Attorney Grievance Commission v. Agbaje

BARBERA, C.J. Petitioner, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“Commission”), acting through Bar Counsel, has filed with this Court a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (“Petition”) against Respondent, Taiwo A. Agbaje. The Commission alleges violations of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) in connection with Respondent’s entering into a Real Estate Investment Partnership Agreement with Dolapo Popoola, while Ms. Popoola was a current client of Respondent. Pursuant to Maryland Rules 16-752(a) and 16-757(c), this Court designated the Honorable Jan Marshall Alexander of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County (“the hearing judge”) to conduct an evidentiary hearing and file written findings of fact and conclusions of law. After conducting the hearing, during which both Respondent ⁷⁰⁶ and Ms. Popoola testified, the hearing judge issued findings of fact and conclusions of law in which he concluded, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent had violated MLRPC 1.8(a) (conflict of interest) 1 ; and MLRPC 8.4(a), (b), (c), and (d) (misconduct). 2 Respondent has filed numerous exceptions relating to process and procedure as well as the substance of the hearing judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.

For reasons we shall explain, we sustain two of Respondent’s exceptions related to the hearing judge’s factual findings and overrule all remaining exceptions. Notwithstanding our agreement with Respondent on these two limited points, we are in accord with the hearing judge’s legal conclusions that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.8(a) and 8.4(a), (b), (c), and (d), and we conclude that disbarment is the appropriate sanction for Respondent’s misconduct. ⁷⁰⁷ I. We begin with the procedural history of the case, which sets the stage for several of the exceptions Respondent places before us for decision. Shortly after being served with the Petition and filing his answer, Respondent served Assistant Bar Counsel with a notice of intention to take the deposition of Ms. Popoola, who resided in England at that time. The next day, Assistant Bar Counsel emailed Respondent to inform him that she did not represent Ms. Popoola and therefore was not authorized to accept the notice on her behalf but was willing to assist in arranging a video deposition of her.

Assistant Bar Counsel subsequently emailed Ms. Popoola in order to obtain her mailing address and telephone number and inquire whether she was willing to appear voluntarily for a deposition. Ms. Popoola provided only her telephone number — explaining that she was unwilling to provide her home address — and agreed to appear for a telephone deposition. At some point, Assistant Bar Counsel forwarded this information to Respondent. After Assistant Bar Counsel had made several efforts to arrange the deposition of Ms. Popoola, Respondent told Assistant Bar Counsel that “[t]here is no need to pursue [scheduling the deposition] any further with you.” Instead, he would “resort to all options provided by Maryland law.” Respondent also served Assistant Bar Counsel with interrogatories.

Among other things, Respondent asked Assistant Bar Counsel to provide “Ms. Popoola’s full name, current address, age, date and place of birth, Social Security Number, marital status, email address, and telephone number.” Assistant Bar Counsel provided the following response: “Dolapo Popoola to the best of petitioner’s information and belief, resides in the United Kingdom. Her Telephone number is ... + 44 * * * * * * * * * * and her email address is ****** * *@yahoo.co.uk.” 3 Shortly thereafter, Respon ⁷⁰⁸ dent filed a motion to compel discovery from Assistant Bar Counsel. He argued that Assistant Bar Counsel had failed to provide Ms. Popoola’s address and, without it, he could not comply with the Maryland Rule governing depositions, which required that he serve upon Ms. Popoola a notice of deposition containing “the name and address of the person to be examined.” See Md. Rule 2-412(a) (emphasis added). The hearing judge denied the motion, reasoning, in pertinent part: I believe [Assistant Bar Counsel] has adequately provided Answers to Interrogatories as required by the Rules.... [T]hey are entitled to give you information that is exclusively within their possession.

They have guided you as to where you could get certain information that was not in their possession, [and] told you how to contact Ms. Popoola. They do not represent her----[T]hey don’t have ... her address. You could [have] easily obtained that or at least made an attempt to obtain that based on the information that was provided to you, mainly her phone number, her email address as well as the assurance of Counsel ... that she was going to be cooperative in ... coordinating with Ms. Popoola to speak with you for a deposition without the need of subpoena or a notice. And you’ve chosen not to avail yourself of that.

And that is your right to do.... But I do not find it to be a discovery violation. Shortly before the commencement of the evidentiary hearing, the Commission, acting through Assistant Bar Counsel, filed a motion to permit Ms. Popoola to testify at that hearing by video conference. Assistant Bar Counsel explained that Ms. Popoola lived in England and her personal appearance at the hearing could not be secured by subpoena.

