Attorney Grievance Commission v. Johnson

HARRELL, Judge. Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-709(a), 1 Bar Counsel, on behalf of the Attorney Grievance Commission (AGC) (Petitioner), and at the direction of the Review Board, filed a petition with this Court for disciplinary action against Dana W. Johnson (Respondent) and John F. McLemore. 2 In this petition, Bar Counsel prosecuted a complaint against Respondent alleging violations of Rules 1.7(b) (conflict of interest), 3.3(a)(1) (candor toward the tribunal), 5.5 (unauthorized practice of law), 7.1 (communications concerning a lawyer’s services), 7.5 (firm names and letterheads), and 8.4 (misconduct) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC). 3 This Court referred the matter to Judge Ann S. Harrington of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County to conduct an evidentiary hearing and to make recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Maryland Rules 16-709(b) 4 and 16-711(a). 5 ⁶⁰⁴ I. After a three day evidentiary hearing, Judge Harrington filed a written Opinion on 13 November 2000, in which she found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent violated MRPC 1.7(b), 3.3(a)(1), 5.5(a), 7.1, 7.5(a) and (b), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d). In addition to filing exceptions to certain findings of fact and conclusions of law made by Judge Harrington, Respondent also excepted to specific evidentiary matters regarding one of the complainants, Mrs. Rebecca Bantug, and her testimony before the Inquiry Panel. Petitioner, who took' exception only to Judge Harrington’s conclusion that Respondent did not violate Rule 7.5(d), recommends that, even should we overrule its exception, we disbar Respondent from the practice of law for his misconduct.

Assuming we do not dismiss the petition or remand the matter for a new hearing as he asks, Respondent urges, as an appropriate sanction, a reprimand or a 30 day suspension, at worst. From the record before her, Judge Harrington made the following findings of fact pertaining to Respondent’s conduct: A. The Law Offices of McLemore and Johnson, P.C. 1. Respondent was admitted to practice law in Virginia and the District of Columbia (D.C.) in June 1988. He is not and never has been licensed to practice law in Maryland. 2.

In January 1997, Respondent and McLemore forged a professional association when they began sharing office space, equipment, support staff, and expenses in Silver Spring, Montgomery County, Maryland. 3. Respondent testified that he and McLemore maintained their own clients and files, with McLemore handling the Maryland cases and Respondent handling the Virginia and D.C. cases. He also claimed that, when his clients sought services in Maryland, he referred them to McLe-more. ⁶⁰⁵ 4. Respondent and McLemore practiced under the firm name of “Law Offices of McLemore and Johnson, F.C.” 6 5.

Respondent admitted that he did not indicate his jurisdictional limitations on the firm’s letterhead, which listed only a Maryland office. Respondent contended that he did not think he needed to list his jurisdictional limitations because he and McLemore maintained a single office in Maryland, not in multiple jurisdictions, and because they did not mix files. B. The Contract of Sale for the Bantugs 9 Home 1. On 13 June 1996, Respondent entered into a contract with Arturo and Rebecca Bantug for the purchase of their Fort Washington, Maryland, home.

The terms of the contract required Respondent to pay $6000 [to the Bantugs] and all debts accrued and accruing, including penalties, on the first and second mortgages held by Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation (Chase Manhattan) and Commercial Credit Corporation, respectively, in addition to securing [re]financing by 30 May 1997, the date after which the contract would terminate. The Bantugs were required by the contract not to contact either mortgage company to discuss the sale of the property without Respondent’s prior knowledge and consent. 2. Prior to [Respondent] entering into the contract for sale, Chase Manhattan retained counsel to initiate foreclosure proceedings [in Prince George’s County, Maryland] based upon the Bantugs’ default on their first mortgage. Respondent was aware of this situation, and on 28 May 1996, he contacted Chase Manhattan’s counsel to advise that the Bantugs had retained him to represent them in connection with the pending foreclo ⁶⁰⁶ sure and to propose that the Bantugs make double payments on the defaulted mortgage until the arrearage was satisfied.

