Attorney Grievance Commission v. Smith

McDonald, J. Attorney discipline cases that result in disbarment often find the attorney committing one of the seven deadly sins— e.g., greed, lust, sloth. This is not one of those cases. The sin in this case was inattention — inattention to clients, inattention to an attorney trust account, and inattention to the activities of a non-lawyer assistant in whom the attorney misplaced his trust and who misused the attorney trust account to the detriment of the. attorney’s clients. Sadly, this too merits disbarment, as our regulation of the practice of law must protect the public not only from those attorneys who engage in deliberate, egregious acts of misconduct, but also those who fail to fulfill the routine duties of the profession that serve and safeguard their clients.

I Background A. Procedural Context The Attorney Grievance Commission (“Commission”) charged Earl Americus Smith, III with violating numerous ³⁵⁶ provisions of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) arising out of the management of his attorney trust account, his delegation of tasks to his non-lawyer assistant, and his handling of several client matters. Specifically, the Commission charged Mr. Smith with violating MLRPC 1.1 (competence), 1.2(a) (scope of representation), 1.3 (diligence), 1.4 (communication), 1.5(c) (fees), 1.15 (safekeeping property), 5.3 (responsibilities regarding nonlawyer assistants), 5.5(a) (unauthorized practice of law), 8.1(a) (false statement in connection with disciplinary matters), and 8.4(a) (violation of MLRPC), (c) (conduct involving deceit) and (d) (prejudice to the administration of justice). The Commission also charged Mr. Smith with violating Maryland Rules 16-606.1 (attorney trust account record keeping), 16-607 (commingling of funds), and 16-609 (prohibited transactions). The Commission later withdrew the charge as to MLRPC 8.1(a).

Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-752(a), this Court designated Judge Larnzell Martin, Jr. of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County to conduct a hearing concerning the alleged violations and to provide findings of fact and recommended conclusions of law. Following a three-day hearing at which Mr. Smith testified and was represented by counsel, the hearing judge issued his findings of fact and conclusions of law. On the basis of those factfindings, the hearing judge concluded that Mr. Smith committed all of the alleged violations. The Commission did not except to the hearing judge’s findings and conclusions; it recommended that we disbar Mr. Smith.

Mr. Smith conceded most of the violations, but filed an exception to the hearing judge’s conclusion that he was responsible for violations of MLRPC 8.4 and argued for a suspension rather than disbarment. The Court heard oral argument on Mr. Smith’s exception and the recommendations for sanction in January 2015. B. Facts The hearing judge’s factual findings are uncontested; we therefore treat them as established. Maryland Rule 16- ³⁵⁷ 759(b)(2)(A).

The hearing judge’s findings, the parties’ stipulations, and the undisputed evidence in the record establish the following facts. Mr. Smith’s Law Practice Mr. Smith was admitted to the Maryland Bar in 1983. He is also a member of the District of Columbia Bar. During 1991, Mr. Smith established a law practice under the name of Bryan & Smith, P.C., which focused on personal injury matters.

Since the mid-1990s, Mr. Smith has been the only attorney at the firm. 1 The key facts relevant to the alleged violations concern Mr. Smith’s delegation of responsibility to — and failure to supervise — his legal assistant, his mishandling of his attorney trust account related to personal injury cases, and his neglect of several client matters, all during the period 2009-2012. Delegation of Responsibility to Dawn Staley-Jackson During 1993, Mr. Smith hired Dawn Staley-Jackson 2 as a paralegal. Ms. Staley-Jackson worked for the firm for the next two decades as a legal assistant. During the time period relevant to the alleged violations, her name appeared on the firm’s stationery with the title “Legal Assistant.” Mr. Smith delegated substantial authority to Ms. StaleyJackson.

Indeed, the hearing judge found that he “allowed Ms. Staley-Jackson to run his law practice without any meaningful oversight.” With Mr. Smith’s knowledge and acquiescence, Ms. Staley-Jackson independently sent demand letters to defendants, negotiated settlements with insurance carriers, communicated with and advised clients, dealt with medical providers, drafted pleadings and other papers for filing in court (frequently signing Mr. Smith’s name), and deposited checks. ³⁵⁸ Mr. Smith gave Ms. Staley-Jackson responsibility for preparing settlement disbursement sheets, and for meeting with the client to explain the settlement sheet. Mr. Smith would not check the accuracy of the lists of disbursements with the client’s file, other than to check the gross amount and his own fee. Mr. Smith also delegated to Ms. Staley-Jackson the responsibility to inform clients that settlement funds had been received. After Ms. Staley-Jackson informed Mr. Smith that she was suffering from a serious illness, he permitted her to work from home, to take client files to her house, and to forward the office phone to her home and personal cell phone.

