Attorney Grievance Commission v. Ucheomumu

Hotten, J. On July 10, 2015, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“Petitioner”), acting through Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action against Andrew Ndubisi Ucheomumu (“Respondent”) charging him with violating the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct ⁶⁸³ (“MLRPC”) 1 , arising out of his representation of David C. Jackson and Jackson’s companies, Jalin Realty Capital Advis-ors (“Jalin”) and American Capital Holdings (“ACH”). Petitioner’s gravest allegations against Respondent claimed that Respondent continued to assist Jackson after Respondent was placed on actual or constructive notice of Jackson’s fraudulent lending practices. 2 The hearing judge agreed and found that Respondent was “well aware of Jackson’s illegal activity,” and that Respondent’s representation “actively aided and abetted” Jackson and Jalin. For the reasons outlined infra, we disagree with the hearing judge’s finding that Respondent had knowledge of Jackson’s advance fee fraud during Respondent’s representation. Accordingly, we disagree with the hearing judge’s finding that Respondent “aided and abetted” Jackson’s criminal activity.

In light of Respondent’s less serious violations of the MLPRC discussed herein, we find that the appropriate sanction is an indefinite suspension with the right to apply for reinstatement after 90 days. As a condition of reinstatement, upon application, Respondent must provide the Attorney Grievance Commission and Bar Counsel with appropriate documentation showing the existence and maintenance of an attorney trust account. Petitioner charged Respondent with alleged violations of several rules of the MLRPC: Rule 1.1 (Competence); Rule 1.2 (Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer); Rule 1.4 (Communication); Rule 1.5 (Fees); Rule 1.15 (Safekeeping Property); Rule 1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation); Rule 3.1 (Meritorious ⁶⁸⁴ Claims and Contentions); Rule 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel); Rule 8.4 (Misconduct); Petitioner also charged Respondent with violations of: Maryland Rule 16-604 3 (Trust account—Required deposits); Maryland Rule 16.606.1 4 (Attorney trust account record-keeping); and § 10-306 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article of the Maryland Code (Trust money restrictions). I. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law By an Order dated July 13, 2016, we referred the Petition to the Honorable Ronald B. Rubin of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County for an evidentiary hearing.

On October 22, 2016, Judge Rubin (“the hearing judge” or “the hearing court”) rendered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The findings were as follows: The [Respondent, Andrew N. Ucheomumu (“Ucheomu-mu” or “[R]espondent”), is 66 years old. He immigrated to the United States from Nigeria in 1979. Before practicing law, he had been employed in the import/export business from 1979 through 2006, Ucheomumu received his undergraduate degree in 2003 from the University of Pittsburgh.

He received his law degree from the David A. Clarke School of Law of the University of the District of Columbia in 2008. Ucheomumu was admitted to the Maryland Bar on June 16, 2009. In 2009, Ucheomumu received an LL.M. from The American University School of Law in constitutional and national security law. In 2011, he received an LL.M. from the University of Hull in England, in European Public Law.

After law school, Ucheomumu began practice as a solo practitioner. At the time of the events giving rise to the Petition, [Respondent's professional experience was limited ⁶⁸⁵ to serving as a panel attorney in Prince George’s County, where he handled juvenile matters, a small number of family law, and simple contract cases. Ucheomumu first met David C. Jackson (“Jackson”) in 1993 at a “business incubator” located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, where they both maintained offices. At that time, Jackson was operating a mortgage business and Ucheomu-mu was running an import/export business.

In 2006, Jackson was convicted of mortgage fraud and sentenced to a forty-one month term in federal prison. This story was, according to [Respondent, “front page news” in the local Pittsburgh newspaper. Respondent admitted that he knew, in 2006, that Jackson had been convicted of mortgage fraud. Ucheomumu moved to Maryland in June 2006.

Jackson was released from prison in 2009. In June 2010, Jackson contacted Ucheomumu by telephone. According to [Respondent, Jackson simply “looked me up” out of the blue and said that he was “back in business on the mortgage lending side.” During that conversation, Ucheomumu told Jackson that he had passed the Maryland Bar and was now engaged in the practice of law. Shortly thereafter, in July 2010, Ucheomumu was asked by Jackson to serve as “outside general counsel” for Jalin Realty Capital Advisers, LLC (“Jalin”), an entity controlled by Jackson.

