Attorney General of Maryland v. Waldron

Digges, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. With this case, we shall answer questions once before raised in but not reached by this Court. Specifically, we determine: (i) whether section 56 (c) of Article 73B, 1 which prohibits the practice of law for compensation by certain members of the Maryland Bar who have previously held a judicial office, violates the principle of separation of powers embodied in Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights; and (ii) whether this same enactment breaches the fundamental principles of equal protection embodied in our State and federal organic laws. As this action raises by implication fundamental issues concerning the proper repository for, and particular limitations on, a large part of the constitutional authority to regulate the legal profession, we shall here provide a full exposition of our thoughts on the matters after initially supplying the necessary factual backdrop to the case. 2 I Factual Background Because the questions here stated present purely legal issues, the facts involved are important only insofar as necessary for a full percipience of the parties’ respective positions.

As we have previously explained, see Chairman of Board v. Waldron, 285 Md. 175 , 401 A.2d 172 (1979) ⁶⁸⁶ (Waldron I), the respondent in this case was a judge of the District Court of Maryland sitting in Prince George’s County (and its predecessor, the People’s Court), who, having not received reappointment following ten years of service on the bench, retired in August of 1977. Desiring to return to the practice of law in this State as well as in the District of Columbia, while perceiving a statutory obstacle to his receipt of pension benefits under Md. Code, Art. 73B, § 57 if he did so, Waldron initiated a frontal assault on the apparent legislative impediment. Thus, the former judge sought in Waldron I, from the Circuit Court for Calvert County, a declaration that section 56 (c) of Article 73B, his perceived antagonist, unconstitutionally infringed his rights to due process and equal protection of the law under both the State and federal constitutions and that the provision invaded the province of the judicial branch in violation of this State’s basic constitutional principle of separation of powers. Judge Waldron succeeded in the trial court on the equal protection claim.

This Court, however, there construed section 56 (c) as creating a prohibition whose violation would constitute the unauthorized practice of law, and not one establishing preconditions to the receipt of pension benefits as we noted that section 56 (c)’s predecessor did. Chairman of Board v. Waldron, supra at 180, 401 A.2d at 175 . Thus, since none of those designated to police the unauthorized practice of law were named in the prior suit, see Md. Code (1957, 1981 Repl. Vol.), Art. 10, § 26A, we were compelled to vacate the trial court’s determination for failure to join parties necessary to adjudicate the questions raised, and consequently did not address the constitutional issues there posed for our review.

Id. at 180, 401 A.2d at 175 . These issues, however, have again found their way before this Court. When Judge Waldron began the practice of law for compensation after our decision in Waldron I, the Attorney General, acting pursuant to the enforcement authority with regard to unauthorized practice vested in him by section 26A of Article 10, docketed an equity suit in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County seeking, first, to enjoin the respondent from the practicó of law while receiving his pen ⁶⁸⁷ sion, and second, a declaration that section 56 (c) is constitutional in all respects. 3 The trial court (Bowen, J.) did not grant this relief. Instead, it declared the contested statutory provision to be contrary to both the principle of separation of powers found in Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the guaranties of equal protection of the law under both the federal and State constitutions.

Prior to consideration of the matter by the intermediate appellate court, we issued our writ of certiorari to enable us to pass upon the important issues raised by this enduring litigation. II Separation of Powers The initial contention of the Attorney General before this Court is that the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County erred when it concluded section 56 (c) of Article 73B of the Maryland Code unconstitutionally "invades the exclusive power of the judiciary to determine who may practice law and, therefore, violates the separation of powers principle.” The contested section 56 (c) provides: A judge who retires and accepts the pension provided by this subtitle may not, thereafter, engage in the practice of law for compensation; but this prohibition does not apply to a former judge who has attained the age of 70 years and received less than $3500 per annum in pension as provided by this ⁶⁸⁸ subtitle, and who has not voluntarily retired. [Md. Code (1957, 1978 Repl. Vol.), Art. 73B, § 56 (c).] The trial judge correctly characterized this provision as one that, "by depriving a person who has been admitted to practice of his right to do so unless he meets further conditions,” regulates the practice of law. This observation is consistent with our construction in Chairman of Board v. Waldron, 285 Md. 175, 180 , 401 A.2d 172, 175 (1979), that section 56 (c) "is a direct command to a retired judge who accepts a pension that he 'may not, thereafter, engage in the practice of law for compensation.’ ” Thus, it is clear that the enactment now before us manifests an undertaking on the part of the General Assembly to regulate the legal profession by prescribing for certain otherwise qualified practitioners additional prerequisites to the continued pursuit of their chosen vocation.

We turn, therefore, to consider whether such regulation by the legislative branch of our government is permissible under the constitution of this State. 4 The concept that the rights and liberties cherished by the people of Maryland are best safeguarded by the division of governmental powers into independent and coequal organs is familiar to even a casual student of our constitutional heritage. Although this doctrine is both fundamental to our scheme of government and well known, we believe it important to recall that the "purpose [of separating the exercise of the sovereign powers] was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.” Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 , 47 S. Ct. 21, 84 , 71 L. Ed. 160 (1926) (Brandéis, J., dissenting). The doctrine of separation of powers was thought by the founding fathers of this State to be of such ⁶⁸⁹ monumental importance for the continued safekeeping of our freedoms that they specifically incorporated this tenet into the proposed initial Declaration of Rights, thereafter adopted as part of the Maryland Constitution of 1776. See Maryland Declaration of Rights of 1776, Art. 6.

