Attorney Grievance Commission v. Kreamer

GREENE, Judge. The Attorney Grievance Commission, acting through Bar Counsel, filed a petition for disciplinary action against Barbara Osborn Kreamer (respondent). Bar Counsel charged Ms. Kreamer with violating several Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, alleging that she failed to file a Complaint for Absolute Divorce for a client, as she had allegedly promised to do, and that she continually failed to respond to the client’s phone calls and e-mails. Bar Counsel also alleged that Ms. Kreamer failed to provide the client’s new attorney with the client’s file in a timely manner and that she failed to respond to the Attorney Grievance Commission’s letters requesting a written response to the client’s complaint.

Finally, Bar Counsel alleged that Ms. Kreamer took funds from the client’s retainer that she had not yet earned. The petition alleged that Ms. Kreamer violated Rule 1.1 (Competence), 1 Rule 1.3 (Diligence), 2 Rule 1.4 (Communication), 3 Rule 1.15 (Safekeeping Property), 4 Rule 1.16 (Declining ⁵¹¹ or Terminating Representation), 5 Rule 8.1 (Bar Admission and ⁵¹² Disciplinary Matters), 6 and Rule 8.4 (Misconduct). 7 Bar Counsel also alleged that Ms. Kreamer violated Rule 16-609 (Prohibited Transactions) 8 and Md.Code (1989, 2004 Repl.Vol.), ⁵¹³ § 10-306 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article (Misuse of Trust Money). 9 ****⁹ Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-752, we referred the matter to Judge Susan Souder of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. Following an evidentiary hearing on December 21, 2004, Judge Souder found that Ms. Kreamer violated MRPC Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.16, 8.1, 1.15, Md. Rule 16-609, and § 10-306 of the Business and Occupations Article of the Maryland Code. Respondent and petitioner filed exceptions.

I. Hearing Judge’s Opinion Judge Souder made the following factual findings: “On February 25, 2002, Benchamas D. Sporay (‘Client’) met with Respondent to obtain legal advice regarding her separation from her husband, which occurred on January 16, 2002. The Client signed a Retainer/Engagement Agreement (‘Agreement’) on March 8, 2002. In the Agreement, the Client agreed to have Respondent represent the Client and perform all necessary legal services in connection with representation in the matter of marital separation and divorce. Furthermore, the Client was to pay Respondent a retainer of two thousand dollars ($2,000.00), which included a two hundred seventy dollar ($270.00) non-refundable engagement fee. 1 The Client agreed to pay Respondent at an hourly rate of one hundred thirty five dollars ($135.00). “The Client submitted four checks to Respondent for payment of her representation.

On March 8, 2002, the Client paid two thousand dollars ($2,000.00). On March 15, 2002, the Client paid ten dollars ($10.00). Additionally, the ⁵¹⁴ Client paid five hundred dollars ($500.00) on April 17, 2002. Finally, on May 5, 2002, the Client paid two thousand dollars ($2,000.00).

Altogether, the client paid $4,510. “The Client’s husband filed a Complaint for Limited Divorce and Other Relief in the Circuit Court for Harford County on March 13, 2002. On April 12, 2002, the Client, through Respondent, filed an Answer and Counter-Complaint for Absolute Divorce. 2 Respondent represented the Client at a protective order hearing in March 2002, in which the Client sought protection from her husband, and to retrieve her belongings from the marital home. An ex parte Order was granted; and a Consent Order was entered in April. A provision of the Consent Order was that the Client’s husband was not to contact her. “In May 2002, the Client met with Respondent to discuss how the case would proceed.

The Client wrote out her reasons for seeking the divorce, and the Respondent wrote her own notes in the margins of the Client’s notes. The Respondent misplaced these notes until the investigation of these charges was underway and never divulged that they were lost to the Client. “After the May 2002 meeting, other than responding to discovery propounded by the Client’s husband, no action took place in the Client’s divorce matter until January 2003. In January 2003, the Client met with the Respondent and indicated that she wanted to proceed with the divorce action, as it had been twelve months since she had separated from her husband. Respondent told the Client that she would file for an absolute divorce based on a mutual and voluntary separation on her behalf. “The Client e-mailed Respondent on March 28, 2003 and May 14, 2003 seeking an update on the status of her divorce case.

