Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Whitted

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Stephen E. Whitted, AG No. 47, September Term, 2021. Opinion by Gould, J. ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – SANCTIONS – INDEFINITE SUSPENSION The Supreme Court of Maryland sanctioned an attorney with an indefinite suspension for repeatedly filing retaliatory meritless claims against his ex-wife, her new husband, her attorneys, and judges who ruled against him; filing meritless appeals; repeating failed arguments; and ignoring rulings. Because such actions took place in tribunals in the State of Washington, the Supreme Court found that the attorney’s conduct violated Washington Rules of Professional Conduct 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions) and 8.4 (Misconduct). Circuit Court for Montgomery County Case No.: C-15-CV-21-000551 Argued: June 3, 2024 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND AG No. 47 September Term, 2021 ______________________________________ ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. STEPHEN E. WHITTED ______________________________________ Fader, C.J., Watts, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, Hotten, Michele D.

(Senior Justice, Specially Assigned), JJ. ___________________________________ Opinion by Gould, J. ______________________________________ Filed: August 1, 2024 Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2024.08.01 13:04:43 -04'00' Gregory Hilton, Clerk On December 6, 2021, under Maryland Rule 19-721, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (the “Commission”), acting through Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (the “Petition”) against Respondent Stephen E. Whitted. The Commission charged Mr. Whitted with violations of the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”), the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“GRPC”), and the Washington Rules of Professional Conduct (“WRPC”). Mr. Whitted was charged with violating MARPC 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions) (Rule 19- 303.1) and 8.4 (Misconduct) (Rule 19-308.4); GRPC 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions), 4.4 (Respect for Rights of Third Persons), and 8.4 (Misconduct); and WRPC 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions), 4.4 (Respect for Rights of Third Persons), and 8.4 (Misconduct). Ultimately, at different stages in these proceedings, the Commission withdrew all but the charges alleging violations of WRPC 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions) and 8.4 (Misconduct).

The hearing judge assigned to this matter held an evidentiary hearing from February 12 to 14, 2024.1 The Commission presented its case with three witnesses, including Mr. Whitted, and 25 exhibits. Mr. Whitted also testified on his own behalf and called five other witnesses. He entered six exhibits into evidence. On April 2, 2024, the hearing judge issued findings of fact and conclusions of law (the “findings”).

The court found by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Whitted 1 The hearing for this case was delayed for multiple reasons, including to accommodate both counsels’ and the trial court’s schedule and due to Mr. Whitted’s documented health condition. violated WRPC 3.1 and 8.4(a), (c), and (d). The hearing judge also found three mitigating factors and six aggravating factors. As permitted under Maryland Rule 19-728(b), Mr. Whitted excepted to multiple findings. The Commission excepted to three findings.

Oral argument was held before this Court on June 3, 2024. As explained below, we overrule Mr. Whitted’s exceptions, sustain two of the Commission’s exceptions, overrule one of the Commission’s exceptions, and, except as noted in our analysis of MARPC 8.4(c), adopt the hearing judge’s findings in all other respects. We determine that indefinite suspension is the appropriate sanction. I FACTS A. Background Facts Mr. Whitted married Lori Jordan in 1985.

They had three children, all born between 1993 and 1998. Mr. Whitted was admitted to the Bar of the State of Maryland on June 21, 1995. Before that, he practiced law in Georgia. He is also admitted to practice law in the District of Columbia and Massachusetts.

Mr. Whitted currently resides in Montgomery County, Maryland. At some point, the family moved to Fulton County, Georgia. In 2006, Mr. Whitted filed for a divorce in the Superior Court of Fulton County. On November 13, 2007, the court issued a Final Judgment and Decree of Divorce.

The court awarded the parties joint legal custody of their children, physical custody to Ms. Jordan, and reasonable visitation 2 to Mr. Whitted. The court ordered Mr. Whitted to pay child support in the amount of $1,735.93 per month and awarded him $55,000 from Ms. Jordan’s 401(k) retirement plan. Mr. Whitted was directed to provide Ms. Jordan with an account into which the retirement funds would be transferred. At that time, Mr. Whitted was employed as an Assistant County Attorney for DeKalb County, Georgia.