Since that time the expression of this concept has always had a place in our organic law, although its written locution has varied in our later constitutions, so that Article 8 of the present document reads: "That the Legislative, Executive and Judicial powers of Government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other; and no person exercising the functions of one of said Departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other.” 5 This provision has been consistently interpreted from its inception to parcel out and separate the powers of government, and to confide particular classes of them to particular branches of the supreme authority. That is to say, such of them as are judicial in their character to the judiciary; such as are legislative to the legislative, and such as are executive in their nature to the executive. Within the particular limits assigned to each, they are supreme and uncontrollable. [Wright v. Wright, 2 Md. 429, 452 (1852).] More recently, this Court has iterated that while "the separation of powers concept may constitutionally encompass a sensible degree of elasticity ... [Article 8] cannot be stretched to a point where, in effect, there no longer exists a separation of governmental power.” Dep’t of Nat. Res. v. Linchester, 274 Md. 211, 220 , 334 A.2d 514, 521 (1975).

Though the precise delineation of authority between the three basic organs of our tripartite government is at times difficult to discern, when an issue arises, we must nevertheless determine such demarcations, for, as we went on to say in Linchester : ⁶⁹⁰ When the Legislature confers, by enactment, powers upon one of the other branches of government which are beyond those permitted under the Constitution, or any of the three branches of government takes unto itself powers denied to it or those strictly within the sovereignty of another branch, the courts of this State must step in and declare such encroachments to be constitutionally prohibited, not because the court is a "Triton among minnows” or predominates in dignity, but because, as Chief Justice Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 , 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803) . . . avowed: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” [Dep’t of Nat. Res. v. Linchester, supra, 274 Md. at 220-21 , 334 A.2d at 521 (1975). See also Perkins v. Eskridge, 278 Md. 619, 624-27 , 366 A.2d 21, 26-27 (1976); Whittington v. Polk, 1 H & J 236, 242-46 (1802) (case predating Marbury espousing identical view in relation to this State’s judiciary).] We have recognized in the past that, in addition to the specific powers and functions expressly granted to the three organs of government by the Constitution, each branch possesses additional powers perforce implied from the right and obligation to perform its constitutional duties. E.g., Dep’t of Nat.

Res. v. Linchester, supra, 274 Md. at 223 , 334 A.2d at 522-23 ; Maryland St. Bar Ass’n v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 546 , 318 A.2d 811, 813 (1974); Maryland St. Bar Ass’n v. Boone, 255 Md. 420, 429-32 , 258 A.2d 438, 443-44 (1969); Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Hahn Transp., Inc., 253 Md. 571, 583 , 253 A.2d 845, 852 (1969); Deems v. Western Maryland Ry., 247 Md. 95, 101-02 , 231 A.2d 514, 517-18 (1967); Stevens v. City of Salisbury, 240 Md. 556, 563-64 , 214 A.2d 775, 779 (1965). Indeed, the existence of such powers inheres in the scheme of a written constitution, for without this authority, the document would, by necessity, be but a tome exhaustively cataloging the sole authority of the respective political institutions.

Particularly important for the resolution of this case, of course, is what has come to be known as the inci ⁶⁹¹ dental, implied or inherent power of one branch of government — the judiciary — and its relation to the police power vested, albeit inherently, in the legislative branch. 6 Discussing the power that inheres in the judiciary in a democracy structured as ours, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, over fifty years ago, lucidly articulated the foundation of such authority: In order to accomplish the purposes for which they are created, courts must also possess powers. From time immemorial, certain powers have been conceded to courts, because they are courts. Such powers have been conceded, because without them they could neither maintain their dignity, transact their business, nor accomplish the purposes of their existence. * * * "The inherent power of the court is the power to protect itself; the power to administer justice...; the power to promulgate rules for its practice; and the power to provide process where none exists. It is true that the judicial power of this court was created by the Constitution, but, upon coming into being under the Constitution, this court came into being with inherent powers.” [State v. Cannon, 196 Wis. 534 , 221 N.W. 603, 603-04 (1928) (quoting In re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472 , 172 P. 1152 (1918).] ⁶⁹² Cognizánt of the constitutionally imposed responsibility with respect to the administration of justice in this State, this Court has heretofore recognized and held that the regulation of the practice of law, the admittance of new members to the bar, and the discipline of attorneys who fail to conform to the established standards governing their professional conduct are essentially judicial in nature and, accordingly, are encompassed in the constitutional grant of judicial authority to the courts of this State.

Attorney Grievance. Comm’n v. Reamer, 281 Md. 323, 331 , 379 A.2d 171, 176 (1977); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Andresen, 281 Md. 152, 159 , 379 A.2d 159, 163 (1977); Maryland St. Bar Ass’n v. Agnew, supra, 271 Md. at 546 , 318 A.2d at 813 ; In re Diener and Broccolino, 268 Md. 659, 685 , 304 A.2d 587, 601 (1973), cert. denied, Broccolino v. Maryland Comm. on Judicial Disabilities, 415 U.S. 989 (1974); Maryland St. Bar Ass’n v. Boone, supra, 255 Md. 420, 430-32 , 258 A.2d 438, 443-44 (1969); Pub. Serv.

