Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Farmer

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. George L. Farmer, AG No. 41, September Term, 2021. Opinion by Gould, J. ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – SANCTIONS – INDEFINITE SUSPENSION The Court indefinitely suspended an attorney who engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, represented clients with a conflict of interest, collected and billed for fees that were unreasonable, and filed a frivolous lawsuit. The attorney’s conduct violated Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct: 1.4 (Communication), 1.5 (Fees), 1.7 (Conflict of Interest—General Rule), 1.16(a)(1) (Declining or Terminating Representation), 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions), 5.5(a) (Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multi- Jurisdictional Practice of Law), and 8.4(a) (Misconduct). Circuit Court for Montgomery County Case No.: C-15-CV-21-000332 Argued: November 4, 2022 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND* AG No. 41 September Term, 2021 ______________________________________ ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. GEORGE L. FARMER ______________________________________ Fader, C.J., Watts, Hotten, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, JJ. ______________________________________ Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Opinion by Gould, J. Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. ______________________________________ 2023-07-14 08:45-04:00 Filed: July 10, 2023 Gregory Hilton, Clerk * At the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Appeals of Maryland to the Supreme Court of Maryland.

The name change took effect on December 14, 2022. On December 1, 2021, pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-721, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (the “Commission”), acting through Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (the “Petition”) against George L. Farmer. The Petition alleged that Mr. Farmer violated the following provisions of the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”): 1 1.4 (Communication) (Rule 19- 301.4), 1.5 (Fees) (Rule 19-301.5), 1.7 (Conflict of Interest—General Rule) (Rule 19- 301.7), 1.16(a)(1) (Declining or Terminating Representation) (Rule 19-301.16), 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions) (Rule 19-303.1), 5.5(a) (Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multi-Jurisdictional Practice of Law) (Rule 19-305.5), and 8.4(a) (Misconduct) (Rule 19-308.4). In accordance with Maryland Rules 19-722(a) and 19-727, we assigned the Petition to the Honorable Karla N. Smith of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (the “hearing judge”) to hold an evidentiary hearing and issue findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The hearing was held virtually on May 16, 17, and 23, and June 1, 2022, via the application Zoom for Government, by consent of the parties. Prior to the hearing, the hearing judge resolved several motions, including: 1. Mr. Farmer’s Motion to Dismiss the Petition Due to Lack of Jurisdiction and Venue – Denied; and 1 Effective July 1, 2016, the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct, which employed the numbering format of the American Bar Association Model Rules, were renamed the MARPC and recodified without substantive modification in Title 19, Chapter 300 of the Maryland Rules. For ease of reference and comparison with our prior opinions and those of other courts, we will refer to the MARPC rules using the numbering of the model rules, as permitted by Rule 19-300.1(22) and as identified in the paragraph to which this footnote is appended. 2.

The Commission’s Motion to Quash Subpoenas to Bar Counsel – Granted. At the evidentiary hearing, the Commission presented its case with four witnesses and 46 exhibits. Mr. Farmer testified on his own behalf and presented 14 exhibits. On July 18, 2022, the hearing judge issued a written statement containing findings of fact and conclusions of law (the “findings”), concluding by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Farmer violated MARPC 1.4 (Communication), 1.5 (Fees), 1.7 (Conflict of Interest—General Rule), 1.16(a)(1) (Declining or Terminating Representation), 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions), 5.5(a) (Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multi- Jurisdictional Practice of Law), and 8.4(a) (Misconduct).

The hearing judge also found one mitigating factor and five aggravating factors. Mr. Farmer filed exceptions to multiple findings pursuant to Maryland Rule 19- 728(b). The Commission excepted to one finding.2 Oral argument was held before this Court on November 4, 2022. As explained below, we overrule Mr. Farmer’s exceptions and the Commission’s exception, adopt the hearing judge’s findings, and determine that indefinite suspension is the appropriate sanction under the facts and circumstances of this case. 2 Although the Commission filed no formal or separate exceptions, in a footnote to its Recommendation for Sanction, it stated that, to the extent that the hearing judge’s failure to reference a violation of Rule 8.4(b) and (c) indicated its conclusion that Mr. Farmer did not violate those rules, it excepts. 2 I FACTS A. Background Facts In 1996, Mr. Farmer was admitted to the bars of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the State of New Jersey.

