Attorney Grievance Commission v. Finnesey

Per Curiam: On August 19, 1977 the respondent was charged by the Attorney Grievance Commission, acting through Bar Counsel, with designated violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The matter was referred to a three-judge panel of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City pursuant to the provisions of Rule BV10. ⁵⁴² The panel concluded, after an evidentiary hearing, that the misconduct had been proved only in part; it recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months. The respondent filed exceptions to the panel’s determination, primarily on the ground that the recommended sanction was too harsh. He urged that the appropriate sanction was a reprimand.

After careful review of the panel’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, we agree with the respondent that the recommended six-month suspension was too severe. We do not agree, however, that a reprimand is the appropriate sanction. Rather, we conclude, in view of the hereinafter quoted portions of the panel’s memorandum opinion, which we adopt, that a suspension of thirty days is the proper sanction. “The Respondent, Lee Rennels Finnesey, was admitted as a member of the Bar of the State of Maryland on December 19,1969. There have been no prior complaints filed against the Respondent for unethical or unprofessional conduct. “Bar Counsel’s Petition specifically charged Respondent with the violation of Disciplinary Rules 1-102 (A) (4) and Rule 6-101 (A) (1), (2), which read as follows: ‘DR 1-102 Misconduct — (a) A lawyer shall not: (4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.

DR 6-101 Failing to act competently. (A) A lawyer shall not: (1) Handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is not competent to handle, without associating with him a lawyer who is competent to handle it. (2) Handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances.’ ⁵⁴³ “The Respondent was served with a copy of the Petition, together with interrogatories and request for admission of facts, on or about September 14, 1977, but did not file a response or answer thereto. “A Decree Pro Confesso was issued against Respondent on October 19, 1977. “Thereafter, although duly notified, the Respondent failed to appear at a Hearing before the Panel on October 26, 1977. “On November 3, 1977, Respondent filed a Petition to Re-open the Hearing. Bar Counsel filed an Answer thereto, or in the alternative a Motion Ne Recipiatur or to Strike Respondent’s Motion to Re-open Hearing. “Answer to Interrogatories were filed by Respondent on November 28, 1977. “The Panel reconvened on November 29,1977, and denied the Motion Ne Recipiatur or to Strike. “Mr. Finnesey was allowed to testify on that date.

He did not deny the allegations of the Bar Counsel as contained in the original Petition and as set forth in the unanswered Admission of Facts. “Basically, it was contended that in January or February, 1973, the Respondent was retained to represent a minor, Deborah Ann Bentley, (nee Carroll) in regard to a motor tort. There was an alleged ‘phantom vehicle’ involved in the occurrence, and the Respondent filed the Notice of Intention to Make Claim form with the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund of the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund, as required under Article 48 A, section 245, Maryland Code. “Although he advised the client that it had been done, no petition seeking leave of court to sue the Fund was ever filed by Respondent. He represented to the client that at least three (3) different dates had been set for a hearing on the required petition but ⁵⁴⁴ that the matter was postponed by the Court on each occasion. “In the late summer or early fall of 1975, the client retained new counsel. “During October, 1975, the new counsel wrote two (2) letters to Respondent requesting the file and a status report. On December 28, 1975, Respondent forwarded the file. “Unable to locate a Petition for Leave to File Suit against the Fund in the file, the new attorney wrote to Respondent on January 6,1976, requesting a copy of all pleadings.

Respondent did not reply. “It is conceded that the Respondent had never filed the said Petition and that no hearings were ever scheduled, although he had so advised the client. “Prior to the Petition for Disciplinary Action, Bar Counsel had informed Respondent of the complaint and requested a reply. Respondent failed to answer two (2) such letters dated April 1,1976 and April 22, 1976, (Petitioner’s Exhibit 7-8) and declined to appear for a hearing before an Inquiry Panel on September 22, 1976. “Indeed, the first acknowledgment by Respondent of the existence of the entire proceedings was his filing of the Petition to Re-open the Hearing on November 3, 1977. “At the hearing on November 29, 1977, it was conceded that the Respondent had paid outstanding medical bills from monies received under PIP