Bill 85-13.

Certain provisions of the Bill, enacted as § 6-1-308(b)(2)-(4) ¹⁴³ and (i)(4)-(6) of the Anne Arundel County Code ("Code"), 1 exclude employee health insurance benefit options and health insurance plans from collective bargaining and arbitration. After the County Administrator, relying on the new law, declined to negotiate employee health insurance benefit options and plans, aggrieved members of the public safety unions affected by Bill No. 85-13 ("Appellants") 2 filed a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County against Anne Arundel County ("County" or "Appellee"). Appellants alleged that the County Council exceeded its legislative authority in enacting Bill 85-13. The County filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment, asserting that the County Council's passage of Bill 85-13 was a lawful exercise of its legislative powers.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. After a hearing, the circuit court denied Appellants' motion and granted summary judgment in favor of the County. Appellants noted a timely appeal to this Court on June 24, 2016, and shortly after, petitioned for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. By order dated September 29, 2016, the Court of Appeals denied Appellants' petition and the County's conditional cross-petition.

Appellants ask us to consider whether laws enacted pursuant to Bill 85-13 that prohibit collective bargaining and arbitration over employee health insurance benefit options and plans violate the form and structure of the County's annual ¹⁴⁴ budget and appropriation process established under Charter Article VIII, §§ 811 and 812. 3 Appellants also ask whether the circuit court erred when, rather than apply the ⁸³⁷ plain meaning of the phrase "terms and conditions of employment" contained in Charter § 812, it deferred to the County Council to define the scope of the law. According to the County, Charter § 812 does not actually require that it bargain over any terms and conditions of employment. Moreover, the County argues that Appellants' reading of Charter §§ 811 and 812 as limiting the County's authority to define the scope of terms and conditions of employment "would lead to an unconstitutional result" under Article XI-A, § 3 of the Maryland Constitution because it would impermissibly limit the County Council's legislative authority. We hold that under Charter §§ 811 and 812, the terms and conditions of employment are subject to the two-step process of collective bargaining and arbitration.

We also hold that the circuit court erred when it decided that it was the County Council's legislative function, exclusively, to resolve any ambiguities in the phrase "terms and conditions of employment" contained in Charter § 812. We conclude that "terms and conditions of employment," as employed in Charter § 812, is a term of art that includes healthcare insurance benefits. We hold, therefore, that the provisions of Bill 85-13 that effectively render meaningless Appellants' right to bargain collectively over the cost of their healthcare insurance benefits are invalid under Charter §§ 811 and 812. However, because this appeal ¹⁴⁵ is from the erroneous grant of summary judgment, the record is not developed sufficiently to define the scope of collective bargaining rights intended under Charter §§ 811 and 812.

Accordingly, we remand the case for further proceedings. BACKGROUND A. The Run Down: Collective Bargaining in the County The citizens of Anne Arundel County amended their Charter during the 1988 election to provide for collective bargaining between the County and certain county employees' union representatives. Section 811 of the Charter mandates that "[e]mployees in the classified service shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through representative employee organizations of their own choosing as provided by ordinance of the County Council." Consistent with Charter § 811, County Code § 6-4-108(a) provides that "[a]n exclusive representative may negotiate collectively with the Administration in matters related to wages, hours, working conditions, and other terms of employment of employees[.]" In 2002, at the recommendation of the Charter Revision Commission, the County Council proposed a resolution to provide for binding arbitration to resolve disputes over police, fire, and other public safety contracts that may arise during labor negotiations pursuant to Charter § 811. Atkinson I , 428 Md. at 734 -35 , 53 A.3d 1184 .

Voters adopted the 2002 amendment, enacting Charter § 812, which states: (a) In addition to the right granted to County employees in Section 811 of this Article to organize and bargain collectively, the County Council shall provide by ordinance for binding arbitration with authorized representatives of the appropriate employee bargaining unit in order to resolve labor disputes with the ⁸³⁸ County's law enforcement employees. The ordinance shall provide for the appointment of a neutral arbitrator by the parties to the arbitration who shall issue a binding decision to be implemented as part of the following year's budget process and which shall take into account the financial condition of the County and the ¹⁴⁶ reasonable interests of the law enforcement employees and the county relating to the terms and conditions of employment.... 4 The following year, the County Council adopted Bill 1-03, codified at County Code § 6-4-111, to implement § 812 of the Charter. The Court of Appeals explained the effect of Bill 1-03 in Atkinson I : Under Bill 1-03, if an impasse exists on March 15 of any fiscal year, the parties may agree to a non-binding confidential mediation but must commence arranging for binding arbitration as well. Provision is made for selecting an arbitrator and an alternative arbitrator.

