Attorney Grievance Commission v. Cafferty

HARRELL, Judge. I. A. Diane E. Cafferty (“Respondent”) was admitted to the Maryland Bar on 19 December 1985 and the District of Columbia Bar in October 1986. On 3 July 2002, Respondent was disbarred in the District of Columbia by Order of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. In re Glenn H. Carlson & Diane E. Cafferty, 802 A.2d 341 (D.C.2002).

The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, acting through Bar Counsel, filed with this Court a petition for reciprocal disciplinary action against Respondent. Bar Counsel attached to its petition a certified copy of the District of ⁷⁰² Columbia Court of Appeals’s opinion in support of Bar Counsel’s allegation that, because of Respondent’s disbarment from the practice of law in the District of Columbia for engaging in conduct involving misappropriation and failure to render ac-countings promptly to clients upon request, Respondent should be disbarred also in Maryland. Based on the District of Columbia order disbarring Respondent, Bar Counsel alleges, under Maryland Rule 16-773, 1 violations of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”), including MRPC 1.15(a),1.15(b), and 1.15(c), 2 8.4(c) and ⁷⁰³ 8.4(d), 3 and Md. Rule 16-609. 4 Bar Counsel asks this Court to impose corresponding discipline to that imposed by the District of Columbia. This Court ordered that Respondent show cause why she should not be disbarred in Maryland.

Respondent filed a response, and we heard argument in this matter on 5 June 2003. As a preliminary matter, we observe that Md. Rule 16-773(g) addresses the conclusive effect of a prior disciplinary adjudication as follows: Except as provided in subsections (e)(1) and (e)(2) of this Rule, a final adjudication in a disciplinary or remedial proceeding by another court, agency, or tribunal that an attorney has been guilty of professional misconduct or is ⁷⁰⁴ incapacitated is conclusive evidence of that misconduct or incapacity in any proceeding under this Chapter. The introduction of such evidence does not preclude the Commission or Bar Counsel from introducing additional evidence or preclude the attorney from introducing evidence otherwise showing cause why no discipline or lesser discipline should be imposed. We therefore accept the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’s conclusion that Respondent recklessly misappropriated client funds and failed to render accountings promptly to her condominium clients upon request.

B. On 30 December 1997, District of Columbia Bar Counsel filed a specification of charges against Respondent alleging that she violated D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct 1.15(a), 1.15(b), 8.4(b), and 8.4(c). D.C. Bar Counsel filed identical charges against Respondent’s law partner, Glenn H. Carlson, and moved to consolidate both cases because they arose out of the Carlson & Cafferty law firm’s representation of owners of condominium units located at 1927 17th Street, N.W., in the District of Columbia. Respondent objected to the proposed consolidation claiming that consolidation would “taint” her due to Mr. Carlson’s individual conduct in these matters and his failure to cooperate with D.C. Bar Counsel. The D.C. Board on Professional Responsibility determined that Respondent would not be prejudiced by the consolidation and that consolidation was appropriate.

Four days of testimony were received in 1998 and, approximately two years later, the D.C. Hearing Committee issued its Report, which the D.C. Board on Professional Responsibility reviewed and modified. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals summarized the factual record as follows: “Documents in the record and the Board’s Report reveal that in February 1985, during the last year of her law school studies, Ms. Cafferty worked as a law clerk at the firm of Kenny, Carlson & Warren. After her graduation from law ⁷⁰⁵ school and admission to the Maryland Bar, Ms. Cafferty joined the firm as an associate; she worked almost exclusively for Mr. Carlson. Around 1988, Mr. Carlson, Ms. Cafferty and Mr. Daniel Ferris left Kenny, Carlson & Warren and established their own firm, Carlson, Cafferty & Ferris.

Mr. Ferris managed the firm’s client trust fund. The firm became Carlson & Cafferty after Mr. Ferris’s departure to practice law in another jurisdiction, and Mr. Carlson assumed the position of managing partner. “The firm maintained a client trust fund at the Riggs Bank (“the Riggs Escrow Account”), an operating account at the First Liberty National Bank between March 1992 and September 1995, and an account for Commercial Quest, Inc. at Riggs Bank, which was used as an operating account beginning around September 1995. Ms. Cafferty served as President of Commercial Quest, ‘a separate business venture.’ Both Mr. Carlson and Ms. Cafferty had signatory authority on all of the firm’s accounts. Ms. Hammond handled day-to-day management of the Riggs Escrow Account until she left the firm in 1993.