Comm’n v. Hahn Transp., Inc., supra, 253 Md. at 583 , 253 A.2d at 852 . See Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Klauber, 283 Md. 597, 603 , 391 A.2d 849, 852 (1978) (concurring opinion by Gilbert, J.). Thus, in Hahn, 253 Md. at 583 , 253 A.2d at 852 , Chief Judge Hammond stated for this Court that "[ujnder our constitutional system of separation of powers, the determination of what constitutes the practice of law and the regulation of the practice and of its practitioners is, and essentially and appropriately should be, a function of the judicial branch of government.” A short time later, this Court determined, inter alia, that the following words of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts are "highly persuasive”: It is a necessary implication from the exclusive jurisdiction of the judicial department of control of membership in the bar that the judicial department is not restricted in the [manner] of review in such ⁶⁹³ proceedings to methods prescribed by statute.

If this were not true the judicial department would be restricted by legislative action in the performance of its duties with respect to membership in the bar of which it has "exclusive cognizance.” [Maryland State Bar Ass’n v. Boone, 255 Md. at 431 , 258 A.2d at 443 .] The principle that the admission of attorneys to the bar as well as their supervision once admitted are by nature functions and concerns of the judicial branch of government is far from a novel concept. The history of the courts in the formative years of this nation, and indeed, the history of our ancestral English courts support the conclusion that this uniquely judicial responsibility is of ancient vintage. Even though the doctrine of separation of powers is not an integral part of the British system of government and is one whose fruition occurred on the western shores of the Atlantic, the English courts — common law, chancery, admiralty and ecclesiastical — have always exclusively admitted attorneys, solicitors and proctors to practice before them. Insofar as the other class of English legal practitioners is concerned, barristers traditionally were regulated by the educational societies known as the Inns of Court, which, in turn, generally are thought to have submitted to the control of judges as visitors to those bodies.

All of this oversight and supervision of the English practitioners was accomplished independent of any authorization or predomination by any other department of government. See State v. Cannon, 206 Wis. 589 , 240 N.W. 441, 445-48 (1932), and In re Day, 181 Ill. 73 , 54 N.E. 646 , 648-50 (1899), and citations therein, for discussions of the history of the admission and regulation of lawyers in England. See also Note, Admission to the Bar and the Separation of Powers, 7 Utah L. Rev. 82 , 82-86 (1960). Similarly, there are early statements in opinions of courts of this country that declare the admission to practice to be an exercise of judicial power.

See, e.g., Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 333, 18 L. Ed. 366 (1867); Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9 , 15 L. Ed. 565 (1857); In re Mosness, 39 ⁶⁹⁴ Wis. 509, 20 Am. Rep. 55 , 56-57 (1876). See also 1 E. Thornton, Attorneys at Law §§ 756-61 (1914). As has been recognized by a distinguished scholar of these matters: It is undoubtedly true that the power to admit one to practice as an attorney at law is a judicial function.

It is a power inherent in the court, which is to be exercised by a sound judicial discretion.... Early in the national jurisprudence it was held that the power to admit and remove was the exclusive province of a federal court. And this ruling has been consistently maintained. Where a state constitution lodges the judicial power exclusively in the courts, as a coordinate department of government, [as does Maryland’s by Art. IV, § 1,] the legislature will not be permitted to encroach upon the judicial powers by assuming to make admission to the bar a legislative function. [Id., § 28, p. 31-32.] Moreover, in more recent decades, various courts from many of our sister jurisdictions have pronounced that such authority, and the power generally to regulate matters regarding the profession and its practitioners, are reposed inherently in the judiciary.

Application of Houston, 378 P.2d 644, 645 (Alaska 1963); Brydonjack v. State Bar, 208 Cal. 439 , 281 P. 1018, 1020 (1929); Denver Bar Association v. Public Utilities Commission, 154 Colo. 273 , 391 P.2d 467, 470-71 , 13 A.L.R.3d 799 (1969) (en banc); State Bar Ass’n of Conn. v. Connecticut Bank & T. Co., 145 Conn. 222 , 140 A.2d 863, 868-69 , 69 A.L.R.2d 394 (1958); Application of Kaufman, 69 Idaho 297 , 206 P.2d 528, 531-39 (1949); In re Mitan, 75 Ill. 2d 118 , 25 Ill. Dec. 622 , 387 N.E.2d 278, 280 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 916 (1979); Matter of Kesler, 397 N.E.2d 574, 575 (Ind. 1979); Committee on Professional Ethics v. Gartin, 272 N.W.2d 485, 487 (Iowa 1979); State v. Schumacher, 210 Kan. 377 , 502 P.2d 748, 752 (1972); Ratterman v. Stapleton, 371 S.W.2d 939, 940-42 (Kentucky 1963); Scott v. Kemper Ins. Co., 377 So. 2d 66, 69 (La. 1979); Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Freddie F. Lee, 422 A.2d 998 , 49 U.S.L.W. 2370 (Me. 1980); Collins v. Godfrey, 324 Mass. ⁶⁹⁵ 574, 87 N.E.2d 838, 839-41 (1949); Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607 , 194 N.E. 313 , 316 (1935); Sharood v. Hatfield, 296 Minn. 416 , 210 N.W.2d 275, 279-82 (1973); Bramlett v. Burgin, 382 So. 2d 284, 285-86 (Miss. 1979); Matter of Mississippi State Bar, 361 So. 2d 503, 505-06 (Miss. 1978); Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467 , 101 S.W.2d 977, 980-85 (1937); State v. Barlow, 131 Neb. 294 , 268 N.W. 95, 97-98 (1936); In re Mussman’s Case, 111 N.H. 402 , 286 A.2d 614, 619-20 (1971); Goodwin Motor Corp. v. Mercedes-Benz, etc., 172 N.J. Super. 263 , 411 A.2d 1144, 1149 (1980); Archer v. Ogden, 600 P.2d 1223, 1226-27 (Okla. 1979); Wajert v. State Ethics Commission, 420 A.2d 439, 442 (Pa. 1980); Banales v. Jackson, 601 S.W.2d 508, 510-12 (Tex. Civ.