A. Books and Records On August 26, 2010, Jackson signed a retainer agreement on behalf of Jalin, which [Respondent had prepared to memorialize the representation. Jalin allegedly was a hard money lender located in Ohio, The retainer agreement was signed by Jackson using the name of “C. David Manns.” According to [Respondent, Jackson told him that he had legally changed his name to Manns after his release from federal prison. Respondent, however, never requested proof of or verified whether Jackson had legally changed his name. As well, [Respondent] never visited Jalin’s office or conducted any due diligence into Jalin’s lending operation, despite knowing that Jackson previously had been convicted ⁶⁸⁶ of mortgage fraud.

Nevertheless, from July 2010 through December 2012, [Respondent performed a variety of legal services for Jalin, a successor entity known as American Capital Holdings, L[L]C (also controlled by Jackson)," and Jackson personally. According to the retainer agreement, [Respondent was hired as “Outside Counsel on General Matters.”[ ] The first page of the agreement provides that there is to be a $10,000.00 non-refundable retainer. The retainer agreement said: “This means CLIENT will not get the money back.” Page two, however, recited inconsistently that legal work for Jalin was to be billed at an hourly rate of $195.00 per hour and charged against the retainer. Page four recited that time is to be recorded in tenths of an hour and that the attorney “will bill monthly for legal services.” Further, the retainer agreement provided that bills for legal services “are payable immediately when received.” During this period of representation, [Respondent did not maintain an attorney trust account.

Consistent with the language of the retainer agreement, [Respondent deposited funds received from his client into his general bank account at the Bank of America." Respondent, who billed at $195.00 per hour according to the retainer agreement, sent only one invoice to Jackson on September 23, 2010." This invoice covered the period August 23, 2010 through September 22, 2010. No further invoices were created or sent to the client until after a complaint had been filed with Bar Counsel and an inquiry into [Respondent’s recordkeeping was initiated. Respondent did not maintain contemporaneous records of Jalin or Jackson’s payments apart from his bank records and the single invoice. On January 7, 2011, [Respondent received a payment of $1,150.00 from American Capital Holdings, a company formed by Jackson.

Respondent did not have a separate retainer agreement with American Capital Holdings. It is not entirely clear from the record whether this company is a legal successor to Jalin or a separate, new entity which ⁶⁸⁷ Jackson formed to continue its lending business. Respondent performed no due diligence in this regard and was unclear during his testimony at the hearing as to the precise nature of this entity and its ownership structure.1-1 Respondent was paid legal fees by American Capital Holdings[ ] and used some of the funds he received from American Capital Holdings to pay other attorneys. The court finds that [Respondent paid one firm, the Pemberton Law Firm of Minnesota, the sum of $1934.00, not the $4,000.00 as originally instructed by Jackson.

Between August 2010 and December 2012, [Respondent received a total of $90,850.00 in legal fees from Jackson and his businesses.” During that same period, [Respondent billed Jackson and his companies for $153,512.25.” Some of the funds deposited into [Respondent’s bank account were earmarked for third parties, such as local counsel.1-] B. Knowledge of Jackson’s Criminal Activities According to FBI Agent Ronald Henderson, [Respondent was told during a meeting on June 6, 2011, that Jackson was again under criminal investigation for mortgage fraud, and that Jackson used C. David Manns and Charles Jackson as aliases. Agent Henderson also presented [R]espondent with a financial analysis of the fraud under investigation and a summary of Jackson’s past criminal history. The agent wanted to interview Jackson, but [Respondent, on Jackson’s behalf, requested transactional immunity from federal prosecution. The government was willing only to grant Jackson use immunity.1 ] As a consequence, on Jackson’s behalf, [Respondent declined the Agent’s request for Jackson to cooperate in the federal investigation.

The court credits Agent Henderson’s testimony and disbelieves [Respondent’s recollection of the meeting and its import. Clearly, as of June 6, 2011, [Respondent knew that Jackson once again was under federal criminal investigation for fraud. The court finds that during his representation of Jalin, American Capital Holdings and Jackson, [Respondent performed no due diligence regarding his clients’ business practices, or the pleadings and discovery responses he ⁶⁸⁸ filed on their behalf in various litigations, despite knowing that investors were claiming that Jalin was running an advance fee scheme[—]taking their advance fees but refusing to fund loans. Once [Respondent met with federal investigators in June 2011, the court finds that [Respondent either knew, or recklessly disregarded, the fact that Jalin was taking advance fees from clients and then intentionally failing to fund loans.

