Attorney Grievance Commission v. Singleton

BLACKWELL, Judge. This is the third occasion we have had to consider disciplinary violations against Respondent, Herbert Louis Singleton, Jr. (Singleton). 1 On July 8, 1987, the Review Board of the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (Commission), directed Bar Counsel to file disciplinary charges against Singleton. The charges involved specific complaints of five unrelated clients. A Petition for Disciplinary Action was filed in the Court of Appeals on August 7, 1987. ³ Singleton, a member of the Maryland Bar since June 20, 1974, is currently suspended from the practice of law.

Pursuant to Md.Rule BV9(b), we referred the charges for hearing to Judge Thomas Ward of the Baltimore City Circuit Court. In a Memorandum of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which we shall summarize, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City found the following violations against Respondent: 1. Singleton violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, 2 Disciplinary Rules (DR) l-102(A)(5)-(6), DR 6-101(A)(3) and DR 7-101(A)(l)-(8) in his representation of Emilie Underwood. The trial court found that Singleton was retained by Underwood on behalf of the heirs of the estate of Clarence Veney in 1977.

Veney had been seriously injured, and later died, allegedly the result of an accident involving a Metropolitan Transit Authority bus in Baltimore City. Singleton “failed to file suit timely,” “failed to investigate the case in an efficient and competent manner,” “failed to keep in touch with his client,” and “even failed to return her file long after many years have passed.” 2. As to the Complaint of Warren M. Smith, Petitioner sustained the charges of violations of DR 1-102(A)(4)-(6), DR 2-110(A)(2), DR 6-101(A)(3) and DR 7-101(A)(l)-(3). The trial court found that Singleton, “after being retained by Warren Smith for the purpose of obtaining his divorce, failed to take any meaningful action towards the eventual resolution of this retention.” The court elaborated that, “he failed to keep Mr. Smith informed of progress, and those reports he did make were either inaccurate or downright dishonest.” ⁴ 3.

As to the Complaint of Phyllis Gaither, Petitioner sustained the charges of violations of DR 2-110(B)(2), DR 5-105(A), DR 6-101(A)(3), DR 7-101(A)(l)-(3) and DR 7-104(A)(2). The background of these charges shall be set forth in Part I. 4. As to the Complaint of Charles D. Smith, Petitioner sustained the charges of violations of DR 1-102(A)(5)-(6), DR 2-110(B)(2), DR 6-101(A)(3), DR 7-101(A)(l)-(3) and DR 9-102(B)(4). Charles D. Smith retained Singleton in February, 1985, in connection with the alleged wrongful termination of his employment from Conrail.

Mr. Smith gave the respondent a copy of a transcript of an administrative hearing which had been held concerning the termination. The trial court found “the evidence clearly shows that Mr. Singleton failed to take any action whatsoever with respect to his client, failed to file suit, and failed to even return the transcript of testimony after having been suspended from the general practice of law.” 5. Singleton violated rules DR 1-102(A)(3), (5) — (6), DR 6-101(A)(3), DR 7-101(A)(l)-(3), DR 9-102(B)(l), (3)-(4) in his representation of Christopher Kelly-El. The background of these charges shall be set forth in Part II.

Generally, these charges consist of a series of continuing violations of neglect, misconduct and failure to withdraw from employment. Singleton filed no exceptions in regard to the trial judge’s findings. The Commission has excepted only as to the findings in the Gaither and Kelly-El matters. We have carefully reviewed the record, and the accompanying exhibits.

We find that there is clear and convincing evidence sufficient to sustain Judge Ward’s findings as to the above violations, and limit our discussion to the Commission’s exceptions. See Attorney Grievance Commission v. Collins, 295 Md. 532, 548 , 457 A.2d 1134, 1142 (1983) (the findings of fact made by the hearing judge must be based on clear and convincing evidence). ⁵ I In the complaint of Phyllis Gaither, the Commission alleged that Singleton represented Mr. Gaither in a divorce proceeding, by filing a complaint on January 80, 1985, and then later prepared an answer on behalf of Mrs. Gaither. Singleton allegedly accepted $180.00 for the preparation of this answer. The answer was prepared so as to appear that she was representing herself in the case.

On May 5, 1986, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City dismissed the divorce action pursuant to Md.Rule 2-507. The Commission maintained that Singleton failed to withdraw from the case despite his indefinite suspension from the practice of law on January 80, 1986. The Commission charged Singleton with violating DR 1-102, entitled “Misconduct,” which provides: (A) A lawyer shall not: (5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. (6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. 3 Upon review of the above charges, the trial judge made the following factual findings: The main evidence to sustain this charge indicates that the case was dismissed under Maryland Rule 2-507 on or about May 5, 1986.