Mr. Whitted chronically failed to pay child support, and in 2010, Ms. Jordan asked the Superior Court of Fulton County to hold him in contempt, alleging arrearages of $15,075.26. The court determined that Mr. Whitted owed $12,307.93 and, in addition to his regular monthly payment, ordered him to pay $1,000 per month until the arrearages were fully paid. On July 16, 2010, Ms. Jordan filed a motion in the Superior Court of Fulton County, asking the court’s permission to relocate the minor children to North Carolina. Soon after, Mr. Whitted filed a separate lawsuit in that same court, naming as defendants Ms. Jordan; her attorney, George Lawson; Mr. Lawson’s law firm; and “John Doe.” He alleged that: (1) Mr. Lawson harassed, intimidated, and maliciously injured Mr. Whitted by filing a petition alleging that Mr. Whitted committed emotional cruelty against Ms. Jordan; (2) Ms. Jordan altered court orders; (3) certain court orders were illegal; (4) Ms. Jordan converted “to her own use” the $55,000 from her 401(k) plan that had been awarded to Mr. Whitted; and (5) John Doe had a “tryst” with Ms. Jordan in August 2008 that resulted in a child born 3 in May 2009.

Mr. Whitted sought $500,000 in damages from each defendant, plus punitive damages.2 On August 30, 2010, in response to Ms. Jordan’s motion to bring the children to North Carolina, Mr. Whitted moved for the court to find Ms. Jordan in contempt, order her to immediately return the children to Georgia, deny her motion, and award him physical custody of the children. In September, Mr. Whitted lost his job, and in October 2010, he ceased paying child support. He did not, however, move for modification of his child support obligation. On January 6, 2011, Superior Court Judge Bensonetta Tipton Lane granted Ms. Jordan sole physical and legal custody of the children, permitting her to move the children to North Carolina.

Mr. Whitted appealed Judge Lane’s custody decision, to no avail. Judge Lane also held Ms. Jordan in contempt for failing to transfer the $55,000 from her 401(k) plan. Judge Lane stated, however, that the burden was on Mr. Whitted to provide Ms. Jordan with a valid and executed qualified domestic relations order (“QDRO”)3 and directed him to do so. Mr. Whitted subsequently executed a defective QDRO but failed to take further action to transfer the money from the 401(k) plan. 2 The complaint was eventually dismissed.

Mr. Whitted appealed the decision, without success. 3 “A Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) is the vehicle by which pension benefits are transferred from one party to another, ‘either pursuant to the Marital Disposition Act, or through an attachment in aid of a support obligation.’” Fischbach v. Fischbach, 187 Md. App. 61, 94 (2009) (quoting Janusz v. Gilliam, 404 Md. 524, 538 (2008)). 4 On May 5, 2011, Mr. Whitted moved for the recusal of Judge Lane. He also petitioned for mandamus against Judge Lane, requesting that his pending motions be decided within five days by a different judge. The court denied the mandamus petition, holding that it lacked the authority or subject matter jurisdiction to impeach a judicial officer. On September 15, Judge Lane recused herself from Mr. Whitted’s cases.

On September 20, 2011, Mr. Whitted filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia against Judge Lane and Ms. Jordan’s husband, alleging, among other things, that Judge Lane violated his constitutional rights when: (1) in 2009, she advised him that he had waited too long to challenge the award of marital assets in the divorce; (2) in 2010, she discarded evidence related to his divorce action; (3) in 2010, she attempted to cancel a hearing to determine his property rights and sought to have the matter dismissed; (4) in 2010, she issued an unconstitutional ruling regarding a dispute between him and Ms. Jordan over the division of marital assets and funds from a retirement account; and (5) she denied him access to the courts. Because Mr. Whitted’s children lived with Ms. Jordan’s husband, Mr. Whitted alleged false imprisonment, abduction, loss of consortium, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. He sought: (1) compensatory damages of $1,000,000 from Judge Lane; (2) compensatory damages of $750,000 from Mr. Jordan; (3) an additional $3,000 per day against Mr. Jordan until he returned the children to Mr. Whitted; (4) punitive damages; and (5) attorneys’ fees. The court dismissed the complaint against Judge Lane due to insufficient service of process and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims against Mr. Jordan. 5 In late 2011, Mr. Whitted began working for the Prince George’s County Attorney as an Assistant County Attorney.