Despite this knowledge, [Respondent thereafter actively aided and abetted Jalin (and Jackson) by intentionally obfuscating the truth about Jalin’s business practices in communications with other attorneys who were complaining about Jalin’s refusal to return fees or to fund loans, and in filings with courts. Respondent’s conduct in this regard was willful, and was not the result of a subjective, good faith mistake. The court finds, based on a review of [Respondent’s time records along with [Respondent's testimony at the hearing, that [Respondent was intimately involved with Jalin’s business practices and Jackson’s personal matters, his protests to the contrary notwithstanding. Respondent was well aware, the court finds, that Jalin was taking advance fees from clients, declining thereafter to fund loans, and that Jalin’s clients were regularly demanding refunds of the advance fees.

Despite this knowledge, [Respondent continued with the representation, including the filing of two federal lawsuits to aid and assist Jackson’s criminal efforts. Also, [Respondent, among other things, represented Jackson personally concerning the restitution Jackson owed for his prior mortgage fraud conviction, as well as legal research for Jackson’s potential (and personal) tort claims. For [Respondent to claim that he did not know what was going on—as he did during his testimony—belies credulity. The court disbelieves [Respondent’s testimony to the contrary.

As Judge Moylan observed in Steinberg v. Arnold, “as fact finder, [the judge] has the usual jury prerogatives of whether to believe or disbelieve witnesses, how much weight ⁶⁸⁹ to give testimony and ultimately whether to be persuaded or not to be persuaded.” 42 Md.App. 711, 712 , 402 A.2d 1302 (1979). The court is persuaded, by clear and convincing evidence, that [Respondent knowingly assisted Jackson’s illegal advance fee scheme and profited therefrom. C. Jalin v. A Better Wireless In July 2010, [Respondent began representing Jalin in a dispute with Mitch Koep, the owner of A Better Wireless, NISP, LLC, a Minnesota company. A Better Wireless had sought funding through Jalin, paying an advance fee of $37,500.00.

Jalin failed to provide funding and refused to refund the fee. On behalf of Jalin, the court finds that [Respondent reviewed documents and provided advice with respect to this failed loan transaction. Thereafter, on January 21, 2011, [Respondent filed a lawsuit on behalf of Jalin in federal court in Minnesota. The complaint pled a number of causes of action and sought money damages and injunc-tive relief.

According to the complaint, A Better Wireless falsely accused Jalin of mishandling the loan. Respondent conducted no pertinent factual investigation before filing the complaint. Further, [Respondent failed to procure a notarized affidavit that was needed to support the demand for injunctive relief. As well, [Respondent failed to appear for a pre-trial conference on June 8, 2011, and was sanctioned $450.00 by the court.

Thereafter, in August 2011, [Respondent was served with discovery requests by counsel for A Better Wireless. On October 9, 2011, [Respondent sent responses to the interrogatories and request for production of documents which wholly failed, the court finds, to comply with settled federal discovery rules. The responses, the court finds, contained frivolous and boilerplate objections, having nothing to do with the information requested by the opposing party. At the hearing in this matter, [Respondent was not able to satisfactorily explain to this court why he answered the Minnesota discovery in the manner in which he did.

Not surprisingly, the federal magistrate judge supervising the Minnesota case also found [Respondent's professional ⁶⁹⁰ conduct sorely lacking. Among other things, the magistrate judge found that [Rjespondent “made no attempt to explain why its discovery responses are substantially justified.” The magistrate judge also found that the “discovery responses fail to meet an objective standard of reasonableness.” The court sanctioned [Rjespondent personally in the amount of $1,610.00. The court also precluded [Rjespondent’s clients from using in any subsequent proceedings in the case any documents or other information requested but not provided in the discovery responses drafted and filed by [Rjespon-dent. The complaint [Rjespondent filed for Jalin later was dismissed by the district judge, with prejudice.

D. The Texas Litigation Jalin was dissolved in 2011, in connection with the bankruptcy filing by Anthony Byrd, a nephew of Jackson. Jalin, it turns out was simply a registered trade name of Rhythm Stone Media Group, LLC, not a separate company. Jackson established American Capital Holdings to continue his “lending” business. On January 30, 2012, [Rjespondent filed a complaint on behalf of American Capital Holdings in federal court in Texas.

