Attorney Grievance Commission v. Hollis

PER CURIAM. The Attorney Grievance Commission, by bar counsel, filed in this Court a petition for disciplinary action against Meldon S. Hollis, Jr., a member of the bar of this Court. Hollis was charged with violating the following Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule 1.15; 1 Rule 8.1; 2 and Rule ⁵⁴⁹ 8.4(c) and (d). 3 In addition, he was charged with violating three of the Maryland Rules relating to attorney trust accounts 4 and with violating Maryland Code (1989, 1995 Repl. ⁵⁵⁰ Vol.), § 10-306 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article. 5 Pursuant to Rule 16-707, this Court on January 2, 1996, ordered that the charges against Hollis be transmitted to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, and we designated Circuit Judge Richard T. Rombro to hear the charges. Our January 2, 1996, order further directed that Hollis respond to the charges within 15 days from the date the charges were served upon him, and that the hearing before Judge Rombro be held not later than 30 days from the filing of Hollis’s response.

Subsequently this Court, upon the Commission’s motion and without any objection from Hollis, entered an order extending the time for a hearing until April 22,1996. Prior to the scheduled hearing on April 22,1996, Hollis filed a “Motion For Recusal of Judge Richard T. Rombro,” asserting a “lack of impartiality on the part of Judge Rombro.” The alleged “lack of impartiality” appeared to be based upon two specific matters: (1) Judge Rombro’s overruling Hollis’s attorney’s objection to the April 22, 1996, hearing date because it was not convenient for the attorney; (2) the fact that Hollis did not support Judge Rombro’s candidacy, as a sitting judge, for election to the circuit court in 1990. This Court, by an order of March 26, 1996, denied the motion for the recusal of Judge Rombro. Thereafter, Hollis filed a “renewed” motion for the recusal of Judge Rombro which this Court denied on April 8,1996. ⁵⁵¹ The hearing commenced on April 22, 1996.

Subsequently, Judge Rombro made the following findings: “This Attorney Grievance matter was referred to this court by the Court of Appeals on January 2, 1996, in accordance with Rule BV-9 et seq. to conduct a hearing and to report the findings of fact and conclusions of law to the Court of Appeals. The referral followed the filing of a petition for disciplinary action against the Respondent, Meldon S. Hollis, Jr. by the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland. “The Respondent filed a motion asking for recusal of the trial court in the Court of Appeals. This motion was denied. Thereafter, the Respondent filed a second motion requesting the same relief, which was again denied.

Following this, hearings were held before this court on April 22nd and April 23rd of 1996. The Respondent appeared with counsel, and at the outset addressed a third motion for recusal to this court. The court declined to rule on Respondent’s motion for the reason that it was within the province of the Court of Appeals, which had twice denied the same motion. The court did explain that even if the motion was proper, there was no basis for recusal.

After these preliminaries, the court took testimony from Bar Counsel and the Respondent and herewith submits the following report to the Court of Appeals. “FINDINGS OF FACT “The Complainant, Dr. Leroy Amar, testified that he had been represented by the Respondent since sometime in 1987. Dr. Amar had met the Respondent while Respondent was a member of his previous law firm. The doctor testified that the Respondent represented him over a period of years on numerous complex matters. “Amar testified that in 1990 he had borrowed $150,000.00 from one Ramona Cowan, who was a personal friend. He was to repay the loan with interest at an annual rate of eighteen percent.

He testified that he had made payments over a period of years, primarily on the interest and had not been able to repay the principal. In 1991 the lender, M’s Cowan, ⁵⁵² died in an automobile accident and the loan to Dr. Amar was included as an asset in her estate. “On January 6, 1992, Dr. Amar sold three of his four medical clinics for approximately one million dollars. The doctor took back a mortgage and the buyer was to pay $200,000.00 at the time of the settlement. Most of the $200,-000.00 was used to pay off debts of the clinic so that the sale could be concluded.

After the payment of debts, there were net proceeds of $40,000.00 to be paid to Dr. Amar. As part of Amar’s agreement with the buyer, he was also to receive a $50,000.00 loan. At the time of settlement then, based on the proceeds and the loan, Amar was to receive $90,000.00. An additional $3,450.00 was withheld to pay an existing tax lien against the business. “Amar clearly testified that his instructions to the Respondent were that the $90,000.00 was to be forwarded to the Estate of M’s Cowan, to be applied to the balance due her. “On January 9, 1992, Respondent wrote to the law firm of Siskind, Burch, Grady & Rosen, who represented the purchaser.

The letter set forth the understanding of the distribution of funds. The Respondent requested from the Siskind firm a certified check payable to Hollis & Associates, P.A., in the amount of $40,095.49. He also requested the amount of $3,450.00, which had been withheld to satisfy a tax lien, but which was apparently not necessary. On that same date, January 9, 1992, the Siskind firm issued its Check No. 1015 drawn on the First National Bank in the amount of $40,095.49 payable to Hollis & Associates, and forwarded it to the Respondent.

The Respondent received that check and deposited it in his account in the First American Bank of Maryland/First Union National Bank on January 10, 1992. The loan to Dr. Amar was advanced by separate check, No. 1016, drawn on the Escrow Account of the Siskind firm on January 10, 1992, and was forwarded to Respondent. That check was also payable to Hollis & Associates, P.A. It was received on January 13, 1992 by the Respondent and deposited into the same account as the earlier check. Finally, Check No. 1017, ⁵⁵³ again drawn on the Escrow Account of the Siskind firm, in the amount of $3,450.00, which had been withheld for the outstanding tax lien, was forwarded to the Respondent.