The [lender’s] law firm rejected this proposal. 3. A distant relative of the Bantugs, a practicing attorney, assisted them with drafting the contract of sale. Although the Bantugs did not retain an attorney to represent them in conjunction with this sale, Respondent did not advise them that they might want to do so. 4. On or about 16 June 1996, approximately three days after signing the contract, the Bantugs relocated to the Phillippines, where they continue to reside.

Respondent moved into the Fort Washington home in June 1999. 5. Respondent breached the terms of the contract by failing to bring the first or second mortgage current. 6. On 10 July 1996, approximately one month after executing the contract of sale, Respondent again wrote to Chase Manhattan’s law firm to advise that the Bantugs were still interested in bringing their account current. On 5 August 1996, Respondent sent the law firm yet another proposal for payment of the arrearage on the ■ Bantugs’ account along with a request that their loan be reinstated.

Respondent attached a copy of a letter allegedly signed by Mr. and Mrs. Bantug, which explained that a family crisis had caused them to fall behind on their payments and that they desired to bring their loan current and to have their loan reinstated. 7. Rebecca Bantug testified 7 that she told Respondent of her and her husband’s plans to sell their home because they were several months in arrears on both of the mortgages. According to Mrs. Bantug, Respondent of ⁶⁰⁷ fered to purchase the home, which she indicated Respondent knew had been appraised, prior to the sale, for $250,000. She further testified that Respondent neither disclosed that his interest in the sale might be adverse to their interest nor advised her how to deal with the delinquent mortgages.

C. The Bantugs ’ Petition for Bankruptcy 1. Mrs. Bantug testified that she returned to the United States in June 1997, one year after her departure. Retrieving her mail from her sister’s house, which she used for her forwarding address, Mrs. Bantug discovered that Chase Manhattan’s counsel had attempted to contact her regarding the foreclosure sale of the Fort Washington home. Upon consulting with an attorney, Mrs. Bantug contacted Chase Manhattan and Commercial Credit to obtain information regarding the status of her mortgages; she learned then that a petition for bankruptcy had been filed on the Bantugs’ behalf.

On referral, Mrs. Bantug retained an attorney more familiar with foreclosure and bankruptcy proceedings to represent her and her husband in resolving the bankruptcy matter. 2. On 23 May 1997, a voluntary petition for bankruptcy was filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Maryland, Greenbelt Division. The petition bears the purported signatures of the Bantugs and was allegedly filed by McLemore, whose signature also appears on the petition. On 9 June 1997, additional documents were filed in the case, including a statement of financial affairs, an individual debtor’s statement of intention, and a Chapter 13 plan, all of which bear the Bantugs’ purported signatures.

On 26 June 1997, a motion to convert from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 was filed bearing McLemore’s purported signature,. 3. On 27 May 1997, a notice of bankruptcy was filed [in the foreclosure action] in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Maryland. The notice, stating that a ⁶⁰⁸ voluntary petition for bankruptcy had been filed on behalf of the Bantugs, bears MeLemore’s purported signature. 4. The Bantugs’ counsel confronted McLemore and asked him why he had filed the bankruptcy petition without the consent or knowledge of the Bantugs.

McLemore responded that he did not know the Bantugs; he did not represent them; he did not file the petition; and, that he did not authorize anyone else to sign their names or his own. Rather, he informed the Bantugs’ attorney that it was his partner, Respondent, who represented the Bantugs in their bankruptcy matter. Although McLemore admitted that Respondent had requested that McLemore act as local counsel in connection with a Maryland bankruptcy claim, McLemore asserted that Respondent provided him with neither the names of the parties nor the details of the case. Moreover, he claimed that he never authorized Respondent to sign his name, and that Respondent never consulted with him before he affixed the signatures and filed the petition. 8 5.