Respondent did not respond to either e-mail. On June 23, 2003, the Client telephoned Respondent seeking an ⁵¹⁵ up-date on her case. Respondent failed to return the Client’s phone call. On July 1, 2003 the Client again [called] Respondent seeking an update of her case, and stated that she was disappointed with Respondent for her procrastination and for ignoring the Client.

Respondent called the Client on July 3, 2003 and promised that she would give an update by July 7, 2003. The Respondent failed to respond by July 7, 2003 as promised. “Respondent’s failures regarding communication with the Client continued from July 9, 2003 through August 11, 2003. During that time the Client telephoned Respondent at least eight times. Of those eight telephone contacts the Client left four messages.

Respondent failed to respond to any of the messages. Furthermore, on several occasions Respondent indicated to the Client that she was busy with another client and that she would get back to the Client. Respondent failed to do so. Additionally, on one occasion, Respondent answered the call but indicated that she was on her way to court and would have to get back to the Client.

Again, Respondent failed to do so. Subsequently, on August 11, 2003 the Client filed a complaint against Respondent with the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (‘Petitioner’). “Respondent testified that from January 17, 2003 through July 29, 2003 she was planning a settlement demand to be submitted to opposing counsel on behalf of the Client. 3 There is no physical evidence of Respondent’s progress on the case other than her initial responses to opposing counsel’s discovery requests. Furthermore, Respondent never propounded discovery requests to the opposing party. There was no activity concerning the Client’s file by Respondent in 2003.

To the extent Respondent was ‘planning,’ it was apparently a cerebral exercise undertaken without the benefit of information concerning the opposing party’s current financial information. ⁵¹⁶ “Indeed, Respondent never determined whether the opposing party was available for the purpose of settlement discussions. At the January 2003 meeting, the Client advised Respondent that her husband, a member of the military reserves, ‘may be called up.’ Whether Client’s husband’s unit had been activated or would be activated in the future is irrelevant. Respondent made no effort to determine the Client’s husband’s status. She did not inquire of husband’s counsel; she filed no discovery requests in the pending litigation; nor did she ever request an absolute divorce on behalf of the client based on a mutual and voluntary separation.

Respondent admits that she was unaware of Client’s husband’s status. “Respondent’s counsel argues that Respondent believed Client’s husband was in active military service overseas, and unavailable for the case to proceed. If that were true, Respondent’s failure to advise her client that the case could not proceed while her husband was on active duty overseas is inexplicable. “On September 3, 2003 the Client retained Christopher R. Van Roden, Esq. (‘Van Roden’) to represent her in her divorce proceedings. Van Roden sent a letter dated September 5, 2003 to the Respondent advising that he had been retained to represent the Client and asking the Respondent to turn over to the Client her case file.

Van Roden also asked Respondent for a detailed itemization of all work Respondent performed for the Client since she was retained, and a refund of any unused portion of Client’s retainer. On September 22, 2003 the Respondent filed a Motion to Strike Appearance. However, the Respondent failed to turn over the Client’s file to Van Roden until February 13, 2004, the date of the Respondent’s Attorney Grievance Commission’s Peer Review Meeting. No explanation for the failure to respond promptly to Van Roden was proffered.

Respondent’s counsel suggested that Van Roden would have reviewed the Court’s file in any case, and, therefore there was no prejudice to the Client by Respondent’s failure to respond to Van Roden. No preju ⁵¹⁷ dice to the Client’s case as a result of Respondent’s delay was shown; Client did have to pay new counsel to review the Court file. “The Respondent failed to properly maintain her finances with respect to the Client’s case. On March 15, 2002, the Respondent took $99.50 more than that to which she was entitled from the Client’s retainer when she wrote Check 1329 to herself in the amount of $257.00. Additionally, Respondent took $47.19 from the Client’s retainer when she wrote Check 1364 in the amount of $1,550.00 on June 11, 2002 to herself. “Respondent admits that her records showed a $47.19 credit due to Client.