Furthermore, Assistant Bar Counsel asserted that requiring Ms. Popoola to travel internationally in order to appear in person would impose upon her an undue hardship. Assistant Bar Counsel proposed allowing Ms. Popoola to testify over Skype — a real-time video conferencing program that she could access on her home computer — and assured the hearing judge that no other individual would be present in the room during her testimony. ⁷⁰⁹ The hearing judge granted the motion, without explanation and over Respondent’s opposition. During the two-day evidentiary hearing, the hearing judge received evidence primarily through the testimony of Ms. Popoola and Respondent as well as various exhibits submitted by both parties. Noteworthy for present purposes, before Ms. Popoola commenced her testimony over Skype, she took an oath to tell the truth.

In addition, at Respondent’s request, she surveyed the room from which she was testifying, with the video camera, to satisfy the hearing judge that she was not receiving improper assistance. At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing judge took the case under advisement. Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-757(c), the hearing judge was required to file his findings of fact and conclusions of law no later than 45 days after the conclusion of the hearing. After that deadline had passed, and his findings and conclusions had not been docketed by the Clerk of the Circuit Court, the Commission, acting through Assistant Bar Counsel, filed in this Court a motion to extend the 45-day deadline.

Assistant Bar Counsel asserted that the hearing judge had completed his findings and conclusions and transmitted them to the Clerk’s office before the deadline, but that office had not docketed them timely due to a backlog. Assistant Bar Counsel further noted that the motion for an extension had been filed “with the knowledge and approval of [the hearing judge].” This Court granted the motion, thereby accepting for filing the hearing judge’s findings and conclusions, which we set forth below.

II

The hearing judge determined that Ms. Popoola’s testimony was credible and Respondent’s testimony, in its entirety, was not credible. He made the following factual findings. Legal Representation of Ms. Popoola Respondent has been a member of the Bar of this Court since 1996. Since his admission to the Bar, he has been ⁷¹⁰ engaged in the general private practice of law.

In December 2005, Ms. Popoola retained Respondent to assist her in obtaining an H1B non-immigrant visa and represent her before the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“US-CIS”). She signed an agreement by which Respondent would perform these legal services for a fee. In addition to retaining Respondent for the services described in the agreement, Ms. Popoola, at some point, discussed with him her desire to apply for “permanent resident” status through the acquisition of a Green Card. In October 2006, Respondent filed, on Ms. Popoola’s behalf, a petition for an H1B visa.

Several months later, the USCIS approved the petition, and Respondent advised Ms. Popoola that the petition had been approved. Respondent did not inform Ms. Popoola, in writing or otherwise, that his legal representation of her terminated at that time. In either June or July 2007, Ms. Popoola paid Respondent $1,000 in connection with her application for a Green Card. Around the same time, Respondent hired Ms. Popoola to tutor his son.

Approximately three months later, in an email to Ms. Popoola’s employer evidently related to her application for permanent residency, Respondent identified himself as “the lawyer assisting Ms. Popoola.” The Partnership Agreement In addition to his law practice, Respondent operated an auctioneering and real estate business. On July 17, 2007, Ms. Popoola approached Respondent at his auctioneering office to inquire about purchasing a property that she could turn into a rental unit. Respondent informed her that she did not have enough capital to purchase a property. He proposed, instead, that she partner with him to renovate two properties in Baltimore City and sell those properties for a profit within three months.

When Ms. Popoola expressed interest in that proposal, she and Respondent settled upon the two properties the partnership would renovate and sell: one located on James Street (owned by Respondent) and another located on Lorraine Avenue (owned by Respondent’s cousin). Respondent ⁷¹¹ subsequently drafted a partnership agreement, which both parties signed that day. The agreement stated, in full: This is a partnership agreement between Taiwo Agbaje and Dolapo Popoola for investment in real estate in accordance with the following: Business Model Acquire 2 houses on assignment from record owner located at (1) 308 East Lorraine Ave., Baltimore, MD 21208 for $150,000 as is, with the investor-assignee to pay all taxes and liens and (2) 1209 James Street, Baltimore, MD 21223 for $140,000 as is, with the investor-assignee to pay all taxes and liens. Dolapo will invest in the partnership the sum of $20,000 each for repairs to the two properties and payment of any liens.