App. 1980); Richmond Ass’n of Credit of Men v. Bar Ass’n., 167 Va. 327 , 189 S.E. 153, 157 (1936); Matter of Washington State Bar Association, 86 Wash. 2d 624 , 548 P.2d 310, 315-16 (1976) (en banc); West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 144 W. Va. 504 , 109 S.E.2d 420, 435-39 (1959); State v. Cannon, supra, 240 N.W. at 450-56; Mendicino v. Whitchurch, 565 P.2d 460, 475 (Wyo. 1977). The statements of this and other courts announcing the obligation of the judicial branch of government to monitor and manage its own house are not hollow proclamations of power, for the placement of this responsibility with the judiciary represents a recognition of the special, and to a degree, unique relationship that has evolved over the years between the legal profession and the tribunals of justice it serves. In this country, it is a well known maxim that attorneys function as officers of the courts, and, as such, are a necessary and important adjunct to the administration of justice. This truism necessarily derives, in our view, from the very theory of the structure of our system of justice.

The adversary process integral to the design of our dispute-resolving scheme is perhaps one of the more remarkable accomplishments of western jurisprudence. It is this process, whereby truth is garnered from the articulation of opposing points of view, that is the preeminent tool through which fairness is achieved in the administration of justice in this country. ⁶⁹⁶ A trial is not a dispassionate and cooperative effort by all the parties to arrive at justice.... In a court there is a judge, who is to pass on the questions, and there are lawyers on each side. Under the American system, the judge is relatively passive, listening, moderating, and passing on what is offered to him.

But neither the judge nor any other representative of the public is active in developing the facts. The lawyers are the ones who develop and present the case. They do so, each for his own side and not for both sides. If one lawyer is poor or lazy, his side suffers accordingly.

If the other lawyer is unscrupulous, his side may benefit unduly. [Cheatham, The Lawyer’s Role and Surroundings, 25 Rocky Mtn. L. Rev. 405, 409 (1953). See also McCracken, The Maintenance of Professional Standards: Duty and Obligation of The Courts, 29 S. Cal. L. Rev. 65 , 85-86 (1955).] Without a vigorous, honorable and qualified bar, the judiciary of this State, to put it quite simply, would be greatly handicapped if not completely incapable of performing those duties assigned to it.

Moreover, the legal profession, for time out of mind, has been infused with and, in a sense, been a trustee for, the public interest. Both the existence of this responsibility resting with the profession and the consequential necessity of judicial supervision of it were earlier verbalized by this Court’s opinion in Maryland St. Bar Ass’n v. Agnew : Few vocations offer as great a spectrum for good and honorable works as does the legal profession. The attorney is entrusted with the life savings and investments of his clients. He becomes the guardian of the mentally deficient, and potential savior for the accused.

He is a fiduciary, a confidant, an advisor, and an advocate.... [I]t can be said that the presence of [truth, candor and honesty] in members of the bar comprisfe] a large portion of the fulcrum upon which the scales of justice rest.... A ⁶⁹⁷ court has the duty, since attorneys are its officers, to insist upon the maintenance of the integrity of the bar and to prevent the transgressions of an individual lawyer from bringing its image into disrepute.... The administration of justice under our adversary system largely depends upon the public’s ability to rely on the honesty of attorneys who are placed in a position of being called upon to conduct the affairs of others both in and out of court. [ 271 Md. at 549 , 318 A.2d at 814 .] In recognition of this historical and deep-rooted interdependence between the judiciary and those who practice before it, the opinions of the courts of this country are replete with similar statements of the necessity for judicial governance of the legal fraternity. See, e.g., Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Lee, supra (power to define and regulate practice naturally and logically belongs to judicial department; admission and disbarment is ultimate exercise of that power); Sharood v. Hatfield, supra, 210 N.W.2d at 279 (to effectively perform functions and duties, essential that court have assistance and cooperation of an able, vigorous and honorable bar); Clark v. Austin, supra, 101 S.W.2d at 981 (practice of law so linked with judiciary that right to define and regulate practice logically and naturally belongs to judiciary); Swenson v. Thibaut, 39 N.C. App. 77 , 250 S.E.2d 279, 299 (1978), appeal dismissed, 254 S.E.2d 183 (1979) (power of court essential to protect from fraud, impropriety and to serve the ends of the administration of justice which are the raison d’etre for its existence); State v. Cannon, supra, 221 N.W. at 604 (inherent power exists because attorneys, as officers of the court, are responsible in no small degree for the quality of justice administered by the courts).