All funds due to the Client were eventually paid to the Client, and there is no claim Respondent owes the Client money. “Respondent explained her failures as resulting from a campaign for elective office in the Fall of 2002, her decertification by the Client Security Trust Fund for a time, time spent correcting the foregoing problem, and the need to train a new secretary who required constant instruction. These excuses did not constitute valid defenses. “Petitioner mailed letters to Respondent on three occasions 4 requesting a written response to the complaint filed with Petitioner’s office on August 11, 2003. On all three occasions Respondent failed to submit a response to Petitioner’s request. Furthermore, Respondent did not file an Answer to the Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action until October 12, 2004.

The untimely Answer was only accepted as Petitioner did not object to the Court vacating its prior Order of Default against Respondent. Eventually, Respondent met with Petitioner’s Investigator concerning the matter on November 17, 2003. “The Honorable William O. Carr, Administrative Judge for the Circuit Court of Harford County, testified that he had known Respondent since elementary school. In the six ⁵¹⁸ months prior to the hearing, in his opinion, Respondent had evolved into a “good problem solver.” Prior to that time he observed that she had difficulty in focusing on the issues and could be “problematic.” “Reverend Clyde Allen Spicer testified to Respondent’s good character.” Judge Souder made the following conclusions of law. “Petitioner alleges that Respondent violated the following Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct: 1.1 (Competence), 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4 (Communication), 1.15 (Safekeeping property), 1.16 (Declining or terminating representation), 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4 (Misconduct). Additionally, Petitioner alleges that Respondent violated Maryland Rule 6-609 (Prohibited transactions) and Md.Code Ann., Business Occupations and Professions, § 10-306 (Misuse of trust money). “Respondent was not diligent in her representation of Client in violation of Rule 1.3.

Respondent took no action to file an absolute divorce on behalf of Client based on a mutual and voluntary separation when requested to do so in January 2003. At no time in 2002/2003 did Respondent propound discovery that might have assisted her in preparing (as opposed to ‘planning’) a settlement demand. Nor did Respondent engage in any settlement discussions with opposing counsel. “Respondent failed to respond meaningfully to numerous communications from Client in violation of Rule 1.4. Respondent failed to provide the file or otherwise communicate with Client’s successor counsel, Mr. Van Roden, for many months in violation of Rule 1.16. “Bar Counsel states that the failure to communicate and the lack of diligence demonstrate that Respondent is not a competent attorney as required by Rule 1.1.

This Court did not find persuasive Bar Counsel’s argument in this case that violations of Rules 1.3 and 1.4 automatically constitute a violation of Rule 1.1. ⁵¹⁹ “Respondent violated Rule 8.1 by failing to respond to Petitioner’s requests seeking a response to the Client’s complaint. Respondent’s defense that she became paralyzed with fear when she received such requests from Bar Counsel and is unable to act is unacceptable. Respondent’s assertion that illness prevented her from timely responding to the Petition herein was also unpersuasive in light of the fact that she worked on other Client matters and appeared in Court during the illness. Respondent’s apology for her failure to respond in the instant case was accepted. “While Respondent’s sloppy bookkeeping practices resulted in violations of the law — 1.15, 16-609 and 10-306, these were merely technical violations, not in large amounts, that more organized financial record keeping would obviate.

Petitioner’s argument that the aforesaid accounting violations also constitute a violation of Rule 8.4 was unpersuasive in this ease.” II. Standard of Review As stated in Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Davis, 375 Md. 131 , 825 A.2d 430 (2003), [t]his Court exercises original jurisdiction over attorney discipline proceedings. We conduct an independent review of the record, accepting the hearing judge’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.