In fact, Mr. Singleton was suspended from the general practice of law on January 80, 1986, long before Rule 2-507 was executed. Rule 2-507 says that in the event that there have been no pleadings or other activities in a pending case for a period of more than one year, then the matter shall be dismissed by the clerk without further request under Rule 2-507. This is ⁶ what occurred on May 5, 1986. However, for Mr. Singleton to have taken any action with respect to this rule would have been in clear violation of DR 2-110.

As a result, the trial judge refused to sustain the charges with respect to DR l-102(A)(5)-(6). The Commission argues that the judge erred in this finding. The hearing judge’s findings are prima facie correct and will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. Attorney Grievance Commission v. Willcher, 287 Md. 74, 77 , 411 A.2d 83, 85 (1980); Bar Association of Baltimore City v. Marshall, 269 Md. 510, 516 , 307 A.2d 677, 680 (1973).

Here, the Commission has demonstrated that Respondent violated DR l-102(A)(5)-(6), and that the trial judge’s conclusion was in error. There was substantial evidence that Singleton neglected Mr. Gaither’s divorce action prior to his suspension from the practice of law in January, 1986. Although Singleton maintains that he had not received attorney fees from Mr.. Gaither, and that he accepted money from Mrs. Gaither only as payment of her husband’s fee, this does not justify the fact that the case was inactive prior to Singleton’s suspension.

In addition, Singleton failed to advise Mr. Gaither that he had been suspended and that the client should obtain other counsel to handle the matter. As stated by the circuit court, Mr. Singleton’s failure to competently handle an uncomplicated, uncontested divorce on behalf of his client, Mr. Gaither, has resulted in the mess that occurred. Not only did he fail to promptly prosecute the case on behalf of his client, but he failed to clarify his relationship with his client’s wife, Mrs. Gaither, the defendant in that case. We are satisfied that Singleton’s representation of Mr. Gaither constitutes “conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice” and “that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.” See DR l-102(A)(5)-(6).

Therefore, the Commission’s exceptions as to the Gaither complaint are granted. ⁷ II In connection with the complaint of Christopher Kelly-El (Kelly-El), the Commission excepted to the circuit court’s failure to find violations of DR l-102(A)(3)-(4) and DR 9-102(A) with reference to the Respondent’s alleged conversion to his own use of the funds of his client. 4 Kelly-El retained Singleton in September, 1981, in relation to a claim for injuries he sustained in a supermarket, Superpride Markets. Respondent allegedly falsely represented to Kelly-El that he had filed a case in court on his behalf. In addition, the Commission charged that Singleton settled the claim in November, 1985, without the client’s authorization. After receiving an insurance settlement of $3,500.00, he failed to inform Kelly-El of the receipt of the settlement money. 5 Respondent allegedly misappropriated and converted to his own use the funds of his client.

Finally, in August, 1986, Kelly-El was paid $2,165.87 by ⁸ Singleton in connection with the claim against Superpride Markets. 6 The trial judge made the following factual determinations: Mr. Kelly-El was quite adamant that he had never received the first memorandum of settlement, and he was equally adamant under cross-examination from Mr. Singleton that he had never authorized the settlement in the first place. This Court finds that Mr. Kelly-El’s testimony is more than persuasive. The testimony also clearly indicates that Mr. Singleton had little or no contact with his client during his entire period of representation, and he excuses his actions in this regard by claiming that Mr. Kelly-El didn’t have a telephone or that his telephone was disconnected. Not only is this denied in part by Mr. Kelly-El, but it is clear that Mr. Singleton never made any real attempt to contact Mr. Kelly-El by mail or by personal contact, despite the fact that his client was still living at the same address throughout all these years.

Again, the Court finds Mr. Kelly-El’s testimony convincing. The Commission’s exception to the trial judge’s refusal to find violations of DR 1-102(A)(4) and DR 9-102(A) is based solely on Singleton’s failure to submit responses to the Commission’s Request for Admissions. 7 Specifically, re ⁹ quest no. 40 stated, “You converted to your own use some or all of the settlement proceeds which belonged to Mr. Kelly-El without his permission or authorization.” The Commission maintained that Respondent’s failure to answer constitutes a conclusive admission pursuant to Md.Rule 2-424(b). 8 Because there was testimony concerning the deposit of the insurance settlement proceeds into an escrow account, the circuit court was unwilling to find misappropriation violations based on the failure to respond to request no. 40. Upon consideration of the charges relating to misappropriation of Kelly-El’s settlement money, the trial judge found: It is true that it is admitted that in his representation of Mr. Kelly-El, Mr. Singleton misappropriated and converted to his own use the funds of his client represented by the insurance company settlement. However, there is no ¹⁰ evidence to indicate what facts Bar Counsel is relying on for this conclusion.

Mr. Singleton’s own testimony, which seems to be borne out by the other facts of the case, is that the check was deposited in his firm’s escrow account, where it stayed until distributed. There is no