Taiwo Agbaje to manage the repairs and has secured the pricing on the homes, will prepare all the legal paperwork. It is expected that the properties upon completion of repairs will be sold as follows: 1. 308 East Lorraine Ave, Baltimore, MD 21208 comp market value rehabbed home to date is $215,000 2. 1209 James Street, Baltimore, MD 21223 comp market value rehabbed home is in the neighborhood of $200,000 more or less. The repairs will take 3 months and the houses will be sold in three months. From the proceeds of the sale, we will pay the record owner the contract amount and the net profit, will be shared equally after deducting each partner’s investment outlay.

Scenario: Assume $220,000 sale for 308 east Lorraine. Sale Price: $220,000 Owner: $150,000 Gross Profit $ 70,000 Refund of Dolapo’s investment $ 20,000 Net Profit $ 50,000 Dolapo’s share $ 25,000 Taiwo’s share $ 25,000 ⁷¹² Real estate taxes and liens will also be paid from gross profits. This is a real estate investment partnership not a loan or securities investment. This is the entire agreement of the parties.

After executing the agreement, Ms. Popoola wrote Respondent a check in the amount of $40,000. At the time she entered into the partnership agreement, Ms. Popoola, in the words of the hearing judge, “was a current client of Respondent” and “[ojther than the sale of her residence in Great Britain ... had no prior real estate or investment experience.” Furthermore, the hearing judge found that Respondent did not advise Ms. Popoola before she signed the agreement that: (1) she could have, or should have, consulted independent legal counsel and/or taken additional time to consider the agreement; (2) real estate investments have significant risks and profits are not guaranteed; (3) the James Street property was in foreclosure and Respondent therefore did not have clear title to the property; (4) Respondent had power of attorney for his cousin’s interest in the Lorraine Avenue property; and (5) Respondent could personally profit as the seller, realtor, and auctioneer of the two properties. At some point after entering into the partnership agreement, Respondent hired a contractor named Karl McDonald to perform repairs on the Lorraine Avenue property. McDonald, however, abandoned the project before its completion because of a dispute with Respondent over payments.

Some repairs were made to the Lorraine Avenue property. Respondent, however, did not produce receipts for the payments he allegedly made to contractors, nor did he produce receipts for the supplies those contractors allegedly used to perform repairs. On February 1, 2008, Respondent, exercising his authority under the power of attorney, sold the Lorraine Avenue property, on his cousin’s behalf, to one of his relatives for $180,000. Respondent did not advise Ms. Popoola that he was selling the property to a relative.

Ms. Popoola eventually ⁷¹³ received the $20,000 she had invested in the property, plus a $2,000 profit. Respondent produced no evidence demonstrating that any repairs had been made to the James Street property or that he had used any portion of Ms. Popoola’s $20,000 investment to prepare the property for sale. At some point in 2008, the property was foreclosed upon. Ms. Popoola did not receive any return on her investment.

Ms. Popoola regularly called and emailed Respondent requesting updates on the progress of the repairs to the two properties before they were sold or foreclosed upon. Respondent rarely responded to those requests and, when he did, his answers were, in the words of the hearing judge, “persistently misleading.” Based upon these factual findings, the hearing judge concluded, by a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof, that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.8(a) and MLRPC 8.4(a), (b), (c) and (d). The hearing judge explained his legal conclusions, as follows: Rule 1.8 Conflict of Interest: Current Clients: Specific Rules This court, having found facts as described above, concludes, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent violated Rule 1.8(a)(1), (2) and (3). The facts show that Respondent was actively engaged in pursuing Permanent Resident status for Popoola at the time that he entered into discussions with her about investing in his real estate business.

As such he was obligated to fully disclose to her each detail of the proposal. He never disclosed to her what percentages he was expecting to collect for acting as the real estate broker or the auctioneer. He did not disclose to her that as the owner of the James Street property, and with the Power of Attorney for the Lorraine Avenue property, he had the authority to reduce the profitability of her investment to favor himself. Among other things, he could set the sales price, commission percentages and accept or ⁷¹⁴ reject offers.

Their levels of experience were vastly disproportionate. Respondent had been actively engaged in the buying and selling of real estate for some time, while Popoola had no prior experience in this area. Respondent never told Popoola that the 2 properties that he directed her to, especially James Street, were distressed by liens, title issues and badly in need of repair. Instead he presented a proposal to Popoola that appeared to guarantee a windfall of $25,000 in excess of her investment within 3 months, on Lorraine Avenue alone____Respondent acknowledged that he never explained the potential risks to Popoola or included that in his proposal.