We will not disturb the factual findings of the hearing judge if they are based on clear and convincing evidence. Our review of the hearing judge’s conclusions of law is de novo. Davis, 375 Md. at 157-58 , 825 A.2d at 445-46 (citations omitted). Moreover, Md. Rule 16-757(b) states: The petitioner has the burden of proving the averments of the petition by clear and convincing evidence.

A respondent who asserts an affirmative defense or a matter of mitigation or extenuation has the burden of proving the defense or matter by a preponderance of the evidence. ⁵²⁰ III. Exceptions Ms. Kreamer filed ten exceptions to Judge Souder’s factual findings and conclusions of law. In particular, Ms. Kreamer excepted to the finding that “the Counter-Complaint for Absolute Divorce failed to allege a ground upon which an absolute divorce can be granted,” noting that the Answer and Counterclaim that she filed alleged facts that would constitute a ground for divorce under § 7-103(a)(7) and (8) of the Family Law Article. 10 The Answer and Counterclaim included the statement that Ms. Sporay, avers that she left the home to regain her health and wellbeing after being subjected to verbal and emotional abuse over the course of the marriage, being subjected to extremely violent acts against her by the Plaintiff on numerous occasions, being subjected to intimidation by guns, swords and other weapons being displayed in every room of the house, demoralized by bullet holes remaining in the ceiling for over a year from the Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant’s having discharged his firearms ... he was driving the automobile in which she was a passenger in a dangerous manner so that her head was forced into the dashboard ... there is no reasonable hope or expectation of reconciliation between the parties. That paragraph was incorporated by reference into the section of the pleading entitled “Counterclaim for Absolute Divorce and Other Relief.” ⁵²¹ We disagree with the hearing judge’s finding that Ms. Kreamer failed to allege a ground upon which an absolute divorce can be granted.

The fact that the pleading did not contain the phrase “cruelty of treatment” or “excessively vicious conduct” does not change the import of the counterclaim. The pleading certainly alleged facts that, if proven, would have supported the grant of an absolute divorce on the grounds of cruelty of treatment. 11 As stated in Md. Rule 2-303(b), “[e]ach averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms of pleadings are required. A pleading shall contain only such statements of fact as may be necessary to show the pleader’s entitlement to relief or ground of defense.... ” Ms. Kreamer’s first exception is sustained.

Ms. Kreamer next contends that the hearing judge wrongly found that “[i]n January 2003 ... Respondent told the Client that she would file for an absolute divorce based on a mutual and voluntary separation on her behalf.” Ms. Kreamer argues that she could not have filed for a divorce on those grounds because she knew that there never was a mutual and voluntary separation agreement reached between her client and the client’s husband. 12 Upon review of the testimony before the court, it is clear (and the Petitioner admits) that Ms. Sporay did not actually state that she had asked Ms. Kreamer to file for an absolute divorce based on a mutual and voluntary separation. Ms. Sporay testified that ⁵²² she had a conversation with Ms. Kreamer on January 16 or 17, 2003, and that she “told her that my separation have come to meet the deadline [sic], 12-month separation. Um, I would like her to go forward with my divorce process.” Ms. Sporay also testified that Ms. Kreamer told her that she would “work on it,” and that she would file for absolute divorce.

No one testified that Ms. Kreamer said that she would file for an absolute divorce based on a mutual and voluntary separation. In fact, as has already been discussed, Ms. Kreamer had already filed for an Absolute Divorce on other grounds in March, 2002, when she filed the Answer to Complaint for Limited Divorce and Other Relief and Counterclaim for Absolute Divorce. Ms. Kreamer’s second exception is overruled in part and sustained in part. Insofar as the hearing judge found that Ms. Kreamer promised to file for an absolute divorce, Ms. Kreamer’s second exception is overruled.

