Attorney Grievance Commission v. Molovinsky

COLE, Judge. This matter originally came to our attention in 1980, when we considered a petition, filed in accordance with Maryland Rule BV16, to suspend Gale Sanders Molovinsky (Molovinsky) from the practice of law. Because on July 31, 1980, Molovinsky had been found guilty of conspiracy to counterfeit United States Federal Reserve Notes, we entered an ²⁹³ order suspending him “from the practice of law until further Order of this Court.” On appeal, Molovinsky’s conviction in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland was affirmed. United States v. Molovinsky, 688 F.2d 243 (4th Cir.1982).

After approximately eight months’ incarceration, Molovinsky was released from prison on September 7, 1983. Thereafter, the Attorney Grievance Commission, by Bar Counsel, filed a petition for disciplinary action alleging that Molovinsky violated Disciplinary Rules (DR) 1-102(A)(1), (3), (4), (5) and (6). In accordance with Maryland Rule BV 9 et seq., this Court ordered that the charges be transmitted to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County to be heard by the Honorable Calvin R. Sanders. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, Judge Sanders filed the following findings of fact and conclusions of law as supported by clear and convincing evidence: 1.

That respondent was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland of the crime of conspiracy to counterfeit, and that the conviction was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit. 2. That the acts of respondent in furtherance of the conspiracy consisted of arrangements for (1) the distribution of counterfeit money, (2) access to a printing facility, (3) acquisition of paper, and (4) the production of two metal plates with the apparent likeness of the $20.00 Federal Reserve Note. 3. That the metal plates were, in fact, magic props with the appearance of currency plates, and were produced in order to convince the potential distributor of the seriousness of respondent’s intentions. 4. That no counterfeit money was ever produced or distributed under the proposed plan of the conspirators. 5.

That the nature of the crime and the acts performed by respondent involve moral turpitude. 6. That respondent violated the following Disciplinary Rules: ²⁹⁴ DR-102(A)—A lawyer shall not: (3) Engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude. (4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. • (5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. (6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.

Molovinsky filed exceptions to these findings. Because he had admitted violating DR 1-102(A), (4), (5) and (6) in his pro se response to the petition for disciplinary action, his exceptions primarily focus on his assertion that the lower court erred in concluding that his conviction for the crime of conspiracy to counterfeit was conclusive proof that he had engaged in “illegal conduct involving moral turpitude.” 1 DR 1-102(A)(3). His attack is two-fold: (1) that applying Maryland Rule BV10 e in this case, where he did nothing more than talk about counterfeiting, deprives him of due process of law; and (2) that the acts he was found to have performed did not involve moral turpitude. In addressing Molovinsky’s first complaint, Judge Sanders found this Court’s opinion in Attorney Griev.

Comm’n v. Mandel, 294 Md. 560 , 451 A.2d 910 (1982), dispositive; we agree. Maryland Rule BV10 e provides that in disciplinary matters a final judgment from another proceeding convicting an attorney of a crime is conclusive proof of the attorney’s guilt of that crime. In Mandel , we were faced with applying that Rule to a federal conviction that had been affirmed on appeal by an equally divided court. Judge Smith noted for the Court that many states have similar rules or statutes, id. at 569 , 451 A.2d 910 , and quoted Chief Judge Murphy’s analysis of Rule BY4 f 1, the predecessor to present Rule BV10 e 1: ²⁹⁵ “[0]ther states provide, as we do, by rule, statute, or case law, that a conviction of an attorney is conclusive proof of guilt.

See, e.g., In re Metheany, 104 Ariz. 144 , 449 P.2d 609 (1969); In re Higbie, 6 Cal.3d 562 , 99 Cal.Rptr. 865 , 493 P.2d 97 (1972); In re Fumo, 52 Ill.2d 307 , 288 N.E.2d 9 (1972); Kentucky State Bar Ass’n v. Lester, 437 S.W.2d 958 (Ky.1968); In re Lurkins, 374 S.W.2d 67 (Mo. 1964). The constitutionality of these procedures has not been seriously questioned. The requirements of due process having been satisfied at the criminal trial, and the attorney’s guilt having been established beyond a reasonable