Attorney Grievance Commission v. Patterson

BARBERA, J. The Attorney Grievance Commission (“Petitioner”), acting through Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action against Respondent, attorney Roland N. Patterson. The petition addresses Respondent’s conduct in three matters: his management of an interest on lawyer trust account (“IOLTA” or “trust account”); an appeal in a landlord-tenant case in which he represented Denver Moten; and a tort claim in which he represented Raehelle Lewis and her son. Pursuant to Md. Rule 16-752, we designated the Honorable Susan Souder of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County to hear the matter and make findings of fact and conclusions of ⁷¹⁴ law in accordance with Md. Rule 16-757. Judge Souder conducted a hearing on January 19, 2011, and dictated her findings of fact and conclusions of law into the record.

The transcribed findings and conclusions were adopted in an Order dated February 4, 2011. Judge Souder found by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”) 1.1 (competence), 1.3 (diligence), 1.4 (communication), 1.5(a) and (b) (fees), 1.15(a) and (d) (safekeeping of client property), 1.16(d) (declining or terminating representation), 3.2 (expediting litigation), 8.1(b) (cooperation with bar counsel), and Md. Rules 16-606.1 and 16-609(c) governing attorney trust accounts. I. Judge Souder made the following factual findings and conclusions of law: With respect to Bar Counsel’s complaint regarding the general lack of record keeping, it is clear that the respondent maintained a Maryland IOLTA trust account ending in 7646 at the Bank of America. On November 1st of 2008, he wrote check 1089 in the amount of $5,140.06.

The purpose for which Mr. Patterson wrote check 1089 was to close his IOLTA account ending in 7646, as had been recommended to him. I take judicial notice that November 1st of 2008 was a Saturday. On November 3rd of 2008, Mr. Patterson wrote check 1090 in the amount of $500 on the same account, the account ending 7646. I take judicial notice of the fact that November 3rd, 2008 was Monday.

Mr. Patterson has testified that he was in the bank when he wrote the check. So, presumably, it was before the bank’s normal closing time. It may be possible that Mr. Patterson was told by a bank teller that his new IOLTA account at the Bank of America ending in 1742 did not have funds available for him to write a check. I say it may be possible, because it seems possible ⁷¹⁵ that the check that he had written on Saturday had not yet been processed or cleared by the Bank of America.

Nevertheless, after being told that Mr. Patterson could not write a check on his account ending in 1742, he then wrote a check on 7646. Again, he may have been told by a bank teller that there were funds available in the account ending in 7646, but that teller would have no way of knowing that on Saturday Mr. Patterson had written a check to close the account. Mr. Patterson, however, did know that he had written a check in the amount of $5,140.06 to close the account, and I find that Mr. Patterson knew that the funds were not available in the account ending in 7646 at the time he wrote the check. As a result, at the time Mr. Patterson wrote the check drawn to the trust account ending in 7646, made out to his law firm for $500, that resulted in an overdraft in his IOLTA trust account.

I make all of my findings by clear and convincing evidence. I do find that Mr. Patterson engaged in a transaction that is prohibited by Rule 16-609(c), which states that, “No funds from an attorney trust account should be dispersed if the dispersement would create a negative balance.” With regard to client matters in the aggregate, in addition, it is clear from the records that have been introduced and admitted into evidence that Mr. Patterson failed to create a record for his IOLTA account that chronologically showed all deposits and dispersements, and by doing so he violated Maryland Rule 16-606.1. It is clear that Mr. Patterson’s records did not show for each deposit the date of the deposit, the amount of the deposit, the identity of the client for whom the funds were deposited and the purpose of the deposit, again in violation of 16-606.1(a)(2)(A). In addition, with respect to Mr. Patterson’s trust account, he did not maintain a record that showed with respect to ⁷¹⁶ dispersements the purpose for which funds were intended, the amount of the dispersement, the payee and the check number, again, in violation of Rule 16-606.1(a)(3)(A).