The Board found that Ms. Cafferty ‘regularly transferred moneys between the Riggs Escrow Account and the various accounts maintained by the law firm, generally at the direction of [Mr.] Carlson.’ “Around May 1989, Thomas Fritz, owner of a condominium unit at the 17th Street condominium, contacted Ms. Cafferty and asked her to represent him in his dispute with his condominium association over services and repairs at the condominium complex. She agreed, and Mr. Fritz decided to send his monthly condominium fee payments of $148.33 to Carlson & Cafferty. These payments were made from around May 1989, through March 1996, and were sent with a letter addressed either to Ms. Cafferty, or to Mr. Carlson and Ms. Cafferty. Each transmittal specified that the check should be put into the law firm’s escrow account.

Commencing in early 1990, at least two other residents of the 17th Street condominium sent monies to the law firm; these funds also were earmarked for the firm’s escrow account. ⁷⁰⁶ Other persons connected to the 17th Street condominium transmitted funds to the firm for the escrow account. “In addition to making payments for the law firm’s escrow account, Mr. Fritz and two other owners of condominium units in the 17th Street condominium retained Carlson & Cafferty under a contingency fee arrangement, in March 1991, to take legal action against the principal officer of the 17th Street condominium’s management company. Approximately ten months after the lawsuit was filed, the parties entered into a settlement agreement, and the settlement funds were placed in the Riggs Escrow Account. “After settlement, Carlson & Cafferty continued to represent Mr. Fritz and other residents of the 17th Street condominium. In May 1992, Mr. Fritz and others retained the firm, at the hourly billing rate of $225, to ‘prepare and update all condominium documents and to take steps necessary to have the [condominium association] in full compliance with the law and all governing documents.’ Furthermore, when one of the persons whom the firm represented assumed responsibility for the management of the 17th Street condominium, bills of the condominium were sent to the firm for payment from escrow funds; some monthly condominium fees also were transmitted for deposit in the firm’s escrow account. “After retaining the firm in May 1992, the 17th Street condominium clients began to request billing statements, bylaws, and information about services that the firm had rendered. Responses to oral and written requests made between May 1992 and December 1994 were delayed.

One accounting was received in October 1993, and at a February 1994 condominium association meeting, attended by Ms. Cafferty and Mr. Carlson, amended bylaws were submitted, as well as an accounting for funds received and paid on behalf of the association since 1989. The accounting showed that ‘[Carlson & Cafferty] had received over $60,000[,] ... had expended approximately $40,000, including $11,948.86 paid to the firm in fees and expenses’ and $21,000 remained in escrow. Following the February 1994 meeting, Mr. Fritz ⁷⁰⁷ repeatedly asked the firm for additional accountings. An accounting was submitted in June 1995, and thereafter, no requested accounting was forthcoming until July 1997.

By that time, two of the condominium clients had filed an ethical complaint against Mr. Carlson and Ms. Cafferty. “Around February and April of 1994, the Washington Federal Savings Bank, which had foreclosed on three of the 17th Street condominium units, began paying monthly condominium fees on these units to Carlson & Cafferty for deposit into the firm’s escrow account. When the 17th Street condominium was sold around March 1996, Washington Federal Savings Bank asked Mr. Carlson to disburse the funds held in the Riggs Escrow Account. Mr. Carlson sent a letter to Washington Federal Savings Bank on March 25, 1996, agreeing to disburse funds, except for $8,000 to be retained for potential liabilities. After the sale closed, Mr. Fritz and others repeatedly requested disbursement of the Riggs Escrow Account funds.

Mr. Carlson did not honor these requests in a timely manner, undoubtedly because there were insufficient funds in the escrow account. In fact, the Board found that: By the Summer of 1996, when Carlson & Cafferty were required to disburse to the condominium owners the more than $40,000 that they had received to hold in trust, only approximately $2,000 of the funds remained in the Riggs Escrow Account. The missing funds of the [condominium association] had been used by [Mr. Carlson and Ms. Cafferty], without their clients’ knowledge or consent, to pay themselves and other payees unrelated to the [condominium association], at times when the balance in the Riggs Escrow Account had fallen below the amount that [Mr. Carlson and Ms. Cafferty] were required to hold in trust for the [condominium association]. “The reason for the shortage of funds in the escrow account is that beginning around April 1992, and continuing to around September 1995, Mr. Carlson and Ms. Cafferty commingled the Riggs Escrow Account funds with other accounts and used the escrow funds for purposes not associ ⁷⁰⁸ ated with the affairs of the condominium clients or the condominium association. During the 1992 to 1995 period, ‘numerous checks’ that Mr. Carlson and Ms. Cafferty wrote on their First Liberty National Bank operating account were dishonored due to insufficient funds.