The powers and duties of the neutral arbitrator are set forth, time limits are established, and a "baseball" type of award is to be rendered.[ ] 5 Subsection (m) provides, in relevant part, as follows: "The final written award issued by the neutral arbitrator ... and the memorandum of agreed issues shall be final and binding upon the County and the Uniformed Public Safety Exclusive Representative and shall be implemented as part of the budget process for the appropriate fiscal years." Either party may move to vacate the award by an action in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. 428 Md. at 736 , 53 A.3d 1184 . Then, in 2011, the County Council enacted Bill 4-11 to amend § 6-4-111 by removing language requiring that the ¹⁴⁷ arbitrator's decision "shall be implemented as part of the budget process for the appropriate fiscal years." The bill also provided that the County Council "shall not be required to appropriate funds or enact legislation necessary to implement a final written award." Id. at 739 , 53 A.3d 1184 . In effect, Bill 4-11 created a system by which, if the arbitrator chose the employees' final offer, the County Council could then choose whether or not to fund the final award. Id. at 742 , 53 A.3d 1184 .

In Atkinson I , public safety employees challenged several features of the legislative enactment embodied in Bill 4-11, arguing that it offended § 812 of the Charter. Id. at 741 , 53 A.3d 1184 . The County, on the other hand, contended that "Bill 4-11 simply construed Charter § 812 to retain the Council's power [under Charter § 709] to reduce or delete appropriations and that construction [wa]s necessary to avoid rendering Charter § 812 unconstitutional." Id. at 742 , 53 A.3d 1184 . The Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of Charter § 812 and observed that its provisions qualified as charter material. 6 The Court reasoned that ⁸³⁹ "[w]hether some portion of the County Council's role in the budget process is to be transferred to a neutral arbitrator, in the event of an impasse in collective bargaining with public safety employees, affects the form and structure of government." Id. at 748 , 53 A.3d 1184 .

The Court held that "Charter § 812 did not unconstitutionally preclude the exercise of the County Council's law-making discretion[ ]" because the voters had made a policy decision and "left all of the detail of implementation to the Council for the exercise of its Art. XI-A, § 3 law-making power[.]" Id. at 749-50 , 53 A.3d 1184 . As for the particular provisions of Bill 4-11, the Court held that § 2, which permitted the County Council to modify or abrogate a binding award, ¹⁴⁸ ran afoul of Charter § 812's requirement that the final award "be binding on the County, which includes the County Council." Id. at 743-44 , 53 A.3d 1184 . The Court also struck down § 3 of Bill 4-11, which attempted to repeal all of Section 6-4-111 in the event that the Court found § 2 invalid, as violative of Charter § 812. Id. at 752-55 , 53 A.3d 1184 .

B. On Deck: Bill 85-13 In September 2011, as litigation was ongoing in Atkinson I , the County created a Collaborative Study Group ("Study Group") to address the increasing costs of employee benefits, concerns about the continued funding of retiree healthcare benefits and pensions, as well as uncertainty surrounding healthcare generally following the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. The Council charged the group, in part, with "determin[ing] fair and equitable priorities in the reduction of the benefit costs, ensuring that such benefits are fair to employees, retirees, and taxpayers of Anne Arundel County and can be funded on a fiscally sustainable basis[.]" The Study Group issued its final report on February 14, 2012. Its analysis focused heavily on the costs to the County of providing healthcare benefits to employees and retirees and recommended several alternatives, including "establish[ing] a trust to insulate health benefit prefunded assets." After receiving the Study Group's report and recommendations, the County Council proposed two new Charter Amendments, both passed by the voters later in 2012: Charter § 718, which required the County to create a reserve fund for retirees' healthcare benefits, and Charter § 815, 7 which granted ¹⁴⁹ the Council authority to establish the reserve fund by ordinance. The next year, on October 7, 2013, the Council introduced Bill 85-13, the passage of which gave rise to the underlying lawsuit.

Ms. Amy Burdick, the County's Acting Personnel Officer, spoke at the public hearing in support of the bill. She stated that the County's position has been "that they will negotiate with the unions only over the cost share for the various health plans[,]" and that the County "do[es] not and will not negotiate over things such as deductible or other types of plan design issues." 8 If the unions had a problem with ⁸⁴⁰ a plan design, Ms. Burdick explained that the County "would meet with them and explain [its] position and listen to [the unions'] concerns and incorporate changes if it was appropriate[,]" but that there was no legal recourse for the unions if the County did not want to incorporate their changes. Mr. David Plymyer, the County Attorney, told the Council that if the unions were dissatisfied with things like "co-pays, deductibles, or out-of-pocket costs," then "the employer would have the right to have an arbitrator ultimately decide." He stated, however, that he believed Bill 85-13 "perfectly embodies past practice and clarifies that the County does not negotiate post-employment, such as retiree benefits." Testifying to the contrary, Mr. Joel Smith, a labor and employment law attorney, said that he was surprised that the County's answers at the hearing "did not include any reference to contracts and the elements of contracts that are routinely entered into between the County and its bargaining representatives." 9 He stated ¹⁵⁰ that "healthcare, wages, and pensions" are the three cardinal rules of bargaining. The Council passed Bill 85-13 on January 6, 2014, and it took effect on March 1, 2014.