Insofar as Rule 1.15 refers to this obligation for attorneys to comply with Title 16, Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules, create and maintain records in accordance with those rules, Mr. Patterson has failed to do so. And so he’s in violation of Rule 1.15. The suggestion that the Attorney Grievance Commission had an obligation to tell Mr. Patterson to read some rules because the records he was submitting were not in compliance with the rules is not well taken because Mr. Patterson is obligated to read the rules and comply with them himself. He has testified that he was under an attorney monitor agreement.

That being the case, it is difficult to understand why Mr. Patterson would not have become an expert in the rules regarding trust accounts by reading them repeatedly until he was sure that he was in full compliance with their provisions. He has not testified that he read the rules or reviewed the rules, consulted the rules or the cases under the rules, and based on what he has argued here, I could not find that he had bothered to consult the rules. He seems to have relied entirely on his monitor to make sure that he was in compliance. That is not Maryland law.

I found Mr. Moten to be a very credible witness.[ 1 ] With respect to the District Court appeal for which Mr. Moten retained Mr. Patterson, Mr. Patterson accepted a retainer in December 2008 in the amount of $2500. The exhibits are clear that he received two money orders at first in the ⁷¹⁷ amounts of $1000.00 and $400, and then, subsequently, received two additional money orders in the amount of $1000.00 and $100.00, such that by December 31st, 2008, he had been paid [in] full the retainer of $2500 that he requested. But it does not appear that Mr. Patterson understood the need or urgency of entering his appearance in the matter so that he would be sent a notice by the Court as to the hearing date. The testimony is undisputed that it was Mr. Moten who kept himself apprised of the hearing date or the status of the matter, and he advised Mr. Patterson of the February 27, 2009, trial date.

Even when Mr. Patterson was advised of this February 27, 2009, hearing date for this de novo appeal, Mr. Patterson still did not enter his appearance. He didn’t seek to continue the matter or postpone it because he hadn’t had time to get ready. He issued no subpoenas. It doesn’t appear that he ever received what had been filed by the District Court, which would have provided him with information as to the names of the witnesses for BGE, who had testified, and their addresses.

All that information appears in the exhibits which have been admitted in this Court. Mr. Patterson apparently had a conversation or he testifies that he had a conversation with Evan Goldman[, evidently, counsel for Bulldog Development,] with respect to the filing of Suggestion of Bankruptcy. The two Defendants in the District Court appeal case were Bulldog Development, LLC, and Devora Sofer. Now, it may be that somehow the Suggestion of Bankruptcy about which Mr. Goldman was talking was relevant to one of those two Defendants, but there is no evidence before this Court that any Suggestion of Bankruptcy with respect to either of those Defendants was ever filed or, in fact, that there ever was a bankruptcy involving either of those Defendants.

Let me see Plaintiffs Exhibit 7 [the case history from the District Court], Mr. Clerk. ⁷¹⁸ There is as a result of the Suggestion of Bankruptcy that was filed in March of 2009, so it doesn’t appear that there was a bankruptcy on February 27th of 2009. As a result of the Suggestion of Bankruptcy that was filed, the case was stayed as to Jason Dennis. What relationship he has to this matter is not clear. Mr. Patterson hasn’t explained it, what exactly Mr. Dennis’ role is in Bulldog Development, LLC.

There is also some paper in the Court file, Plaintiffs Exhibit 7, that there is a debtor by the name of Live Oak Development, LLC. What that has to do with this case, again, I don’t know. But Bar Counsel is right, that in this particular case we don’t have any records of any bankruptcy filed by Bulldog Development, LLC, or Devora Sofer. What happened on February 27th, 2009, is that a default judgment was entered against the two Defendants.

The judgment was in the amount of zero. It is not clear to me that even as of today that Mr. Patterson understands what that meant. It certainly did not mean that there was an opportunity to come back to Court and necessarily present some evidence. Not a mandatory, not a matter of right.