This was a completely one-sided deal where Popoola was exposed to the risk of losing her money, while Respondent was free to use her money without any oversight or risk to himself. In no way can it be said that this was fair or reasonable. Respondent was obligated to not only suggest to Popoola to seek independent counsel before entering into this agreement, but should have advised her of such, in writing. It is undisputed that this was not done.

Even after he drafted the agreement, he never suggested that she have it reviewed by another attorney, or to take some time to review it herself. Instead he had her execute it and took her $40,000 check at the initial meeting.... Respondent’s actions clearly display a conflict of interest to that of his client. Misconduct 8.4(a) This court, for the reasons discussed below, concludes, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent violated Rules 8.4(b), (c) and (d) and as a consequence thereof is in violation of Rule 8.4(a).

Attorney Grievance Commission v. Foltz, 411 Md. 359 , 983 A.2d 434 (2009). 8.4(b) ⁷¹⁵ This court, having made findings of fact as described above, concludes ... that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(b). This court concludes that Respondent committed the criminal act of theft, in that he willfully and knowingly utilized deception to obtain control over his client Popoola’s $40,000 investment. Annotated Code of Maryland, Criminal Law § 7-104(b)(l), (2) and (3). Respondent committed this act when he failed to advise Popoola that his profit making proposal was not based on established market values, appraisals or comparable sales.

He also failed to disclose to her the potential risk of losing all or part of her investment. As well, he failed to disclose to her that he could profit from her financial loss. To the contrary, he presented the proposal as if it were a guarantee to return a substantial profit within 3 months. Essentially, this was a fraudulent inducement. 8.4(c) This court, having made findings of fact as described above, concludes, by clearing and convincing evidence, that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(c).

Honesty is of paramount importance in the practice of law. Attorney Grievance Commission v. Ellison, 384 Md. 688 [ 867 A.2d 259 ] (2005). Candor and truthfulness are two of the most important moral character traits of a lawyer. Attorney Grievance Commission v. Myers, 333 Md. 440 [ 635 A.2d 1315 ] (1994).

This court concludes that Respondent displayed a persistent pattern of dishonesty and deceit toward his client, Popoola. This started with suggesting that she invest in properties that were distressed by lack of repair, liens, and delinquent mortgage payments. While he disclosed to her that he had an interest in the properties, he did not tell her that he had the ability to manipulate the sale prices, costs of repairs and fees, commissions and settlement costs to his financial advantage. When Popoola became concerned about the lack of progress of the repairs and sales, Respondent often avoided her communications.

When Respondent did respond to Popoola, typically through ⁷¹⁶ email, he misled her with a series of excuses and deceptions. At one point he told her that he was pursuing criminal charges against the contractor who abandoned the repair work____ At hearing, Respondent acknowledged that he took no such action. Without any consultation with Popoola, Respondent sold the Lorraine Avenue property to his relative at a price that was $40,000 less than was stated in the REIP. He also gave the relative an additional $10,800 in settlement assistance____ Respondent’s dishonesty and deceit with regard to the James Street property was worse.

In a December 11, 2007 email to Popoola, Respondent indicates that he had a buyer for the property and that the contract had been executed and loan approved.... This contract was never produced by Respondent. Months later, Respondent told Popoola that he had found tenants for the property who had an option to buy it. Respondent states that he will keep the monthly rental payments as reimbursement for the mortgage payments that he was paying....

The clear and convincing evidence produced showed that there were no renters and Respondent had not been paying the mortgage on the James Street property, which was by this time in foreclosure. As Popoola’s inquiries continued, Respondent next tells her that he has rented the property to a nonprofit organization ..., which again, was untrue. In fact, a review of Respondent’s emails submitted into evidence show a pattern of excuses, deceptions and lies. At various times, he blames his lack of response to Popoola’s calls on poor phone service, illness, being away on travel, and being overwhelmed with problems.

When Popoola pressed further for resolution, Respondent tried to stall her efforts with offers for her to purchase other properties.... 8.4(d) This court, having made findings of fact as described above, concludes, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(d). ⁷¹⁷ Conduct which is likely to impair public confidence in the profession, impact the image of the legal profession and engender disrespect for the court is conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. Attorney Grievance Commission v. Childress, 360 Md. 373 [ 758 A.2d 117 ] (2000). As stated, Respondent utilized his skill, knowledge and training as a member of the bar to induce his client to give him $40,000 to invest in distressed properties, owned and/or controlled by him. Respondent induced Popoola to enter into an agreement which was overwhehningly beneficial to Respondent’s financial situation, but provided substantial risks that his client could lose all or part of her investment.