Operation of Personal Injury Trust Account Mr. Smith maintained two attorney trust accounts at Sun-Trust Bank — one for attorney’s fees and the other for receiving and disbursing funds in personal injury cases. The alleged violations concern the operation of the personal injury trust account. At all relevant times, Mr. Smith had sole check-signing authority for the personal injury trust account and used a computer software program to record deposits and disbursements and to issue checks payable from that account. From January 2009 continuing through September 2012, Mr. Smith failed to create or maintain any meaningful records relating to the personal injury trust account.

He did not keep accurate chronological listings of all deposits and disbursements, and failed to generate individual client matter records. Mr. Smith did not reconcile his trust account records on a monthly basis. Mr. Smith ordinarily received monthly bank statements by mail. He testified that, sometime during 2010, the bank statements began to arrive by mail either sporadically or not at all.

He said that he would go to the local branch to obtain a bank statement each month, but did not request copies of the negotiated checks. When Mr. Smith did receive a statement in the mail, it included photocopies of checks drawn on his trust account, but he did not regularly review these checks. ³⁵⁹ Ms. Staley-Jackson’s Fraud Beginning in at least 2009, Ms. Staley-Jackson regularly and systematically misappropriated funds from the firm’s personal injury trust account by diverting checks drawn on that account payable to others or by fraudulently creating and cashing checks made payable to herself. During the first seven months of 2009, Ms. Staley-Jackson took checks made payable to Jason Carle, a chiropractor who had rendered services to Mr. Smith’s clients. Ms. Staley-Jackson would forge Mr. Carle’s endorsement, sign the check herself, and cash the check.

She cashed approximately 15 checks payable to Mr. Carle for more than $34,000 from January to July 2009. After July 2009, Ms. Staley-Jackson was apparently able to create and cash checks drawn on the trust account that listed herself as the payee. 3 The parties stipulated that, during the period from January 2009 through September 2012, Ms. Staley-Jackson misappropriated the proceeds of checks exceeding $600,000 in value. Deposit of Personal Funds into Attorney Trust Account Ms. Staley-Jackson’s diversion of funds from the personal injury trust account resulted in insufficient funds in that account to cover the purposes for which the funds had been deposited. When Mr. Smith realized in 2010 that the personal injury trust account was short of funds, he attempted to compensate for the shortfall with personal funds.

Mr. Smith deposited his own personal funds or placed borrowed funds into the trust account on five separate occasions from December 2010 through June 2012. On December ³⁶⁰ 1, 2010, Mr. Smith cashed out his personal retirement account and deposited that money ($85,900) into the personal injury trust account. On February 10, 2011, Mr. Smith obtained a $10,000 loan from his father and deposited it into the trust account. On April 18, 2011, Mr. Smith deposited into the trust account another loan from his father in the amount of $50,000.

On March 5, 2012, Mr. Smith deposited into the trust account another $25,000 — this time a loan from his father-in-law. On June 21, 2012, Mr. Smith deposited $100,000 into the trust account, also obtained from his father-in-law. The hearing judge found that these deposits belied any assertion that Mr. Smith was unaware of the serious deficiencies in the personal injury trust account — that it lacked sufficient funds to cover his existing fiduciary obligations to clients and third parties. In other words, Mr. Smith was aware for more than a year and a half that his personal injury trust account at SunTrust Bank was out of trust.

However, as the hearing judge found, his “persistent failure over a period of almost four years to comply with the trust account record-keeping requirements” of the Maryland Rules meant that he was unable to detect the source of the shortfall and enabled Ms. Staley-Jackson “to get away with her theft scheme for as long as she did.” Eventually the influx of personal funds failed to compensate for the misappropriations. In September 2012, SunTrust Bank reported to Bar Counsel an overdraft of Mr. Smith’s trust account. Late Payments to Medical Providers In many of Mr. Smith’s personal injury cases, the client and Mr. Smith signed an undertaking requested by a medical provider who had treated the client in which they agreed that Mr. Smith would pay fees owed to the provider directly from any settlement proceeds that he received on behalf of the client. During the time that Ms. Staley-Jackson was misappropriating funds from the trust account, these payments were made late, or sometimes not at all. ³⁶¹ For example, in July 2010, Mr. Smith deposited a personal injury settlement check in the amount of $4,000 for the benefit of his client Teonka Young.