He was admitted to the bar of the State of Colorado in 1999. He has never been a member of the Maryland bar. In 2018, Thuan Nguyen, a family friend of Mr. Farmer, began working for Maryland resident, Louise Williams Marsh, as her full-time caretaker. At that time, Ms. Marsh was a 92-year-old widow who suffered from dementia.

Ms. Marsh was represented by J. Laurence Kent, a Maryland attorney who had provided estate and trust planning services to Ms. Marsh, her late husband, Richard Wade Marsh, Sr. (“Mr. Marsh”), and their son Richard Marsh, Jr. (“Rick”) for approximately three decades. In 2018, Ms. Marsh and Rick lived together in Ms. Marsh’s house in Silver Spring, Maryland. In 1988, Mr. Kent set up a trust for the Marshes (the “Trust”), which initially named Mr. Marsh and Ms. Marsh as the grantors, trustees, and beneficiaries, with Rick as the successor beneficiary. The assets of the Trust included the Marshes’ Silver Spring house and various bank and brokerage accounts.

The Trust’s bank accounts were maintained at Sandy Spring Bank. Mr. Marsh passed away on January 22, 2009. After her husband passed away, Ms. Marsh succeeded her husband as the sole trustee. She amended the Trust in 2010 to name herself as the sole beneficiary during her lifetime, with Rick as the successor beneficiary upon her death.

The Trust also provided 3 that if Rick predeceased Ms. Marsh, the Trust assets would pass to various charities. Under the amended Trust, Ms. Marsh continued as trustee, and Mr. Kent was named successor trustee. In 2015, Ms. Marsh executed an amendment to the Trust prepared by Mr. Kent to provide that upon Ms. Marsh’s death, if Rick was surviving, her house would pass to him free of the Trust, and the remaining assets would be held in trust for his benefit. In late 2018 or early 2019, Ms. Nguyen and Rick were married.

Ms. Nguyen moved into the residence and continued working as Ms. Marsh’s paid caretaker.3 In 2019, Rick retained Mr. Kent for estate planning services, including preparation of his own will and power of attorney, both of which he duly executed. In early March 2020, Rick fell ill and was hospitalized. Because Ms. Marsh was no longer able to serve as trustee, Mr. Kent assumed the trustee’s duties, as provided under the 2010 amendment to the Trust. With Mr. Kent now serving as trustee, the Trust needed a new successor trustee in case something happened to Mr. Kent that rendered him unable to serve.

And because Rick was unable to serve due to his declining health, 4 Mr. Kent prepared an amendment to the Trust on March 3, which Ms. Marsh signed, appointing his law partner, Helen Dankos, as successor trustee. 3 The Trust paid Ms. Nguyen $2,000 per week for her caretaking services. 4 Rick died on April 21, 2020. 4 B. Mr. Farmer Enters the Scene Ms. Nguyen was never a beneficiary of the Trust, but she was a beneficiary under Rick’s will. After Ms. Marsh executed the amendment to the Trust, Ms. Nguyen reached out to her brother who notified Mr. Farmer that she needed assistance. On March 3, Ms. Nguyen spoke to Mr. Farmer, and the next day, he drove from New Jersey to Maryland to meet with Ms. Nguyen, Ms. Marsh, and Rick Marsh. Initially, Mr. Farmer met with Ms. Nguyen and Ms. Marsh at Ms. Marsh’s residence.

They then went to the hospital to speak with Rick. While at the hospital, Mr. Farmer asked Rick how much money was in the Trust; Rick said it held about five million dollars. Mr. Farmer then returned to New Jersey. He had several conversations with Ms. Nguyen, and she ultimately retained him to represent her.

On March 5, Mr. Farmer sent a letter to Mr. Kent titled “Louise Williams Marsh’s Instructions to J. Laurence Kent, Esq.,” which was drafted by Mr. Farmer and signed by Ms. Marsh in the presence of a notary public. In these instructions, Ms. Marsh told Mr. Kent to (1) rescind the power of attorney naming Mr. Kent as her agent;5 (2) draft a new power of attorney in favor of Mr. Kent and Ms. Nguyen jointly, so that neither could act individually on her behalf; and (3) send Mr. Farmer copies of the Trust documents and Ms. Marsh’s will. On March 6, Mr. Kent visited Ms. Marsh’s residence. While there, he spoke with Mr. Farmer by telephone.