Meanwhile, in the summer of 2012, the Jordans moved with the children to King County, Washington. Between 2010 and 2016, Mr. Whitted made no child support payments. On June 14, 2016, Ms. Jordan, through her attorney, Stacey Smythe, filed to register the Georgia divorce decree in the Superior Court of Washington for King County and to collect unpaid child support. Two weeks later, Mr. Whitted moved for a dismissal and for contempt, claiming that: [b]ecause of [Ms. Jordan’s] “unjustifiable misconduct,” her unclean hands, her failure to inform this Court of the civil actions previously filed in Georgia and North Carolina, and her contumacious conduct in failing to inform [Mr. Whitted] of the addresses of the Parties’ children since 2011, as well as her acts of parental alienation, this Court should decline to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction in this matter.

Mr. Whitted also alleged that Ms. Jordan owed him $55,000, plus accrued interest, for a total of $140,000. On August 11, 2016, Mr. Whitted filed a writ of garnishment in the Superior Court of Washington for King County against Ms. Jordan’s wages. On August 22, 2016, a Commissioner of the court denied Ms. Jordan’s motion to register the Georgia divorce decree, finding that it did not comply with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. Ms. Jordan moved to revise the Commissioner’s order.

The Honorable Elizabeth Berns reversed the Commissioner’s 6 finding and, by order dated December 6, 2016, held that Ms. Jordan substantially complied with that statute. On January 12, 2017, Judge Berns held a hearing to determine whether Mr. Whitted should be held in contempt for failing to pay child support. Judge Berns found Mr. Whitted in contempt, awarded Ms. Jordan attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $10,000, and entered judgment for Ms. Jordan for unpaid child support in the amount of $169,868.85, plus interest. The court subsequently remanded Mr. Whitted into custody with bail set at $5,000, representing about three months of child support.

The court further ordered him to pay down his arrearages with monthly payments of at least $2,000. On January 13, 2017, Mr. Whitted’s wife, Mary Whitted, made Mr. Whitted’s $5,000 bail payment. On February 9, 2017, Judge Berns issued an order finding that Mr. Whitted’s past due child support and health insurance expenses from November 13, 2007, through December 31, 2016, were $164,868.85.4 Judge Berns’ order stated: Stephen Earl Whitted is a licensed litigation Attorney with experience in domestic relations. He has been either gainfully employed or self-employed throughout the period in question.

Furthermore, Mr. Whitted knew how to go about and should have obtained a modification of the support order if this was not the case. He failed to do so and is therefore liable. He is employed by Prince George’s County Maryland Law Office located at 14735 Main Street, Upper Marlboro, MD 20772 as a civil litigator and he earns over $125,000 per year according to his 2016 year-end pay-stubs. Mr. Whitted has no other children whom he is financially responsible for. 4 The court reduced the amount he owed by the $5,000 that Mr. Whitted paid to be released from jail. 7 Although the order did not address Mr. Whitted’s request for a writ of garnishment or his claim for $55,000 from Ms. Jordan’s 401(k) plan, it noted that “[t]he issue of the property division involving [Ms. Jordan’s] 401k is not properly before this court and there is no agreement to otherwise offset [Mr. Whitted’s] back support judgment.” Mr. Whitted appealed Judge Berns’ February 9, 2017 order.

In an unpublished opinion filed on February 12, 2018, the Court of Appeals of Washington found that Mr. Whitted’s arguments were meritless and affirmed Judge Berns’ rulings. Jordan v. Whitted, 2 Wash. App. 2d 1034 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2018) (unpublished).

In March 2017, one month after he filed his appeal, Mr. Whitted filed a complaint against Judge Berns with the State of Washington Commission on Judicial Conduct. He alleged that Judge Berns operated her courtroom with “an atmosphere of fear and intimidation” and that her February 9, 2017 order violated the Federal Consumer Protection Act and his constitutional due process rights. On May 2, 2018, Mr. Whitted sued Ms. Jordan, Mr. Jordan, Ms. Smythe, Ms. Smythe’s law partner, and Ms. Smythe’s employer in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. He alleged: (1) intentional interference with parent- child custodial relationship; (2) civil conspiracy; (3) abuse of process; (4) common law invasion of privacy; (5) invasion of privacy – intrusion into seclusion; (6) state constitutional right to privacy; (7) defamation; (8) civil conspiracy; (9) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (10) negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Mr. Whitted requested compensatory damages of $750,000, plus punitive damages. 8 On June 13, 2019, the Honorable John C. Coughenour granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment and dismissed Mr. Whitted’s claims with prejudice. The court also granted the Jordans’ motion for Rule 11 sanctions, ordering Mr. Whitted to pay the Jordans for the attorneys’ fees incurred in defending the action. The court stated: The Court concludes that Mr. Whitted’s complaint is frivolous and that it was filed for the improper purpose of harassing the Jordans. As the Court has previously explained, Mr. Whitted’s intentional interference claim against Mr. Jordan is barred by Washington’s statute of limitations.

