Attorney Grievance Commission v. Lane

CATHELL, Judge. On January 17, 2001, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, petitioner, by Melvin Hirshman, Bar Counsel, and Glenn M. Grossman, Deputy Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary Action against Samuel Joseph Lane, respondent. The petition alleged that respondent, based on his representation of Lance D. Williams and Cheryl Lynn Bair, had violated Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC) 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4, 1.5(c), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d). 1 This Court, by Order ⁶³⁶ dated January 18, 2001, transmitted the action to the Circuit Court for Washington County for that court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Circuit Court held eviden-tiary hearings on May 14, 2001 and August 17, 2001. 2 ⁶³⁷ On October 3, 2001, the Circuit Court for Washington County filed its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

The record from the Circuit Court was then transferred to our Court for oral argument. I. Facts On June 21, 1995, respondent was admitted to the Bar of Maryland. In February of 1996, respondent began practicing law as a sole practitioner with a focus on divorce, child support, and preparing wills. Respondent’s previous legal experience was as a student in a law school clinic and as an intern with the Office of the State’s Attorney for Montgomery County.

In September of 1997, respondent closed his private practice to accept a position with the Public Defender’s Office in Allegany County. While with the Public Defender’s Office respondent was offered a position in the Office of the State’s Attorney for Allegany County. Respondent joined the State’s Attorney’s Office in September of 1998 and he currently works for that office as a circuit court felony prosecutor. The two complaints against respondent arose from his representation of clients while he was a sole practitioner.

In its findings of fact, the Circuit Court for Washington County has done a complete job of summarizing the facts of the two complaints. We shall, therefore, quote the Circuit Court, which stated: “Williams Case “Mr. Williams retained the Respondent in April 1996 to oppose the claim of Jeanette Miller, the mother of his daughter, for an increase in child support payments. Mr. Williams also complained that he had been denied visitation with his daughter. In July 1996, a hearing was held before a Master of the Circuit Court for Allegany County.

Mr. Williams’ child support obligation was found to be $562.00 per month. On October 31, 1996, Williams’ exceptions were ⁶³⁸ overruled by the Honorable J. Frederick Sharer and no appeal was taken pursuant to Mr. Lane’s advice. “In February 1997, Mr. Williams again engaged the services of the Respondent. This time, he sought a reduction in child support and visitation. The Respondent agreed to file a Complaint to Establish Visitation and a Motion to Modify Child Support.

The Respondent does not dispute that he was retained [to] handle these issues. From February 1997 through September 19[9]8, Mr. Lane took no substantive action on behalf of Mr. Williams. No pleadings or motions were filed with the court, and no contact was made with Ms. Miller or her attorney. “During this time, however, the Respondent engaged in a course of conduct to conceal the fact that he had taken no action on behalf of Mr. Williams. Mr. Lane told numerous deliberate falsehoods to Mr. Williams: he stated that counsel for Ms. Miller agreed to a reduction in the child support payments; that he had attended a hearing with Ms. Miller’s counsel and that Mr. Williams’ attendance was not necessary; that Ms. Miller had filed pleadings to oppose Mr. Williams’ claim for visitation; that court dates had been cancelled. “Perhaps the most incredulous web of falsehoods was in regard to a hearing allegedly scheduled for February 28, 1998.

Mr. Lane informed Mr. Williams that a hearing had been scheduled for that date and that he had issued a subpoena compelling Ms. Miller’s attendance. There was no hearing and no subpoena. However, Mr. Williams and his wife met the Respondent at the courthouse where the Respondent informed them that Ms. Miller had failed to appear. While Mr. Williams and his wife waited, Mr. Lane pretended to have a meeting with the Judge.

