Attorney Grievance Commission v. Whitehead

CATHELL, Judge. H. Allen Whitehead, respondent, was disbarred by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, based upon respondent’s consent. Bar Counsel, on behalf of the Attorney Grievance Commission, petitioner, pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-773(b), 1 and based on the misconduct for which respondent was disbarred in the District of Columbia filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action against respondent for violation of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC). 2 The petition alleged that the respondent unethically and unprofessionally violated MRPC 8.4 and 1.15. 3 Petitioner also ⁶⁶⁶ alleged that respondent violated Maryland Rules 16-609 and Maryland Code (1989, 2004 Repl. Vol.), §§ 10-306 and 10-307 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article.

On June 16, 2005, this Court issued a Show Cause Order pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-773(e). 4 Both parties filed their responses to the Show Cause Order and oral arguments were heard on December 5, 2005. Petitioner asked this Court to impose a “reciprocal” 5 sanction and disbar respondent. Respondent ⁶⁶⁷ argued that, under Maryland law, suspension was the appropriate sanction for his conduct. I. Facts Respondent was admitted as a member of the Bar of this Court on December 1, 1973.

He practiced in Maryland and the District of Columbia until 1999, when he moved to New York. Throughout his legal career, respondent has concentrated in estate and trusts law. In December of 1998, he became involved in the District of Columbia in the administration of the proceeds from a medical malpractice settlement. Then, in September of 1999, he was appointed as the Conservator of those funds. 6 Upon allegations that respondent had paid legal fees to himself in the amount of $40,200.00 for his services in that case without prior court approval, he was removed from his post. 7 As a result of his conduct, the District of Columbia Bar ⁶⁶⁸ Counsel initiated proceedings against respondent.

Respondent represented himself during the disciplinary proceedings and, according to him, was led to believe that the infraction subjected him to automatic disbarment in the District of Columbia. Accordingly, respondent filed an affidavit consenting to disbarment from the Bar of the District of Columbia. In that affidavit, respondent admitted to taking the fees prior to court approval and stated that the fees were reimbursed. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, on consideration of the affidavit, a report and recommendation from the Board on Professional Responsibility, and a letter from Bar Counsel, disbarred respondent by consent.

II

Discussion “Reciprocal” discipline cases are adjudicated according to Maryland Rule 16-773. Under subsection (b), “[u]pon receiving and verifying information from any source that in another jurisdiction an attorney has been disciplined ..., Bar Counsel may file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 16-751(a)(2).” 8 The Court, then, issues a show cause order as required by subsection (c). After the parties respond to the show cause order, the Court “may immediately impose corresponding discipline,” assign the matter to a judge for a hearing, or enter “any other appropriate order.” Rule 16—773(f) (emphasis added). This subsection, entitled “Action by Court of Appeals,” makes it clear that it is within the Court’s discretion as to which sanction should be imposed upon the attorney.

The rule states that the Court may impose “corresponding discipline,” not that it shall impose “identical discipline.” ⁶⁶⁹ In making a determination in “reciprocal” disciplinary cases, this Court generally gives deference to the factual findings of the original jurisdiction: “(g) Conclusive effect of adjudication. Except as provided in subsections (e)(1) and (e)(2) of this Rule, a final adjudication in a disciplinary or remedial proceeding by another court, agency, or tribunal that an attorney has been guilty of professional misconduct or is incapacitated is conclusive evidence of that misconduct or incapacity in any proceeding under this Chapter. The introduction of such evidence does not preclude the Commission or Bar Counsel from introducing additional evidence or preclude the attorney from introducing evidence or otherwise showing cause why no discipline or lesser discipline should be imposed.” Rule 16—773(g); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Weiss, 389 Md. 531 , 886 A.2d 606 (2005); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Scroggs, 387 Md. 238, 249 , 874 A.2d 985, 992 (2005); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ayres-Fountain, 379 Md. 44, 56 , 838 A.2d 1238, 1245 (2003); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Cafferty, 376 Md. 700, 703 , 831 A.2d 1042, 1045-46 (2003). In the case sub judice, the only factual finding by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is contained in the order of disbarment by consent.

The order states that the sanction is based upon respondent’s affidavit in which he stated: “I was appointed as Conservator, I took fees (which later were reimbursed) prior to Court approval.” In keeping with the general spirit of Rule 16-773(g) we accept the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ finding that respondent violated the rules of professional conduct by taking fees without prior court approval. We must, however, determine whether the sanction imposed by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is appropriate under the circumstances of this case, especially since in this Court, the attorney has not consented to disbarment. A. Reciprocal Discipline Sanctions Maryland Rule 16-773(e) is titled “exceptional circumstances,” it provides that “[rjeciprocal discipline shall not be ⁶⁷⁰ ordered, if Bar Counsel or the attorney demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence” any of five different conditions. Rule 16-773(e) (emphasis added). 9 It does not define the term “reciprocal discipline” as to whether it refers to process, findings, sanctions, or all three.