He then commenced a pattern of avoidance, delay, denial and falsehoods to prevent her from finding out the truth of his scheme. Most assuredly, Respondent’s actions and conduct were prejudicial to the administration of justice. III. “In attorney discipline proceedings, this Court has original and complete jurisdiction and conducts an independent review of the record.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Page, 430 Md. 602, 626 , 62 A.3d 163 (2013). “[W]e accept the hearing judge’s findings of fact as prima facie correct unless shown to be clearly erroneous.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lara, 418 Md. 355, 364 , 14 A.3d 650 (2011). “Consistent with the standard of review for factual findings ... we have iterated that the judge ‘may elect to pick and choose which evidence to rely upon.’ ” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kreamer, 404 Md. 282, 311 , 946 A.2d 500 (2008) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harris, 403 Md. 142, 158 , 939 A.2d 732 (2008)). Furthermore, “[t]he Court shall give due regard to the opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the credibility of witnesses.” Md. Rule 16-759(b)(2)(B).

We review de novo the hearing judge’s conclusions of law. Md. Rule 16-759(b)(l). The ultimate decision as to whether an attorney has engaged in professional misconduct therefore lies with this Court. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Joehl, 335 Md. 83, 88 , 642 A.2d 194 (1994). ⁷¹⁸ When a party files exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact, those exceptions will be overruled so long as the findings are not clearly erroneous.

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Manger, 396 Md. 134, 146 , 913 A.2d 1 (2006) (citation omitted). When a party takes exception to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law, those exceptions will be overruled so long as the conclusions are supported by the facts found. Id. at 146-47 , 913 A.2d 1 . Respondent has filed numerous exceptions, which we shall address in turn.

Exceptions Related to Rulings on Motions and Conduct of Assistant Bar Counsel Respondent’s first exception concerns the hearing judge’s denial of his motion to compel the Commission to disclose Ms. Popoola’s address in England. Respondent claims that the Commission’s failure to provide the address prejudiced his ability to take Ms. Popoola’s deposition. He contends that, without the address, he could not comply with the “mandatory notice” requirement of Maryland Rule 2-412(a) and thereby guarantee her attendance at the deposition. The record reflects, and Respondent does not deny, both that the Commission had no independent knowledge of Ms. Popoola’s address in England and that Assistant Bar Counsel made a good faith effort to obtain the address, but Ms. Popoola was unwilling to provide it.

The discovery rules required no more from Assistant Bar Counsel. See Md. Rule 2-421 (b) (“An answer [to an interrogatory] shall include all information available to the party directly or through agents, representatives, or attorneys.”) (emphasis added). In any event, Respondent has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the denial of his motion to compel. He does not dispute that Assistant Bar Counsel offered to arrange a telephone deposition of Ms. Popoola and Ms. Popoola confirmed, in writing, her willingness to appear.

Moreover, Respondent does not dispute that he never followed up with Assistant Bar Counsel to have the deposition scheduled. Consequently, the deposition did not occur. Given these circumstances, the hearing judge neither erred nor abused his ⁷¹⁹ discretion in denying the motion to compel. Accordingly, the exception is overruled.

Respondent’s next exception concerns the hearing judge’s granting the Commission’s motion to allow Ms. Popoola to testify at the evidentiary hearing over Skype. Respondent argues that, even assuming Ms. Popoola resided in England, the Commission did not explain adequately why traveling to Maryland would impose upon her an undue cost or hardship. Respondent claims that citizens of England — who do not require a visa to visit the U.S. — travel to this country in order to testify in court “all the time.” He further argues that the Commission’s motion did not comply with certain requirements set forth in Maryland Rule 2-513, the Rule governing testimony taken by telephone. Finally, he contends that the hearing judge failed to implement safeguards to guarantee the integrity of Ms. Popoola’s video testimony.

We disagree on all fronts. Regardless of whether requiring Ms. Popoola to travel to Maryland would have imposed upon her an undue cost or hardship, the hearing judge lacked jurisdiction to enforce a subpoena compelling her attendance at the evidentiary hearing. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gallagher, 371 Md. 673, 701-02 , 810 A.2d 996 (2002) (“the subpoena powers of the State of Maryland stop at the state line”) (quoting Bartell v. Bartell, 278 Md. 12, 19 , 357 A.2d 343 (1976)). Thus, to the extent Ms. Popoola was unwilling or unable to appear personally, allowing her to testify over real-time video conference constituted a reasonable alternative.