Mr. Whitted alleges that Mr. Jordan interfered with his parent-child relationship based on conduct dating back to 2010––allegations that are clearly barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations. Moreover, these are largely the same allegations that Mr. Whitted made against Mr. Jordan in his 2011 federal lawsuit, in which Mr. Whitted claimed Mr. Jordan’s actions caused Mr. Whitted to suffer a loss of affection with his children. This procedural history precludes Mr. Whitted from arguing that his claim could now be timely or that he conducted an adequate pre-filing review before filing the claim. Mr. Whitted offers no contrary legal authority.

Mr. Whitted’s abuse of process claim against Ms. Jordan is similarly frivolous. The claim strikes the Court as a veiled attempt to challenge the rulings made by the King County Superior Court and Washington Court of Appeals. The conduct that Mr. Whitted alleges forms the basis of this claim—Ms. Smythe registering the divorce decree under the UCCJEA instead of UIFSA—was explicitly determined to be harmless by both state courts. Mr. Whitted repeatedly refers to the commissioner’s initial ruling on the registration issue, but that ruling was overturned by the superior court and effectively rendered meaningless.

Even more fatally for his claim, Mr. Whitted has neither alleged nor supported with evidence, a single act by Defendants in the King County action taken “to accomplish an end not within the purview of the suit.” He cannot do so because Ms. Jordan’s lawsuit was a legitimate civil action in which she prevailed both at trial and on appeal. All of Mr. Whitted’s alleged privacy torts are also frivolous for several reasons. As an initial matter, Mr. Whitted’s privacy related claims are based on a picture taken of him in a public hallway of the King County courthouse. Controlling Washington precedent is clear that such facts do not support an invasion of privacy claim or an intrusion into seclusion claim.

In 9 the face of this on-point Washington precedent, Mr. Whitted attempts to support his claims with unrelated federal case law. Mr. Whitted neither alleged factual allegations, nor came forward with evidence that would support his theories for invasion of privacy or intrusion into seclusion. His inability to distinguish this caselaw is also indicative of his failure to conduct an adequate prefiling review of his claims. But there are several other problems with Mr. Whitted’s privacy and defamation claims.

It is unclear to the Court how Ms. Jordan could be liable for physically intruding into Mr. Whitted’s seclusion based on photographs taken by Ms. Smythe. As the Court previously mentioned, Washington does not recognize a civil cause of action for violation of article I, section 7 of the state constitution. Yet, Mr. Whitted alleged such a claim against Ms. Jordan, without providing any argument or justification for departing from Washington law. Mr. Whitted did not support his defamation claim by alleging facts or providing evidence that Ms. Jordan published anything false about him.

Mr. Whitted neither alleges nor explains how a picture of him in handcuffs with the caption “off to jail” could be defamatory in light of the undisputed fact that at the time of the picture, Mr. Whitted had just been ordered into custody and was being escorted to the King County jail. In addition to being frivolous, Mr. Whitted’s claims appear to be aimed at harassing the Jordans. The record before the Court evinces a troubling pattern of retaliatory litigation by Mr. Whitted against Ms. Jordan and others associated with her since the couple’s divorce well over a decade ago. Unfortunately, this lawsuit appears to be the latest iteration of this troubling pattern.

The pattern goes like this: Ms. Jordan files a meritorious lawsuit against Mr. Whitted related to the divorce decree, and Mr. Whitted responds by filing a separate unsuccessful lawsuit. In 2008, Ms. Jordan sought and obtained a contempt order against Mr. Whitted for failing to pay child support. Mr. Whitted later filed a lawsuit against Ms. Whitted, her lawyer, and “John Doe” for their alleged improper litigation conduct and interfering with Mr. Whitted’s parent-child relationships. Mr. Whitted’s claims were eventually dismissed.

In 2011, Ms. Jordan sought and obtained sole legal and physical custody of the children. Mr. Whitted responded by filing a federal lawsuit against a superior court judge and Mr. Jordan, alleging improper litigation conduct and interfering with Mr. Whitted’s parent-child relationships. His claims were ultimately dismissed without prejudice. In 2016, Ms. Jordan obtained a substantial judgment against Mr. Whitted for six years of unpaid child support in the King County action.