The use of the language “shall not be ordered” does not imply that, in the absence of any of the five exceptions, the Court shall find that the same sanction must be imposed even if the findings of the foreign court as to misconduct are accepted. To the contrary, this language reads so as to limit the ability of this Court to rely solely on the original jurisdiction’s findings as to misconduct when any of the enumerated exceptions are met. If Bar Counsel — or the sanctioned attorney — provides sufficient evidence showing that one or more of the exceptions exist, the Court cannot use its discretion as to whether to accept the findings as to misconduct and to impose a corresponding (but not necessarily the same) sanction, or a different sanction all together. If these exceptions exist, the Court cannot rely exclusively on the findings of the foreign jurisdiction and cannot summarily impose the same discipline.

If, however, none of the exceptions exist the Court may do so. In further interpreting the meaning of subsection (e), we must evaluate it in the context of the entire Rule 16-773. Subsection (b) provides that Bar Counsel “may” file a petition upon learning that an attorney has been disciplined in another state. Under subsection (d) the Court “may” suspend the attorney from practice while the proceedings in Maryland are taking place.

Then, under subsection (f), the Court “may ⁶⁷¹ immediately impose corresponding discipline,” or it “may” assign the case for a hearing, or it “may enter any other appropriate order.” None of these provisions provide any indication that the findings and the sanction of the foreign court are required to be accepted. Only subsections (a), (c), and (h) use the mandatory language “shall.” Subsection (a) requires that the attorney “shall” inform Bar Counsel if he or she has been disciplined in another state; subsection (c) states that the Court “shall” issue a show cause order; subsection (h) orders that when the case is stayed in the original jurisdiction, any proceedings under the rule “shall” be stayed. Subsection (g), which establishes that an adjudication in another state is conclusive evidence of misconduct, does not relate to sanctions. In light of the fact that the sections dealing with sanctioning the attorney, (b), (d), and (f), use the permissive language “may,” it is reasonable to interpret the use of the language “shall not be ordered ... if ’ to be read as permissive language also.

Were that section to be read as requiring the Court to impose the same or equivalent sanction (if one exists) unless any of the circumstances in subsection (e) were present, it would render — at the very least — part of subsection (f) meaningless. The rule specifically provides that the Court shall not impose the same sanction if “the conduct established ... warrants substantially different discipline in this State.” Rule 16—773(e)(4) (emphasis added). The most reasonable way to determine whether the attorney’s conduct in another jurisdiction warrants substantially different discipline in this state is to review our own cases and determine which sanction would have been adequate had the case originated in this State. Weiss, 889 Md. at 548, 886 A.2d at 616 .

This reading of the rule is consistent with practically every prior holding of this Court in “reciprocal” discipline cases. We have repeatedly stated that in these cases, we are prone, but not required, to impose the same sanction the original jurisdiction imposed. Weiss, 389 Md. at 546 , 886 A.2d ⁶⁷² at 615. 10 Furthermore, in “reciprocal” discipline cases “[w]e are required to assess for ourselves the propriety of the sanction imposed by the other jurisdiction and that recommended by the Commission.” Scroggs, 387 Md. at 254 , 874 A.2d at 995 (citing Gittens, 346 Md. at 326, 697 A.2d at 88). We have consistently pronounced: “ When the Court considers the appropriate sanction in a case of reciprocal discipline, we look not only to the sanction imposed by the other jurisdiction but to our own cases as well.

The sanction will depend on the unique facts and circumstances of each case, but with a view toward consistent dispositions for similar misconduct.’ ” Weiss, 389 Md. at 548 , 886 A.2d at 616 (emphasis added) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Parsons, 310 Md. 132, 142 , 527 A.2d 325, 330 (1987)). We do not take this position lightly. The Court views it as a duty to “assess for itself the propriety of the sanction imposed by the other jurisdiction.” See e.g., Steinberg, 385 Md. at 704 n. 9, 870 A.2d at 608 n. 9; Ayres-Fountain, 379 Md. at 57 , 838 A.2d at 1246 . It is clear that this language, used in essentially every “reciprocal” discipline case, would be meaningless were the Court to apply the same sanction regardless of the state of the law in Maryland with respect to the proscribed conduct.

Certainly, as acknowledged in Weiss, many (if not most) times we will come to the same conclusion as the original jurisdiction and ⁶⁷³ impose an identical sanction. See e.g., Willcher, 340 Md. at 220, 665 A.2d at 1060; Roberson, 373 Md. at 357, 818 A.2d at 1077; Cafferty, 376 Md. at 728 , 831 A.2d at 1059 ; Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Moore, 301 Md. 169, 171 , 482 A.2d 497, 498 (1984). When our cases, however, clearly demonstrate that we would apply a different sanction — had the conduct occurred or the case originated here — we need not follow the original jurisdiction’s determination. To always follow the same sanction imposed by the originating jurisdiction might result in two different lines of sanctions for identical conduct; one in “reciprocal” cases and a different one in cases originating in Maryland.