Respondent maintains that Mrs. Bantug, if not her husband, knew about the filing of the bankruptcy petition, for it was necessary to file the petition in order to stop the foreclosure sale on the Fort Washington home, which had been scheduled for 27 May 1997. Respondent also claims that he was unable to secure financing, as required under the terms of the contract of sale, because the true value of the home was significantly less than the appraisal value. He noted that he never intended to pursue the bankruptcy matter, but rather intended only to delay the foreclosure sale. 6. Respondent admitted that he signed the Bantugs’ and MeLemore’s names to the bankruptcy petition without their express permission. 9 He reiterates, however, that ⁶⁰⁹ Mrs. Bantug knew about the petition.

It is his contention that he and Mrs. Bantug were more than friends, and that hard feelings on her part may have precipitated her complaints. 7. Mrs. Bantug testified 10 that she never retained Respondent to represent her or her husband in a bankruptcy matter, and that she never even discussed filing for bankruptcy with Respondent. Confirming Respondent’s admissions, she stated that she never signed her name to any of the bankruptcy-related documents. Her account differs from Respondent’s, however, in that she also claims she never authorized Respondent to sign her name. 8.

Chase Manhattan’s counsel ultimately sold the Fort Washington home to McLemore at a foreclosure sale on 21 January 1998. McLemore purchased the home on Respondent’s behalf because Respondent could not find anyone else to attend the sale. Although McLemore intended to purchase the home in Respondent’s name, pursuant to an executed power of attorney, he actually purchased the home in his own name, with the intention of immediately substituting Respondent as the purchaser. This substitution was made shortly after the sale.

Based upon these findings of fact, Judge Harrington concluded that Respondent violated MRPC 1.7(b), 3.3(a)(1), 5.5(a), 7.1, 7.5(a) and (b), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d). Both parties except to some part or another of Judge Harrington’s findings and/or conclusions. Respondent asserts that there was no conflict of interest created between the Bantugs and himself; that he did exhibit candor before the tribunal; and, that Judge Harrington and this Court have no jurisdiction over this matter. In this regard, Respondent specifically argues that, because he is not a member of the Maryland bar, he cannot be sanctioned by the Court of Appeals of Maryland.

In a separate, evidentiary argument, ⁶¹⁰ Respondent contends that it was error for Judge Harrington to declare Mrs. Bantug an unavailable witness and to accept into evidence her testimony before the Inquiry Panel. Moreover, he argues that Mrs. Bantug’s attorney should have been compelled to divulge information regarding his client’s relationship with Respondent because Mrs. Bantug waived her attorney-client privilege. Petitioner excepts to Judge Harrington’s conclusion that Respondent did not violate MRPC 7.5(d). We address both parties’ exceptions below.

II

Standard of Review This Court has original jurisdiction over all attorney disciplinary proceedings. See Attorney Grievance Commission v. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1, 17 , 741 A.2d 1143, 1152 (1999); Attorney Grievance Commission v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 470 , 671 A.2d 463, 473 (1996); see also Md. Rule 16-709(b) (stating “[c]harges against an attorney shall be filed on behalf of the [Attorney Grievance] Commission in the Court of Appeals”). As to Respondent’s exceptions to Judge Harrington’s findings, “we [presently make] an independent, detailed review of the complete record with particular reference to the evidence relat[ed] to the disputed factual finding.” See Sheridan, 357 Md. at 17 , 741 A.2d at 1152 ; Glenn, 341 Md. at 470 , 671 A.2d at 473 (quoting Bar Association v. Marshall, 269 Md. 510, 516 , 307 A.2d 677, 680-81 (1973)). In our review, “we must keep in mind that the findings of the [hearing] judge are prima facie correct and will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous.” See Sheridan, 357 Md. at 17 , 741 A.2d at 1152 ; Glenn, 341 Md. at 470 , 671 A.2d at 473 ; Attorney Grievance Commission v. Kemp, 303 Md. 664, 674 , 496 A.2d 672, 677 (1985); Attorney Grievance Commission v. Collins, 295 Md. 532, 548 , 457 A.2d 1134, 1142 (1983) (quoting Attorney Grievance Commission v. Kahn, 290 Md. 654, 678 , 431 A.2d 1336, 1349 (1981)).