The suit was against an entity called Brightway Financial Group for allegedly issuing bogus standby letters of credit. In connection with this litigation, and in opposition to a motion to compel arbitration, [Rjespondent knowingly filed an affidavit for Jackson using the false name [“jCharles Jackson,” not David C. Jackson, which was his legal name. E. Mitigation By way of mitigation, [Rjespondent presented the testimony of Samuel Hamilton, a well-known and senior member of the Bar. Mr. Hamilton has known [Rjespondent since 2010.

The court credits Mr. Hamilton’s testimony regarding [Rjespondent’s character during the period and in the context which he has known him. (Footnotes omitted). The Conclusions of Law made by the hearing judge were as follows: ⁶⁹¹ Conclusions of Law In view of the court’s factual findings, the court concludes that [Rjespondent has violated a number of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The court finds that [Rjespondent knowingly failed to deposit client funds into an attorney trust account in violation of Rule 1.1.

Respondent did not even have an attorney trust account until after his representation of Jalin and Jackson ended, in violation of Rule 16-604. As well, [Rjespondent was required to deposit funds intended for Gilbert and Pemberton in trust, and not in his general bank account. Similarly, [Rjespondent did not maintain contemporaneous records of his receipt of client funds until after Jackson filed a complaint and Bar Counsel requested [Rjespondent to provide time and billing records, in violation of Rule 16-606.1. See also Section 10-306 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article, which prohibits the use of trust money for other than its intended purpose[ j.

With respect to the A Better Wireless litigation in Minnesota, the court finds that [Rjespondent demonstrated a lack of competence in violation of Rule 1.1. The court further finds that [Rjespondent failed, under Rule 1.4(a)(3) to comply with reasonable requests for information during discovery. The court also finds that [Rjespondent violated Rule 1.4(b) by failing to disclose and clarify to his clients, in an unambiguous manner, the structure of the billing arrangement and the apportionment of fees to specific legal work. The court also finds that [Rjespondent manifestly did not possess the requisite skill and experience to prosecute the Minnesota federal action, as evidenced by his testimony in this case, and the decision of two Minnesota federal judges.

Respondent also violated Rule 3.1 in connection with the Minnesota litigation. Among other things, the complaint [Rjespondent filed had no good faith, factual basis and the [Rjespondent had no documents to support the allegations he made in the complaint. Further, the complaint was, at best, highly misleading and, the court finds, was part of a concerted effort to assist Jackson in holding onto illegally ⁶⁹² earned advance fees extracted in connection with a fraudulent lending scheme. Respondent’s conduct in discovery also violated Rule 3.4(a) and Rule 3.4(d).

Respondent intentionally withheld substantive, discoverable information he learned from his meeting with the FBI and the complaints of other Jalin clients about its failure to fund loans. He also failed, in good faith, to meet and confer with opposing counsel. Further, in connection with the Minnesota case, the court finds that [Respondent did not properly account to his clients (albeit they too were part of a criminal enterprise themselves) for the fees he charged, in violation of Rule 1.5(a). The court finds that [Respondent violated Rule 1.15(a) by failing to maintain funds belonging to third parties in an attorney trust account.

Respondent also violated Rule 1.15(c) and (d) when he failed to obtain third parties’ informed consent (the Pemberton Law Firm and Greg Gilbert, Esquire) before depositing unearned funds into his general bank account. The court also finds that [Respondent violated Rule 1.16(d) by failing to send Jackson invoices and a complete copy of his file, after Jackson requested these documents on at least two occasions. The court also finds multiple violations of Rule 8.4. Respondent plainly violated Rule 8.4(c) and (d) (and therefore also Rule 8.4(a)).

Particularly egregious was his filing of two declarations by Jackson, using different names, with two federal courts. The court finds that [Respondent knew that these were filed in an attempt to mislead and misinform the court and opposing counsel, and to conceal Jackson’s true identity. Respondent, the court finds, intentionally used a false name on behalf of his client (Jackson) in two court filings, all of which aided and assisted his client’s cover-up of an on-going fraud scheme, and enabled [Respondent at the same time to bill and collect tens of thousands of dollars in fees. It defies common sense for [Respondent to posit that he was unware of Jackson’s activities and that he was simply another person “duped” by Jackson.

The court finds the opposite to be true; [Respondent, well aware of Jack ⁶⁹³ son’s illegal activity, dined on the gravy train until that gravy simply got too hot to handle. (Footnotes omitted).