After 10 that judgment was affirmed by the Washington State Court of Appeals, Mr. Whitted filed the present lawsuit. He again alleges that Ms. Jordan, her lawyer, and Mr. Jordan have engaged in improper litigation conduct and interfered with his parent-child relationships. As the Court has explained in detail, Mr. Whitted’s claims in this lawsuit are frivolous. Given Mr. Whitted’s past litigation conduct and the deficiencies in the present complaint, the Court concludes that Mr. Whitted filed this lawsuit for the improper purpose of harassing the Jordans.

Mr. Whitted’s intent to harass appears even more obvious when considering that all these lawsuits arose from, or can be traced back to, an acrimonious divorce. Enough is enough. Mr. Whitted’s failure to comply with Rule 11 warrants monetary sanctions, which are necessary to deter him from filing further baseless lawsuits against the Jordans. (Internal citations omitted).

Mr. Whitted appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment and awarded the Jordans an additional $13,540 for attorneys’ fees they incurred on appeal. Whitted v. Jordan, 815 F. App’x 202 (9th Cir. 2020). On August 28, 2019, Mr. Whitted filed a motion in the Superior Court of Washington for King County to vacate the January 12, 2017 judgment entered against him by Judge Berns that had found him in contempt for failing to pay child support. In his motion, he also sought to relitigate issues already fully litigated.

In response, on October 4, 2019, Ms. Jordan moved for Rule 11 sanctions against Mr. Whitted and to designate him as a vexatious litigant. Mr. Whitted responded with a motion to assign the case to a judge other than Judge Berns, arguing that because he had filed a judicial complaint against Judge Berns, she should recuse herself. On October 15, Judge Berns denied Mr. Whitted’s motion. 11 On November 1, 2019, Judge Berns held a hearing on Ms. Jordan’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions and Mr. Whitted’s motion to vacate. Mr. Whitted failed to appear.

The court entered an order designating Mr. Whitted as a vexatious litigant. The court sanctioned him in the amount of $9,425. Mr. Whitted appealed this order on November 25. Besides appealing the vexatious litigant finding and the denial of the motion to vacate his contempt order, Mr. Whitted tried to relitigate issues that had been previously decided and affirmed on appeal, such as his request that Judge Berns be recused.

On August 3, 2020, the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order sanctioning Mr. Whitted and designating him a vexatious litigant. And, on September 8, that court ordered Mr. Whitted to pay the Jordans $27,984.22 for the attorneys’ fees they incurred on appeal. This was in addition to the $9,425 previously awarded by the trial court. B. The Commission’s Investigation On July 8, 2020, the Jordans filed a complaint with the Commission, alleging, among other things, that Mr. Whitted demonstrated contempt for the authority of multiple courts by refusing to comply with their Orders and Judgments, has repeatedly made false and misleading statements in his pleadings against the Jordans, has abused his license to practice law by engaging in frivolous and abusive litigation for the sole purpose of harassment, and has knowingly made false statements and claims against officers of the Court.

Mr. Whitted responded on August 6, claiming that he “at all times [had] been ready and willing to pay the amount that is legally owed to Ms. Jordan” but that Ms. Jordan’s “personal conduct and unfair litigation tactics have prevented this from occurring.” He also 12 rehashed old arguments and attempted to litigate matters that various courts had previously resolved. II STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court has original jurisdiction over attorney discipline proceedings and conducts an independent review of the hearing judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Hamilton, 444 Md. 163, 178 (2015) (citing Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Harmon, 433 Md. 612, 623 (2013)). We review the hearing judge’s conclusions of law without deference.

Md. Rule 19-740(b)(1). Either party may file exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact or conclusions of law. Md. Rule 19-728(b). We may treat any facts not challenged by exceptions as established.

Md. Rule 19-740(b)(2)(A). “If exceptions are filed,” we determine “whether the findings of fact have been proved by the requisite standard of proof set out in Rule 19-727(c).” Md. Rule 19-740(b)(2)(B). Under Rule 19-727(c), the Commission must prove its allegations of misconduct by clear and convincing evidence. As we stated in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Johnson, 472 Md. 491, 526 (2021) (cleaned up): If a party excepts to the hearing judge’s findings, this Court shall determine whether the findings of fact have been proved by the requisite standard of proof set out in Rule 19-727(c). We may confine our review to the findings of fact challenged by the exceptions, mindful though, that the hearing judge is afforded due regard to assess the credibility of witnesses.