The Court file reflects that at some point a judge did vacate the judgment. The case was set for an inquisition, for an opportunity to present damages, and as a result of the fact there was no competent evidence of damages being presented, the judgment remained at zero in this matter. I did not find Mr. Patterson’s testimony credible in many respects during this proceeding. I had the opportunity to observe his demeanor and his way of testifying, as well as his manner of speaking.

To the extent that his testimony diverged from the facts testified to by Denver Moten and Rachelle Lewis, I resolve those issues in favor of Denver Moten and Rachelle Lewis.[ 2 ] ⁷¹⁹ At times in testifying Mr. Patterson was evasive and hesitant. He often did not answer direct questions with direct answers. To the extent that Mr. Patterson, in the Moten matter, did not issue any subpoenas, did not attempt to present any evidence on February 27th, I believe that he was in violation of Rule 1.1 regarding competence. I do not find it credible when he said that he prepared certain papers.

No such drafts of any papers have been presented here, and I did not find his testimony credible as to the kinds of papers he said that he prepared but then did not serve or did not file or otherwise did not pursue. I do find that Mr. Patterson then was in violation of Rule 1.1. With respect to Rule 1.3, Mr. Patterson did not act with reasonable promptness to enter his appearance and prepare the case for the hearing on February 27th, 2009. So I do find that he’s in violation of Rule 1.3.

With respect to the communication, Mr. Patterson did fail to explain to Mr. Moten that a $0 judgment had been entered. Mr. Patterson failed to explain what steps could be taken or what steps were being taken or what bankruptcy effect there was on this case, but I think all of those things have to do with Mr. Patterson’s lack of competence in this matter. It was a lack of written communication regarding the status of the case, but I don’t think that attorneys have a legal obligation to regularly send out letters explaining the case. Mr. Moten did frequently ask for information.

I don’t believe he was given accurate information about the case. ⁷²⁰ I do find that Mr. Patterson failed to explain the matter reasonably necessary to permit Mr. Moten to make informed decisions about the proceeding. So I do find that Mr. Patterson violated Rule 1.4(B). To the extent that Mr. Patterson thought that his representation had been terminated, or that he had been fired, he failed to provide any notice to Mr. Moten with respect to that termination of representation. So he did violate Rule 1.4 in that respect.

Regarding the fees that were paid. Mr. Moten paid the $2500. I find that Mr. Patterson never advised Mr. Moten that he would be charging an hourly rate. I do not believe that Mr. Patterson ever had prepared a retainer agreement or communicated to Mr. Moten that he was to sign it or review it.

I do not believe that Mr. Moten was ever advised of the contents of Plaintiffs Exhibit 14 [an unsigned fee agreement between Respondent and Mr. Moten]. I don’t believe that Mr. Moten ever understood there was any fee agreement between him and Mr. Patterson as reflected by Plaintiffs Exhibit Number 14. The $2500 fee was not unreasonable on its face at the outset of this matter, but when Mr. Patterson failed to enter his appearance promptly upon being paid, and to take steps to apprise himself of the status of the matter and the scheduling of the matter, when he failed to prepare competently for the hearing on February 27th, 2009, or to take steps to confirm whether or not there was a bankruptcy, the $2500 fee did become unreasonable. I find that Mr. Patterson has violated Rule 1.5(a) based on the quality of representation provided and the lack of any meaningful result obtained.

The collection by Mr. Patterson of the $600 for the execution of the judgment I find was unreasonable on its face at the outset, because there was no judgment. It was clear from Mr. Moten’s testimony that he did not even understand that Mr. Patterson had obtained a $0 judgment. ⁷²¹ The Defendant performed no meaningful services of any kind with respect to the $600 fee collected from Mr. Moten for the execution of judgment. There was no judgment on which to execute at any time. So the $600 was unreasonable for the amount of services provided and for the results obtained.

