Attorney Grievance Commission v. Lawson

PER CURIAM. In 2007, we suspended Jeffrey Lawson from the practice of law as a result of his improper efforts to increase a fee by threatening withdrawal after beginning representation of a client. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lawson, 401 Md. 536 , 933 A.2d 842 (2007). Mr. Lawson has not practiced law since that time.

In this case, we disbar him in light of other fee-related misconduct he committed prior to his suspension. In this matter, the Attorney Grievance Commission (the “Commission”) charged Mr. Lawson with violating numerous provisions of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”). The alleged violations all arose during Mr. Lawson’s representation of Harry F. Fields in an uncontested divorce and subsequent division of marital property. ¹⁰⁶ Pursuant to Maryland Rules 16-752(a) and 16-757, we referred the matter to Judge Robert E. Cahill, Jr., of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County to conduct a hearing and to provide findings of fact and recommended conclusions of law. Mr. Lawson declined to participate in the hearing before Judge Cahill.

In his absence, Judge Cahill entered a judgment by default 1 and held an evidentiary hearing at which the court received documentary and testimonial evidence. Judge Cahill made various findings of fact and concluded that Mr. Lawson violated MLRPC 1.2(a) (duty to abide by the client’s decisions concerning the objectives of the representation); 1.5(a) (prohibition against charging an unreasonable fee); 1.8(a) (restriction on business transactions with clients); 1.15(a) (duty to safekeep the property of clients); and 8.4(a), (c), (d) (professional misconduct involving violation of disciplinary rules, dishonesty, and other conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). He concluded that Mr. Lawson did not violate MLRPC 1.1 (duty to provide competent representation). Neither Mr. Lawson nor the Commission filed exceptions to Judge Cahill’s findings of fact or recommended conclusions of law.

We explain below why Mr. Lawson must be disbarred. Background 2 The Divorce Case Jeffrey Lawson was admitted to the Maryland Bar on April 1, 2004. On or about January 24, 2006, Harry F. Fields engaged Mr. Lawson in connection with a property settlement and divorce. At that time, Mr. Fields was homeless, diabetic, and hypertensive, and suffered from vision impairment because of glaucoma.

He knew Mr. Lawson because they were ¹⁰⁷ both Muslims and worshiped at the same masjid. 3 Mr. Fields’ estranged wife had recently offered him $5,000 for his share of any marital property as part of the finalization of their divorce, and it was with an eye toward obtaining a larger share of the marital property that Mr. Fields retained Mr. Lawson. Mr. Fields signed a written fee agreement in which he agreed to pay Mr. Lawson $250 per hour plus costs and expenses and in which Mr. Lawson agreed to represent Mr. Fields in his divorce. Cracks in the attorney-client relationship soon developed, however. An initial problem was a disagreement over meeting locations that would continue throughout the representation.

Mr. Fields, who was then sleeping at the masjid, requested that their meetings take place in Mr. Lawson’s law office. 4 Instead, Mr. Lawson would only agree to meet in the masjid where, in Mr. Fields’ words, they could be overheard by others; on the street; in Mr. Lawson’s vehicle; or in a parking lot. This initial disagreement further developed into a fee dispute because, according to Mr. Fields, Mr. Lawson billed Mr. Fields for all travel time to and from their rendezvous points. Mr. Fields’ testimony suggests that Mr. Lawson would travel to the masjid for prayer and deliver papers to Mr. Fields while he was there. He would then, according to Mr. Fields, bill Mr. Fields for the entire trip.

On March 6, 2006, Mr. Lawson filed on Mr. Fields’ behalf a Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order, a Preliminary Injunction, and a Limited and Absolute Divorce and Partition in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. 5 Then, in mid-March, Mr. Fields was given a bill for approximately $12,000. Mr. Fields disputed the amount of the bill and ¹⁰⁸ sought to involve their imam in resolving the dispute, but Mr. Lawson refused to moderate his demands. There was further disagreement as to what actions Mr. Lawson would take in his representation of Mr. Fields. In pursuing the divorce claims, Mr. Lawson engaged in extensive discovery related to a Motion for Entry Upon Jointly Owned Land.

Mr. Fields testified that he did not wish to enter the home or spend time with his estranged wife and that he did not authorize Mr. Lawson to take this action. The discovery documents in the record indicate that Mr. Lawson was requesting temporary entry in order to photograph and identify marital property located in the marital home. Mr. Fields also testified that he directed Mr. Lawson to contact a judgment creditor and attempt to negotiate a reduction of the amount owed prior to the settlement on the property but that Mr. Lawson did not do so. On or about May 23, 2006, the circuit court master awarded Mr. Fields temporary support, pendente lite, from his wife in the amount of $500 per month.

Mr. Lawson directed Ms. Fields to send these funds to himself, though the record does not indicate that any funds were ever transferred, and both sides filed exceptions to the support award. 6 While the divorce action was still pending, on August 2, 2006, Mr. Fields and his wife negotiated and signed a settlement agreement that resolved the property dispute. The agreement provided, in part, for the sale of the marital home and equal division of the proceeds. 7 Mr. Fields was unable to read the settlement agreement due to his poor eyesight, so he brought a female friend to the settlement conference to assist him in reading the documents. Mr. Lawson refused to permit Mr. Fields to sit next to the woman. In his original complaint to the Commission, Mr. Fields explained that Mr. Lawson was ¹⁰⁹ concerned that it would give the impression that Mr. Fields was in an extra-marital relationship with the woman.