Check No. 1017 was also payable to Hollis & Associates, P.A., and was received by the Respondent on January 13, 1992, who deposited it into the account referred to above. “The daughter of Ramona Cowan was employed by Dr. Amar in an office in Washington, D.C. Dr. Amar testified that in a conversation with the daughter he was told that the lawyer for the estate was upset because no monies had been paid to the estate. Dr. Amar thereupon contacted the Respondent and asked why the money had not been paid. The Respondent advised the doctor that he had made the payment. “Based on Respondent’s representations, Dr. Amar told M’s Cowan’s daughter that, in fact, the money had been paid to the estate. Dr. Amar testified that he had occasion to speak directly to the Executor of the Estate, who informed him again that no money had been paid.

Dr. Amar thereupon contacted the Respondent and asked the Respondent to produce cancelled checks or other proof of payment so that he could show it to the Executor. The court believes from Dr. Amar’s testimony that the request to the Respondent for the proof of payment was not made in a confrontational manner; that the doctor believed that the Executor was mistaken, and wished to show her the proof of payment. The Respondent, according to Dr. Amar, promised to obtain and present such proof to him. The Respondent did not deny Dr. Amar’s testimony in this regard. “Sometime later, the Respondent finally acknowledged that he had not made any payments on behalf of Dr. Amar to the Estate of M’s.

Cowan. During the course of those discussions Dr. Amar learned for the first time that the $3,450.00 amount which had been withheld for the tax lien was also in the Respondent’s account. The Respondent agreed to send this amount to Dr. Amar with interest, which was done and received by Dr. Amar sometime in August of 1992. ⁵⁵⁴ “On May 28, 1993, Dr. Amar filed a complaint against the Respondent with the Attorney Grievance Commission alleging that Respondent had failed to pay the Estate of M’s Cowan as he had been instructed to do. “Thereafter Bar Counsel began an investigation of the matter and throughout the course of counsel’s investigation the Respondent gave several conflicting reasons for his actions in connection with the account. “Bar Counsel’s letter of September 14, 1993 (Petitioner’s Exhibit No. 9), requested bank records of the Respondent’s Escrow Account to ascertain the status of Dr. Amar’s funds. On September 21, 1993, the Respondent acknowledged receipt of the request (Petitioner’s Exhibit No. 11), and thereafter, on November 2, 1993, refused to provide the requested bank records (Petitioner’s Exhibit No. 12).

In explaining his reasons for non-compliance with the Petitioner’s request, the Respondent made the puzzling statement, ‘First, the funds that Dr. Amar alleges are owed to him have in no way been connected with my escrow account since January of 1991 ... It is known by Dr. Amar and his attorney, and not disputed by me, that the funds were removed from the account and invested ... The fact that the funds were moved into an investment account to be held pending resolution of the amount due to our firm, was communicated both to Dr. Amar and his counsel.’ “The Commission immediately responded to the November 2nd letter and on November 4, 1993, (Petitioner’s Exhibit 13), again requested specific bank records and directed that the Respondent reply by November 10th. On that date the Respondent did reply and asked for additional time to provide an accurate accounting of the funds held on behalf of Dr. Amar.

The Respondent requested until November 15th to reply. In the November 10th letter the Respondent partially complied with some of the Commission’s requests. As to one item Respondent replied: ‘4. In addition you have requested a complete accounting of funds “held, maintained or invested, including an ⁵⁵⁵ accounting of any interest earned on the investment, how the interest was disbursed and to whom”.

It is my recollection that the subject funds were held in the escrow account for several months. It is also my recollection that several disbursements were made out of the escrow account to Dr. Amar and to other parties including government agencies. After several months, those funds were removed from the escrow account at the instruction of and with the full knowledge of the client.’ Although the response is couched in terms of a ‘recollection’ rather than simple declarative statement, the court finds that this recounting of events was false. The spreadsheet summary of the Respondent’s bank records and the testimony of the Petitioner’s investigator clearly showed there were no such payments made either to Dr. Amar or on his behalf from this account. “The spreadsheet summary of Respondent’s account was obtained by Bar Counsel by subpoena.

These records were reviewed for the period from December 31, 1991 through February 28, 1994. The records show that the account was closed on June 25, 1992, when there was a remaining balance of $8.15. The records also show that no payments had been made out of that account on behalf of Dr. Amar; rather, the records disclose that between January 10, 1992 and June 25, 1995 the Respondent transferred large sums from the escrow account to his own operating account and made direct payments for professional expenses for the benefit of his law office. They also show a transaction of April 15, 1992 in the amount of $82,781.00 withdrawn from the escrow account.

These are the funds that the Respondent said he had invested. Finally, the records show that the escrow account was an interest-bearing account and that $1757.28 in interest had been credited to the account, which was not paid to Dr. Amar. “The evidence is uneontradicted that by February, 1994, more than two years after the Respondent had received the funds on behalf of his client, no payments had been made to ⁵⁵⁶ the Estate of Ramona Cowan or to the Complainant or for any other purpose for the Complainant’s benefit. “The Respondent indicated that the monies withdrawn had been invested in a stock named Pyrocap, which was being held in trust at Tameron Investment Corporation for the benefit of Dr. Amar. The court finds that this statement also was not true. “In Respondent’s letter of March 10, 1992, (Petitioner’s Exhibit No. 3) Respondent alleged that there was a fee dispute with Dr. Amar which caused him to withhold funds. The Respondent testified as to the fee dispute in general terms and never identified for the court what amount he claimed was in dispute.

This court finds that there was no fee dispute, and that the issue was advanced by the Respondent as an excuse for not having paid the funds to Dr. Amar. In any event, it is clear that the entire amount was not in dispute as a result of a fee controversy; assuming the Respondent would have been able to hold a disputed amount pending resolution, he certainly could not hold the entire $82,781.00. “Respondent also testified before the