In light of the intimate relationship between the learning and character of attorneys, the perceptions of the public, and the performance by the courts of their constitutionally assigned functions, we are confident that, as a general matter, the proper repository for the authority, responsibility and obligation to regulate the profession, in ⁶⁹⁸ our scheme of constitutionally divided realms of power, is and must ultimately be the judiciary of this State. Having reached this conclusion, however, we observe that Maryland’s judiciary in the past generally has been able to harmonize its obligations with enactment by the General Assembly of a restricted class of statutes relating to the legal profession, passed by the Legislature pursuant to its interest in promoting the health, safety and welfare of the people of this State. This harmony heretofore has been possible because the legislation has been calculated to, and did, augment the ability of the courts to carry out their constitutional responsibilities; at the most, there was but a minimal intrusion. E.g., Md. Code (1957, 1981 Repl.

Vol.), Art. 10, § 10 (prescribing oath of office for admission to the bar); Code (1957, 1981 Repl. Vol.), Art. 10, § 43 (authorizing creation by Court of Appeals of a client security fund) and Md. Rule 1228 (creating such a trust fund); Code (1957, 1978 Repl. Vol., 1980 Cum. Supp.), Art. 40A, § 4-105 (a) (legislative request that Court of Appeals devise rules prescribing financial disclosure by members of judicial branch) and Md. Rule 1231 (Rules of Judicial Ethics, number 8) and Md. Rule 1232 (Rules of Conduct, number 12) (each requiring appropriate financial disclosure); see Code (1957, 1976 Repl.

Vol.), Art. 10, §§ 13-26 (repealed by Acts 1977, ch. 305) (misconduct of attorneys). See generally 52 Transactions Maryland State Bar Association 154, 154-59 (1947); Chroust, The Rise of the Legal Profession in America II, 258-61 (1965). Thus, in furtherance of the comity that has traditionally existed between these coequal branches of our State’s government, we have spoken in the past of a "comfortable accommodation” which has developed between them in regard to the specific regulation of certain aspects of the legal profession. Pub.

Serv. Comm’n v. Hahn Transp., Inc., supra, 253 Md. at 583 , 253 A.2d at 852 . Accord, e.g., Ex Parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9, 14 (1856); Denver Bar Association v. Public Utilities Commission, supra, 391 P.2d at 470 ("gratuitous” legislation); Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Lee, supra (recognition of legislation as a "matter of comity”); Clark v. ⁶⁹⁹ Austin, supra, 101 S.W.2d at 984 ; West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, supra, 109 S.E.2d at 438 (statutes "declaratory of power inherent” in court); State v. Cannon, supra, 221 N.W. at 605 (comity). There can be no doubt, however, that the deferential respect accorded the legislative branch by the judicial must neither undermine nor dilute the fundamental authority and responsibility vested in the judiciary to carry out its constitionally required function, an aspect of which, as we have seen, is the supervision of practicing attorneys.

Nonetheless, the flexibility that inheres in the separation of powers doctrine allows for some limited exertion of legislative authority. As a consequence of this elasticity, we have recognized, first, that the General Assembly may act pursuant to its police or other legitimate power to aid the courts in the performance of their judicial functions, Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Hahn Transp., Inc., supra, 253 Md. at 583 , 253 A.2d at 852 ; see, e.g., Md. Code (1957, 1976 Repl.

Vol., 1980 Cum. Supp.), Art. 10, §§ 1, 2, 3, 11, 26A, 32, 33, 43, 44; accord, Denver Bar Association v. Public Utilities Commission, supra, 391 P.2d at 470 ; People v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346 , 8 N.E.2d 941, 944 (1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 728 (1937); Collins v. Godfrey, supra, 87 N.E.2d at 840 ; Matter of Mississippi State Bar, supra, 361 So. 2d at 505 ; and, second, that the General Assembly may establish minimum criteria for the learning and character of persons admitted to the bar of this State. See Bastian v. Watkins, 230 Md. 325 , 187 A.2d 304 (1963); In re Maddox, 93 Md. 727 , 50 A. 487 (1901). Accord, e.g., Application of Houston, supra, 378 P.2d at 645 ; Application of Kaufman, supra, 206 P.2d at 539 ; Collins v. Godfrey, supra; State v. Barlow, supra, 268 N.W. at 97 .

However, since admission to the bar is a judicial function, the Legislature may not prescribe the maximum qualifications necessary for admittance, for this Court is always free to adopt any additional requirements it deems necessary to maintain a high level of professional competence in the bar and promote public trust in and respect for the profession. Accord, Application of Houston, supra, 378 P.2d at 645 ; Brydonjack v. State Bar, supra, 281 P.2d at 1020; Application of Kaufman, supra, 206 P.2d at 539 ; Collins v. Godfrey, ⁷⁰⁰ supra, 87 N.E.2d at 840 ; State v. Barlow, supra, 268 N.W. at 98 ; West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, supra, 109 S.E.2d at 438-39 . Even when legislating the minimum requisites to the practice of law, the power of the General Assembly is not unlimited; the Legislature may not constitutionally place restrictions on the practice so onerous or burdensome that they impinge on the ability of the judicial branch to carry out its duties. We give an example — a legislative restriction on admission to the legal profession that limits entry to such a degree that courts are deprived of sufficient officers to fulfill their constitutionally assigned functions could not withstand examination.