Mr. Kent informed Mr. Farmer that he would not provide the 5 The instructions reflect a mistaken assumption that Ms. Marsh had previously signed a power of attorney appointing Mr. Kent as her agent. 5 requested information and documentation. Mr. Kent contended that Mr. Farmer did not have the authority to instruct him because he was not a Maryland attorney, and Ms. Marsh “didn’t have the capacity to appoint him.” Because Mr. Farmer believed that he needed to become Ms. Marsh’s attorney to compel Mr. Kent to send him the Trust and will documents, on March 6, he prepared a “Legal Representation Retainer Agreement” addressed to Ms. Marsh. The agreement was executed by Ms. Marsh, and she paid Mr. Farmer a retainer of $8,500. The agreement was printed on letterhead from Mr. Farmer’s Northfield, New Jersey office and stated, in relevant part: Please accept this letter as my request for me to represent your interests in reviewing Mr. Kent’s prior services and documents, as well as the financial accounts including, but not limited to the documents he had you sign recently, the trust agreement(s), your will, the financial accounts, the expenditures from the accounts, etc. with the purpose of determining if there are any improprieties.

By signing this retainer letter of engagement, you are authorizing me to perform these services, obtain the aforementioned documents, and take whatever steps I deem necessary (if any) to protect your interests depending upon the information I discover. In light of the fact that I represent your daughter-in-law as well, you will need to waive any conflicts that might exist as well as any appearance of conflicts. By entering into this retainer agreement, you hereby do waive said conflicts and appearance of conflicts. On or about March 10, Ms. Nguyen executed a separate conflict of interest waiver, which stated merely that she waived any conflict of interest created by Mr. Farmer’s representation of both her and Ms. Marsh. 6 On March 13, Mr. Farmer again demanded that Mr. Kent comply with the instructions in the March 5 letter and threatened an ethics complaint against Mr. Kent if he refused.

On April 7, Ms. Marsh signed a document entitled “Third Amendment to Louise W. Marsh, Second Amended and Restated Trust Agreement” (the “Third Amendment”).6 Under the Third Amendment, Ms. Marsh remained trustee, and Mr. Kent was removed as co-trustee. In Mr. Kent’s place, the Third Amendment appointed one John L. Hoffmann, a CPA who happened to share Mr. Farmer’s New Jersey office and with whom Mr. Farmer had a professional relationship for about twenty years. Mr. Farmer sent a copy of this amendment to Mr. Kent and broke the news that Mr. Kent was no longer co-trustee. On April 7, Mr. Farmer sent a letter to Sandy Spring Bank declaring that any actions by Mr. Kent were “hereby ineffective” and that the Trust’s money was to be transferred to a Wells Fargo account being established by Mr. Hoffmann.

Sandy Spring Bank declined to follow these requests, prompting Mr. Farmer to file a complaint against the bank.7 6 When questioned by Bar Counsel as to who drafted this Third Amendment, Mr. Farmer asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and did not answer the question. In addition to the adverse inference she drew from his assertion of this right, the hearing judge found that there was sufficient evidence to find that Mr. Farmer drafted the document, noting that: Mr. Farmer began purportedly representing Ms. Marsh on March 6; he came into possession of the amendment the same day that Ms. Marsh signed it; Mr. Hoffman, a person unknown to Ms. Marsh but a longtime associate of Mr. Farmer, was appointed as the new co-trustee; and Mr. Kent was not aware of this amendment until Mr. Farmer sent it to him. According to Mr. Farmer’s testimony, he filed the complaint with the “Department 7 of Banking with the state.” 7 On April 9, Mr. Farmer sent a letter to Mr. Kent demanding that he cease and desist acting as co-trustee and requesting the Trust’s Federal Employer Identification Number. After Mr. Kent did not respond, Mr. Farmer sent several emails to Mr. Kent requesting the Trust documents.