We note that the hearing judge “may elect to pick and choose which evidence to rely upon,” Kemp, 303 Md. at 675 , 496 A.2d at 677 , for she or he is in the best position to assess a witness’s credibility. See Sheridan, 357 Md. at 17 , 741 A.2d at 1152 . Therefore, we will not tamper with Judge Harrington’s factual ⁶¹¹ findings if they are grounded on clear and convincing evidence. See Kahn, 290 Md. at 678 , 431 A.2d at 1350 .

We recently reiterated the definition of clear and convincing evidence in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56, 79 , 753 A.2d 17, 35 (2000): The requirement of “clear and convincing” or “satisfactory” evidence does not call for “unanswerable” or “conclusive” evidence. The quality of proof, to be clear and convincing, has also been said to be somewhere between the rule in ordinary civil cases and the requirement of criminal procedure — that is, it must be more than a mere preponderance but not beyond a reasonable doubt. It has also been said that the term “clear and convincing” evidence means that the witnesses to a fact must be found to be credible, and that the facts to which they have testified are distinctly remembered and the details there of narrated exactly and in due order, so as to enable the trier of the facts to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. Whether evidence is clear and convincing requires weighing, comparing, testing, and judging its worth when considered in connection with all the facts and circumstances in evidence.

(quoting Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md. 302, 320 , 413 A.2d 170, 178 (1980) (quoting 30 Am.Jur. 2d Evidence § 1167) (citing Whi tington v. State, 8 Md.App. 676 , 679 n. 3, 262 A.2d 75 , 77 n. 3 (1970))).

III

A. Respondent’s Evidentiary Exceptions Respondent argues that Judge Harrington erred when she determined that Mrs. Bantug was an unavailable witness under Rule 5-804(a)(5) 11 and admitted into evidence, under ⁶¹² Rule 5 804(b)(1), 12 testimony that Mrs. Bantug gave to the Inquiry Panel over the telephone on 11 February 1999. Respondent makes several assertions in pursuing this argument. First, Respondent asserts that Bar Counsel did not avail itself of all reasonable means to insure Mrs. Bantug’s ability to testify before Judge Harrington, for “the burden rested upon Bar Counsel to prove that there was no process, no act, no statute, no comity, literally nothing that would produce her presence with regard to ‘other reasonable means’ employed to get her to trial.” 13 Respondent argued further that, because “it is the cost of [his] doing business,” Bar Counsel should ⁶¹³ have paid for Mrs. Bantug to fly from the Phillippines if the reason she could not attend the hearing was due to economic hardship. 14 Second, Respondent argued that Mrs. Bantug’s “oral statement” should not have been admitted because “there was no oath administered in the Phillippines.” Third, Respondent asserted that he was given no advance notice that Mrs. Bantug would not be present before Judge Harrington. 15 Fourth and lastly, Respondent asserted that declaring Mrs. Bantug an unavailable witness and admitting her testimony given before the Inquiry Panel “was unfair and violates [his] due process.” ⁶¹⁴ Maryland Rule 5-804(a)(5) requires that Bar Counsel be unable to secure Mrs. Bantug’s availability at the hearing either by process or other reasonable means. The rule does not, as Respondent incorrectly contends, require that Bar Counsel go to any lengths — to exhaust every conceivable means — to procure Mrs. Bantug’s attendance.

As we stated in an analogous context in State v. Breeden, 333 Md. 212, 222 , 634 A.2d 464, 468-69 (1993): “Other reasonable means” require efforts in good faith and due diligence to procure attendance. If the declarant is so unavailable as a witness, former testimony bearing the indicia of reliability, given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, may be admissible if the party against whom the testimony is now offered had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. In such circumstances, the receipt in evidence of the prior testimony does not offend either the confrontation requirement or the hearsay rule. In Breeden , we held that the State’s attempts at service of process were not sufficient to meet its burden to prove that an expert witness was unavailable, thus making the admission of the expert’s prior testimony a violation of the defendant’s right to confrontation. 333 Md. at 227 , 634 A.2d at 471 .