The new law established a more comprehensive County public safety employee and retiree health benefits program by repealing and replacing § 6-1-308 of the Code. 10 The law also added a new provision to Article 4, Title 11 that requires the County Executive to submit a five-year plan to the County Council to fund the retiree health benefits reserve fund. § 4-11-117. Additionally, Bill 85-13 imposed new limitations on public safety employees' collective bargaining rights. The amendment to § 6-1-308(b)(1) established that "[t]here is a County Employee and Retiree Health Benefits Program administered by the Personnel Officer that shall include insurance for medical ¹⁵¹ care and prescription drugs and may include insurance for dental ⁸⁴¹ and vision care as provided in this section." 11 Through Bill 85-13, the County Council granted to the County's Personnel Officer the duty and authority "to establish the health insurance benefit options and design the health insurance plans made available to participants[.]" § 6-1-308(n)(1). Collective bargaining is delimited in § 6-1-308(b)(3): The health insurance benefit options, health insurance plans, and employer subsidies for retirees and survivors are not subject to collective bargaining.

Employer subsidies for employees are subject to collective bargaining in accordance with subsection (i)(5). The health insurance benefit options and health insurance plans offered to employees are not subject to collective bargaining. However, before beginning collective bargaining over employer subsidies in accordance with subsection (i)(5) the Personnel Officer shall consult with and consider the comments by exclusive representatives on the health insurance benefit options and health insurance plan or plans that the Personnel Officer proposes to offer to employees. Accordingly, the employer subsidy is the only aspect of the healthcare program subject to collective bargaining under the new law.

See § 6-1-308(b)(4). Section 6-1-308(i)(5) provides that "[t]he employer subsidy used to determine the rates for employees represented by an exclusive representative selected in accordance with Title 4 and any monetary credits for opting out of coverages shall be determined through collective bargaining and, if applicable, binding arbitration." Pursuant to § 6-1-308(k)(2), however, "[t]he amount of the subsidy or allowance shall be proposed by the Personnel Officer and approved by resolution of the County Council." For current employees, § 6-1-308(i)(4) specifies: ¹⁵² Effective January 1, 2016, employer subsidies for optional plans available to participants for the same type of coverages established in accordance with this subsection shall be applied to the estimated annual costs for the plan with the lowest estimated annual costs approved by resolution of the County Council under subsection (h) in order to determine the rates paid by participants in health insurance plans. Participants who select plans other than the plan with the lowest estimated annual costs shall pay all costs for the plans in excess of the amount of the employer subsidy as applied to the plan with the lowest estimated annual cost. In other words, Subsection (i)(4) sets a flat-rate employer subsidy based on the amount the employer contributes to the lowest-cost plan option and requires employees who choose a more expensive plan to cover all additional costs in excess of that flat-rate subsidy.

For instance, if the lowest-cost plan is $100 per month and the County agrees to pay 85% of the cost of the lowest-cost plan, the County's contribution will remain $85 per month regardless of whether an employee chooses the lowest-cost plan or a more expensive plan. The flat rate established under Subsection (i) is also the rate of Medicare subsidy, cash subsidy, or allowance available to retirees under Subsections (j) and (k). The County and union representatives began collective bargaining sessions in January 2015 in advance of the County's fiscal year 2016 budget and the expiration ⁸⁴² of the two-year Memorandum of Agreement between the County and public safety employee unions. These negotiations took place following passage of Bill 85-13 and, according to Appellants, in at least two of those sessions, "the County Administrator announced that it intend[ed] to rely on Bill 85-13, codified as Code § 6-1-308, to refuse to bargain over essential 'terms and conditions of employment' with respect to employee health insurance plans." C. The Challenge On February 13, 2015, Appellants filed a complaint in the circuit court for declaratory and injunctive relief under the ¹⁵³ Maryland Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Maryland Code (1973, 2013 Repl.

Vol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article ("CJP"), § 3-401 et seq. , seeking a judgment declaring that Bill 85-13 and § 6-1-308 of the Code are contrary to Charter § 812. Appellants also sought to enjoin the County from enforcing the new law. Appellants challenged the provisions of § 6-1-308 exempting health insurance options and plans offered to employees and retirees from collective bargaining. According to Appellants, prior to the enactment of this bill, health insurance benefit options and plans were subject to collective bargaining between the County and Appellants.