Meanwhile, Sandy Spring Bank froze the Trust’s accounts. C. Mr. Kent Files a Petition for Appointment of Guardian of the Person and Property of Ms. Marsh Concerned that others were trying to gain improper access to Ms. Marsh’s finances, on April 17, Mr. Kent filed in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County an Emergency Petition for the Appointment of Temporary and Permanent Guardians of the Person and Property of Ms. Marsh. Mr. Kent supported his petition with a certification from Ms. Marsh’s primary care physician stating that: (1) Ms. Marsh had been examined in her care for over ten years; (2) in December 2019, she determined that Ms. Marsh was suffering from severe dementia; (3) Ms. Marsh’s overall mental health would decline; (4) she believed Ms. Marsh needed a guardian of her property; and (5) the dementia “prevent[ed] [Ms. Marsh] from making or communicating responsible decisions concerning her personal affairs and her property.” On April 20, the circuit court granted the emergency petition and issued four orders: (1) compelling an independent examination to determine Ms. Marsh’s capacity; (2) appointing Mr. Kent as temporary guardian of Ms. Marsh’s person; (3) appointing a 8 local attorney, Robert McCarthy, as temporary guardian of Ms. Marsh’s property; and (4) appointing another local attorney, Catherine McQueen, as counsel for Ms. Marsh.8 Mr. McCarthy then spoke with Mr. Farmer and suggested that Mr. Farmer had a conflict of interest in representing both Ms. Marsh and Ms. Nguyen. Mr. Farmer disagreed.

Mr. McCarthy also noted that Mr. Farmer was not authorized to practice law in Maryland. Mr. Farmer dismissed the concern as not a problem. D. Mr. Farmer’s Attempt to Obtain Local Counsel Meanwhile, Mr. Farmer was searching for a Maryland lawyer to serve as local counsel. He consulted with Zhia Shepardson and Mary Lombardo, two attorneys at the Rismiller Law Group, LLC (“Rismiller”).

Initially, Rismiller agreed to sponsor Mr. Farmer’s pro hac vice petition to represent Ms. Marsh and Rick in potential trust litigation. Rismiller sent a retainer agreement to Ms. Marsh and Rick, but it was never executed. Mr. Farmer also sought Rismiller’s assistance in connection with Ms. Marsh’s Trust and the alleged impropriety by Mr. Kent. Rismiller initially agreed, and on April 29, sent an Attorney Fee Agreement (the “Fee Agreement”) addressed to Ms. Nguyen.9 Mr. Farmer proposed several revisions and returned the Fee Agreement to Rismiller.10 8 Mr. Kent’s petition suggested the appointments of himself and Mr. McCarthy as guardians and Ms. McQueen as counsel. 9 The Fee Agreement indicated that the scope of the work was “Reviewing and advising pertaining to the guardianship litigation regarding Louise Marsh in Montgomery County[.]” Mr. Farmer was not mentioned in the Fee Agreement.

Mr. Farmer additionally changed the address on the Fee Agreement to “Louise 10 Williams Marsh c/o George L. Farmer,” added that Rismiller would appear as local counsel 9 Ms. Shepardson and Mr. Farmer then communicated by email. Ms. Shepardson stated that “[i]f we need to loop Louise into being a client as well, then we can cross that bridge. We are simply trying to do what we need to do in order to begin review [of the documents].” Mr. Farmer said that he had no problem with Rismiller reviewing the documents but that he wanted clarification that they would appear in court, be local counsel, and sponsor his pro hac vice application. Ms. Shepardson responded: “Yes, we can still do that – we just need to review the documents to help determine exactly what it is we will be doing.” After they reviewed the documents, Rismiller informed Mr. Farmer that the firm would not undertake the representations because Ms. Marsh had a court-appointed attorney and because Ms. Nguyen lacked standing in the guardianship proceeding.