II

Standard of Review The manner in which this Court reviews attorney discipline proceedings is well established: This Court has original and complete jurisdiction over attorney discipline proceedings in Maryland. We conduct an independent review of the record and we accept the hearing judge’s findings of fact unless shown to be clearly erroneous. Under our independent review of the record, we must determine whether the findings of the hearing judge are based on clear and convincing evidence. With respect to exceptions, upon our review of the record, the hearing judge’s findings of fact generally will be accepted unless they are clearly erroneous.

A hearing judge’s factual finding is not clearly erroneous if there is any competent material evidence to support it. As to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law, such as whether provisions of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct were violated, our consideration is de novo. Attorney Grievance v. Hodes, 441 Md. 136, 168-69 , 105 A.3d 533, 552-53 (2014) (citations, footnote, and quotations omitted). Petitioner filed no exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, and recommends disbarment.

Respondent filed numerous exceptions to both the hearing judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.

III

Respondent’s Exceptions to the Findings of Fact Respondent’s Exceptions to the Findings of Fact Pertaining to Respondent’s Knowledge and Assistance of Jackson’s Criminal Activity Respondent presents several exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact regarding Respondent’s knowledge of Jackson’s criminal activity during Respondent’s representation of Jackson and his companies. Underlying our analysis is the “fundamental principle that the factual findings of the ⁶⁹⁴ assigned judge in an attorney disciplinary proceeding ‘are prima facie correct and will not be disturbed on review unless clearly erroneous,’ ” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1, 17 , 741 A.2d 1143, 1152 (1999) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 470 , 671 A.2d 463, 473 (1996)). A hearing judge’s factual finding is not clearly erroneous “[i]f there is any competent material evidence to support [it].” YIVO Inst. for Jewish Research v. Zaleski, 386 Md. 654, 663 , 874 A.2d 411, 416 (2005). Respondent opposes the hearing judge’s findings of fact that, after Respondent conferred with Agent Henderson in June 2011, “[Respondent either knew, or recklessly disregarded, the fact that Jalin was taking advance fees from clients and then intentionally failing to fund loans.” Respondent argues that the jury verdict sheet utilized in Jackson’s wire fraud trial supports Respondent’s position.

The guilty verdict adjudged Jackson’s conduct during a time period which spanned from April 27, 2010 to August 3, 2010. Jackson did not initially contact Respondent regarding legal representation until July 16, 2010. Conversely, Petitioner contends that Respondent’s billing records, Jackson’s use of aliases, and Respondent’s meeting with Agent Henderson provide competent material evidence that Respondent had knowledge of, or recklessly disregarded, Jalin’s fraudulent activities. Agent Henderson’s testimony regarding the June 2011 meeting with Respondent provides evidence of the infancy of the investigation of Jackson at the time of Agent Henderson’s meeting with Respondent.

Agent Henderson testified at Respondent’s evidentiary hearing as follows: So the purpose of our meeting, then, with [Respondent] was to talk to him about possibly getting his client, Mr. Jackson, to potentially cooperate. And during the course of that meeting, then we gave, we laid out some of the evidence that we basically collected against his client. One of the, a couple of the things were that his client, we knew that his client’s name was David Jackson, not C. David Manns, and that’s the name that he [had] been using to, in communicating with several victims that we had spoken to. ⁶⁹⁵ We also communicated to [Respondent] about Mr. Jackson’s past. We knew that he had a previous felony conviction.

Had just gotten out of federal prison in 2009. And we knew the, told [Respondent] that we knew the extent of the fraud that [Jackson] had committed previously. And then we talked to [Respondent] about, basically told him that we had done some financial analysis, some bank record analysis, and had spoken to victims, and talked to them about statements that were made to, to them by Mr. Jackson. 5 Before the hearing court, Agent Henderson testified that, at the time of his meeting with Respondent, Agent Henderson was not aware of the issuance of any warrant pertaining to Jackson’s advance fee fraud. Agent Henderson further testified that he could not recall whether a target letter 6 had been issued regarding any ongoing investigation of Jackson’s advance fee fraud. 7 The ultimate conviction against Jackson was based on conduct that occurred during a time period that almost entirely preceded Respondent’s representation of Jackson.