The witness in Breeden was located in Puerto Rico, a territory of the United States, which placed that Breeden witness within the scope of the court’s subpoena power. 333 Md. at 222-25 , 634 A.2d at 469-70 . 16 ⁶¹⁵ In the present case, Mrs. Bantug is a citizen of the Phillippines. 17 Because she is a not a citizen of the United States or one of its territories, she could not be compelled, as Bar Counsel properly maintains, to attend Respondent’s hearing by virtue of a Maryland judicial subpoena. “[Ojther reasonable means” requires a good faith effort on Bar Counsel’s part to procure Mrs. Bantug’s attendance, and, via email communications, Bar Counsel apparently made such an effort, 18 we conclude that the trial court did not err by declaring Mrs. Bantug an unavailable witness. Moreover, we also conclude that, where Respondent had and exercised a full opportunity and similar motive to cross-examine Mrs. Bantug when she testified by telephone at the Inquiry Panel hearing conducted on 11 February 1999, Judge Harrington did not err by admitting that testimony in evidence. Additionally, we find no merit in Respondent’s contention that Mrs. Bantug’s testimony was inadmissible because she was not sworn properly and because the admission of her testimony violated his right to due process. The former contention becomes frivolous and transparent in light ⁶¹⁶ of the following discourse on the record before the Inquiry-Panel. [COURT REPORTER]: May I swear in the witness? [MR.

RYDER 19 ]: Absolutely. Thank you. [RAYMOND HEIN]: Mrs. Bantug, I’m just, one minute, this is Raymond Hein [assistant bar counsel]. A court reporter is here in the room and he is now going to swear you in. [COURT REPORTER]: If you would, raise your right hand. [MRS. BANTUG]: Yes.

WHEREUPON, REBECCA BANTUG, HAVING BEEN DULY SWORN ACCORDING TO LAW, WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: Mrs. Bantug properly was sworn. Respondent did not raise an objection before the Inquiry Panel as to the manner or venue in which she was sworn nor how her testimony was taken. We also reiterate that Respondent, who was present at the hearing, had an opportunity and similar motive to conduct cross-examination of Mrs. Bantug at that time. Respondent exercised this opportunity fully, which undermines his argument that he was denied due process because he was unable to cross-examine Mrs. Bantug again in front of Judge Harrington.

We reject, therefore, Respondent’s evidentiary exceptions. 20 ⁶¹⁷ B. Other Exceptions 1. Violation of MRPC 1.7(b) Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(b) — Conflict of ⁶¹⁸ Interest: General Rule. (b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer’s own interests, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) the client consents after consultation. Petitioner contends that Respondent, by indicating to Chase Manhattan’s counsel that he represented the Bantugs in connection with the foreclosure while simultaneously entering into a contract of sale to purchase the Bantugs’ home himself, violated MRPC 1.7(b).

Specifically, Petitioner asserts that Respondent acted in his self-interest and adversely to the interest of the Bantugs, who wished to avoid a foreclosure sale, when he forced the foreclosure by breaching the terms of the contract for sale. Specifically, Petitioner argues that Respondent acted in his self-interest exclusively by living in the Bantugs’ home for approximately one year and by failing to disclose to the Bantugs that he failed to obtain financing or to bring their mortgages current. In response, Respondent asserts that he did not violate MRPC 1.7(b) because the Bantugs were represented by other counsel when they sold him their home. According to Respondent, a distant relative of the Bantugs, a practicing attorney, was involved in the preparation of the contract of sale and present at closing, where he witnessed the signing of the contract.

Respondent specifically disputes the conclusion that such conduct by the Bantugs’ attorney/relative does not constitute the practice of law even though there was no retainer agreement, contract, or fee involved. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we agree with Judge Harrington’s findings of fact and conclusions of law as they pertain to MRPC 1.7(b). The evidence, such as Respondent’s testimony, infra, supports the conclusion that the Ban-tugs did not know about the foreclosure sale, much less ⁶¹⁹ engage Respondent to represent their interests with regard to it. [BAR COUNSEL]: Mr. Johnson, at any time prior to filing the voluntary petition for bankruptcy in the names of Arturo and Rebecca Bantug, did you have authorization, written or oral specifically from Arturo Bantug to file a bankruptcy case in his name? [RESPONDENT]: Yes, I did. [BAR COUNSEL]: Do you have any written agreements to represent Mr. Bantug? [RESPONDENT]: Yes, I do. [BAR COUNSEL]: Do you have that here with you today? [RESPONDENT]: You have it. It’s the contract for purchase of realty. [BAR COUNSEL]: Can you tell us where in that document it authorizes you to file bankruptcy on behalf of Mr. Bantug? [RESPONDENT]: The last whereas clause on the first page.