E. Enforcement of the April 20 Orders Although one of the court’s April 20 orders required Ms. Marsh to be examined by Dr. Carole Guinta for the purpose of determining her capacity, Ms. Nguyen on several occasions prevented Dr. Guinta from conducting the examination. This prompted Mr. Kent to file an emergency motion for an order requiring Ms. Nguyen to comply with the court order. Mr. Kent then consulted with Mr. McCarthy and rescheduled the examination. On May 8, with police escorts to ensure Ms. Nguyen’s compliance, Mr. Kent and Mr. McCarthy went to Ms. Marsh’s home to take her to the appointment.

While at the home, for Ms. Marsh and sponsor Mr. Farmer’s pro hac vice motion, and changed the agreement to indicate that Rismiller would represent Ms. Marsh and Ms. Nguyen, and not Rick. 10 Mr. McCarthy observed that Ms. Marsh looked “very childlike” and that Ms. Nguyen appeared to have moved her family into Ms. Marsh’s residence. He also found a prescription bottle of Ms. Marsh’s that contained several different medications as well as peanuts. Mr. Kent and Mr. McCarthy then took Ms. Marsh to her appointment with Dr. Guinta. Dr. Guinta found Ms. Marsh to be severely impaired and in need of a guardian of her person and property.

On May 1, Ms. McQueen filed an emergency motion for a hearing on the court’s appointment of a temporary guardian of Ms. Marsh’s person and property because the appointments had been made without the hearing required under Maryland Rules 10- 205(b), 10-212, and 10-304. F. Mr. Farmer’s Motions In response, on May 8, Mr. Farmer filed two motions: one on behalf of Ms. Marsh to dismiss Ms. McQueen’s emergency petition, vacate the April 20 orders, and award attorneys’ fees due to the bad faith filing of the petition (the “Motion to Dismiss”); and the second, a motion for admission pro hac vice as Ms. Marsh’s counsel. Mr. Farmer filed the pro hac vice motion on his own, without the sponsorship of a Maryland-licensed attorney. In the Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Farmer also claimed that Ms. McQueen’s appointment was unnecessary because he was already representing Ms. Marsh.

Mr. Farmer further alleged that Mr. Kent was engaged in significant misconduct that was harming Ms. Marsh. Mr. Farmer then sent Mr. McCarthy a letter accusing both him and Mr. Kent of misconduct, including kidnapping Ms. Marsh by taking her to her court-ordered medical appointment. Mr. Farmer also filed a letter with the court on Ms. Marsh’s behalf, 11 requesting that the court hear the motions on an expedited basis, citing Ms. Marsh’s poor health, Mr. Kent’s alleged misconduct, and alleged collusion between Mr. Kent and Dr. Guinta. On May 18, Ms. Nguyen filed a motion that purported to be pro se, requesting that the court dismiss the petition, vacate the court’s April 20 orders, and appoint her as the sole decision-maker pertaining to Ms. Marsh’s health care.

When questioned as to who drafted this motion, Mr. Farmer again asserted his Fifth Amendment rights against self- incrimination. The hearing judge found that Mr. Farmer either drafted or assisted in drafting the motion, noting among other things, the similarity in style and format to the Motion to Dismiss. On May 20, Ms. McQueen filed a motion requesting that the court strike the Motion to Dismiss. A hearing on the pending motions was held on May 20.

The court denied Mr. Farmer’s pro hac vice motion with prejudice and denied the Motion to Dismiss. The court found that Ms. Marsh was represented by Ms. McQueen, and, as a result, ruled that Mr. Farmer was prohibited from communicating with her. G. Mr. Farmer’s Request for Fees After the hearing, Mr. Farmer presented Mr. McCarthy with an invoice in the amount of $158,589.18 for expenses and for “legal services” purportedly rendered on behalf of Ms. Marsh between March 2020 and May 2020. Mr. McCarthy refused to pay Mr. Farmer. 12 H. The Federal Complaint On June 12, Mr. Farmer filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland against Mr. Kent, Mr. Kent’s law partner, and their law firm, alleging tortious interference with contract, tortious interference with economic relationship, legal malpractice, and “willful and malicious acts,” all based on his relationship and agreement with Ms. Marsh.