The hearing judge was free to believe Ms. Sporay’s testimony that Ms. Kreamer promised to file for an absolute divorce after the meeting with the client in January 2003. 13 As to the ground for divorce, however, Ms. Kreamer’s exception is sustained. There is no evidence in the record that Ms. Kreamer said she would file on the ground of mutual and voluntary separation. It appears from the hearing judge’s factual findings that the purpose for mentioning the failure to file was to showcase Ms. Kreamer’s continued failure to communicate with Ms. Sporay about the status of her divorce and the failure to do something to move the divorce forward. The particular ground for divorce has nothing to do -with those failures.

Thus, in our view, the hearing judge’s error is insignificant. Ms. Kreamer’s third exception is to the hearing judge’s finding that “Respondent’s failures regarding communication ⁵²³ with the Client continue from July 9, 2003 through August 11, 2003.” Ms. Sporay testified that Ms. Kreamer called her on July 29 and told her that she had been busy with another case and “didn’t have time for my case that much, but she will try to work on it. Get a copy mailed to my attention by the following week.” Ms. Kreamer testified that the conversation on July 29 was “a substantive conversation that was for the purpose of moving the case forward.” In addition, Bar Counsel submitted Ms. Kreamer’s notes from that conversation, as Plaintiffs Exhibit 7. The notes appear to reflect a substantive conversation, making mention of the credit and debt situation of the parties, alimony, and the husband’s retirement account, among other things.

Nonetheless, the hearing judge found that “Respondent’s failures regarding communication with the Client continued from July 9, 2003 through August 11, 2003.” Judge Souder also noted that “[djuring that time the Client telephoned Respondent at least eight times. Of those eight telephone contacts the Client left four messages. Respondent failed to respond to any of the messages.” In view of those facts, we cannot say that the hearing judge erred by finding that the communication failures continued during the time mentioned, even if one of the phone calls could be described as substantive. Moreover, Judge Souder was free to believe Ms. Sporay’s testimony about the July 29 call (that it was not substantive) and to disbelieve Ms. Kreamer’s notes and testimony.

The chancellor is free to disregard evidence that she considers not credible. Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 385 , 773 A.2d 463, 468 (2001). Respondent’s third exception is overruled.

Ms. Kreamer also excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that “[t]here was no activity concerning the Client’s file by Respondent in 2003” because “[i]t is undisputed that Respondent met with Sporay on January 17, 2003 and also that Respondent and Sporay had a conversation concerning Sporay’s case on July 29, 2003.” Respondent also argues that she “had records ... that were the result of discovery” during ⁵²⁴ that time, that there was “an e-mail exchange on May 14, 2003,” and “several non-substantive telephone contacts in early July 2003,” and that she “was planning the elements of a settlement demand which included the items that were narrated on the notes of July 29.” First, it was not error for Judge Souder to refuse to consider the e-mails and several phone contacts as “activity” on the client’s case. 14 Those non-substantive contacts did nothing to propel Ms. Sporay’s divorce forward. Second, the fact that-Ms. Kreamer “had records ... that were the result of discovery” during the time in question does nothing to prove that she did anything with that discovery during that time or that she attempted to obtain any new discovery during that time. In fact, Ms. Kreamer testified that she did not file or propound interrogatories or request for production of documents between January and July of 2003. She also testified that the most recent financial information that she had was from March of 2002.

Third, Judge Souder was free to disbelieve (and apparently did disbelieve) Ms. Kreamer’s testimony that she was planning a settlement demand from January through July of 2003. She specifically found that, [t]here is no physical evidence of Respondent’s progress on the case other than her initial responses to opposing counsel’s discovery requests. Furthermore, Respondent never propounded discovery requests to the opposing party. There was no activity concerning the Client’s file by Respondent in 2003.