The record contains no greater detail on this incident. On September 22, 2006, Mr. Lawson filed a Motion to Enforce Attorney’s Lien and Enjoin Distribution of Proceeds of Sale. He filed this motion on behalf of Mr. fields, and the motion requested, among other things, that the court order that any proceeds from the sale of the marital home be given to Mr. Lawson and not Mr. Fields. The basis for this request was a March 7, 2006, lien agreement that Mr. Lawson had persuaded Mr. Fields to sign several months into the representation. 8 The agreement purported to create a lien for attorney’s fees against any proceeds recovered.

Mr. Fields testified that at some unidentified later time he entered into a handwritten settlement agreement with Mr. Lawson to resolve a fee dispute and believed that Mr. Lawson had agreed to accept $3,500 as payment. According to Mr. Fields, he later discovered that the handwritten document actually called for Mr. Lawson to reduce the fee, which had ballooned to approximately $46,000, down to $35,000. 9 Mr. Lawson entered into this business transaction with Mr. Fields without advising Mr. Fields verbally or in writing of his option to seek independent legal counsel, nor did Mr. Lawson give Mr. Fields a reasonable opportunity to do so. As a result of this agreement, Mr. Lawson received the entirety of Mr. Fields’ share of the proceeds from the sale of the marital property. Mr. Fields ultimately came away from the settlement with less than he started with because his share of the proceeds was still $3,000 short of the full legal bill that Mr. Lawson claimed he was owed. ¹¹⁰ During the representation, Mr. Fields had also furnished Mr. Lawson with certain documents, among which was the title to a van.

After the representation ended, Mr. Lawson returned some of the documents, but he did not return the title to the van. Additionally, the records indicate that Mr. Lawson billed Mr. Fields at his full rate of $250 per hour for simple clerical tasks such as preparing a fax cover sheet ($50) and making copies ($50 on one occasion, $100 on another). Similarly, he charged his full rate for driving time to the courthouse to file motions, resulting in several charges in excess of $500 per round trip. He also billed $850 for preparing and filing requests to waive filing fees for his client.

On or about September 17, 2006, Mr. Fields asked Mr. Lawson whether he was the same Jeffrey Lawson who was the subject of an attorney disciplinary case then pending in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. Mr. Lawson denied that this was the case. This was a lie, as Mr. Fields discovered when he attended a hearing scheduled in that matter. Complaint and Investigation Several months later, on or about December 7, 2006, Mr. Fields complained to the Commission about Mr. Lawson’s conduct.

A series of letters between the Commission and Mr. Lawson followed, with Mr. Lawson refusing to respond to the complaint or comply with a subpoena to provide records and give testimony. 10 This impasse continued until August 16, 2007, when the Commission received the following documents: Client Expense Log, Client Billing Summary, and Time Sheet for Harry Frederick Fields. The Commission again requested the full file, including any records of funds received from or on ¹¹¹ behalf of Mr. Fields. Mr. Lawson never produced any additional documents. The Hearing Judge’s Conclusions of Law In a detailed analysis based on these facts, Judge Cahill concluded that Mr. Lawson violated MLRPC 1.2(a) (duty to abide by the client’s decisions concerning the objectives of the representation); 1.5(a) (prohibition against charging an unreasonable fee); 1.8(a) (restrictions on business transactions with clients); 1.15(a) (duty to safekeep the property of clients); and 8.4 (professional misconduct involving violation of disciplinary rules, dishonesty, and other conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).

Judge Cahill found no violation of MLRPC 1.1 (duty to provide competent representation). Neither party filed exceptions. Discussion We review the hearing judge’s conclusions of law de novo pursuant to Rule 16 — 759(b)(1). MLRPC 1.1 MLRPC 1.1 provides that a lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.

We agree with Judge Cahill that the Commission has failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mr. Lawson did not employ proper legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation in his representation of Mr. Fields. There was, accordingly, no violation of MLRPC 1.1. MLRPC 1.2 MLRPC 1.2(a) provides in relevant part that: (a) Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and, when appropriate, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation.

A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a ¹¹² matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify. Judge Cahill found that Mr. Lawson’s pursuit of the Motion for Entry Upon Jointly Owned Land and related discovery constituted a violation of MLRPC 1.2. We disagree.

Although Mr. Fields’ complaint and testimony before the lower court unambiguously show that Mr. Fields did not want to move back in with his wife, it also shows that he had no idea about the purpose of discovery. 11 Further, an examination of the motions and discovery filed by Mr. Lawson does not establish that he was trying to obtain for Mr. Fields re-entry into the property for purposes of living there with his estranged wife. The evidence is plain that the motion related solely to a brief re-entry in order to inspect the property, take ¹¹³ photographs, and identify any of Mr. Fields’ personal property that may have been left by him. This is entirely consistent with Mr. Fields’ objective of obtaining a more favorable division of the marital property. Mr. Fields’ misunderstanding of what Mr. Lawson was doing is problematic, but it does not necessarily mean there was a violation of MLRPC 1.2.

Additionally, Judge Cahill found that Mr. Lawson’s refusal to negotiate a reduction in Mr. Fields’ obligations to his creditors was a violation of 1.2. Again, we do not agree. There is no evidence that Mr. Lawson agreed to represent Mr. Fields in any matter other than the divorce proceeding, and indeed their written agreement contemplates representation only as to that proceeding. MLRPC 1.2(c) permits reasonable limitations on the scope of representation, and we cannot say that Mr. Lawson’s refusal to represent Mr. Fields in an unrelated creditor dispute was unreasonable.

We therefore find no violation of MLRPC 1.2. MLRPC 1.5 MLRPC 1.5 provides, in relevant part: (a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: (1) the time and labor required, the