The guilty verdict in Jackson’s federal criminal conspiracy trial found Jackson guilty of conspiracy to commit wire fraud ⁶⁹⁶ and substantive counts of wire fraud occurring on or about the following dates in 2010: April 27, May 10, May 21, June 28, June 24, July 1, July 14, July 30, and August 3. 8 Respondent’s billing records show that he had billed Jackson for 2.1 hours of work on July 19, 2010 and 3.2 hours of work on July 21, 2010 for a total of 5.3 hours billed during the time period in which Jackson’s convicted conduct occurred. Respondent’s retainer agreement was not signed by Jackson until August 27, 2010. Based on the record, it is too grave of an inferential step to charge Respondent with sufficiently particularized knowledge of, or reckless disregard for, Jackson’s criminal activity, as there is no competent material evidence to support that finding by clear and convincing evidence. Thus, Respondent’s exception is sustained.

Respondent also excepts to the hearing judge’s factual finding that Agent Henderson “presented [Respondent with a financial analysis of the fraud under investigation ...,” The testimony of Agent Henderson regarding this matter was as follows: And then we talked to [Respondent] about, basically told him we had done some financial analysis, some bank record analysis, and had spoken to victims and, and talked to them about statements that were made to, to them by Mr. Jackson. Petitioner did not file a written response to this exception. 9 “A hearing judge’s factual finding is not clearly erroneous if there is any competent material evidence to support it.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McDonald, 437 Md. 1, 16 , 85 A.3d 117, 125 (2014) (quotation omitted). Agent Henderson’s testimony that he “told [Respondent] [the FBI] had done some financial ⁶⁹⁷ analysis” does not lead to the inference that “Agent Henderson also presented [Respondent with a financial analysis of the fraud under investigation .... ” A presentation of financial analysis is substantially different from a communication that “some financial analysis[]” has been completed. Thus, Respondent’s exception is sustained.

Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that “Respondent was well aware ... that Jalin was taking advance fees from clients, declining thereafter to fund loans, and that Jalin’s clients were regularly demanding refunds of the advance fees. Despite this knowledge, [Respondent continued with the representation, including the filing of two federal lawsuits to aid and assist Jackson’s criminal efforts.” For the reasons stated above, Respondent’s exception to the hearing judge’s finding regarding Respondent’s knowledge of Jackson’s criminal activity is sustained. It follows that, without knowledge of Jackson’s criminal activities, Respondent could not aid and abet Jackson’s criminal activities. See, e.g., Bellamy v. State, 403 Md. 308, 334 , 941 A.2d 1107, 1122 (2008) (holding that “a person aids and abets the commission of a crime by knowingly associating with the criminal venture with the intent to help commit the crime, being present when the crime is committed, and seeking by some act to make the crime succeed”).

There is no competent material evidence to support a finding that Respondent’s continued representation and lawsuits “aid[ed] and assisted] Jackson’s criminal efforts.” The first lawsuit, entitled Jalin Realty Capital Advisors, LLC v. A Better Wireless, NISP, LLC, was brought in United States District Court for the District of Minnesota on January 21, 2011. 917 F.Supp.2d 927 (D. Minn. 2013). This suit involved claims for cybersquatting, 10 trademark infringement, common ⁶⁹⁸ law defamation and tortious interference. Id. All of Jalin’s claims were dismissed by the court on summary judgment, and A Better Wireless’ motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim for fraud was denied.

Id. at 945 . The suit was ultimately settled. The second lawsuit, entitled American Capital Holdings, LLC v. Brightway Financial Group, LLC, was brought in the Northern District of Texas on January 30, 2012. This suit was based upon claims by Jackson that Alex Hurt, and others associated with Brightway, had defrauded Jackson’s company, ACH, and its customers by issuing fraudulent guaranty letters of credit from a dummy company known as RBS Alliance.

The lawsuit was ultimately dismissed based upon a decision upholding a mandatory arbitration clause in the parties’ contract. There is no competent material evidence of record to support a finding that Respondent’s representation and filing of these two lawsuits “aid[ed] and assisted] Jackson’s criminal efforts.” Next, Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s finding of fact that Respondent “knowingly assisted Jackson’s illegal advance fee scheme and profited therefrom.” For the reasons expressed above, there is no competent material evidence of record to support a finding by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent had knowledge of, let alone assisted in, Jackson’s criminal activities. Thus, this exception is sustained. Respondent’s Exceptions to the Hearing Judge’s Remaining Findings of Fact Respondent demurs to the finding of fact that “[Respondent paid one firm, the Pemberton Law Firm of Minnesota, the sum of $1[,]934.00, not the $4,000.00 as originally instructed by Jackson.” Respondent testified before the hearing court that he sent to Jackson the Pemberton Law Firm’s ⁶⁹⁹ bill of $1,934 to be paid by Jackson directly to the Pemberton Law Firm.