On August 5, 2010, Ms. Young signed a settlement disbursement sheet that listed a disbursement of $625 to New Carrollton Therapy, a medical provider that had treated Ms. Young. Ms. Young received her portion of the settlement. However, a check payable to New Carroll-ton Therapy for the benefit of Ms. Young was not issued until April 17, 2012. On March 31, 2011, Mr. Smith deposited a settlement check for the benefit of his client Robert Mayo in the amount of $7,300.

On May 26, 2011, Robert Mayo signed a settlement disbursement sheet that listed disbursements of $1,216.50 to Chris Brannigan, an attorney, and $2,500 to Alpha Health Center-Oxon Hill. A check for Mr. Mayo’s portion of the settlement was issued on May 25, 2011. However, the checks payable to Mr. Brannigan and Alpha Health Center-Oxon Hill were not issued until 10 months later, on March 9, 2012. On March 31, 2011, Mr. Smith deposited a personal injury settlement check in the amount of $15,500 for the benefit of client Robin Mayo.

In September 2011, Mr. Smith provided Robin Mayo with a settlement disbursement sheet that listed a disbursement of $5,305 to Alpha Health Center. Ms. Mayo received her portion of the settlement on September 23, 2011. A check payable to Alpha Health Center for the benefit of Robin Mayo was not issued until April 3, 2012. Mr. Smith testified that he would not have sent out these payments in March and April 2012 without first checking his computer program’s accounts to ensure he had not already paid these medical providers.

However, Mr. Smith did not check the client files, which were then located in Ms. StaleyJackson’s house, or examine his bank statements. Instead, he talked with Mr. Staley-Jackson regarding the discrepancy and relied on her information. Beginning in the late summer of 2011, James Bolger, a collection agent for several chiropractor facilities, began to call Mr. Smith to alert him about unpaid bills owed to those ³⁶² facilities by Mr. Smith’s clients. When Mr. Smith was unresponsive, Mr. Bolger filed several complaints with the Commission regarding his inability to obtain payment from Mr. Smith on the unpaid medical bills.

After Mr. Bolger filed complaints with the Commission, Mr. Smith issued ten checks in March and April 2012 to various medical providers represented by Mr. Bolger. Mr. Smith was aware that his trust account did not contain the necessary funds to pay the amounts due and obtained the $25,000 loan from his father-in-law in March 2012 to help cover the deficit. Discovery of the Fraud Following notice in September 2012 from SunTrust Bank that he had an overdraft on his trust account, Mr. Smith discovered that the bounced checks had been payable to Ms. Staley-Jackson. Mr. Smith then retrieved his client files from Ms. Staley-Jackson’s home on October 4, 2012, and shortly thereafter fired Ms. Staley-Jackson. 4 Unauthorized settlements and diversion of proceeds Several complaints received by the Commission concerning Mr. Smith revealed a pattern of delegation to Ms. StaleyJackson, settlement of claims by her without the client’s knowledge, and the diversion of the settlement proceeds. —Orin H. Thomas, Jr. Mr. Smith represented Orin H. Thomas, Jr. on a contingent fee basis with regard to a personal injury claim arising out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on September 1, 2006.

On August 27, 2009, Mr. Smith filed a complaint on behalf of Mr. Thomas in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. The complaint named two defendants, Joy Felicia Lee, who was insured by Allstate, and Mr. Thomas’s own insurance carrier, Metlife Auto & Home Insurance Company, later ³⁶³ amended to name Metropolitan Group Property & Casualty Insurance Company (“Metropolitan”) with respect to under-insured motorist benefits. Following a settlement with Allstate for the policy limits, a check in the amount of $50,000 issued by Allstate and payable to “Earl Smith, Esquire & his client, Orín Thomas” was deposited into Mr. Smith’s attorney trust account on October 13, 2009. On November 12, 2009, Mr. Smith issued a check drawn on his trust account and payable to Bryan & Smith, P.C. representing a partial attorney’s fee payment.