Appellants asserted that "Bill 85-13 will interfere with and impair [their] enjoyment of the rights secured and guaranteed to them under County Charter VIII, §§ 811 and 812," which is prohibited by the Court of Appeals' holding in Atkinson I , 428 Md. 723 , 53 A.3d 1184 . They complained that during negotiations, the County Administrator proposed, in writing, an employer subsidy of 85% of the health insurance premium for the plan with the lowest estimated annual cost to the Fraternal Order of the Police ("FOP 70") for police department employees, IAFF 1563, and other public safety employee unions. Appellants aver that, at that point, the Personnel Officer had not selected which health insurance plans would be available for the 2016 Calendar Year. Because the dollar value of the employer subsidy depends on the insurance premium of the plan with the lowest estimated annual cost, Appellants believed that their right to bargain was "meaningless." The County disagreed and asserted, as they maintain on appeal, that collective bargaining need extend only to the cost allocation of the health insurance benefits between the County and employees.

D. Stay Delay Appellants filed a motion for summary judgment on February 25, 2015, asserting that Bill 85-13 conflicts with Charter §§ 811 and 812. They contended that Bill 85-13 limited public safety employees' collective-bargaining rights by "prohibit[ing] negotiation over health insurance benefit options;" "confin[ing] ¹⁵⁴ County support for its health insurance plans to the employer subsidy;" and "restrict[ing] collective bargaining and binding arbitration to the amount of the employer subsidy of undetermined plans and any credits for opting out of coverage." Further, Appellants asserted that any right to bargain over the employer subsidy under the new law "is meaningless" because the subsidy is tied to the lowest-cost health insurance plan, which the County Administrator chooses. Appellants maintained that neither Charter § 811 nor § 812 exempt health insurance plans, benefit options, and employer subsidies from collective bargaining. According to Appellants, "terms and conditions of employment" in Charter § 812 is a term of art that includes health insurance benefits, which are "bedrock elements of employee compensation." Appellants then filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction on March 9, 2015.

On March 13, 2015, the circuit court granted Appellants' ⁸⁴³ motion and issued a preliminary injunction. The court ordered the County to retain in place the existing health insurance plans, health insurance benefit options, and cost allocations (including premium share and co-pay formulae) without change through December 31, 2015. The Defendant County shall use its best efforts to maintain similar health insurance plan options (i.e. HMO, non-HMO) for the plan year commencing January 1, 2016 and the premium share cost allocation currently being paid by County employees represented by the union Plaintiffs shall remain the same for similar plans[.] Additionally, the court enjoined the County from enforcing §§ 6-1-308(b)(2)-(4) and 6-1-308(i)(4)-(6) of the Code.

This preliminary injunction remains in effect until the court orders otherwise. E. The Shutout On March 30, 2015, the County filed its answer and a counterclaim for declaratory judgment. In its counterclaim, the County asserted that Bill 85-13 was valid because the ¹⁵⁵ former version of § 6-1-308 limited collective bargaining on health benefits to the cost-share arrangement and because plan options and deductibles have never been subject to collective bargaining or binding arbitration. That same day, the County also filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and an opposition to Appellants' motion for summary judgment.

In its motion, the County argued that Appellants' "case rests on an excessively broad-and fundamentally incorrect-reading of the Court's opinion in Atkinson I [.] ... Nothing in Atkinson I , or in Charter §§ 811 or 812, precludes the Council from delineating the scope of collective bargaining with respect to health insurance benefits for County employees." The County asserted that the prior version of § 6-1-308 (enacted in 1989), see supra note 10, "clearly reflected the Council's limit on collective bargaining about health benefits to only the cost-sharing arrangement." The County maintained that the current version of § 6-1-308 kept the status quo: the cost-sharing is still subject to collective bargaining and plan design and options were never part of collective bargaining. Additionally, the County contended that Appellants were wrong to read §§ 811 and 812 of the Charter together to mean that "the County must engage in collective bargaining over all terms and conditions of employment, including all aspects of health care benefits." The County asserted that the County Council, by implication, "retains the power to 'flesh out' the scope of those terms and conditions [subject to binding arbitration]." Lastly, the County argued that Appellants' interpretation of §§ 811 and 812 of the Charter limit the County Council's legislative power impermissibly under Article XI-A § 3 of the Maryland Constitution. Following a hearing held on June 29, 2015, the court entered an order dated July 15, 2015, in which it denied the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment to allow the parties to develop the record.