With respect to the fact that at the time that the $1400 was paid by Mr. Moten to Mr. Patterson and Mr. Patterson immediately withdrew it, I find that Mr. Patterson violated Rule 1.15(a), because he had done nothing to earn that fee at the time that he withdrew it. Similarly, with respect to the $1100 paid by Mr. Moten to Mr. Patterson, which Mr. Patterson promptly withdrew, again, there is no record to support that any services had been rendered at the time that the fee was withdrawn. I find that Mr. Patterson had not earned that fee of $1100, and he violated Rule 1.15(a) when he withdrew it. Because Mr. Patterson never provided any meaningful service regarding the $600 fee paid by Mr. Moten, when Mr. Patterson understood that he was terminated, he was clearly obligated to refund the $600 to Mr. Moten.

When he failed to do so, he violated Maryland Rule 1.16(d). With respect to Rachelle Lewis, at the time that Mr. Patterson filed the complaint, in February of 2008, it appears from that complaint that Mr. Patterson had neglected to perform any kind of services or undertake research, to collect documents to support that complaint such that the complaint appears all by itself on its face to violate Rule 1.1. It’s a lack of competence in the drafting of the complaint itself. The complaint was then dismissed when Mr. Patterson failed to take any action.

He failed to respond to the Court notice telling him that there was an intention by the Clerk to dismiss the complaint for lack of action, and, in that regard, Mr. Patterson violated Rule 1.3 by not taking reasonable steps in representing Rachelle Lewis and [her son]. He failed to act with reasonable diligence and ⁷²² promptness in representing the client with regard to that complaint. He also failed to expedite that litigation since he undertook no effort to serve process upon either of the Defendants, he undertook no discovery. I don’t find any credible evidence that any reasonable effort was made by Mr. Patterson in connection with the Lewis civil matter to expedite that litigation.

With respect to the filing of the second complaint for Ms. Lewis, about which she was not advised, there is no evidence that Mr. Patterson has undertaken reasonable efforts to diligently prosecute that matter either. With respect to Mr. Patterson’s communications with Ms. Lewis, he clearly failed to advise her that the first civil lawsuit he filed had been dismissed. He did not keep her reasonably informed. He failed to respond in any prompt matter to her telephone calls or to most of her e-mails.

He did not communicate to her anything about the notice of contemplated dismissal or the fact that the case was actually dismissed. Mr. Patterson did not explain to the extent reasonably necessary to Ms. Lewis what was the status of her case until she was deprived of any opportunity to make informed decisions about the litigation. He accepted the fees from Ruby Lewis. He failed to communicate with her and he understood his client to be [the son of Rachelle] Lewis, and even after [he] had reached the age of majority, [Mr. Patterson] failed to explain to [Rachelle Lewis’s son], Ruby or Rachelle Lewis the status of the case that was dismissed or efforts to prepare the second case.

The $3,000 fee that he collected with respect to the Lewis civil case was not unreasonable on its face, but it ultimately became unreasonable because Mr. Patterson did not provide competent services in connection with the civil suit and, clearly, there was a lack of results obtained with respect to the filing of the second lawsuit. ⁷²³ With respect to the payment of the $3,000, Mr. Patterson began withdrawing money almost immediately after the deposit of that money into his trust account, and he kept no time records. None of the documents or the testimony in the case indicate any basis on which the removal of the money from the trust account would have been justified. As with respect to the other matters, or consistent with the other cases, Mr. Patterson failed to keep adequate records regarding the fee deposited in his trust account and the withdrawals. So he violated Rule 1.15(a).

When Ms. Lewis demanded a refund of the fee that had been paid, Mr. Patterson failed to provide a full accounting of the money that he had received and that he had deposited in his trust account and then dispersed to himself. So he violated Rule 1.15(d). I don’t find Mr. Patterson’s testimony credible with respect to efforts to obtain the medical records. The alleged violation of Rule 1.16 is premised on a belief that he couldn’t obtain these medical records from Rachelle Lewis.