Mr. Smith did not inform Mr. Thomas that this fee disbursement was made and did not provide Mr. Thomas with a written settlement disbursement statement. Mr. Smith testified that he wrote checks to medical providers and lien holders on Mr. Thomas’ behalf; but these checks were somehow converted into checks payable to Ms. Staley-Jackson. On January 28, 2010, Mr. Smith filed a stipulation of voluntary dismissal as to Ms. Lee following the settlement with Allstate. 5 In October 2010, more than a year after depositing the settlement check from Allstate, Mr. Smith first issued a check from the settlement proceeds to Mr. Thomas for $3,000. From October 2010 to June 2012, Mr. Thomas received six checks from Mr. Smith, totaling $13,200.

Mr. Thomas received no other disbursements from the settlement proceeds of $50,000. Mr. Smith testified that he did not distribute the remaining proceeds from the Allstate settlement because he expected there to be additional liens. Mr. Smith did not respond to Mr. Thomas’ repeated requests for an accounting and for information regarding the case. After the settlement with Allstate, the claim against Mr. Thomas’ own insurance company, Metropolitan, remained pending in the circuit court.

On February 24, 2011, Metropolitan filed a motion to compel discovery based on Mr. Smith’s ³⁶⁴ failure to respond to discovery requests. Mr. Smith neither responded to the motion nor filed any discovery responses. Mr. Thomas’ case was scheduled for a pretrial conference on May 3, 2011. Mr. Smith did not appear for the pretrial conference and the court dismissed Mr. Thomas’ case with prejudice.

Mr. Smith testified that he did not appear for the pretrial conference because he never received the scheduling order or the discovery requests, and because he did not know that Metropolitan had been served. Instead, he thought negotiations (as conducted by Ms. Staley-Jackson) were ongoing. Mr. Smith knew of the dismissal of Mr. Thomas’ claim against Metropolitan, but did not inform Mr. Thomas that his case had been dismissed. —Terry Hardy and the Hardy children Mr. Smith represented Terry Hardy and his two minor children, Terry Hardy Jr. and Deja Hardy, in a personal injury matter following a motor vehicle accident that occurred on August 26, 2009. The representation was on a contingent fee basis.

Without Mr. Hardy’s knowledge or consent, Ms. StaleyJackson negotiated a settlement for Mr. Hardy and his daughter, Deja Hardy. On March 2, 2011, Mr. Smith picked up two settlement checks from the Silver Spring office of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. One check was payable to “Terry D. Hardy & Earl A. Smith, his attorney” in the amount of $7,000. The second check was payable to “Terry D. Hardy, as parent and natural guardian of Deja Hardy, a minor, & Earl A. Smith, his attorney” in the amount of $3,600.

Mr. Smith personally deposited both checks into his trust account on March 2, 2011. No settlement was negotiated or received on behalf of Terry Hardy, Jr. A signature purporting to be Mr. Hardy’s appeared on the back of both checks, although Mr. Hardy was not aware of either check and had not authorized anyone to sign his name. Neither Mr. Hardy nor his children received any of the settlement proceeds. Mr. Smith did not create or provide settlement disbursement sheets to Mr. Hardy and he did not ³⁶⁵ create client matter records for the funds deposited in trust.

Mr. Smith was not responsive to Mr. Hardy’s telephone calls and requests for information. —Sharon Hardy Mr. Smith also represented Sharon Hardy, Terry Hardy’s wife, in connection with a personal injury claim following a separate motor vehicle accident that occurred on September 1, 2009. Without Mrs. Hardy’s knowledge or consent, Ms. Staley-Jackson negotiated a settlement of her claim. On May 25, 2011, a check from Progressive Insurance Company payable to Mrs. Hardy and Bryan & Smith, P.C. in the amount of $6,007 was deposited into Mr. Smith’s trust account. Mrs. Hardy never received any of the settlement proceeds.

Mr. Smith did not generate or provide a settlement disbursement sheet to Mrs. Hardy, and did not create a client matter record for her funds deposited in trust. Mr. Smith was not responsive to Mrs. Hardy’s telephone calls and voicemails. —Sheila Matthews Mr. Smith represented Sheila Matthews regarding a personal injury claim on a contingent fee basis following a motor vehicle accident that occurred on February 16, 2011. On December 8, 2011, Mr. Smith filed a civil complaint on behalf of Ms. Matthews in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Prince George’s County. The complaint named two defendants, Oscar Tyler, who was insured by Bankers Independent Insurance, and Tiffany Johnson, who was insured by ELCO Administrative Services.