And, approximately six months later, following discovery, the parties renewed their cross-motions for summary judgment on January 6, 2016. The court ¹⁵⁶ addressed the cross-motions during a hearing on May 16, 2016, at which the parties stipulated that there were no genuine disputes of material fact. 12 The parties largely reiterated the same arguments. ⁸⁴⁴ The circuit court granted the County's motion for summary judgment and denied Appellants' motion for summary judgment in an order and memorandum opinion entered on June 9, 2016. In its written memorandum, the court stated: The question [ ] for this Court, is whether the usage of "terms and conditions of employment" in Charter Section 812 includes the selection and types of health insurance coverage[,] which would then require collective bargaining and[,] if necessary[,] the submittal to a neutral arbitrator on the issue. The Court believes that the scope of those terms and conditions is controlled by the County and, once the scope is established, the parties follow Charter Section 812.

Interpreting the charter amendment is the appropriate place to begin. The primary focus of charter interpretation is to determine the intent of the charter amendment. Mayor & City Council of Ocean City v. Bunting , 168 Md. App. 134 , 141 [ 895 A.2d 1068 ] (2006). The language of the amendment is the starting point and if the language of the amendment is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to delve further.

Id. The Court believes the language is not plain and ¹⁵⁷ unambiguous. First, the charter amendment[,] in relevant part[,] fails to describe what is meant by "terms and conditions." Section 6-4-111 of the Code, which implemented the binding arbitration requirement of Charter Section 812 also fails to clarify the phrase. This Court believes that because the statutes in question fail to illuminate the exact intent and meaning of the phrase "terms and conditions of employment," it is necessarily up to the County Council to define the scope by legislation.

Bunting , 168 Md. App. at 141 [ 895 A.2d 1068 ]. (Emphasis added). Appellants noted their timely appeal to this Court on June 24, 2016. DISCUSSION Appellants assign error to the circuit court's decision to defer to the County Council's interpretation of the phrase "terms and conditions of employment." This deference, Appellants argue, led the circuit court to decide incorrectly that Bill 85-13 did not violate Charter §§ 811 and 812 by excluding employee health insurance benefit options from the charter-mandated process of collective bargaining and binding arbitration.

The County, for its part, insists that Charter § 812 does not require terms and conditions of employment to be bargained over in the first place but "merely directs the arbitrator to take into account the reasonable interests of both the County and law enforcement employees related to the terms and conditions of employment." Further, it argues that we must interpret Charter § 812 so that its effect is limited to budgetary issues and not legislative issues, meaning that the County must only negotiate the "costs" of health insurance benefits. Consistent with this, the County reasons that defining "terms and conditions of employment" ⁸⁴⁵ is the County Council's legislative prerogative-not a matter of charter material that affects the structure and form of government and may be controlled by Charter § 812-and to construe Charter ¹⁵⁸ § 812 otherwise would violate Article XI-A, § 3 of the Maryland Constitution. I. Charter Amendments and Our Standard of Review Anne Arundel County adopted charter home rule in 1964. M. Peter Moser, County Home Rule-Sharing the State's Legislative Power with Maryland Counties , 28 Md. L. Rev. 327 , 333 n.19 (1968).

Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution, which the General Assembly passed in 1914 and voters ratified in 1915, provides for home rule by charter. 1914 Md. Laws, ch. 416. Section 2 of Article XI-A requires the General Assembly to grant, through public general law, express powers to charter counties to enact public local laws. The General Assembly, not the charter counties, may "enlarge[ ] or extend[ ]" the grant of legislative powers to the charter counties. Article XI-A, § 2.

These express powers are codified at Maryland Code (2013, 2017 Supp.), Local Government Article ("LG"), § 10-101 et seq. Judge Levine, writing for the Court of Appeals in Ritchmount P'ship v. Bd. of Sup'rs of Elections for Anne Arundel Cty. , explained: Article XI-A, s[ection] 1 effectively reserves to the people of this state the right to organize themselves into semi-autonomous political communities for the purpose of instituting self-government within the territorial limits of the several counties. The means by which the inhabitants acquire such autonomy is the charter. Being, in effect, a local constitution, the charter fixes the framework for the organization of the county government.

It is the instrument which establishes the agencies of local government and provides for the allocation of power among them. 283 Md. 48 , 58, 388 A.2d 523 (1978) (internal citations omitted). The Court of Appeals has stated repeatedly, " 'a county charter is equivalent to a constitution.' " Save Our Streets v. Mitchell , 357 Md. 237 , 248, 743 A.2d 748 (2000) (citations ¹⁵⁹ omitted). We interpret charters "under the same canons of construction that apply to the interpretation of statutes." O'Connor v. Balt. Cty. , 382 Md. 102 , 113, 854 A.2d 1191 (2004).