When establishing minimum criteria for bar admission, the General Assembly pursues its vision of what is useful for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of this State, acting by virtue of the broad police powers vested in that body. See Md. Coal, etc. Co. v. Bureau of Mines, 193 Md. 627 , 69 A.2d 471 (1949). The exercise of this "inherent attribute and prerogative of sovereignty .. . has been described as essentially 'no more than the power to govern.’ ” Stevens v. City of Salisbury, 240 Md. 556, 564 , 214 A.2d 775, 779 (1965) (quoting Allied American Co. v. Comm’r., 219 Md. 607 , 150 A.2d 421 (1959)). In a democracy, however, where government is limited, all power has corresponding restraints.

Since the police power "inheres in and springs from the nature of our institutions, ... the limitations upon it are those which spring from the same source as well as those expressly set out in the Constitution.” Smith v. Higinbothom, 187 Md. 115, 128 , 48 A.2d 754, 761 (1946). Separation of powers, which emanates from the governmental structure our forefathers erected, as is made manifest in our organic law, is by design such a limitation. In view of the three-fold separation of powers specifically ordained by our State’s constitution, we think it clear that section 56 (c) cannot pass muster. It is not in the same mold as any type of enactment previously recognized by this Court to be a legitimate exercise of legislative power — that is, it cannot realistically be considered a provision to aid the ⁷⁰¹ judiciary in carrying out its constitutional obligations, or one establishing minimum standards for admission to the practice of law in this State.

Nor does section 56 (c) spawn a third category which can be the subject of proper legislative action. Having satisfied all the criteria, both legislatively and judicially imposed, for admission to the practice of law, and upon being so admitted, an attorney may be deprived of his license only through judicial action for proper cause, and any attempt by the legislature to effect the same result by enactment must fail as an unconstitutional usurpation of a power vested exclusively in the judiciary. Accord, Archer v. Ogden, 600 P.2d 1223, 1226 (Okla. 1979); State v. Barlow, 131 Neb. 294 , 268 N.W. 95 (1936); Wajert v. State Ethics Commission, 420 A.2d 439, 442 (Pa. 1980); Matter of Washington State Bar Association, 86 Wash. 2d 624 , 548 P.2d 310, 315 (1976) (en banc). Because the problem presented to the United States Supreme Court over a hundred years ago is so analogous to the one here presented, and since the views expressed in resolving the issue there so nearly coincide with those we entertain, a lengthy quote from the opinion of Justice Field for the Supreme Court is warranted: The statute is directed against parties who have offended in any of the particulars embraced by these clauses.

And its object is to exclude [among others, practicing attorneys loyal to the Confederacy during the Civil War] from the profession of the law, or at least from its practice in the courts of the United States. As the oath prescribed cannot be taken by these parties, the Act, as against them, operates as a legislative decree of perpetual exclusion. The profession of an attorney and counselor is not like an office created by an Act of Congress, which depends for its continuance, its powers and its emoluments, upon the will of its creator, and the possession of which may be burdened with any ⁷⁰² conditions not prohibited by the Constitution. Attorneys and counselors are not officers of the United States; they are not elected or appointed in the manner prescribed by the Constitution for the election and appointment of such officers.

They are officers of the court; admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private character.... The order of admission is the judgment of the court that the parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and counselors, and are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry the parties become officers of the court, and are responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold their office during good behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by the judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded.

Their admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in numerous cases.. . . "Attorneys and counselors . .. are not only officers of the court, but officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature. And hence their appointment may, with propriety, be intrusted to the courts, and the latter in performing this duty may very justly be considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial functions.” The attorney and counselor being, by the solemn judicial act of the court, clothed with his office, does not hold it as a matter of grace and favor.

The right which it confers upon him to appear for suitors, and to argue causes, is something more than a mere indulgence, revocable at the pleasure of the court, or at the command of the Legislature. It is a right of which he can only be deprived by the judgment of ⁷⁰³ the court, for moral or professional delinquency. [Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 377-79 , 18 L. Ed. 366 (1867) (citations omitted).] These principles expressed by Justice Field are equally applicable to the problem presented by this case. The concern of the Legislature manifested by the enactment and suggested by the State — the avoidance of the appearance of, or actual, undue influence exerted by former judges when practicing before ex-colleagues on the bench — is one that has been extensively addressed by this Court pursuant to its rulemaking power. See Md. Rule 1220 a and b; Md. Rule 1231 (Canons of Judicial Ethics, Canons IV, XIII, XVI, XXV, XXVIII, XXX, XXXI, XXXII, XXXIII), (Rules of Judicial Ethics, Rules 2, 3, 5, 7, 9 and 12); Md. Rule 1230 (Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 8 and 9, and the disciplinary rules thereunder).

See also Maryland Constitution, Art. IV, § 7. Accord, Wajert v. State Ethics Commission, supra, 420 A.2d at 442 . The defect which surfaces from the regulation contained in section 56 (c) is that it, in effect, revokes the license of certain members of the bar based upon criteria entirely unrelated to their educational or moral fitness to engage in the practice of law; it is, thus, unrelated to the Legislature’s legitimate interest in prescribing proper prerequisites for entry into the profession. As section 56 (c) does not fall within an area of legitimate legislative concern regarding the legal profession and its practitioners, the General Assembly has acted outside the domain, albeit wide, of its constitutional bailiwick.