Without Ms. Matthews’ consent or knowledge, Ms. StaleyJackson presented written settlement demands and eventually negotiated a settlement with ELCO Administrative Services for $1,600 in exchange for a release. On June 17, 2012, Ms. Staley-Jackson forged Ms. Matthews’ signature on the release. On August 17, 2012, the settlement check in the amount of $1,600 payable to Sheila Matthews and Bryan & Smith, P.C. was deposited into Mr. Smith’s personal injury trust account. ³⁶⁶ Ms. Matthews never received the settlement proceeds from the ELCO settlement. Mr. Smith did not provide a written settlement statement or other accounting of settlement funds.

After ELCO settled, the claim against the second defendant, Oscar Tyler and Bankers Independent Insurance, remained pending in the District Court and was scheduled for trial on September 26, 2012. Ms. Matthews received notice from Mr. Smith’s office that her case had been set for trial, but she had no further contact with Mr. Smith prior to the trial date. Mr. Smith testified that he was aware of the trial date but that he had been told by Ms. Staley-Jackson that the entire case had settled. Ms. Matthews appeared in court but Mr. Smith did not appear.

When Ms. Matthews called Mr. Smith’s office, she was told by Ms. Staley-Jackson that the entire case had been settled and that she should tell this fact to the court. Accordingly, Ms. Matthews informed the court that the case had settled, although in fact only a portion of her case had been settled. The court then dismissed the case. 6 Mr. Smith did not communicate with Ms. Matthews regarding the status of her case and had done no work to prepare for trial on September 26, 2012. II Discussion The hearing judge concluded that Mr. Smith committed all of the violations alleged by the Commission, except for the allegation relating to MLRPC 8.1(a), which the Commission had withdrawn.

We review the hearing judge’s conclusions of law de novo — ie., without any special deference. Maryland Rule 16-759(b)(l). In the course of this review, we consider the exception filed by Mr. Smith. In particular, Mr. Smith excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that he is responsible for the violation of several sections of MLRPC 8.4. ³⁶⁷ Mr. Smith’s misconduct may be considered in three categories: (1) his failure to supervise Ms. Staley-Jackson; (2) his failure to comply with rules concerning his representation of his clients and the management of his personal injury attorney trust account; and (3) misconduct of Ms. Staley-Jackson for which Mr. Smith is responsible.

A. Failure to Supervise Non-Lawyer Assistant At the heart of most of the alleged violations in this case is the unsupervised delegation of many of Mr. Smith’s responsibilities to his legal assistant. That unsupervised delegation is intertwined with violations directly committed by Mr. Smith as well as the misconduct of his legal assistant for which he bears responsibility. Unsupervised delegation is also itself a violation of the MLRPC. MLRPC 5.3(a) and (b) — Supervision of Non-Lawyer Employees MLRPC 5.3(a) and (b) require attorneys to take certain steps to ensure that non-lawyer employees act consistently with the lawyer’s ethical responsibilities.

MLRPC 5.3(a) requires that an attorney with managerial responsibilities in a firm “make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the [non lawyer’s] conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer.” MLRPC 5.3(b) requires attorneys with direct supervisory authority over a nonlawyer to make “reasonable efforts” to ensure that employee’s conduct is in fact compatible with the attorney’s professional responsibilities. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zuckerman, 386 Md. 341, 373-74 , 872 A.2d 693 (2005); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 479 , 671 A.2d 463 (1996). Mr. Smith violated MLRPC 5.3(a) and (b). Instead of establishing reasonable measures to ensure that Ms. StaleyJackson’s conduct complied with his ethical obligations, Mr. Smith delegated to Ms. Staley-Jackson broad authority to act on his behalf with little supervision — such as permitting Ms. Staley-Jackson to negotiate with insurance companies and to ³⁶⁸ obtain consent from clients to settle.

He apparently relied on Ms. Staley-Jackson to run his practice with little to no supervision or effort to ensure that she actually performed the tasks delegated to her in a manner consistent with his ethical obligations. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zuckerman, 403 Md. 695, 714 , 944 A.2d 525 (2008) (attorney’s failure to instruct employees of the proper management of trust account and inform himself of the status of the employee’s efforts to monitor the funds in the account, creating the opportunity for an employee to misappropriate funds, was a violation of 5.3(a) and (b)). MLRPC 5.5(a) — Unauthorized Practice of Law MLRPC 5.5(a) states that a “lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in doing so.” (emphasis added). This rule does not prohibit lawyers from delegating functions to legal assistants and other non-lawyers, “so long as the lawyer supervises the delegated work and retains responsibility for their work.” MLRPC 5.5, Comment [2].