Our guiding principle in doing so is to ascertain the drafters' intent in amending the charter. See id. at 113-14 , 854 A.2d 1191 . "To determine what that intention was, we look first to the language of the amendment." Mayor & City Council of Ocean City v. Bunting , 168 Md. App. 134 , 141, 895 A.2d 1068 (2006) (construing amendment to municipal charter authorized under Article XI-E, §§ 3 and 4 of the Maryland Constitution ). "If the meaning of the amendment is plain and unambiguous, we need look no further." Id.

When the text invites multiple interpretations, however, we must turn to the various interpretive tools at our disposal to resolve the resulting ambiguity. For instance, we consider the practical result of our decision, seeking to " 'avoid constructions that are illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense.' " Id. at 142 , 895 A.2d 1068 (citation omitted). We may also look to the greater context surrounding the enactment-its legislative history; other contemporaneous enactments by the drafters; and similar provisions in other counties, the state code, and, if relevant, federal law on the subject-to distill a more complete understanding of the drafters' intent. See id. at 143-146 , 895 A.2d 1068 ; ⁸⁴⁶ Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Balt.

City Firefighters Local 743, I.A.F.F. , 136 Md. App. 512 , 528-29, 766 A.2d 219 (2001) [hereinafter " Firefighters II "]. In so construing charter provisions, we must avoid unconstitutional results. Bunting , 168 Md. App. at 146 , 895 A.2d 1068 . In the instant case, the parties urge us to review the lower court's grant of summary judgment under a de novo standard, each alleging there are no material facts in dispute.

As an initial matter, when reviewing a circuit court's grant of summary judgment, this Court must, as a threshold matter, determine "whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists[.]" Remsburg v. Montgomery , 376 Md. 568 , 579, 831 A.2d 18 (2003). In reviewing determinations of law, "we review the ¹⁶⁰ Circuit Court's decisions without deference to determine whether the conclusions involving ordinance construction were correct legally." Fraternal Order of Police, Montgomery Cty., Lodge 35 v. Montgomery Cty. , 437 Md. 618 , 631, 89 A.3d 1093 (2014). A. The Structure of §§ 811 and 812 As an initial matter, the parties disagree over what Charter §§ 811 and 812 require. Appellants assert throughout their briefing the general premise that Charter §§ 811 and 812 require the County, through a two-step process, "to bargain and arbitrate over 'terms and conditions of employment.' " The County argues in response that "terms and conditions of employment" are not mandatory bargaining subjects but simply considerations for the arbitrator: "Section 812 merely directs the arbitrator to take into account the reasonable interests of both the County and law enforcement employees related to the terms and conditions of employment." We begin with an analysis of the general structure and effect of Charter §§ 811 and 812.

Charter § 811 grants, broadly, County public safety employees "the right to organize and bargain collectively ... as provided by ordinance of the County Council." And Charter § 812 provides rights "[i]n addition to the right granted to County employees in Section 811[.]" Section 812 mandates that the County Council "provide by ordinance for binding arbitration ... in order to resolve labor disputes[,]" and that the ordinance "shall provide for the appointment of a neutral arbitrator ... who shall issue a binding decision ... [,] which shall take into account the financial condition of the County and the reasonable interests of the [County] employees and the county relating to the terms and conditions of employment." Reading the two Charter provisions together, Charter § 811 provides for collective bargaining, and "in the event of an impasse in collective bargaining with public safety employees," Atkinson I , 428 Md. at 748 , 53 A.3d 1184 , Charter § 812 ¹⁶¹ mandates that the County must submit any "labor disputes" to binding arbitration. The arbitrator resolves the disputes considering the County's financial condition on the one hand and the terms and conditions of the public safety employees' employment on the other. The County's argument that Charter § 812 does not require bargaining over the "terms and conditions of employment" ignores the canon of statutory construction by which "[a]ll parts of a statute are to be read together to determine intent, and reconciled and harmonized to the extent possible." Condon v. Univ. of Md. , 332 Md. 481 , 491, 632 A.2d 753 (1993). To the extent the later-enacted mandate of Charter § 812 requiring arbitration over "terms and conditions of employment" is more specific than the general collective bargaining requirement of § 811 and can be said to alter the overarching scheme as it existed prior to its enactment, we "should give effect to the specific statute in its entirety and should retain as much of the general statute as is reasonably possible." ⁸⁴⁷ State v. Ghajari , 346 Md. 101 , 116, 695 A.2d 143 (1997) (citation omitted).

Reading Charter §§ 811 and 812 together, the County's argument loses salience. In interpreting charters, as with statutes, we must avoid interpretations that produce illogical results. Bunting , 168 Md. App. at 142 , 895 A.2d 1068 . It is unnatural and would ignore logic to read Charter § 812 to require arbitration over terms and conditions of employment during the second step of labor negotiations if those terms and conditions of employment were not subject to collective bargaining during the first step of the process.