He then falsely informed Mr. Williams and his wife that the Judge would rule in Williams’ favor, and further falsely advised them that he would forward papers to the Judge for the Judge’s signature. He later told Mr. Williams that the ‘papers’ were on the Judge’s desk and that Ms. Miller had filed for a stay with respect to the Judge’s Order. As there ⁶³⁹ had been no hearing and no judicial determination, all of these representations were untrue. “When Mr. Lane joined the Office of the State’s Attorney for Allegany County in September 1998, he informed Mr. Williams that his case had been referred to George McKinley, Esquire. Mr. Lane falsely advised Williams that a hearing had been scheduled for October 13, 1998.

In fact, no hearing had been scheduled for that or any other date. At this point, Mr. Williams had not established an attorney-client relationship with Mr. McKinley. On October 13,1998, Mr. Williams went to the Allegany County Circuit Court and reviewed his case file. He discovered that no papers of any kind had been filed by the Respondent. “Mr. Williams searched for and located the Respondent, who admitted that no Complaint for Visitation or Motion for Reduction of Child Support had been filed.

Mr. Lane stated, however, that the matter could be ‘taken care of that very day. As of October 13, 1998, Mr. Williams had not seen his daughter for approximately two years. Bair Case “Cheryl Lynn Bair retained Mr. Lane on or about July 19, 1997 to represent her in a claim against Lanaconing Water Company (LWC) for termination of water service to her home. The Respondent agreed to represent her on a contingency fee basis but the terms of the fee were not communicated to Ms. Bair in writing. “Although Ms. Bair’s water service had been terminated in July 1997, the Respondent did not file a Complaint seeking an emergency ex parte injunction until February 26, 1998.

Mr. Lane filed a Complaint for money damages against LWC contemporaneously with the filing of the Complaint for Injunction. As an explanation for his dilatory behavior, Mr. Lane explained to this Court that he had never filed for an injunction and, thus, he did not know the steps to take in doing so. ⁶⁴⁰ “At the time Mr. Lane filed for an injunction, Ms. Bair owed the water company approximately $772.00. The Respondent paid $550.00 from his own funds to LWC and LWC restored water service to Ms. Bair. The Respondent did not inform Ms. Bair that he had paid LWC, but rather gave her the impression that the injunction had been granted.

Within approximately one month, Ms. Bair’s water service was again terminated. Mr. Lane falsely advised Ms. Bair that he had filed a Motion for Sanctions against LWC for terminating her water service again. Subsequently, he told Ms. Bair that LWC had been sanctioned by the Court. From his own funds, he paid Ms. Bair $1,700.00 and indicated to her that said sum had come from LWC as a result of the sanctions. “Perhaps the most incredulous web of falsehoods in regard to Ms. Bair’s case centered around Mr. Lane’s statement to her on or about June 30, 1998 that he had filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and that a judgment was granted in her favor in the amount of eleven[-]and-a-half million dollars.

He further indicated that LWC had filed an appeal, [or] that LWC would immediately file same. “In January 1999, Mr. Lane false[ly] advised Ms. Bair that he was involved in settlement discussions with LWC. In January or early February 1999, he told Ms. Bair that her case had settled for over eleven million dollars. He also misrepresented the nature of the settlement; that the Court had ordered payment to be made and that the Internal Revenue Service had charged Ms. Bair taxes on the settlement. Mr. Lane told his client to come to the Circuit Court for the purpose of receiving the Court ordered award.

He told her to bring a suitcase for the purpose of carrying the substantial amount of cash which comprised part of the settlement. She was also told to have someone accompany her for the purpose of security. On February 10, 1999, at the Circuit Court for Allegany County, the Respondent disclosed to Ms. Bair for the first time that he had misled her concerning her lawsuit and he also disclosed that no money would be forthcoming from LWC.” ⁶⁴¹ The Circuit Court concluded that respondent, in his representation of Mr. Williams, had violated MRPC 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d). The court found that respondent had violated the MRPC through the following actions: his failure to take substantive action on behalf of Mr. Williams, respondent’s representation was not characterized by diligence and promptness, his deception deprived Mr. Williams of being able to make informed decisions about his case, he did not abide by his client’s decision concerning the objectives of the case, he did not keep Mr. Williams reasonably informed about the case, and his misrepresentations about the status of Mr. Williams’ case prevented Mr. Williams from obtaining the legal relief he had sought.