Mr. Kent and the other defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. On February 23, 2021, the court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The court held that because Mr. Farmer was not licensed to practice law in Maryland, his retainer agreement with Ms. Marsh was invalid and against public policy. Additionally, the court found that Mr. Farmer’s claim that Mr. Kent was engaged in willful and malicious acts was “not grounded in any cognizable common law tort under Maryland law.” II STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court has original jurisdiction over attorney discipline proceedings and conducts an independent review of the hearing judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hamilton, 444 Md. 163, 178 (2015). We review the hearing judge’s conclusions of law without deference. Md. Rule 19-740(b)(1). Either party may file exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact or conclusions of law.

Md. Rule 19-728(b). We may treat any facts not challenged by exceptions as established. Md. Rule 19-740(b)(2)(A). “If exceptions are filed,” we determine “whether the findings of fact have been proved by the requisite standard of proof set out in Rule 19-727(c).” Md. Rule 19-740(b)(2)(B). 13 Under Rule 19-727(c), the Commission must prove its allegations of misconduct by clear and convincing evidence. As we stated in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Johnson, 472 Md. 491, 526 (2021) (citations omitted): If a party excepts to the hearing judge’s findings, this Court “shall determine whether the findings of fact have been proved by the requisite standard of proof set out in Rule 19-727(c).” . . . “We may confine our review to the findings of fact challenged by the exceptions, mindful though, that the hearing judge is afforded due regard to assess the credibility of witnesses.” . . .

This Court will not disturb the hearing judge’s findings “where ‘there is any competent evidence to support the’ finding of fact.” . . . Therefore, “[i]f the hearing judge’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous and the conclusions drawn from them are supported by the facts found, exceptions to conclusions of law will be overruled.” . . . In contrast, the respondent must prove any affirmative defenses and any mitigating or extenuating factors by a preponderance of the evidence. Md. Rule 19-727(c).

III DISCUSSION In one form or another, through general or specific allegations, Mr. Farmer excepted to virtually every adverse factual finding made by the hearing judge. Fortunately, the hearing judge meticulously supported each factual finding with citations to the relevant portions of the transcript and exhibits. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that none of the hearing judge’s factual findings are clearly erroneous. To the extent that Mr. Farmer excepts to any of the factual findings not specifically discussed 14 below, such exceptions are overruled.11 The Commission did not file any exceptions to the hearing judge’s factual findings.

A. General Exceptions Mr. Farmer excepts to the introduction section of the hearing judge’s findings, contending that she failed to consider his side of the story and that she admitted and credited hearsay. Mr. Farmer claims the hearing judge was biased against him, disregarded his arguments, defenses, and testimony, and rubber-stamped the Commission’s submissions. He also contends that the hearing judge’s decision lacked “normalcy, reasonableness, and compassion.” These exceptions lack merit and are summarily overruled. Mr. Farmer also criticizes Bar Counsel.

He contends that Bar Counsel had unclean hands by pressing charges against him while ignoring the alleged misdeeds of Mr. Kent. Mr. Farmer also contends that Bar Counsel pursued this matter as retaliation for the ethics complaint he filed against Mr. Kent. Further, Mr. Farmer contends that he was denied due process because he was not allowed to elicit testimony from Bar Counsel about its relationship to Mr. Kent and its motivation in investigating him. We summarily overrule these baseless objections as well. 11 Mr. Farmer’s exceptions, especially as to the factual findings, are disjointed, rambling, and repetitive.

We have consolidated the exceptions, as appropriate. 15 B. Exceptions to the Hearing Judge’s Factual Findings 1. Thoroughness of the Findings. Mr. Farmer complains that the hearing judge’s factual findings are incomplete and omit key information.12 A judge is not required to specifically mention each piece of evidence in its findings, and the failure to do so does not indicate a failure to consider the evidence. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Chanthunya, 446 Md. 576, 599 (2016) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderline, 364 Md. 376, 385 (2001)).

Further, a judge is free to disregard any testimony she deems not credible. Id. We therefore overrule this exception. 2. Exceptions to the Finding that Mr. Farmer Represented Ms. Nguyen Mr. Farmer excepts to the finding that he represented Ms. Nguyen.