Whereas, until such time as buyer acquires financing, sellers will take all lawful and necessary steps to protect sellers’ and buyers’ interest in the premises. [BAR COUNSEL]: And you believe that authorized you to file for bankruptcy on behalf of Mr. Bantug? [RESPONDENT]: That in addition to oral statements. [BAR COUNSEL]: Was the term ‘bankruptcy’ ever discussed with Mr. Bantug? [RESPONDENT]: Yes, we discussed bankruptcy, as one of many options. [BAR COUNSEL]: In May of 1997, when a bankruptcy was actually filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court, did you speak to Mr. Bantug before filing that? ⁶²⁰ [RESPONDENT]: No, I didn’t. I hadn’t spoken to Mr. Bantug since June 13th, 1996. [BAR COUNSEL]: Did you send a copy of the bankruptcy to Mrs. Bantug? [RESPONDENT]: No, I didn’t send one to her____I didn’t forward it because Pm not really sure where she was____ We find it incredible that Respondent is unable to recognize the conflict of interest that he explains so clearly. Moreover, we share Judge Harrington’s obvious difficulty accepting that Respondent truly believed that the language quoted supra from the contract of sale authorized Respondent to file for bankruptcy on the Bantugs’ behalf. Assuming arguendo that such language and the purported “oral statements” 21 provided him with the authority, then, using Respondent’s reasoning, Respondent (“buyer”) would be authorized to file a bankruptcy petition on the Bantugs’ (“sellers”) behalf so that the Bantugs could protect Respondent’s and their own interests in the property.

Common sense and well-recognized legal principles indicate this cannot be so. Assuming, arguendo, that the Bantugs were represented by independent counsel in negotiating and executing the contract of sale, Respondent nonetheless acted in his own interest, and against the interest of the Bantugs, when he failed to record the deed transferring title to the property, submitted to Chase Manhattan a proposal on the Bantugs’ behalf (but without their knowledge or consent) for a workout of the arrearages of a loan that Respondent was obligated to bring current under the terms of the contract of sale, initiated the bankruptcy proceeding without the Bantugs’ knowledge, and failed to take any remedial action to have the unautho ⁶²¹ rized bankruptcy case dismissed. We conclude, therefore, that Judge Harrington’s findings of fact and conclusions of law that Respondent violated MRPC 1.7(b) were based on clear and convincing evidence. 2. Violation of MRPC 3.3(a)(1) Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3(a)(1) — Candor toward the tribunal.

(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal.... Respondent excepts to Judge Harrington’s findings that he forged the Bantugs’ and McLemore’s signatures. According to Respondent, both the Bantugs and McLemore knew that Respondent was going to sign their names to the bankruptcy petition. 22 Yet, we note the following discourse before Judge Harrington between Bar Counsel and Respondent regarding whether McLemore authorized the filing of the bankruptcy petition and whether Respondent filed accurate information in that petition. [BAR COUNSEL]: Mr. McLemore didn’t know anything about [the filing of the bankruptcy petition or the foreclosure on the Batungs’ home]? [RESPONDENT]: No, he didn’t. [BAR COUNSEL]: And to the extent that you may have had conversations with the Bantugs after your association with Mr. McLemore, he wouldn’t have known about that [the bankruptcy petition] even after your association? [RESPONDENT]: No, because all of my discussions were with [Mrs. Bantug] at that time. ⁶²² [BAR COUNSEL]: Well, there came a point when you actually had to prepare some paperwork to file [for the bankruptcy petition]. [RESPONDENT]: Yes, I prepared them and I filed them and I didn’t show them to him. [BAR COUNSEL]: You at no point showed them to him. [RESPONDENT]: No. I think the first time he saw them was when [the Bantugs’ attorney] showed them to him. [BAR COUNSEL]: You never said “Hey [McLemore], remember today I’m going down to the Bankruptcy Court to file [the Bantugs’ bankruptcy petition], and remember I talked to you about that matter, and I am going to do it today”? [RESPONDENT]: No, I didn’t do that. Regardless of whether McLemore agreed generally, at an earlier and undetermined date, to act as Maryland counsel for Respondent or his clients, according to Respondent’s own testimony, supra, McLemore did not authorize Respondent to sign McLemore’s name on the bankruptcy petition.