The Board found that bank records for the operating account ‘reflected only three monthly periods in which the account was not overdrawn.’ The Board also determined that: ‘[Mr.] Carlson and [Ms.] Cafferty regularly wrote checks using funds from the Riggs Escrow Account to pay firm expenses at times they both knew that the law firm had a shortage of funds in its operating account at First Liberty Bank.’ “After the bank closed Carlson & Cafferty’s operating account, Mr. Carlson and Ms. Cafferty ‘transferred thousands of dollars in funds from the Riggs Escrow Account to the Commercial Quest account,’ and began to use that account as its operating account. Between September 1995, and December 1995, $35,425.30 was deposited into the Commercial Quest account, and less than $1,000 of that sum was traceable to a source other than the Riggs Escrow Account. During the September to December 1995 period, Mr. Carlson did not spend much time in Carlson & Cafferty’s office and did not attend to the affairs of the law firm. Consequently, ‘[Ms.] Cafferty signed many of the checks that were drawn on the Riggs Escrow Account that transferred these funds’ to the Commercial Quest account. “Even before the close of Carlson & Cafferty’s First Liberty National Bank operating account, Mr. Carlson and Ms. Cafferty were using funds from the Riggs Escrow Account to pay themselves and office expenses.

Bank records revealed that this practice began around November 1991 and continued through 1996, and into 1997. Indeed, some 94 checks signed by Ms. Cafferty in 1995 alone, were written on the Riggs Escrow Account and were made payable to ‘cash’ in sums ranging from $50.00 to $7,615.06. Funds from one ‘cash’ check for $678.00 were used to pay a Carlson & Cafferty employee’s rent. ⁷⁰⁹ “Funds deposited in the Commercial Quest account, which included monies transferred from the Riggs Escrow Account, also were used by Mr. Carlson and Ms. Cafferty for cash purposes. During the period September to December 1995, Ms. Cafferty wrote checks to cash on the Commercial Quest account which totaled $3,294.15. “When she testified before hearing committee Number Five, Ms. Cafferty was asked about the checks made out to ‘cash’ that she wrote on the Riggs Escrow Account.

She replied: Well, ... [Mr.] Carlson told me to take the cash out of the account; that he had plenty of money in the account ... If the operating account were low, he’d say take the money out of that and put the cash in the operating account so that it gets credited immediately. She denied taking any of the condominium clients’ funds, ‘to [her] knowledge.’ Instead, she maintained that funds for the checks made out to cash came out' of Mr. Carlson’s father’s estate money. She thought that Mr. Carlson ‘had an abundance of money.’ She also asserted that at the time, Mr. Carlson had obtained about $39,000 from his wife to put into the account. “Ms. Cafferty acknowledged during her testimony before the hearing committee that one of the reasons Mr. Carlson, Mr. Ferris and she left their prior firm was because an attorney in that firm sought to use money from a client trust account to pay office expenses.

She admitted knowing ‘that [such use] was wrong at the time[.]’ She also confirmed that she had personally deposited some of the condominium clients’ money into the firm’s client escrow account periodically. When Bar Counsel inquired whether she paid herself ‘compensation out of the [client] trust account,’ she responded: Yes. When [Mr. Carlson] had his money in there, and I needed to get paid, he would say write it for cash, and he was loaning it to the firm from his money. ⁷¹⁰ She added that she ‘always thought that there were trusts within trusts that were theoretically insulated from each other.’ “By June 1997, Carlson & Cafferty still had not presented a final accounting to the condominium clients, and had not disbursed the condominium association funds that were supposed to be in the Riggs Escrow Account. Therefore, two of the condominium clients filed an ethical complaint against Carlson & Cafferty.