Ill Equal Protection We turn now to consider appellee’s second contention, namely, that section 56 (c) operates to deny Judge Waldron and those similarly situated equal protection of the law. In connection with this argument, we observe that the most delicate and difficult decisions to be made in cases, such as the one before us challenging the constitutionality of legisla ⁷⁰⁴ tive actions, arise where we must determine when to defer to legislative discretion to attack a perceived problem by whatever means chosen, and when the Legislature, in the exercise of that discretion, has crossed the line of constitutional impermissibility. However, when an enactment invades protected rights to life, liberty, property or other interests secured by the fundamental doctrines of our jurisprudence, there is reason to be especially vigilant in the exercise of our constitutional duty. In this regard, we are concerned with provisions contained in both the federal and our State constitutions.

It is the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution which is here involved, where it provides in pertinent part: "No State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Although the Maryland Constitution contains no express equal protection clause, we deem it settled that this concept of equal treatment is embodied in the due process requirement of Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights. 7 Board of Supervisors of Elections v. Goodsell, 284 Md. 279 , 293 n.7, 396 A.2d 1033, 1040 (1979); Governor v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410 , 438 n.8, 370 A.2d 1102, 1118 (1977) aff'd, 437 U.S. 117 (1978); Bruce v. Dir., Chesapeake Bay Aff., 261 Md. 585, 600 , 276 A.2d 200, 208 (1971); see Detroit Automotive Purchasing Services v. Lee, 463 F. Supp. 954, 970 (1978). 8 It is, perhaps, because this State has no express equal protection clause that Article 24 has been interpreted to apply "in like manner and to the same extent as the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution,” United States Mortgage Co. v. Matthews, 167 Md. 383, 395 , ⁷⁰⁵ 173 A. 903, 909 (1934), rev’d on other grounds, 293 U.S. 232 (1934); see Detroit Automotive Purchasing Services v. Lee, supra, so that "decisions of the Supreme Court on the Fourteenth Amendment are practically direct authorities.” Bureau of Mines of George’s Creek, 272 Md. 143, 156 , 321 A.2d 748, 755 (1974). While it is true, as our later discussion will show, that the equal protection guaranties of Article 24 and the fourteenth amendment are independent, capable of divergent effect, it is apparent that the two are so intertwined that they, in essence, form a double helix, each complementing the other.

Because the decisions of the United States Supreme Court are not only controlling as to our interpretation and application of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment but also persuasive as we undertake to interpret Article 24, we first examine the currents of the federal analysis prior to determining the impact of these constitutional guaranties in this case. 9 Upon inspecting the multitude of cases applying the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, it becomes apparent that, with this evolving doctrine, "[c]onfusion now hath made his masterpiece.” 10 Plowing through this morass, it seems that the foundation of equal protection analysis, at least until the last ten years, rested on the bedrock of a two-tier scrutiny largely refined by the Supreme Court over the previous three decades. See Toyosahuro Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 , 65 S. Ct. 193 , 89 L. Ed. 194 (1944). The top tier of this review contemplates that when a statute creates a distinction based upon clearly "suspect” criteria, or when that enactment infringes upon personal rights or interests deemed to be "fundamental,” then the legislative product must withstand a rigorous, ⁷⁰⁶ "strict scrutiny.” Laws which are subject to this demanding review violate the equal protection clause "unless the State can demonstrate that such laws are 'necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.’ ” Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 , 92 S. Ct. 995 , 31 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1972) (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 , 89 S. Ct. 1322 , 22 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1969) (emphasis in original). A suspect class is a category of people who have "experienced a 'history of purposeful unequal treatment’ or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities.” Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 , 96 S. Ct. 2562 , 49 L. Ed. 2d 520 (1976).

Placed in the suspect category by the Supreme Court thus far are those classifications based on race, McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 , 85 S. Ct. 283 , 13 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1964), national origin, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 , 91 S. Ct. 1848 , 29 L. Ed. 2d 534 (1971), and ancestry, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 , 68 S. Ct. 269 , 92 L. Ed. 249 (1948). Fundamental rights or interests are those "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed” by the federal constitution, San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 , 93 S. Ct. 1278 , 36 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1973); see Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 , 92 S. Ct. 2286 , 33 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1972) (first amendment rights), and they, as presently delineated by the Supreme Court, include the right to vote, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 , 86 S. Ct. 1079 , 16 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1966), the right of interstate travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S: 618, 89 S. Ct. 1322 , 22 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1969), the right of equal access to a criminal appeal, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 , 76 S. Ct. 585 , 100 L. Ed. 891 (1956), and the right to procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 , 62 S. Ct. 1110 , 86 L. Ed. 1655 (1942). See also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 , 98 S. Ct. 673 , 54 L. Ed. 2d 618 (1978) (plurality) (right to marry "fundamental”; statute restricting right received "critical examination”). If, on the other hand, neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right or interest is implicated, then the traditional ⁷⁰⁷ equal protection analysis calls forth a much less demanding standard of review under the second tier — the "rational basis” test.

