Attorney Grievance Commission v. Truette

MURPHY, Chief Judge. The Attorney Grievance Commission, acting through Bar Counsel, filed a petition for disciplinary action against ⁴³⁷ Whiteman Samuel Truette III, alleging numerous violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We referred the matter, pursuant to Maryland Rule BV9, to Judge James M. Rea of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, Judge Rea filed detailed findings as follows: “The Court finds, as a matter of fact, that Mr. Truette is a member of the Maryland Bar and that he was admitted to the bar in December, 1973, that through 1976 he worked with the law firm of Hoyer and Fannon, with no particular instances of complaint against him.

In 1976, he went into partnership with David Shriver and this continued until December, 1980. His practice was general practice, slanted toward criminal practice, in addition to some commercial law practice. In December, 1980, the Respondent left the Prince George’s County area, which was his area of practice, with no notice to his partner, leaving only a note to his wife saying he was leaving. At this time, he went to the State of North Carolina and got a job planting trees in the Greensboro region.

From the date of his second marriage in May, 1977 through the present, he had marital difficulties. The Respondent characterized the marriage as a total failure. The Court further finds that through competent psychiatric reports ..., that during the year 1981, the Respondent sought psychiatric help. As a result thereof, he was diagnosed as suffering from depression, self-doubts, suicidal preoccupation, the desire to get away from it all, insomnia, with occasional reliance on alcohol for relief of symptoms.

As a result thereof, the Respondent has sought active psychological and psychiatric treatment. The Court finds that there has been a high degree of recovery by use of this treatment. “Complaint A “The first is a complaint of Drew A. Marcks, as Treasurer of the Board of Directors of a condominium association. ⁴³⁸ The Court finds that the Respondent did attempt to represent said condominium association and that he made representation to said parties that there was a pending suit in the Circuit Court and indicated at one time that he had settled the case for $7,950.00. At that time, he forwarded to the complainant a check in this amount drawn on his escrow account. The Respondent, in his deposition ... admitted there was no money to cover said check in his escrow account.

As a matter of fact, the case was not settled for said amount; but, on a later date, the Respondent gave the complainant a cashier’s check for $2,500.00, which the Respondent admitted ... that he disbursed, and that at a later date, he indicated the case had been settled for $8,110.17. On ... the Respondent’s deposition, he admits that in addition, a promissory note, in the amount of $4,000.00, was supplied to the complainant from the Respondent, making a total payment to the complainant in the amount of $6,500.00. There was a note prepared for $4,000.00, but the Respondent never signed said note. The Respondent, in his deposition did, however, confess a settlement agreement with the complainant in the amount of $6,500.00.

It appears to the Court that $2,500.00 of this claim has been paid by the Respondent. “Complaint B “This is a complaint by Ronald W. Kegley in which the Respondent indicated that on a one-third contingency fee he would institute suit for an automobile accident and that he represented to the complainant Kegley that the case was subject to be tried in or about October, 1980 and that the case would be re-scheduled. Actually, no suit had been filed and there was no scheduled trial to be re-scheduled by any court. The Respondent did not inform the complainant that he had ceased to practice law and had migrated to the State of North Carolina. The Respondent indicated ... [in] his deposition that other counsel apparently took up the claim and that the statute of limitations had not run at the time he failed to represent the complainant. ⁴³⁹ “Complaint C “This is the complaint of Ernestine Jean Bellosi, who testified in open court.

The complainant indicated that the United States Internal Revenue Service had filed a lien against her for taxation and that the Respondent was retained to represent her in effectuating a discharge of this lien. The Respondent was given a $500.00 retainer. Summary judgment was entered in the U.S. District Court for Maryland in favor of the Federal Government against the complainant. The complainant had thought that a necessary answer for summary judgment had been filed by the Respondent; however, this apparently had not been filed and a summary judgment was granted.

The complainant, in proper person, upon learning of the judgment, managed to have the summary judgment vacated, but later a final judgment was entered against the complainant after the District Court had given the complainant an opportunity to be heard. “Complaint D “This is a complaint of the Owl & Tortoise- Corporation. The Court notes that the complainant in Complaint C, Ernestine Jean Bellosi, along with Joseph Amerigo Bellosi, was connected with this corporation. The corporation operated a business in Northwest Washington, D.C. and the corporation was having difficulty with its landlord, particularly concerning the heat and hot water in the building. In addition, the landlord took action against the tenant corporation to terminate the lease.