To the extent Respondent was “planning,” it was apparently a cerebral exercise undertaken ⁵²⁵ without the benefit of information concerning the opposing party’s current financial information. Ms. Kreamer admitted that she did not present a settlement demand after January 17, 2003. Fourth, and finally, even though everyone agrees that Ms. Kreamer and Ms. Sporay had a meeting in January of 2003, we cannot say it was clearly eiToneous for the hearing judge to find that no activity had taken place on Ms. Sporay’s file in 2003, especially in view of Ms. Sporay’s testimony that the meeting in January consisted solely of Ms. Sporay telling Ms. Kreamer that she wanted her case to be moved forward and Ms. Kreamer saying that she would work on the case. Saying that she would work on the case is different than actually working on the case.

While the meeting may qualify technically as “activity” in the case, it is clear from Judge Souder’s discussion that the kind of activity needed to move the case forward was completely lacking between January 2003 and the end of Ms. Kreamer’s representation of Ms. Sporay. We think that is the kind of inactivity that was considered. Ms. Kreamer’s fourth exception is overruled. Ms. Kreamer next excepts to the finding that, [a]t the January 2003 meeting, the Client advised Respondent that her husband, a member of the military reserves, “may be called up,” Whether Client’s husband’s unit had been activated or would be activated in the future is irrelevant.

Respondent made no effort to determine the Client’s husband’s status.... Respondent admits that she was unaware of Client’s husband’s status. Ms. Kreamer points to Ms. Sporay’s testimony and notes that, while discussing defendant’s Exhibit 4 (an e-mail dated March 18, 2002 from Ms. Sporay to Ms. Kreamer in which Ms. Sporay wrote “[Mr. Sporay] was on active duty in Kosovo from 02/01 — 08/01 ... ”), Ms. Sporay agreed that at the time she first saw Ms. Kreamer her husband was still in the active reserve. Ms. Kreamer also relies on Plaintiffs Exhibit 3 (her notes of the January 17, 2003 meeting), in which she wrote, “he may be called up.” ⁵²⁶ The fact that Ms. Kreamer knew that Ms. Sporay’s husband was on active duty in 2001 and that he may be called up in 2003 does not mean that Ms. Kreamer was aware of Ms. Sporay’s husband’s cuvrent status, the only status that was relevant to the question of how to proceed with the divorce.

In fact, Ms. Kreamer testified that she thought the husband may have been on active duty in January 2003, but that she did not know “for sure” if he was. She also admitted that she did not tell Ms. Sporay at the January meeting that they could not proceed with the divorce if her husband had been on active duty at the time. 15 In view of that testimony, we cannot say the finding on the matter was clearly erroneous. Ms. Kreamer’s fifth exception is overruled. 16 ⁵²⁷ Ms. Kreamer also excepts to the finding that “Client did have to pay new counsel to review the Court file.” 17 Ms. Kreamer admits and Mr. Van Roden testified that he reviewed the Court file and charged Ms. Sporay to do so. Pointing out that the new attorney “necessarily, in the exercise of prudence, would review the court file when taking over representation,” does nothing to change the fact that Ms. Sporay would never have incurred the additional expense if Ms. Kreamer had properly represented her and moved her divorce forward.

Ms. Kreamer’s sixth exception is overruled. Ms. Kreamer next excepts to the finding that “[t]he Honorable William O. Carr, Administrative Judge for the Circuit Court of Harford County, testified that he had known Ms. Kreamer since elementary school. In the six months prior to the hearing, in his opinion, Respondent had evolved into a ‘good problem solver.’” Ms. Kreamer argues that Judge Carr actually testified that he had “been quite impressed over [the past six months] by her ability to [be a problem solver] for her clients.” While it is true that Judge Carr made this statement, he also stated that he had “seen Barbara evolve into what I think is a pretty good problem solver.” Judge Souder was not required to repeat everything in Judge Carr’s testimony, and the finding she made is supported by the testimony in the record. See Attorney Griev.

Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 385 , 773 A.2d 463, 468 (2001) (noting that the “hearing court’s duties are to consider all evidence properly submitted in the discipline ⁵²⁸ process. Absent indications that such evidence is not considered, we presume it was considered along with all the other evidence”). Ms. Kreamer’s seventh exception is overruled. Ms. Kreamer excepts to the conclusion that she was “not diligent in her representation of client in violation of Rule 1.3.” As previously noted, Rule 1.3 requires a lawyer to “act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” While we disagree with the conclusion that Ms. Kreamer should have filed an absolute divorce “based on a mutual and voluntary separation when requested to do so,” we agree with the rest of Judge Souder’s assessment regarding the failure to do anything to move the case forward.

From January 2003, when Ms. Sporay made her wishes known about moving forward with the divorce, through the end of her representation of Ms. Sporay, Ms. Kreamer propounded no discovery, made no settlement demands on opposing counsel, and repeatedly ignored Ms. Sporay’s calls and e-mails. See Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Awuah, 374 Md. 505, 522 , 823 A.2d 651, 661 (2003) (holding that respondent violated Rule 1.3 because he did little work on a client’s case and was not responsive to her requests about her case, among other things); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Cohen, 361 Md. 161, 174 , 760 A.2d 706, 713 (2000) (holding that respondent violated Rule 1.3 because of repeated failure to return phone calls from client, among other things).

Even if the January 2003 meeting and the July 2003 phone call were substantive (because Ms. Kreamer was gathering pertinent information from her own client), the record does not reflect that Ms. Kreamer did anything with that information during the relevant time period to obtain a divorce for her client. Ms. Kreamer’s argument that “[fjiling a supplemental complaint for absolute divorce in January 2003 would have been a waste of Respondent’s time and Sporay’s money if Mr. Sporay was on active duty ...,” is unavailing. It does not save Ms. Kreamer to argue, after the fact, that Mr. Sporay actually was on active duty at the time, which would have prevented even the most diligent attorney from obtaining ⁵²⁹ additional discovery or a divorce. 18 The hearing judge found that Ms. Kreamer was unaware of Mr. Sporay’s active duty status during the relevant time period. Further, the hearing judge did not believe that Ms. Kreamer informed Ms. Sporay that they could not move forward while Mr. Sporay was on active duty.

As a result, we cannot say Judge Souder erred by finding that Ms. Kreamer did not act “with reasonable diligence and promptness.” Ms. Kreamer’s eighth exception is overruled. Ms. Kreamer violated Rule 1.3. Ms. Kreamer next excepts to the conclusion that “Respondent failed to respond meaningfully to numerous communications from Client in violation of Rule 1.4.” In support of this exception, Ms. Kreamer points to her representation of Ms. Sporay when she was first retained and notes the hearings and orders that she obtained “expeditiously ... in order to protect her client.” Anything Ms. Kreamer did to represent Ms. Sporay before January 2003 is irrelevant to whether Ms. Kreamer failed to communicate with her client after January 2003, the relevant time period in this case. 19 Even if Ms. Kreamer represented Ms. Sporay well at the beginning of her representation, it does not change the fact that during the relevant time period in this case she failed to respond to requests for information from Ms. Sporay. Ms. Kreamer also argues that since she was informed in January 2003 that Ms. Sporay’s husband “may be called up,” her “brief’ telephone calls and e-mails to the client were acceptable.

We disagree. As mentioned earlier, Rule 1.4 requires attorneys to keep their clients “reasonably informed ⁵³⁰ about the status of a matter” and to “promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.” In addition, the rule requires attorneys to “explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.” Judge Souder’s findings include a litany of failures to respond meaningfully to Ms. Sporay’s requests for information, over a span of many months. The hearing judge also found that even if Ms. Kreamer had known that Mr. Sporay was on active duty, “Respondent’s failure to advise her client that the case could not proceed ... is inexplicable.” In view of those facts, we agree with the hearing judge that Ms. Kreamer violated Rule 1.4. See Attorney Griev.

Commn’n v. Zuckerman, 386 Md.