Using this approach, a statutory classification is struck down, in the oft-expressed words of the Supreme Court, only if the means chosen by the legislative body are "wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective.” McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 , 81 S. Ct. 1101 , 6 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1961); McDonald v. Board of Election, 394 U.S. 802, 809 , 89 S. Ct. 1404 , 22 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1969). The Supreme Court, in applying this test, has been willing to uphold the constitutionality of an enactment when "any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.” McGowan v. Maryland, supra at 426. See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 , 99 S. Ct. 383 , 58 L. Ed. 2d 292 (1978); Kotch v. Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U.S. 552 , 67 S. Ct. 910 , 91 L. Ed. 1093 (1947). This deferential review of state legislative classifications operates, at least in the sphere of economic regulation, "quite apart from whether the conceivable 'state of facts’ (1) actually exists, (2) would convincingly justify the classification if it did exist, or (3) has ever been urged in the classification’s defense by those who either promulgated it or have argued in its support.” L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 16-3, p. 996 (1978) (hereinafter cited as Tribe).

See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Company, — U.S. —, 101 S. Ct. 715 , 66 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1981); U.S. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, — U.S. —, 101 S. Ct. 453 , 66 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1980); McDonald v. Board of Election, supra; Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528-29 , 79 S. Ct. 437 , 3 L. Ed. 2d 480 (1959); Kotch v. Pilot Comm’rs, supra; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 , 31 S. Ct. 337 , 55 L. Ed. 369 (1911). In the last decade, however, dissatisfaction on the part of the Supreme Court with the rigid two-tier analysis has become evident. It appears to us that this is a natural result of the limitations inherent in the analysis — to determine the level of scrutiny is, in large measure, to decide the case. A statute subject to strict scrutiny is nearly always struck ⁷⁰⁸ down under an analysis which is " 'strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.” Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term: Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine On a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv.

L. Rev. 1 , 8 (1972) (hereinafter cited as Gunther); see Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 317-27 , 96 S. Ct. 2562 , 49 L. Ed. 2d 520 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). And a statute subjected to the rational basis test as articulated receives "minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact.” Gunther, at 8; see U.S. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, supra at , [49 U.S.L.W. at 4040] (Brennan, J., dissenting); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 , 96 S. Ct. 2513 , 49 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1976) (overruling Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 , 77 S. Ct. 1344 , 1 L. Ed. 2d 1485 (1957), the only modern case in which the Supreme Court struck down a purely economic regulation on equal protection grounds). The Supreme Court has responded to the limitations of the traditional bifurcated approach in a varied and, at times, seemingly conflicting manner. 11 In the face of a strict scrutiny test that foreordains the invalidation of nearly every classification involving such analysis, it is not surprising that the Court has thus far declined to expand the group of fundamental interests and suspect classes that will trigger analysis under this standard. See, e.g., San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 , 93 S. Ct. 1278 , 36 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1973) (education not a fundamental interest, nor are distinctions based on wealth suspect classifications); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, supra (age not suspect; no fundamental right to continued governmental employment); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 , 93 S. Ct. 1764 , 36 L. Ed. 2d 583 (1973) (sex not suspect); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 , 92 S. Ct. 862 , 31 L. Ed. 2d 36 (1972) (no fundamental interest in right to occupy home). ⁷⁰⁹ Nevertheless, while eschewing strict scrutiny and espousing rational basis, the Supreme Court, faced in recent years with cases implicating important private interests or burdened classes, has struck down many enactments that it is doubtful would have survived the most deferential form of rational basis scrutiny exemplified by McGowan v. Maryland, supra, and McDonald v. Board of Election, supra. 12 For example, in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 , 92 S. Ct. 251 , 30 L. Ed. 2d 225 (1971), a unanimous Court overturned an Idaho statute which gave preference to men over women when both, equally qualified, applied for appointment to administer a decedent’s estate.

While purporting to rely on rational basis review, the Reed court resurrected language from Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 , 40 S. Ct. 560 , 64 L. Ed. 989 (1920), indicating that a legislative classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.” The fair and substantial relation test articulated in Royster Guano had fallen into disuse, for as far as we can discern, that case was never quoted or relied upon by the High Court during at least the two decades preceding the Reed decision. 13 In this regard, we think it significant that the Reed court did not speculate as to hypothetical justifications for the contested legislation whose objectives, admittedly, had "some legitimacy.” 404 U.S. at 76 . The analysis utilized by the Court in Reed , although not raising gender-based classifications to a level requiring strict scrutiny, exhibits to us a special sensitivity to, and a heightened review of, sex when used as a ⁷¹⁰ classifying factor. 14 Nor has the Supreme Court limited the application of this apparent heightened scrutiny to gender-based classifications, for the Court has engaged in an active review of legislation not implicating rights previously determined to be "fundamental” or involving classifications held to be "suspect.” See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 , 92 S. Ct. 1029 , 31 L. Ed. 2d 349 (1972) (Court refused to accept profferred statutory ends, but instead focused on means-oriented search for actual purpose; statutory distinction between married and unmarried persons bore no "fair and substantial” relation to sole perceived purpose of prohibiting use of contraceptives); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 374-75 , 94 S. Ct. 1160 , 39 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1974) (the Court, praising Congress