This Court will not disturb the hearing judge’s findings where there is any competent evidence to support the finding of fact. Therefore, if the hearing judge’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous and the conclusions drawn from 13 them are supported by the facts found, exceptions to conclusions of law will be overruled. In contrast, the respondent must prove any affirmative defenses and any mitigating or extenuating factors by a preponderance of the evidence. Md. Rule 19-727(c).

III DISCUSSION Mr. Whitted excepts to multiple factual findings and conclusions of law. The Commission excepts to one mitigating factor found by the hearing judge and the hearing judge’s failure to find two additional aggravating factors. Each exception is addressed below. A. Mr. Whitted’s Exceptions to the Findings of Fact Most of Mr. Whitted’s exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact are of the “failure to find” variety—that is, he complains that the hearing judge did not make findings that align with his characterization of the various litigation events discussed above.

Mr. Whitted contends that the hearing judge failed to find that: • The final custody order issued by the Georgia state court provided that although Ms. Jordan “shall have final decision making with respect to all matters connected with [the children’s] wellbeing, . . . she must first discuss major decisions, such as changing their schools, consenting to an operation, starting or terminating therapy, etc., with [Mr. Whitted].” • The final custody order issued by the Georgia state court required Ms. Jordan to inform Mr. Whitted about the children’s events and activities and to allow Mr. Whitted additional visitation with their youngest child. • Ms. Jordan did not provide Mr. Whitted with the family’s Washington address. • While living in Washington, Ms. Jordan violated the terms of the final custody order by neglecting to inform Mr. Whitted about the children’s lives and activities. • While living in Washington, Ms. Jordan failed to foster love and affection in the children for Mr. Whitted, as required by the unamended terms of the divorce decree. 14 • From 2010 through June 13, 2016, Ms. Jordan rejected Mr. Whitted’s offers to her to pay child support and the children’s health care expenses. • Ms. Jordan never asked the Georgia state courts to terminate their continuing and exclusive jurisdiction over the parties’ domestic matters. • Neither Ms. Jordan nor her counsel filed a Uniform Interstate Family Support Act Petition, as required by the State of Washington. • Ms. Jordan never obtained a certified court order holding Mr. Whitted in contempt for refusing to timely pay child support, as required by Georgia law. • Ms. Jordan’s Washington state court child support case was wrongfully reassigned from Judge North to Judge Berns. • When Ms. Smythe moved to remove the matter from Judge North’s consideration, she falsely certified that she had a “conflict” with Judge North. • Ms. Smythe filed a false affidavit to seek reassignment of the case from Judge North to Judge Berns. • The hearing before Judge Berns was held in an atmosphere of fear and intimidation due to the presence of three armed Deputy Sheriffs who stood a few feet directly behind Mr. Whitted during the hearing. • The judgment entered by Judge Berns was inflated, as it included monetary amounts for items Ms. Jordan was not entitled to collect from Mr. Whitted, such as college tuition. • The $169,868.85 figure accepted by Judge Berns wrongly included health care expenses that were not proven or established by Ms. Jordan. • Mr. Whitted should not have been held in contempt at the February 9, 2017 hearing. • As of February 9, 2017, the accrued amount with interest that Ms. Jordan owed to Mr. Whitted was $114,950. • During the February 9, 2017 hearing, Mr. Whitted offered to pay the amount owed to Ms. Jordan, represented to Ms. Jordan that there was no need for the continuation of any lawsuit, and conceded his rights to the $114,950 that Ms. Jordan then owed him, which served as a setoff against his child support arrearage. • Judge Berns abused her discretion in the February 9, 2017 hearing, by ordering Mr. Whitted to pay child support arrearages in the amount of $2,000 per month. • On May 11, 2017, Judge Berns recused herself from another civil action filed in Washington state court involving Ms. Jordan and Mr. Whitted, and in so doing, she issued an order stating that “Judge Berns is prejudiced . . . such that a fair and impartial hearing cannot be obtained.” • Mr. Whitted filed the federal action to try to reestablish and rehabilitate the parent- child relationship with his children, not to harass Ms. Jordan and her husband. • All defendants filed answers to the federal action without first moving to dismiss, signifying the claims were facially meritorious. 15 • In a minute order entered on April 22, 2019, the federal court denied the Jordans’ motion for sanctions. • The federal district court prematurely granted summary judgment against Mr. Whitted and issued sanctions against him while discovery remained ongoing, and Mr. Whitted had pending motions for a continuance and for leave to file an amended complaint. • Ms. Jordan asked the Commission to compel Mr. Whitted to pay all outstanding money judgments that she had obtained against him. • The Commission exerted pressure on Mr. Whitted to pay all sums demanded by Ms. Jordan. • The Commission improperly rejected Mr. Whitted’s April 2021 offer to pay the full demand that Ms. Jordan was then making, which would have resolved the entire matter before the petition was ever filed. Mr. Whitted’s “failure to find” exceptions have no merit. The hearing judge was tasked with determining the facts relevant to the specific charges of misconduct, not to relitigate the many state and federal proceedings where Mr. Whitted had received adverse rulings. And the hearing judge was within her discretion not to credit Mr. Whitted’s testimony on such matters and to decline to ascribe the significance Mr. Whitted attaches to such matters.