According to Mr. Farmer, “[t]he hearing judge fails to mention the most important aspect of [his] representation of [Ms. Nguyen]: the scope of my representation.” Mr. Farmer contends that he was supposed to assist Ms. Nguyen “in her efforts to find out what Mr. Kent was up to, and to see if he had done anything improper with respect to her mother in law, Mrs. Marsh.” The record is replete with evidence that Mr. Farmer represented Ms. Nguyen. His retainer agreement with Ms. Marsh says that he represented Ms. Nguyen. The conflict of interest waiver he had Ms. Nguyen sign says that he had been representing Ms. Nguyen 12 For example, Mr. Farmer contends that the hearing judge failed to mention Ms. Nguyen’s education, the motivation for Mr. Kent’s allegedly wrongful actions, including his motivation for filing the emergency petition, and that Mr. Farmer sent the March 5, 2020 letter before he was retained. 16 and would continue to do so. The complaint he filed in federal court said he represented Ms. Nguyen.

We overrule Mr. Farmer’s exception. 3. Exception to the Finding that the Instructions were Drafted by Mr. Farmer Mr. Farmer excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that the instructions to Mr. Kent in his March 5 letter emanated from him. He contends that that he was only a conduit for Ms. Marsh and that he only typed up Ms. Marsh’s instructions because she was blind. We are unpersuaded.

In 2019, Ms. Marsh was evaluated by a physician who found that she suffered from severe dementia and that her condition would decline. On May 8, 2020, Dr. Guinta examined her and concluded that she had a “Major Neurocognitive Disorder (Dementia) due to Alzheimer’s Disease.” The hearing judge’s finding that Mr. Farmer drafted the instructions was not clearly erroneous. We overrule this exception. 4. Exception to the Finding that Mr. Farmer Drafted the Third Amendment Mr. Farmer excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that he drafted the Third Amendment—the amendment that, among other things, named his New Jersey office suitemate as successor trustee.

Mr. Farmer complains that the hearing judge based this finding solely on an adverse inference drawn from his assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and contends that there is no evidence he drafted the amendment. This exception is without merit. First, because this is not a criminal matter, the hearing judge was entitled to draw an adverse inference from Mr. Farmer’s assertion of his Fifth Amendment right. See Robinson v. Robinson, 328 Md. 507, 515-16 (1992).

Second, the hearing judge cited to substantial evidence to support her conclusion that Mr. Farmer drafted the Third 17 Amendment. Specifically, Mr. Farmer began purportedly representing Ms. Marsh on March 6, and Mr. Farmer came into possession of the Third Amendment on April 7, the same day Ms. Marsh signed it. The co-trustee appointed in the Third Amendment, Mr. Hoffman, happens to share an office with Mr. Farmer in New Jersey. And Mr. Kent, who had represented the Marsh family for over 30 years, was not aware of this amendment until Mr. Farmer—not some other unknown lawyer—sent it to him.

We note further that Mr. Farmer’s redacted invoice for April indicates that on April 6 and 7, he drafted a status letter and then prepared something13 that took him 4.5 hours. The inferences the hearing judge drew from such evidence are logical, sound, and well-reasoned. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ross, 428 Md. 50, 87 (2012); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hekyong Pak, 400 Md. 567, 608 (2007). Accordingly, we overrule this exception. 5.

Exception to the Finding that Ms. Marsh was Incompetent Mr. Farmer excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that Ms. Marsh was incompetent, claiming that a determination of her competency on May 8 was irrelevant to her mental capacity two months prior, when she entered into the retainer agreement with him. The evidence before the hearing judge included two certifications, one dated before Ms. Marsh signed the retainer agreement and one dated after, signed by a physician and psychologist who each examined Ms. Marsh, both of which support the hearing judge’s finding. We overrule this exception. 13 Mr. Farmer redacted that little detail. 18 C. Exceptions to the Hearing Judge’s Conclusions of Law From the foregoing factual findings, the hearing judge found by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Farmer violated MARPC 1.4 (Communication), 1.5 (Fees), 1.7 (Conflict of Interest—General Rule), 1.16(a)(1) (Declining or Terminating Representation), 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions), 5.5(a) (Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multi-Jurisdictional Practice of Law), and 8.4(a) (Misconduct). Mr. Farmer excepts to each conclusion.