The more natural reading of Charter §§ 811 and 812 is advanced by Appellants and was accepted by the circuit court below: terms and conditions of employment are subject to a two-step process of collective bargaining and arbitration. Our reading is consistent with what the County Council's contemporaneous legislative acts indicate the Council understood the process to be. Bill 1-03, which the Council drafted to implement Charter § 812 shortly after the voters amended the Charter, defined an "impasse" as "when the Administration ¹⁶² and exclusive representative are unable to agree on the wages, hours, working conditions, or other terms and conditions of employment to create a memorandum of agreement after a reasonable period of negotiations." 2003 Laws of Anne Arundel Cty., Bill No. 1-03, § 4-101(j) (enacted March 24, 2003) [hereinafter "Bill No. 1-03"] (emphasis added). B.

"Terms and Conditions of Employment" Having resolved that Charter §§ 811 and 812 impose a structure that requires the County to bargain collectively over and, if necessary, submit to binding arbitration any labor disputes concerning the terms and conditions of public safety workers' employment, we now turn to what is meant by "terms and conditions of employment." 1. The Parties' Arguments Appellants contend that the circuit court erred when it deferred to the County Council to define the scope of "terms and conditions of employment" by legislation instead of applying the plain meaning of the phrase. They assert that Charter § 812 changed the form and structure of County government, removing from the County Council the authority to determine the scope of the "terms and conditions" of public safety workers' employment. According to Appellants, in the context of labor law, "terms and conditions of employment" is a term of art with a plain meaning that includes health insurance benefits.

Based on this reading of Charter § 812, Appellants assert that the County Council lacks the authority to exclude from collective bargaining Appellants' health insurance options and plans. This Court asked Appellants at oral argument how and where the line is drawn between those facets of public health insurance benefits that are subject to collective bargaining and arbitration pursuant to Charter §§ 811 and 812 and those that are not. Appellants' counsel responded, "What we should have the right to bargain about is the economics of the features of the plan." More specifically, Appellants urged us to adopt the balancing test, set out infra , that the Court of Appeals endorsed in ¹⁶³ Montgomery Cty. Ed. Ass'n, Inc. v. Bd. of Ed. of Montgomery Cty. , 311 Md. 303 , 534 A.2d 980 (1987) [hereinafter " MCEA "].

The County responds that Appellants' reading of Charter § 812-that every term and condition of employment is subject to collective bargaining-is unreasonably broad. Instead, the County submits that defining terms and conditions is the County Council's legislative function under § 3 of Article XI-A and LG §§ 10-303(d) and ⁸⁴⁸ 10-206(a)(2) 13 and that Charter § 812 merely directs the arbitrator to weigh those terms and conditions against the County's budgetary interests. The County also complains that there is no legal basis requiring it to allow union employees to bargain for a separate subsidy for each health insurance plan option (Bill 85-13 limits collective bargaining on employees' health insurance benefits to the employer subsidy with the lowest-cost health insurance plan). At oral argument, when this Court pressed the County on how narrowly the Council could define "terms and conditions of employment," the logical conclusion of its argument became clear: it believes the Charter only requires it to negotiate the issue of wages.

Although Bill 85-13 requires the County to negotiate over the fixed-dollar contribution to health insurance benefits, the County represented that, under its theory, the Council could also remove all aspects of healthcare from collective bargaining-including the fixed-dollar contribution. Appellants' only recourse to the Council doing so, the County suggested, would be "the ballot box." The County posited that wages are the exception because they are "so intertwined with the contractual relationship" between employer and employee that we may infer from "general labor law" that they are a mandatory subject of bargaining. On rebuttal, Appellants ¹⁶⁴ warned that under the County's proposed reading, "the playing field is defined not by the process of negotiation, but by the County itself defining which [ ] the lowest cost plan [is] and what the lowest cost is." 2. Defining the Scope of the Charter Provisions In Firefighters II , supra , this Court considered whether two contract provisions were arbitrable under the Baltimore City Charter, 14 which-much like the County Charter here-required the city and its firefighters "to submit to binding arbitration 'terms and conditions of employment.' " 136 Md. App. at 515 , 766 A.2d 219 .

The union in that case sought two provisions that the City rejected: "(1) a 'parity provision'-under which the Firefighters would receive pay and benefits equal to that of paid police officers; and (2) the 'rule of one'-a method used to determine promotions for individual Firefighters based solely upon certain test scores." Id. Under Baltimore City's arbitration process at the time, the bargaining parties each submitted a proposal and a panel of arbitrators chose between them. Id. The City filed a complaint in circuit court seeking to enjoin the arbitration, contending that the two proposals at issue violated the City Charter and the City code.