Mr. Carlson informed Ms. Cafferty of the shortage of funds in the Riggs Escrow Account, but stated that he would obtain $39,000 from his wife to replace the funds. He put the funds from his wife, as well as smaller sums, into an account that he had opened in July 1997 at the First Liberty National Bank, to bring the Liberty account up to $40,624.39. Then he deposited $40,536.05 of that amount in the Riggs Escrow Account, and paid that sum to the condominium clients and the Washington Federal Savings Bank.” 802 A.2d at 343-47 (internal footnotes omitted). The District of Columbia Court of Appeals considered the report and recommendation of the D.C. Board on Professional Responsibility under a standard of review requiring the court to “accept the findings of fact made by the Board unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence of record, and [to] adopt the recommended disposition of the Board unless to do so would foster a tendency toward inconsistent dispositions for comparable conduct or would otherwise be unwarranted.” 802 A.2d at 347 (quoting D.C.Bar.

R. XI, § 9(g)). The court, however, also observed that its review of whether Ms. Cafferty recklessly misappropriated client funds was a legal question which it reviewed de novo. The District of Columbia court noted that the definition of “misappropriation” in D.C. was “any unauthorized use of client’s funds entrusted to [the lawyer], including not only stealing but also unauthorized temporary use for the lawyer’s own purpose, whether or not [she] derives any personal gain or benefit therefrom.” 802 A.2d at 347 -48 (quoting In re ⁷¹¹ Harrison, 461 A.2d 1034, 1036 (D.C.1983)). The court noted further that “misappropriation occurs whenever the balance in [the attorney’s escrow] account falls below the amount due to the client” and is “essentially a per se offense.” 802 A.2d at 348 .

Because of the serious nature of a misappropriation offense, the District of Columbia “adhered to a standard of presumptive disbarment,” except in cases of negligent misappropriation or extraordinary circumstances. 802 A.2d at 348 . The District of Columbia classifies misappropriation cases into three categories: (1) intentional misappropriation; (2) reckless misappropriation; and (3) negligent misappropriation. The principle of presumptive disbarment applies only to the first two categories. Id, In the District of Columbia, Ms. Cafferty argued that if the facts of her case fell into any of the categories it was the negligent misappropriation category, and merited therefore only a six month suspension.

Id. The D.C. Board, however, found her actions to constitute reckless misappropriation, meriting disbarment. Id. In that regard, the District of Columbia court opined that: The central issue in determining whether a misappropriation is reckless is how the attorney handles entrusted funds, whether in a way that suggests the unauthorized use was inadvertent or the result of simple negligence, or in a way that reveals either an intent to treat the funds as the attorney’s own or a conscious indifference to the consequences of his [or her] behavior for the security of the funds.

Id. (quoting In re Anderson, 778 A.2d 330, 339 (D.C.2001)). In the District of Columbia, the examination of how the attorney handled entrusted funds and whether reckless misappropriation occurred entails examination of “a pattern or course of conduct demonstrating an unacceptable disregard for the welfare of entrusted funds, such as (1) the indiscriminate commingling of entrusted and personal funds, (2) the failure to track settlement proceeds, (3) the disregard of the status of accounts into which entrusted funds were placed, or (4) per ⁷¹² mitting the repeated overdraft condition of an account.” 802 A.2d at 348-49 . The court also noted that “the indiscriminate movement of monies between accounts” and the “disregard of inquiries concerning the status of funds” were other factors indicating recklessness. 802 A.2d at 349 .

The court distinguished Ms. Cafferty’s case from another misappropriation case, In re Anderson, stating that Anderson involved a single act of misconduct and a finding of negligent misappropriation, whereas Ms. Cafferty “engaged in a pattern of course or conduct demonstrating an unacceptable disregard for the welfare of entrusted funds.” Id. (citation omitted). The court continued: This pattern extended over several years, including substantial periods of time in which Mr. Carlson was not paying attention to the affairs of the firm, thus calling into question Ms. Cafferty’s insistence that she acted only at the direction of Mr. Carlson, and that the entire blame for the misappropriation falls squarely on him. 802 A.2d at 349 . The District of Columbia court observed that in Anderson, although there was insufficient evidence to conclude that Anderson engaged in reckless misappropriation and related violations involving a single failure to pay a client’s medical bill from settlement funds, the court noted that “[i]f in fact Mr. Anderson ignored or willfully blinded himself to ... reminders [by the client that the bill had not been paid], then we would have no difficulty sustaining the [hearing committee’s] determination of recklessness.” Id.' (quoting Anderson, 778 A.2d at 341 ).