So I don’t find any violation of Rule 1.16(a). But Mr. Patterson did violate Rule 1.16(d), when he did not take any steps to strike his appearance if, in fact, he understood that he was being terminated. With respect to both the Lewis complaint to Bar Counsel and the Pridgen complaint[ 3 ] to Bar Counsel, Mr. Patterson failed to respond to the demands of Bar Counsel for information. Consequently, I find that he violated Rule 8.1(b).

These findings will be transcribed. I think that completes the Court’s findings. ⁷²⁴ II. A. “In attorney discipline proceedings, this Court has original and complete jurisdiction and conducts an independent review of the record.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bleecker, 414 Md. 147, 167 , 994 A.2d 928, 940 (2010) (citations omitted). The hearing judge is required to apply the clear and convincing standard of proof when weighing the evidence, in order to establish the facts.

Md. Rule 16-757(b); 4 Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Siskind, 401 Md. 41, 54 , 930 A.2d 328, 335 (2007). “ ‘The clear and convincing standard of proof lies somewhere between a preponderance of evidence standard, which is generally applied to civil cases, and beyond a reasonable doubt standard, which is applied to most crimes.’ ” Id., 930 A.2d at 335 (citations omitted). “ “We accept a hearing judge’s findings of fact unless we determine that they are clearly erroneous.’ ” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Edib, 415 Md. 696, 706 , 4 A.3d 957, 964 (2010) (citation omitted). That deference is appropriate because the hearing judge is in a position to assess the demean- or-based credibility of the witnesses. Id. at 707 , 4 A.3d at 964 . Moreover, “[t]he hearing judge is permitted to ‘pick and choose which evidence to rely upon’ from a conflicting array when determining findings of fact.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50 , 891 A.2d 1085, 1095 (2006) (citation omitted).

We grant no deference to the hearing judge’s proposed conclusions of law; those, we review de novo. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ugwuonye, 405 Md. 351, 368 , 952 A.2d 226, 236 (2008). In other words, “[t]he ultimate determination [] as to an attorney’s alleged misconduct is reserved for this Court.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. ⁷²⁵ Garfield, 369 Md. 85, 97 , 797 A.2d 757, 764 (2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). B. Petitioner takes no exception to Judge Souder’s factual findings and legal conclusions.

Respondent, though, has filed exceptions to Judge Souder’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. He challenges, in particular: (1) Judge Souder’s findings of fact in connection with Respondent’s handling of his IOLTA account, and the Judge’s legal conclusion that he thereby violated Rules 16-606.1 and 16-609, and MRPC 1.15; (2) Judge Souder’s findings of fact in connection with Respondent’s handling of the Denver Moten matter and the Judge’s conclusion that he thereby violated MRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5,1.15, and 1.16; and (3) Judge Souder’s findings of fact in connection with Respondent’s handling of the Rachelle Lewis matter and the Judge’s legal conclusion that he thereby violated MRPC 1.1, 1.3,1.15, and 1.16. Respondent also excepts to Judge Souder’s failure to consider and make findings concerning evidence of mitigation. He argues that to redress that failure he is entitled to a remand to Judge Souder, for her to make the requisite findings concerning mitigation.

We shall consider each of Respondent’s exceptions, in turn. 1. The IOLTA Account Respondent takes exception to several of Judge Souder’s findings regarding his handling of the IOLTA account. First, he challenges Judge Souder’s finding that he “knew that the funds were not available in the account ending in 7646 at the time he wrote the [$500] check.” Respondent, notably, does not dispute Judge Souder’s finding that he overdrew the 7646 account. Rather, he disputes the Judge’s finding that he knowingly did so. ⁷²⁶ Maryland Rule 16-609(c) prohibits an attorney from disbursing funds from a trust account “if the disbursement would create a negative balance.....” 5 Rule 16-609 does not contain an intent requirement.