Id. at 516-17 , 766 A.2d 219 . "Specifically, the City asserted that the parity provision 'impermissibly restrict[ed] and interfere[d] with the City's ability to negotiate directly and in good faith with both the police and fire unions[,]' " and that "the rule of one would interfere with the authority of, and violate the rules and regulations established by, the City's Department of Personnel [ ] and the [City's Civil Service] Commission." Id. at 517 , 766 A.2d 219 . The circuit court ⁸⁴⁹ dismissed the City's complaint, deciding that the question of which issues are arbitrable under the City Charter "was not for the court to decide, but rather, for the board of arbitrators ¹⁶⁵ and that 'a court of competent jurisdiction does not have jurisdiction until the matter is adjudicated in arbitration.' " Id. On appeal, this Court began by holding that whether "the issues submitted to arbitration were [ ] 'terms and conditions of employment' " within the meaning of the City Charter was a justiciable issue for the courts to decide.

Id. at 521 , 766 A.2d 219 . We instructed that "it is for the court to decide whether there exists an agreement to arbitrate on the subject matter of dispute." Id. And although we did not need to reach the issue, we suggested that we were inclined to believe "that the arbitration was not required before the court could determine arbitrability of these issues[.]" Id. at 521-22 , 766 A.2d 219 . Moving on to whether the proposed contractual terms fell within the City Charter's requirement that the parties arbitrate "terms and conditions of employment," we agreed with the unions that the mandate "is broad, and on its face clearly encompasses a parity provision." Id. at 529 , 766 A.2d 219 .

We rejected the City's argument that the parity provision would affect its negotiations with the police because the City had finite budgetary resources, reasoning that regardless of parity, resources allotted to one department affected those that the City could allot to the other and unions could use the other department's allotment as a bargaining chip. Id. Further, we reasoned, "[s]ubmitting the issue of parity to arbitration does not mean that the City has no opportunity to present evidence and argue before the arbitrators that, under current conditions, parity with the police is an unwise or undesirable provision." Id. at 531 , 766 A.2d 219 . Thus, we concluded, the issue of whether the firefighters were entitled to the same wages and benefits as the police was a proper subject of arbitration because it was a "term and condition of employment" under the City Charter.

Id. As for the "rule of one," we determined that the record was too sparse to determine the issue, but before we remanded, id. at 515 , 766 A.2d 219 , we noted some relevant points from the parties' previous dispute in City of Balt. v. Balt. Fire Fighters Local 734, I.A.F.F. , 93 Md. App. 604 , 613 A.2d 1023 (1992) ¹⁶⁶ [hereinafter " Fire Fighters I "]. We observed that in Fire Fighters I , this Court held that "notwithstanding the broad language" in the City Charter, "some management rights are excluded from the scope of the arbitration clause." Firefighters II , 136 Md. App. at 536 , 766 A.2d 219 (citing Fire Fighters I , 93 Md. App. at 617 , 613 A.2d 1023 ).

In Fire Fighters I , the unions had argued that (1) a reduction in staffing levels and (2) accrued vacation leave were disputes that involved "terms and conditions of employment" within the meaning of the City Charter. Id. Before resolving the parties' dispute, this Court noted the tension that exists between management prerogatives and a mandate to negotiate and arbitrate labor disputes. Id. at 537, 766 A.2d 219 (citing Fire Fighters I , 93 Md. App. at 619 -20 , 613 A.2d 1023 ).

We rejected the parties' " 'extreme positions' " and adopted an approach consistent with the Court of Appeals' reasoning in MCEA , 311 Md. 303 , 534 A.2d 980 , 15 ¹⁶⁷ holding that " '[t]he interests ⁸⁵⁰ of the employees are to be balanced against the interest of the governmental entity, school system or firefighting system, as a whole.' " Id. Applying this balancing test, we concluded that both the reduction of staffing levels and accrued vacation leave issues were arbitrable. Fire Fighters I , 93 Md. App. at 622 , 613 A.2d 1023 . Thus, in Firefighters II , we clarified that the balancing test is appropriate when the governing charter and code contain no expression of the enacting body's intent to make an issue arbitrable. 136 Md. App. at 538 , 766 A.2d 219 .

Five years after Firefighters II , this Court interpreted collective-bargaining amendments to the Ocean City Charter in Bunting , supra , 168 Md. App. at 136 , 895 A.2d 1068 . There, we considered whether the Ocean City Council violated the Ocean City Charter when it adopted a labor code that excluded certain ranking officers from the collective bargaining process. Id. at 136 , 895 A.2d 1068 . The applicable charter amendment (adopted the same year as Charter § 812) permitted police department "employees ... to engage in collective bargaining with respect to 'the formulation and implementation of personnel policies affecting their employment[,]' " and