We therefore overrule Mr. Whitted’s “failure to find” exceptions. Mr. Whitted also excepts to the hearing judge’s findings that detail the events in the custody and child support litigation in Georgia. He claims that such findings are irrelevant because the charges under the GRPC were dropped. We overrule this exception for two reasons.

First, the findings provided history and context to the pending charges and are therefore relevant. Second, Mr. Whitted does not contend that any such findings were not supported by the evidence. Indeed, the hearing judge supported each finding with citations to the relevant portions of the transcript and exhibits. 16 Based on our independent review of the record, we conclude that the hearing judge’s findings of fact were supported by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, we adopt the hearing judge’s findings of fact, except that we sustain two of the Commission’s exceptions as to aggravating and mitigating factors.

B. Mr. Whitted’s Exceptions to the Hearing Judge’s Conclusions of Law The hearing judge found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mr. Whitted violated WRPC 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions) and 8.4 (Misconduct). Mr. Whitted excepts to both findings on general and specific grounds. We address each in turn. 1. Improper Motives of Ms. Jordan According to Mr. Whitted, the hearing judge’s legal conclusions should be disregarded because the charges against him were animated by Ms. Jordan’s improper motive to force him to pay the money he owes her.

This exception has no merit. The hearing judge stated: The Court finds that it is wholly appropriate to explore the motivations of a complaining witness to show bias, prejudice or to attack their credibility. However, the fact that a witness may have an “agenda” does not go to the propriety of the AGC to bring disciplinary charges. The Respondent has not cited any authority that supports such a position in this case.

In other words, the hearing judge correctly understood Ms. Jordan’s personal motives went to her credibility, which the hearing judge was in the best position to assess. We therefore overrule this exception. 2. Improper Motives of the Commission Mr. Whitted also excepts to the hearing judge’s legal conclusions because, he alleges, the Commission pursued this disciplinary proceeding for improper motives. He 17 claims that Lydia Lawless, who was Bar Counsel during the investigation, exerted pressure on him to pay Ms. Jordan the money he owes.

He also claims that Ms. Lawless rejected his offer to pay Ms. Jordan in full. This exception has no merit. First, Mr. Whitted provides no evidentiary support for his allegations. Second, even if his allegations were true, he alleges no improper motive by Ms. Lawless.

As the hearing judge stated: “[t]he Respondent has not alleged any impropriety, improper motive, or ill will on the part of the staff attorney or the commission, itself. Nor has the Respondent introduced any evidence for this Court to find support for such an allegation.” We agree with the hearing judge. Third, Mr. Whitted did not need Ms. Lawless or anyone else to broker a resolution with Ms. Jordan, nor was that Ms. Lawless’ job. He needs only to pay Ms. Jordan what he owes her.

Accordingly, we overrule these exceptions. 3. Pro Se Exception Mr. Whitted does not dispute that jurisdiction in this Court is proper under MARPC 19-308.5(a): (1) An attorney admitted by the Supreme Court to practice in this State is subject to the disciplinary authority of this State, regardless of where the attorney’s conduct occurs. (2) An attorney not admitted to practice in this State is also subject to the disciplinary authority of this State if the attorney: (A) provides or offers to provide any legal services in this State, (B) claims to be practicing law in this State, or (C) has an obligation to supervise or control another attorney practicing law in this State whose conduct constitutes a violation of these Rules. 18 Nor does Mr. Whitted dispute the applicability of the choice of law provisions in MARPC 19-308.5(b)(1), which provides: (b) In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this State, the rule of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows: (1) for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which