See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Awuah, 346 Md. 420, 435 , 697 A.2d 446, 454 (1997) (explaining that “[cjlaimed ignorance of ethical duties and bookkeeping requirements is not a defense in disciplinary proceedings”). Consequently, for purposes of Rule 16-609 it matters not whether Respondent intentionally overdrew the IOLTA account. We recognize, though, that “a finding with respect to the intent with which a violation was committed is relevant on the issue of the appropriate sanction.” Awuah, 346 Md. at 435 , 697 A.2d at 454 . Therefore, we consider for that purpose whether Judge Souder erred in finding that Respondent knowingly overdrew the account.

Judge Souder found that, on November 1, 2008, Respondent wrote a check on the 7646 trust account equal to the entire balance remaining in the account, in order to transfer the funds to a new account. On November 3, 2008, Respondent wrote a separate check for $500 on the 7646 account. Judge Souder found that, based on the November 1 check, Respondent “knew that the funds were not available” for the second, $500 check at the time he wrote it. Respondent argues that he was told by a bank teller on November 3 that the 7646 account balance had not yet been transferred.

Even if true, that fact does nothing to undermine Judge Souder’s finding that Respondent knew that the account lacked sufficient funds to cover both the November 1 and November 3 checks. We therefore overrule Respondent’s exception to Judge Souder’s factual finding that he knowingly created a negative balance in his trust account, and, upon our independent assessment of the record, we conclude that Respondent violated Md. Rule 16-609(c). ⁷²⁷ Respondent next argues that the evidence produced at the hearing “did not show that he failed to create records, for deposits and disbursements,” and, consequently, he excepts to Judge Souder’s conclusion that he violated Md. Rule 16-606.1. Subsection (a)(2) of this Rule requires attorneys to keep a record of their trust accounts “that chronologically shows all deposits and disbursements[.]” Additionally, subsection (a)(3)(A)(iv) requires that every disbursement record include “the payee and the check number or other payment identification[.]” 6 Judge Souder found that Respondent ⁷²⁸ “failed to create a record for his IOLTA account that chronologically showed all deposits and disbursements, and by doing so he violated Maryland Rule 16-606.1.” During Respondent’s testimony at the hearing, Bar Counsel asked: “Did you maintain at that time, November 1, 2008, a running chronological ledger of the amount that was maintained in your attorney trust account ending in 7646?” Respondent answered: “If you mean in addition to my statement [from the bank], the answer is no.” Moreover, Respondent’s “Client Escrow Ledger[s],” which were entered into evidence, do not include all the information required by Rule 16-606.1. Specifically, the ledgers do not describe the “check number or other payment identification” for disbursements.

Md. Rule 16-606.1(a)(3)(A)(iv). We therefore overrule Respondent’s exception to Judge Souder’s factual findings that he failed to keep his trust account records showing all deposits and disbursements, and we conclude, upon our independent review of the record, that Respondent violated Md. Rule 16-606.1. Respondent’s violations of Md. Rules 16-609(c) and 16-606.1, in turn, constitute a violation of MRPC 1.15(a). 7 2. The Moten Case Respondent challenges most of Judge Souder’s findings concerning Respondent’s handling of the Moten case.

First, ⁷²⁹ he challenges Judge Souder’s finding that he did not provide competent representation by failing to subpoena witnesses or otherwise be prepared for trial on February 27, 2009. In that regard, he argues that a default judgment was the “proper result” of the litigation. Second, Respondent excepts to Judge Souder’s finding that he acted without requisite promptness by failing to enter his appearance in the matter until the February 27 scheduled trial date. Third, Respondent argues that Judge Souder erred in finding that he did not communicate sufficiently with Mr. Moten during the course of the representation and thereby prevented Mr. Moten from making decisions about the case.

