Attorney Grievance Commission v. Sparrow

ORDER The Petitioner, Victor H. Sparrow, III, was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in Maryland on December 20, 1988, see Atty. Griev. Comm. v. Sparrow, 314 Md. 421 , 550 A.2d 1150 (1988). Sparrow petitioned the Court for termination of his indefinite suspension on January 2, 1990.

Bar Counsel opposed the termination on the ground that Sparrow, during the period of his indefinite suspension, may have engaged in the practice of law in another jurisdiction within which he was not admitted to practice and in connection therewith made false and misleading statements. The Court referred the matter to Judge Raymond G. Thieme, Jr. of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County to make appropriate findings concerning Sparrow’s alleged misconduct. Judge Thieme conducted an evidentiary hearing and determined, for reasons stated in his findings attached hereto, that Bar Counsel’s objections to the termination of Sparrow’s indefinite suspension were well founded and should be sustained. ⁷⁰² The Petitioner filed exceptions to Judge Thieme’s findings. The Court held a hearing and considered arguments presented by the parties at that time.

The Court has determined to accept Judge Thieme’s findings and not to grant Sparrow’s petition to terminate his indefinite suspension at this time. It is, therefore, this 26th day of June, 1990 ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that the petition of Victor H. Sparrow, III, be and it is hereby DENIED. Costs of two hundred and thirty four dollars ($234.00) shall be paid by Victor H. Sparrow, III. FINDINGS OF FACT -Background- By opinion of the Court of Appeals, Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Victor H. Sparrow, III, 314 Md. 421 , 550 A.2d 1150 filed on December 20, 1988, Victor H. Sparrow, III, was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in this State, with leave to apply for reinstatement at the expiration from one year.

This reinstatement is subject to the Court of Appeals’ satisfaction as to Sparrow’s rehabilitation, and present competence to practice law in Maryland. On January 2, 1990, Sparrow filed a Petition for Termination of Indefinite Suspension. The Attorney Grievance Commission, in two separate Responses alleged that Sparrow was, in effect, practicing law in a jurisdiction in which he was not admitted and additionally may have made false and misleading statements. The Court of Appeals then appointed the undersigned 1. “...to make appropriate findings as to whether Sparrow illegally engaged in the practice of law during his period of suspension; and to make appropriate findings as 2. “... to whether Sparrow made false statements____” ⁷⁰³ Pursuant to these Orders, testimony was taken and counsel heard.

All subsequent findings of fact were made by clear and convincing evidence as required by Maryland Rule BY10(d). -Findings of Faet- The facts which lead to Sparrow’s suspension are set forth in the Court of Appeals’ opinion 1 , and will not be repeated herein. Sparrow testified that he is not admitted to the practice of law in the District of Columbia. He is, however, admitted in California, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, New York and the Trust Territories. Although he maintains an office in the District, he claims not to be engaged in the practice of law there 2 . -Exhibit 1- This consists of the certified records from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, Family Division, Domestic Relations Branch, captioned, Alfred A. Weldon v. Gladys C. Weldon.

These documents show that on October 29, 1987, Sparrow moved for admission pro hac vice as counsel for the defendant, Gladys G. Weldon. Ms. Weldon is the aunt of Sparrow’s ex-wife with whom he has lived in the past. Testimony shows that Ms. Weldon requested Sparrow’s aid in this suit claiming that she could not afford an attorney and no money was paid for Sparrow’s services. Prior to the entry of his appearance herein, Sparrow admitted that he was unfamiliar with the procedure for his admission pro hac vice and specifically Civil Rule 101(a)(8) 3 ⁷⁰⁴ of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (Exhibit 4).

He spoke with a Court Clerk regarding the procedure and claims to have followed the advice given. The paper which moved for his admission pro hac vice and which is dated October 22, 1987, contains a blatant misstatement in paragraph 2: “2. Petitioner for the past five (5) years has practiced regularly in the City of San Diego in the State of California.” 4 Sparrow in his testimony unconvincingly attempts to brush this aside as simple inadvertence caused by haste. Attached to this paper is what appears to be a curriculum vitae, the reading of which clearly leads one to the conclusion that Sparrow is engaged in the practice of law 5 .

His “Legal Experience” on the first page indicates his current occupation as: “1986-Present Connecticut & R Associates” No explanation of what the nature of this association is given, although all prior affiliations are spelled out in some detail. A Judge on November 6, 1987 permitted Sparrow’s appearance to be entered pro hac vice. ⁷⁰⁵ Sparrow, on November 24,1987, then moved for a Continuance, and filed Answers to Interrogatories. Neither of these documents contain any signature of another attorney as required by District Rule 101(a)(8). The matter then proceeded uncontested before a Commissioner. -Exhibit 3- This exhibit contains certified copies of a civil action from The Superior Court of the District of Columbia, F.R. Ruskin v. Sharon L. Norcutt.

Ms. Norcutt is an employee of the Company for which Sparrow was working at the time. Again, attempting to help a litigant who could not afford legal representation, Sparrow went to the Clerk of Court inquiring how he could enter his appearance pro hac vice.