Respondent averred that he sent this bill to Jackson because Jackson habitually paid Respondent for his work, while also giving Respondent payments that were to be forwarded to Pemberton. Respondent further testified that Jackson wired $4,000 and then $2,000 into the Respondent’s operating account. Respondent testified that, at the time these funds were wired, Jackson owed Respondent the sum of $52,333 for legal work performed. An email from Respondent to Jackson, with the subject line “Re: Money Transfer from AMERICAN CAPITAL HOLDINGS, LLC [ ]” stated as follows: “This is to certify that we received a total of $6,000.00 representing the following: A) $4,000.00 for Pemberton Law Firm in Minnesota.

B) $2,000 for The Ucheomumu Group, LLC to offset the cost of traveling and lodging in Minnesota for the upcoming hearing scheduled for September 19, 2012. Thank you.” Respondent testified before the hearing court that, immediately after Respondent sent this email, Jackson sent Respondent a considerable amount of documents to review. Respondent then asked Jackson how Jackson would pay Respondent for this document review, as Jackson already had an outstanding balance due to Respondent. Respondent testified that Jackson then instructed Respondent to only pay the Pemberton Law Firm their outstanding balance of $1,934 from the wired funds, instead of $4,000 as Jackson originally instructed.

Despite Respondent’s testimony regarding Jackson’s second instruction to only pay $1,934 of the wired funds to Pember-ton, the evidence of this second instruction does not render null and void the competent material evidence to support the finding of fact that “[Respondent paid one firm, the Pember-ton Law Firm of Minnesota, the sum of $1934.00, not the $4,000.00 as originally instructed by Jackson.” (Emphasis added). Thus, Respondent’s exception is overruled. 11 ⁷⁰⁰ Respondent next excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that “[i]n July 2010, [Respondent began representing Jalin in dispute with Mitch Koep, the owner of A Better Wireless, NISP, LLC, a Minnesota company.” The evidence of record demonstrates that Respondent’s representation in the A Better Wireless suit began in October 2010, not July 2010. Thus, this exception is sustained. Lastly, Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that “Respondent failed to procure a notarized affidavit that was needed to support the demand for injunctive relief.” While this is ultimately supported by competent material evidence of record, we also note that the record reflects that Respondent made attempts to procure the affidavit from his client, Jackson.

Jackson, through no fault of Respondent, failed to provide the requisite information needed for the affidavit to Respondent.

IV

Respondent’s Exceptions to the Conclusions of Law Respondent filed exceptions to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law. We review the hearing judge’s conclusions of law de novo, addressing each of Respondent’s exceptions. Respondent’s Exceptions to the Conclusions of Law Pertaining to Respondent’s Knowledge and Assistance of Jackson’s Criminal Activity Respondent excepts to the following conclusions of law made by the hearing judge pertaining to Respondent’s knowledge and assistance of Jackson’s criminal activity: Further, the complaint [in the A Better Wireless suit] ... was part of a concerted effort to assist Jackson in holding on to illegally earned advance fees extracted in connection with a fraudulent lending scheme. [[Image here]] ⁷⁰¹ Respondent ... intentionally used a false name on behalf of his client (Jackson) in two court filings, all of which aided and assisted his client’s cover-up of an on-going fraud scheme[.] For the reasons outlined in Section III, we sustain Respondent’s exceptions pertaining to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law based on findings of fact that Respondent had knowledge of, or recklessly disregarded, Jackson’s criminal activity, and acted in furtherance thereof. Respondent’s Exceptions to the Hearing Judge’s Remaining Conclusions of Law Respondent’s Exception to Rule 1.1 as it Pertains to Trust Accounts Rule 1.1 provides, “[a] lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.

Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion of law that Respondent “knowingly failed to deposit client funds into an attorney trust account in violation of Rule 1.1” During all times pertinent to Respondent’s representation of Jackson and Jalin, Respondent did not maintain an attorney trust account. Thus, Respondent’s exception is overruled. As we held in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shephard, competent representation includes proper treatment and maintenance of client funds in a trust account. 444 Md. 299, 324-25 , 119 A.3d 765, 780 (2015). We find by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated Rule 1.1 by failing to maintain an attorney trust account during his representation of Jackson, Jalin, and ACH.

Respondent’s Exception Regarding Rule 1.15 Respondent next excepts to the hearing judge’s