The particular court in the District of Columbia gave judgment to the landlord. Mr. Truette made representation that an appeal would be taken from the landlord/tenant action. Apparently such an appeal was filed but not actively pursued and the appeal was dismissed. At which time, upon petition by the corporation, the appeals court allowed the appellant corporation to reinstate its appeal and new counsel was employed by the complainants to prosecute the appeal.

Further, the Respondent indicated he would file suit against the said landlord ⁴⁴⁰ for destruction of certain property owed by said complainant/tenant and no such suit was ever filed. "The Attorney Grievance Commission has petitioned under several of the Disciplinary Rules in each of the complaints, as noted. Complaint A also includes alleged violation of Article 10, Section 44 of the Annotated Code of Maryland. “Conclusion — Complaint A “It is the finding of this Court that the primary violation is DR 1-102(A) — Misconduct, (1) Violate a Disciplinary Rule, in that the Respondent did not properly inform his client. The Court is of the opinion that DR 1-102(A)(4), (5) and (6) are cummulative and repetitive of DR 1-102(A)(1) but that the same factual finding applies to each of these complaints.

"As to DR 2-110(A) — Withdrawal from Employment, the Court finds that the Respondent did violate DR 2-110(A)(2) and (3) by not properly withdrawing from employment or making total refund to the client. “The Court finds that DR 2-110(B)(2), (3) and (4) — Mandatory Withdrawal; DR 6-101(A)(l), • (2) and (3) — Failing to Act Competently; and DR 7-101(A)(2) — Representing a Client Zealously are repetitive to the factual situation which the Court has already found the Respondent in violation thereof and thereby suggests no action as to these particular charges. "The Court finds that the Respondent did violate DR 7-102(A)(3) and (5) — Representing a Client Within the Bounds of the Law in that he knowingly made false statements as to the settlement of the complainant’s claim. Further he violated DR 9-102(A)(l) and (2) — Preserving Identity of Funds and Property of a Client in that checks were forwarded to the complainant on bank accounts which did not have sufficient funds to cover them. “The Court does find that the Respondent did violate Article 10, Section 44(o) of the Annotated Code of Mary ⁴⁴¹ land, pertaining to the Respondent’s Escrow Account, and that he did, by his own admission, co-mingle funds. “Conclusion — Complaint B “The Court finds that the Respondent violated DR 1-102(A) — Misconduct, (1) Violate a Disciplinary Rule; DR 6-101(A) — Failing to Act Competently and DR 7-101(A)(2)— Representing a Client Zealously. It is the finding of this Court that the Respondent represented that a law suit had been filed, which had in fact not been filed.

Also, the Respondent left the area, not informing his client that such was the case. “The Court is of the opinion that DR 1-102(A)(4), (5) and (6); DR 2-110(A)(3); DR 2-110(B)(3); DR 6-101(A)(l), (2), (3); DR 7-101(A) (3); and DR 7-102(A)(3), (5) are cumulative and repetitive. The Court is of the opinion that no action should be taken on these specific charges but the Court does find that these charges have been violated by the factual situation. “Conclusion — Complaints C and D “Considering that some of the parties are the same in both complaints, it is the Court’s finding that the Respondent violated DR 1-102(A) — Misconduct, (1) Violate a Disciplinary Rule; DR 2-110(A)(3) — Withdrawal from Employment; DR 6-101(A)(2) and (3) — Failing to Act Competently; and DR 7-101(A)(l) and (2) — Representing a Client Zealously. In each of these complaints, the Respondent failed to properly inform his clients of the condition of the claims against them and left the area without informing his clients that there were pending matters in appropriate courts that needed the skills and responses of a competent attorney; and, therefore, the clients were forced to enter their cases in proper person in order to assert their defenses and claims. In Complaint D, it became necessary to employ other counsel. ⁴⁴² “The Court is of the opinoin that DR 1-102(4), (5) and (6); DR 2-110(B)(3); DR 6-101(A)(l); DR 7-101(A)(3) — (3-as to Complaint C only); DR 7-102(A)(3) and (5) are repetitive of the charges present as to these complaints.

Even though there is a factual violation of these particular charges, the Court suggests no further action on these matters. “In summary, the Court finds that due to the psychological problems which the Respondent suffered, he became seriously involved in alcohol. The Court further finds that upon receiving psychiatric treatment, the Respondent has returned to the practice of law in the State of Maryland and entered into practice with Mr. Robert E. Ammons, under Mr. Ammons’ close supervision. Since his return, he has confined his practice to the criminal law filed in which field the Respondent has displayed a degree of expertise. It was reported to the Court that, at the time of the hearing, the Respondent was being retained in the State’s Attorney’s Office in Carroll County and that his practice there would be limited to the prosecution of criminal cases.