In that regard, Respondent argues that Judge Souder “failed to set forth exactly what about the matter that Mr. Moten needed to decide.... ” Fourth, Respondent attacks Judge Souder’s finding excessive the fees Respondent charged Mr. Moten (the $2500 fee for handling the de novo appeal and the subsequent $600 fee for the supposed bankruptcy matter). Fifth, Respondent asserts that, contrary to Judge Souder’s finding, he conducted work on Mr. Moten’s case prior to withdrawing funds from his attorney trust account. Respondent, representing himself, testified at the hearing before Judge Souder. So too did Mr. Moten, as a witness for the Commission.

Judge Souder found that Mr. Moten was a “very credible” witness. Judge Souder also stated that she “did not find [Respondent’s] testimony credible in many respects during this proceeding.” And, “[t]o the extent that his [Respondent’s] testimony diverged from the facts testified to by Denver Moten,” Judge Souder “resolve[d] those issues in favor of Denver Moten[.]” Mr. Moten testified that, at the initial meeting with Respondent to discuss the Circuit Court appeal, he provided Respondent with the names of several witnesses who testified on his behalf in the District Court, and he conveyed his desire to have those witnesses called again at the Circuit Court de novo trial. Mr. Moten also testified that he learned of the February 27 trial date a few days beforehand, not from Respondent, but from his, Moten’s, independent monitoring of the court’s ⁷³⁰ docket. And it was Mr. Moten who informed Respondent of the scheduled trial date, of which Respondent was previously unaware.

Mr. Moten further testified that Respondent did not advise him before the trial date that he, Respondent, would be seeking a default judgment on February 27; instead, Respondent advised Mr. Moten that a postponement would be sought “because it was such short notice.” Finally, Mr. Moten testified that Respondent did not mention to him that the witnesses who had testified on his behalf at the District Court proceeding now wanted to be compensated. We defer absolutely to Judge Souder’s credibility determinations; therefore, we accept as fact Mr. Moten’s version of events as we consider each of Respondent’s exceptions. The relevant records of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City were entered into evidence and show that February 27, 2009 was the date the Moten case was scheduled for trial. Judge Souder had before her that information as well as the information gleaned from Mr. Moten’s testimony that: (1) Mr. Moten retained Respondent in December 2008 and, by the end of that month, had paid Respondent all of the agreed-upon $2500 fee; (2) Mr. Moten advised Respondent, early on, of the witnesses he wished to be called at trial; (3) Respondent did not enter his appearance in the case until the trial date, February 27, 2009; (4) Respondent did not learn of the looming trial date until Mr. Moten informed him of it several days in advance of it; and (5) Respondent did not give Mr. Moten accurate information about the status of the case; in particular, Respondent did not tell him that the witnesses he wished to have testify at the trial wanted to be compensated as “experts.” Based on these facts, we conclude that Judge Souder did not err, much less clearly so, in finding that Respondent did not subpoena witnesses, did not promptly enter his appearance in the case, and did not communicate accurate information to Mr. Moten about the case.

Respondent mentions that he had learned from Evan Goldman, evidently the attorney for Bulldog Development, LLC, that one of the defendants in the Moten case had filed a ⁷³¹ suggestion of bankruptcy and would not be present on the February 27 trial date. 8 Respondent suggests that, armed with this knowledge, he reasonably anticipated obtaining an order of default on the trial date. We have mentioned that Judge Souder did not find Respondent to have been a credible witness; therefore, we cannot assume the truth of Respondent’s testimony. 9 Even so, the fact that Respondent was able ultimately to obtain a default judgment (with an award of $0) is irrelevant to whether he violated the rules of professional conduct that mandate competence, diligence, and accurate client communication. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zdravkovich, 362 Md. 1, 25 , 762 A.2d 950, 963 (2000) (finding no merit in the respondent’s exception based on an argument of “no harm, no foul,” and “all is well that ends well”); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Davis, 375 Md. 131, 162 , 825 A.2d 430, 448