In Ms. Bair’s case, the Circuit Court concluded that respondent had violated MRPC 1.1, 1.2,1.3,1.4(a) and (b), 1.5(c), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d). The court found that respondent had violated the MRPC through the following actions: his failure to provide Ms. Bair with the terms of the contingency fee in writing, respondent failed to understand how to file for an injunction and failed to take action on Ms. Bair’s case, he did not abide by Ms. Bair’s decisions concerning the objectives of the case, he did not act in a diligent and prompt manner, respondent knowingly misled and made misrepresentations to Ms. Bair, respondent’s misrepresentations prevented his client from making informed decisions about her case and kept her from being reasonably informed about the status of her case, and respondent’s deceit kept Ms. Bair from pursuing her interests in court. Respondent has not filed any exceptions to the Circuit Court for Washington County’s findings of fact or conclusions of law. The “hearing court’s findings of fact are prima facia correct and will not be disturbed unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garland, 345 Md. 383, 392 , 692 A.2d 465, 469 (1997) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Goldsborough, 330 Md. 342, 347 , 624 A.2d 503, 505 (1993)).

After a review of the record, we hold that the findings of fact of the Circuit Court are not clearly ⁶⁴² erroneous. We hold that the Circuit Court’s conclusions of law are supported by the facts. The only issue being disputed by respondent is the appropriate sanction for his violations of the MRPC.

II

Sanction We examined the purpose behind the attorney grievance procedure and the appropriate sanction for an attorney in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Franz, 355 Md. 752, 760-61 , 736 A.2d 339, 343-44 (1999), when we stated: “It is well-settled that the purpose of disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public rather than to punish the erring attorney. Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Myers, 333 Md. 440, 446-47 , 635 A.2d 1315, 1318 (1994); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Goldsborough, 330 Md. 342, 364 , 624 A.2d 503, 513 [(1993)]; Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Protokowicz, 329 Md. 252, 262-63 , 619 A.2d 100, 105 (1993); Attorney Griev.

Comm’n v. Myers, 302 Md. 571, 580 , 490 A.2d 231, 236 (1985); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Velasquez, 301 Md. 450, 459 , 483 A.2d 354, 359 (1984); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Montgomery, 296 Md. 113, 119 , 460 A.2d 597, 600 (1983). The public interest is served when this Court imposes a sanction which demonstrates to members of the legal profession the type of conduct that will not be tolerated.

Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Kerpelman, 288 Md. 341, 382 , 420 A.2d 940, 959 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 970 , 101 S.Ct. 1492 , 67 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). By imposing such a sanction, this Court fulfills its responsibility ‘to insist upon the maintenance of the integrity of the Bar and to prevent the transgression of an individual lawyer from bringing its image into disrepute.’ Maryland St. Bar Ass’n v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 549 , 318 A.2d 811, 814 (1974). Therefore, the public interest is served when sanctions designed to effect general and specific deterrence are imposed on an attorney who violates the disciplinary rules.

See Protokowicz, 329 Md. at 262-63 , 619 A.2d at 105 ; Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Owrutsky, 322 Md. 334, 355 , 587 A.2d 511, 521 (1991); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Alison, 317 Md. 523, 540-41 , 565 ⁶⁴³ A.2d 660, 668 (1989). Of course, what the appropriate sanction for the particular misconduct is, in the public interest, generally depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case.

Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Babbitt, 300 Md. 637, 642 , 479 A.2d 1372, 1375 (1984) (the facts and circumstances of a case will determine how severe the sanction should be); Montgomery, 296 Md. at 120 , 460 A.2d at 600 ; Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Pollack, 289 Md. 603, 609 , 425 A.2d