When an attorney fails to make the “reasonable efforts” required by MLRPC 5.3(a) and (b) and fails to supervise a non-lawyer assistant, the end result will often be that the assistant engages in the unauthorized practice of law. Permitting a non-lawyer assistant to send demand letters to insurance companies, settle claims, and provide legal advice to clients without supervision constitutes assisting another in the unauthorized practice of law. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ambe, 425 Md. 98, 129-30 , 38 A.3d 390 (2012) (evaluating settlement offers, and providing legal advice to clients as to settlement was practice of law). Permitting a non-lawyer assistant to draft, edit, and file pleadings without supervision also constitutes assisting another in the unauthorized practice of law.

See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bocchino, 435 Md. 505, 535 , 80 A.3d 222 (2013). The hearing judge found that in carrying out various activities without supervision, Ms. Staley-Jackson engaged in the ³⁶⁹ practice of law, a finding clearly supported in the record. Mr. Smith regularly delegated to Ms. Staley-Jackson the authority to send demand letters to insurance companies, negotiate settlements, communicate with and advise clients, communicate with medical providers, and draft and sign pleadings and other filings for the court, all with little or no supervision. Accordingly, Mr. Smith violated 5.5(a) by assisting Ms. StaleyJackson in the unauthorized practice of law.

B. Misconduct in Relation to Clients and Trust Account MLRPC 1.1 — Competence MLRPC 1.1. states: “A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” Mr. Smith failed to properly oversee his personal injury trust account and, as a result, failed to maintain the settlement monies in the account, resulting in negative balances as to individual clients and a negative balance overall as of September 2012. This was a violation of MLRPC 1.1. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mungin, 439 Md. 290, 305 , 96 A.3d 122 (2014) (an attorney demonstrates his or her incompetence by failing to properly maintain settlement monies in a trust account resulting in negative balances).

Mr. Smith’s mismanagement of his trust account resulted in his failure to promptly pay clients and medical providers after receiving settlement proceeds. See Zuckerman, 386 Md. at 369 , 872 A.2d 693 (failure to promptly deliver money to a client and to pay third parties demonstrates incompetence). Mr. Smith also failed to act competently in his handling of the cases of Ms. Matthews, the Hardys, and Mr. Thomas. He failed to consult with Ms. Matthews regarding settlement of her case, to inform her that a settlement check had been received, and to appear in court on her behalf, resulting in the dismissal of the remainder of her case.

Similarly, Mr. Smith failed to pursue litigation against Mr. Thomas’ insurance company following the settlement with Allstate, failed to re ³⁷⁰ spond to discovery requests and a motion to compel discovery, and failed to appear for a pretrial conference, resulting in the dismissal of part of Mr. Thomas’ case. Mr. Smith failed to consult with the Hardys regarding the settlements, to inform them once settlement checks were received, and to respond to their requests for information. Such conduct violated MLRPC 1.1. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Barnett, 440 Md. 254 , 102 A.3d 310 (2014) (failure to notify client of hearing date, and otherwise to communicate with client, and withdrawal of exceptions without client’s consent violated MLRPC 1.1); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garrett, 427 Md. 209, 222 , 46 A.3d 1169 (2012) (the failure to take action to further a client’s case and appear at court proceedings violates the obligation to provide competent representation).

MLRPC 1.2(a) — Scope of Representation MLRPC 1.2(a) states, in part, that “a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and, when appropriate, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.” MLRPC 1.2(a) specifically obligates the lawyer to “abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter.” Mr. Smith violated MLRPC 1.2(a) by settling at least a portion of the cases of Ms. Matthews and the Hardys without the clients’ knowledge or consent. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Thaxton, 415 Md. 341, 362 , 1 A.3d 470 (2010) (attorney violated MLRPC 1.2(a) by failing to obtain the client’s consent to settle, notify client of when settlement funds were received, or pay medical bills on time). MLRPC l.S — Diligence MLRPC 1.3 directs a lawyer to “act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” This Court has stated that “an attorney violates [MLRPC] 1.3 when he or she does nothing whatsoever to advance the client’s cause or endeavor.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Blair, 440 Md. 387, 402 , 102 A.3d 786 (2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). ³⁷¹ Incompetence often goes hand in hand with a lack of diligence — a failure to act with reasonable diligence will often result in incompetent representation. For example, the failure to pursue a claim after filing a complaint demonstrates not only incompetence, but also insufficient diligence.