As noted above, we review all conclusions of law without deference. We conclude that the hearing judge’s conclusions are supported by clear and convincing evidence and therefore overrule Mr. Farmer’s exceptions. 1. Mr. Farmer Violated Multiple Rules of Professional Conduct by Representing Clients With Conflicting Interests Mr. Farmer violated three different rules of professional conduct, MARPC 1.4, 1.7, and 1.16(a)(1), when he represented both Ms. Nguyen and Ms. Marsh, two clients with conflicting interests. MARPC 1.4 provides: (a) An attorney shall: (1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client’s informed consent, as defined in Rule 19- 301.0(g) (1.0), is required by these Rules; (2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter; (3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and (4) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the attorney’s conduct when the attorney knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.

(b) An attorney shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. 19 This Rule is violated when an attorney undertakes joint representation of clients but fails to explain a potential conflict of interest. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Olszewski, 441 Md. 248, 267 (2015). MARPC 1.7 provides: (a) Except as provided in section (b) of this Rule, an attorney shall not represent a client if the representation involves a conflict of interest. A conflict of interest exists if: (1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the attorney’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the attorney.

(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a conflict of interest under section (a) of this Rule, an attorney may represent a client if: (1) the attorney reasonably believes that the attorney will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client; (2) the representation is not prohibited by law; (3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the attorney in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and (4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. Under MARPC 1.7, a conflict of interest exists in a dual representation if the parties have adverse competing interests. See Olszewski, 441 Md. at 257 . MARPC 1.16(a)(1) provides: “Except as stated in section (c) of this Rule, an attorney shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if: the representation will result in violation of the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct or other law[.]” The hearing judge found conflicts of interest with respect to both the guardianship proceedings and the Trust.

According to the hearing judge, at the inception of the dual 20 representation, Mr. Farmer should have recognized “the impropriety of representing both Ms. Marsh, who needed funds from the Trust for her daily needs and medical care, and Ms. Nguyen, who wanted control of the Trust for her own benefit. Those two interests were diametrically opposed to each other.” The hearing judge concluded that Mr. Farmer violated MARPC 1.4(a)(1) and (b) “when he failed to adequately explain the conflict of interest presented by his dual representation of Ms. Marsh and Ms. Nguyen.” According to the hearing judge, at most, Mr. Farmer explained to Ms. Nguyen and Ms. Marsh that a potential conflict existed arising from the fact that Ms. Nguyen was Ms. Marsh’s daughter-in-law. He failed to explain the significant conflicts involved because he contended that no conflict existed. The hearing judge further concluded that Mr. Farmer’s “insistence on gaining pro hac vice admission to represent Ms. Marsh in the guardianship proceeding while he continued to represent Ms. Nguyen, indicates” either that he was not fully aware of the conflict of interest or chose to ignore it.

The hearing judge concluded that Mr. Farmer violated MARPC 1.7(a)(1) by representing directly adverse parties in the guardianship proceedings. Mr. Farmer drafted or helped draft a motion on behalf of Ms. Nguyen that sought to place Ms. Marsh under her care while simultaneously representing the alleged disabled person. According to the hearing judge, this motion demonstrated that Ms. Nguyen’s interests were directly adverse to those of Ms. Marsh, and therefore, that the conflict was not waivable. Similarly, the hearing judge found that Mr. Farmer’s representation of both Ms. Nguyen and Ms. Marsh with regard to the Trust violated MARPC 1.7(a)(2) because: 21 there was a “significant risk” from the outset that [his] representation of Ms. Marsh would be “materially limited” by his representation of Ms. Nguyen.

Ms. Marsh needed funds from the Trust for her own support, particularly as her mental and physical health declined in her advanced age. Meanwhile, the evidence and testimony produced during the hearing demonstrates Ms. Nguyen, who was not a beneficiary of the Trust, sought to assert control over the Trust for her own benefit. The hearing judge also found that as to the Trust, Ms. Marsh’s court-appointed attorney, Ms. McQueen, informed the court that Ms. Marsh desired a guardian of her person or property, contrary to Mr. Farmer’s contention. The hearing judge concluded that Mr. Farmer violated MARPC 1.16(a)(1) because “his representation of Ms. Marsh and Ms. Nguyen could not be