The court found that precise situation in Ms. Cafferty’s case: Ms. Cafferty ignored repeated requests by the 17th Street condominium clients for an accounting of client trust funds. She also willfully blinded herself to Mr. Carlson’s improper transfer of funds from the Riggs Escrow Account to Carlson & Cafferty’s operating accounts, as well as to the consequences of her own improper use of the Riggs Escrow Account by writing checks to “cash” for personal payments. As the Board noted in another reckless misappropriation case, ‘this is not a case where all of the conduct resulting in ⁷¹³ a misappropriation was caused by someone else.’ In re Gregory, 790 A.2d 573 , 578 n. 1 (D.C.2002). Indeed, the record clearly and convincingly demonstrates Ms. Cafferty’s active and reckless involvement in the misappropriation of client trust funds. 802 A.2d at 349 .

Ms. Cafferty’s culpable behavior was described as follows: “Ms. Cafferty was a signatory on the firm’s accounts, including the Riggs Escrow Account. She was well-attuned to the impropriety of using client funds to pay for personal expenses, and she had left a prior firm because a partner had engaged in the practice. Nonetheless, bank records reveal that at least from late 1991, and continuing through mid-1996, Ms. Cafferty personally wrote numerous checks on the Riggs Escrow Account that were made out to cash, in amounts ranging from $50.00 to $7,615.06. During this period of time, Carlson & Cafferty’s operating account at the First Liberty National Bank was overdrawn repeatedly, to such an extent that the bank closed the account in 1995.

To create another operating account, Mr. Carlson and Ms. Cafferty transferred thousands of dollars from the Riggs Escrow Account to the Commercial Quest, Inc. account, designed initially for a business venture headed by Ms. Cafferty. The Board specifically found that ‘[Ms.] Cafferty signed many of the checks that were drawn on the Riggs Escrow Account that transferred these funds’ to the Commercial Quest account, despite the fact that she personally deposited some of the funds sent to the law firm by the 17th Street condominium clients into the escrow account and thus knew that the Riggs Escrow Account contained client trust funds. After transferring funds from the escrow account to the Commercial Quest account, Ms. Cafferty wrote checks out to ‘cash’ on that account in the amount of $3,294.15. By mid-1996, when the condominium clients were seeking disbursement of approximately $40,000.00 in client trust funds, less than $2,000.00 remained in the Riggs Escrow Account. ⁷¹⁴ “Furthermore, Ms. Cafferty acknowledged that she even paid herself with funds from the Riggs Escrow Account, but again sought to shift the blame to Mr. Carlson.

As she asserted during her testimony before the hearing committee, in response to a question about her receipt of compensation from the client trust fund: “When [Mr. Carlson] had his money in there, and I needed to get paid, he would say write it for cash, and he was loaning it to the firm from his ■ money.’ “Ms. Cafferty wrote checks on the Riggs Escrow Account, made out to cash, when she knew about requests from the condominium clients for accountings. She attended meetings of the 17th Street condominium association and became aware that repeated requests had been made for an accounting of the client trust funds. Even though she may not have prepared or seen the reports, she was present at the condominium association meetings when inaccurate and misleading accounting reports were distributed to her clients. She also knew that she and Mr. Carlson were the only lawyers in the firm; that personal funds from Mr. Carlson were being placed in the client trust fund; and that beginning in or around 1994, Mr. Carlson was not paying proper attention to the affairs of the law firm due to personal problems, including protracted problems with his marriage and heavy drinking, leaving substantial responsibility for the affairs of the firm to her.

Yet, she took no steps to ensure the ‘safety and welfare of entrusted funds.’ In re Anderson, 778 A.2d at 338 . Instead, she personally displayed ‘an unacceptable disregard for the security of the client funds,’ id. (citation omitted) and ‘a conscious indifference to the consequences of [her] behavior for the security of these funds[,]’ id. at 339 (reference omitted). In short, her actions relating to the Riggs Escrow Account were not inadvertent or negligent.