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gray, 436 Md. 513, 520 , 83 A.3d 786 (2014). Failure to keep a client informed about the client’s case, to promptly disburse settlement funds, or to respond to reasonable requests for information also violates MLRPC 1.3. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Park, 427 Md. 180, 192-93 , 46 A.3d 1153 (2012); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Goodman, 426 Md. 115, 125 , 43 A.3d 988 (2012) (“An attorney who agrees to pay client medical bills from recoveries in connection with his/her representation, and fails to do so in a timely manner after receipt of settlement or judgment funds, acts without reasonable diligence and promptness.”); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kremer, 432 Md. 325, 335 , 68 A.3d 862 (2013) (attorney violated MLRPC 1.3 by being routinely unavailable to Ghent’s attempts to contact him and providing very little information when eventually reached). Mr. Smith violated MLRPC 1.3 by filing a complaint against Bankers Independent Insurance on behalf of Ms. Matthews, but failing to take any action to advance that case.

He also failed to act with diligence when he filed a complaint against Metropolitan on behalf of Mr. Thomas but faded to respond to discovery and took no action to further that case. He violated MLRPC 1.3 when he did not respond to reasonable requests for information from Ms. Matthews, Mr. Thomas, and the Hardys. MLRPC 14 — Communication MLRPC 1.4 states, in relevant part that: (a) A lawyer shall: (1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client’s informed consent ... is required by these Rules; (2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter; ³⁷² (3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information .... (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

A lawyer who receives a settlement offer from opposing counsel “must promptly inform the client of its substance” unless the client has indicated the proposal would be unacceptable or has previously authorized the attorney to act. MLRPC 1.4, Comment [2]. Mr. Smith violated MLRPC 1.4(a) when he failed to communicate with his clients, to inform them of settlement offers, or to obtain their informed consent. Ms. Matthews and Mr. Thomas were unable to talk to Mr. Smith despite repeated efforts.

Mrs. Hardy never met Mr. Smith in person and was unable to reach him for three years, despite numerous attempts by phone. Ms. Matthews, Mr. Hardy, and Mrs. Hardy were all unaware that their cases had been settled. Ms. Matthews and Mr. Thomas were not informed that part of their case had been dismissed. Such conduct violates MLRPC 1.4(a)(l)-(3) and 1.4(b).

See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Brigerman, 441 Md. 23, 37 , 105 A.3d 467 (2014) (failure to inform client of settlement and dismissal of case and failure to respond to multiple, reasonable requests for information violated MLRPC 1.4(a) and (b)). MLRPC 1.5(c) — Contingent Fee Disbursement Statements MLRPC 1.5(c) states, in part, that “[ujpon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter, and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination.” Mr. Smith represented Ms. Matthews, Mr. Thomas, Mr. Hardy and his children, and Mrs. Hardy, each on a contingent fee basis. However, Mr. Smith failed to provide any of these clients with a written statement indicating the client’s recovery or payments to third parties. ³⁷³ MLRPC 1.15(a) and (b) — safekeeping of trust funds Maryland Rule 16-606.1 — trust account records Maryland Rule 16-607 — commingling funds MLRPC 1.15(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] lawyer shall hold [the] property of clients ... that is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer’s own property.” MLRPC 1.15(b) bars an attorney from depositing the attorney’s own funds in a trust account, except in specific circumstances permitted by the Maryland Rules. Maryland Rule 16-607(a) generally prohibits an attorney from commingling personal funds in a trust account. 7 Maryland Rule 16-606.1 requires an attorney to keep detailed records of deposits and disbursements for trust accounts, to cause a monthly reconciliation of the account, and to retain all related records for at least five years.

A failure to keep records of deposits and disbursements also violates the directives of MLRPC 1.15(a). Mr. Smith violated 1.15(a) and (b) and Maryland Rule 16-607(a) by depositing more than $220,000 in personal funds into his attorney trust account on five separate occasions from December 2010 through June 2012. In addition, Mr. Smith’s failure to maintain