Furthermore, Respondent’s reliance upon Rule 2-513 is misplaced. There was no reason for Assistant Bar Counsel to satisfy the requirements of that Rule, including the requirement that all motions be filed at least 30 days before the hearing, because, by its plain language, the Rule applies only to testimony taken by “landline telephone” — not video conference. Likewise, there is no merit to Respondent’s claim that the hearing judge did not impose reasonable safeguards to ensure the integrity of Ms. Popoola’s testimony. Maryland Rule 5- ⁷²⁰ 611(a) affords trial judges broad discretion to control “the mode ... of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to ... make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth.” The record reflects that the hearing judge required Ms. Popoola to take the same oath to tell the truth that she would have taken had she appeared personally in the courtroom.

Moreover, the judge required her to survey the room in which she was testifying, with her video camera, to confirm that she was alone. Our conclusion that the hearing judge did not abuse the broad discretion afforded to him in this context is unchanged by Respondent’s complaint that Ms. Popoola referred throughout her testimony to a computer screen other than the one displaying the Skype program. The record reflects that reference to the second computer was necessary in order to allow Ms. Popoola to review electronic versions of the Commission’s exhibits, which Assistant Bar Counsel had sent to Ms. Popoola in advance of the hearing. The record is devoid of evidence indicating that she consulted the second computer for any other purpose.

For all of these reasons, we overrule Respondent’s second exception. Respondent’s third exception challenges the circumstances that led to Assistant Bar Counsel filing a motion to extend the deadline for the hearing judge to file his findings of fact and conclusions of law. Respondent points out that the deadline, under Maryland Rule 16-757(c), was September 3, 2013, but the findings and conclusions were not docketed until three days later. Respondent claims that, after Assistant Bar Counsel discovered that the findings and conclusions had not been docketed by the September 3 deadline, she contacted the hearing judge’s chambers, without first notifying Respondent, and engaged in an ex parte communication with the judge related to the filing of a motion for an extension.

Respondent further complains that the hearing judge failed to notify him of the ex parte communication with Assistant Bar Counsel after the fact, as he was required to do under the Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct. All of this, Respondent argues, is ⁷²¹ evidence of the hearing judge’s bias and inattentiveness, which manifested themselves in his findings and conclusions. During oral argument before this Court, Assistant Bar Counsel clarified the extent of her communication with the hearing judge’s chambers related to the filing of the motion for an extension. She explained that she spoke only to the hearing judge’s law clerk, not the hearing judge himself.

During that conversation, she discovered that the findings and conclusions had been submitted timely to the Clerk’s office, but had not been docketed timely by that office. She conceded that she did not contact Respondent before communicating with the hearing judge’s chambers but emphasized that Respondent received a copy of the Commission’s motion and was afforded sufficient time to oppose its merits. In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Davy, 435 Md. 674, 697 , 80 A.3d 322 (2013), we rejected an exception similar to the one Respondent presents, reasoning that the respondent in that case “received a copy of the motion to extend time, and the Commission did not communicate directly with the hearing judge about the motion.” We reach the same conclusion here, and therefore overrule the exception. Respondent’s fourth exception alleges that Assistant Bar Counsel received improper legal advice from her father at some point during the evidentiary hearing.

This exception has no basis in the record. The affidavit of Respondent’s wife, on which he relies in support of this exception, states that Assistant Bar Counsel received what appeared to be legal advice from “a lawyer or staff with the Attorney Grievance Commission” — not Assistant Bar Counsel’s father. This is consistent with Assistant Bar Counsel’s disclosure to the hearing judge at the beginning of the hearing that she was joined by co-counsel. Nothing in the Maryland Rules prohibits a lawyer from consulting with co-counsel during a hearing.

Accordingly, we overrule the exception. Exceptions to Findings of Fact We first address Respondent’s broad challenge to the hearing judge’s crediting Ms. Popoola’s testimony and ⁷²² relying upon that testimony in making his findings of fact. The general rule is that we defer to the credibility findings of the hearing judge. We do so because the hearing judge, not this Court, “is in the best position to assess the demeanor-based credibility of a witness.” See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50 , 891 A.2d 1085 (2006).

Respondent argues that, in light of Ms. Popoola’s “multiple instances of failure[ ] to remember facts with sufficient detail,” the hearing judge improperly credited her testimony and, therefore, her testimony cannot serve as support for the hearing judge’s findings of fact. We disagree. Ms. Popoola remembered all the material facts of her dealings with Respondent. It is of no moment, for example, that seven years after the fact, Ms. Popoola could