Rather, the record contains clear and convincing evidence that she recklessly misappropriated client trust funds. The record also supports the Board’s determination that Ms. Cafferty failed to render accountings promptly to her condominium clients upon request. She ⁷¹⁵ attended meetings of the condominium association, including one in February 1994, and many of the written requests for accountings were addressed to her. Hence, Ms. Cafferty was aware of the requests for accountings, but made no effort to see that they were rendered in a timely fashion.

For example, despite repeated requests, after the delayed submission of an accounting in June 1995, for an additional accounting, none was forthcoming until two of the condominium clients filed an ethical complaint against Mr. Carlson and Ms. Cafferty. Thus, the record contains clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Cafferty failed to render ac-countings promptly to her condominium clients upon request.” 802 A.2d at 349-51 (internal footnotes omitted). The District of Columbia Court of Appeals also addressed Ms. Cafferty’s contention that the consolidation of her case with Mr. Carlson’s case violated her due process rights. The court noted the importance of judicial economy in consolidating the cases because they both arose out of their joint representation of the 17th Street condominium clients, and concluded that the record revealed that no prejudice accrued to Ms. Cafferty. 802 A.2d at 351 . 5 II.

A. Ms. Cafferty argues that this Court should find compelling her enumeration of “undisputed” facts: ⁷¹⁶ “It is undisputed that, throughout her entire professional career (since 1985), Respondent Cafferty never managed the accounts of the firm and in particular the trust account, as the Hearing Committee and the Board correctly concluded; “It is undisputed that Respondent Cafferty never wrote a single check except at the express direction of Carlson; “It is undisputed that Respondent Cafferty, on a number of occasions during the time period Bar Counsel maintains misappropriations were being made, asked complainants to take possession and control of the funds at issue; “It is undisputed that the complainants never dealt with Cafferty concerning the sale of the condo; they had nothing to do with her for more than a year prior to the sale; “It is undisputed that, after the closing(s), the complainants never asked Respondent Cafferty to [disburse] the funds nor did they inform her that Carlson had failed to do so upon request; “It is undisputed that Carlson prepared all the account-ings; “It is undisputed that Cafferty did not have the data necessary to generate an accounting; “It is undisputed that throughout the representation, complainants received periodic accountings from Carlson; “It is undisputed that although Fritz [a condominium association client] wanted accountings more frequently, complainants continued to retain the firm, specifically Mr. Carlson; “It is undisputed that the primary accounting issue had to do with Mr. Thompson’s abject failure to make timely payments in the proper amount; [and] “It is undisputed that Respondent Cafferty has never been the subject of any disciplinary action, prior to this matter.” Respondent asks us to disregard the findings and conclusions of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and instead rely on the conclusions drawn by the D.C. Hearing Committee and ⁷¹⁷ the D.C. Board of Professional Responsibility that she had not acted dishonestly as alleged by D.C. Bar Counsel. Ms. Caf-ferty argues that it was inconsistent for the D.C. Hearing Committee and D.C. Board to each find that she had not acted dishonestly, but nonetheless recommend that she be disbarred from the District of Columbia Bar. Respondent analogizes her case to that of Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Powell, 328 Md. 276 , 614 A.2d 102 (1992), a case involving the alleged misappropriation of funds in which we found that there was a lack of clear and convincing evidence of “dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” 328 Md. at 292 , 614 A.2d at 110 . Respondent notes that Mr. Powell was the only attorney responsible for the trust account and that he was aware that there was a probability that his client’s funds might be mis-deposited. 328 Md. at 295 , 614 A.2d at 112 .

Powell also had arranged a “loan” from a client and subsequently bounced the repayment check although the funds were ultimately repaid. Id. This Court found that the misappropriation had been unintentional and suspended Powell for six months. Respondent notes that we took into account that Powell had been in practice for twenty years with no prior occurrences of misconduct. 328 Md. at 301 , 614 A.2d at 115 .

Respondent contends that, like Powell, she engaged in no prior instances of misconduct in her fifteen years as a member of the D.C. Bar. Respondent points out she fully cooperated with Bar Counsel, unlike Powell, who was found to have been “less than cooperative and reasonable in his responses to Bar Counsel’s investigation.” 328 Md. at 299 , 614 A.2d at 114 . Respondent also relies on Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ober, 350 Md. 616 , 714 A.2d 856 (1998), where we took note of Mr. Ober’s spotless record when determining his sanction. She lastly urges