McLe-more’s testimony, infra, supports this finding: “I’ve never met with the Bantugs. I’ve never had a retainer agreement with them. I never had any kind of agreement with them. I never signed any bankruptcy petitions.

I don’t have any explanations of why particular petitions were signed and my name was on them, other that I didn’t give authorization for them.” Additionally, Respondent admitted to Judge Harrington that “he filed a bankruptcy petition with inaccurate and incomplete information.” The testimony of Mr. Reburn corroborates this finding: [BAR COUNSEL]: Did [Respondent] give you any further information about the bankruptcy filing? [MR. REBURN]: Well, I inquired about whether or not he had been retained, and the preparation of the documents; ⁶²³ and he acknowledged that he had not been paid. I had documents in front of me and we reviewed them; I reviewed those with him, but he had not been paid the fee that was outlined on the bankruptcy documents and he had not been retained, and there were misrepresentations. [Emphasis added]. [MR. REBURN]: ...

I said “Is that a misrepresentation?” And he indicated to me that it was. And one of them [the misrepresentations] was the fee amount.... [H]e said he sat at his computer and inputted the information, and he made up the information that was put on the form without the benefits of [an agreement with the Bantugs]. [BAR COUNSEL]: You indicated one of the things was fee amount. Were there other specific items that [Respondent] acknowledged to be misrepresentations? [MR. REBURN]: Well, the address for the Bantugs; they were in the Philippines.

And that he lived in the house, and he has them listed as 7504 Burgess Lane. 23 The fact that the document titled, Notice to Individual Consumer Debtor, the last line says “I, the Debtor, affirm that I have read this notice” and they [the Bantugs] had not. [MR. REBURN]: ... Then there’s the statement regarding compensation that bears the signature ‘John McLemore’; that is misrepresentation. [BAR COUNSEL]: Did you ask [Respondent] whether he had knowledge of any of the Bantugs’ other finances? ⁶²⁴ [MR. REBURN]: No. He sat at the computer, he told me, and inputted the information.

He made wp information without input from [the Bantugs], [Emphasis added]. Clearly, Respondent failed to exhibit candor either to the federal bankruptcy court or to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County when he filed the bankruptcy petition and the notice of bankruptcy in the foreclosure action, respectively- Judge Harrington’s role as the fact finder placed her in the best position to assess witness credibility and “to pick and choose which evidence to rely upon.” Kemp, 303 Md. at 675 , 496 A.2d at 677 ; see Sheridan, 357 Md. at 17 , 741 A.2d at 1152 . Having weighed the evidence and the testimony before her, Judge Harrington found that Respondent did not discuss the bankruptcy proceeding with the Bantugs, and thus he did not have the authority to sign their names to the petition. Judge Harrington also found that Respondent completed the bankruptcy petition using what he knew to be incorrect information about the Bantugs, and that he did not have McLe-more’s authorization to enter his signature on that petition.

Because these findings are based upon clear and convincing evidence, we sustain the resultant conclusion that Respondent violated MRPC 3.3(a)(1). 3. Violation of MRPC 5.5(a) Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5(a) — Unautho rized practice of law. A lawyer shall not: (a) practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction.... Maintaining that he is not a member of the Maryland Bar and has never practiced law in Maryland