This would lead to an inconsistency in sanctions that we try to avoid. We have applied this principle in a number of occasions. Most recently in Weiss , we found that disbarment was the appropriate sanction in Maryland for an attorney after he had been suspended in the District of Columbia for embezzling funds from his law firm. We determined that when the conduct involves stealing or like offenses, our cases clearly indicate that disbarment is the appropriate sanction absent compelling extenuating circumstances as the root cause of the misconduct.

Weiss, 389 Md. at 553 , 886 A.2d at 618-19 ; see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Goodman, 381 Md. 480 , 850 A.2d 1157 (2004); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Post, 379 Md. 60 , 839 A.2d 718 (2003); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Spery, 371 Md. 560 , 810 A.2d 487 (2002); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376 , 773 A.2d 463 (2001). In Dechowitz, this Court found that a conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute required disbarment in Maryland, even though Dechowitz was only suspended in California where the conduct took place. Dechowitz, 358 Md. at 192, 747 A.2d at 661. The District of Columbia and California courts imposed a different sanction from that which we normally imposed in such cases originating in Maryland.

Thus, we declined to impose the same sanction. This principle is not only followed when the original jurisdiction does not impose a sanction that is as severe as we would ⁶⁷⁴ impose had the conduct originated here, we also follow it when a lesser sanction is consistent with our experience. In Parsons , two attorneys were suspended for six months in the District of Columbia for forging a client’s signature on a divorce complaint. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Parsons, 310 Md. 132 , 527 A.2d 325 (1987).

This Court determined that a ninety day suspension was the appropriate sanction in Maryland, due to a similar case decided eight months earlier. Parsons, 310 Md. at 142 , 527 A.2d at 330 (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Maxwell, 307 Md. 600 , 516 A.2d 570 (1986) (holding that a ninety day suspension was appropriate for an attorney’s false signature on a deed)). Even though attorney discipline is for the primary purpose of protecting the public, the bar and public policy are served best by determinations consistent with other Maryland sanctions for similar misconduct. B. Public Policy for Attorney Discipline The primary purpose of attorney discipline is the protection of the public, not the punishment of the attorney.

Weiss, 389 Md. at 547 , 886 A.2d at 615 ; Scroggs, 387 Md. at 254 , 874 A.2d at 995 ; Steinberg, 385 Md. at 703, 870 A.2d at 607; Ayres-Fountain, 379 Md. at 58 , 838 A.2d at 1246 ; Cafferty, 376 Md. at 727 , 831 A.2d at 1059 ; Roberson, 373 Md. at 356, 818 A.2d at 1076; McCoy, 369 Md. at 237, 798 A.2d at 1138. As Chief Judge Bell stated for the Court: “ ‘We have recognized that the public interest is served when this Court imposes a sanction which demonstrates to members of the legal profession the type of conduct that will not be tolerated.... Moreover, such a sanction represents the fulfillment by this Court of its responsibility “to insist upon the maintenance of the integrity of the bar and to prevent the transgression of an individual lawyer from bringing its image into disrepute.”... Therefore, the public interest is served when sanctions designed to effect general and specific deterrence are imposed on an attorney who violates the disciplinary rules....

Of course, what the ap ⁶⁷⁵ propriate sanction for the particular misconduct is, in the public interest, generally depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case____The attorney’s prior grievance history, as well as facts in mitigation, constitute part of those facts and circumstances.’ ” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sperling, 380 Md. 180, 191 , 844 A.2d 397, 404 (2004) (emphasis added) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Myers, 333 Md. 440, 447 , 635 A.2d 1315, 1318 (1994)). This goal of effecting general and specific deterrence is best achieved by ensuring that every member of the bar clearly understands the standards of conduct to which he or she is expected to adhere and the consequences of failing to meet those standards. One of our goals, in maintaining these standards is to ensure that consistent determinations as to sanctions for similar misconduct are reached in our cases. Whether the case arises in this jurisdiction, or it comes to us as a “reciprocal” discipline case, does not change this Court’s duty to apply consistent treatment, i.e., sanctions-as far as is possible.

Our position on sanctions in “reciprocal” cases has to do with ensuring consistency, which in turn provides the appropriate deterrent for incompetent, unscrupulous or unethical lawyers. Nor do we abandon well reasoned principles of comity in reaching our decision. As required by Rule 16-773(g), the heaviest weight is given to our sister jurisdictions’ factual findings. From them we rarely stray.

We deviate from their sanctions, however, when the history of our cases warrants a substantially different disposition, such as is the case here. C. Appropriate Sanction in Maryland In the case sub judice we must determine what sanction is typically imposed in Maryland when an attorney takes fees from funds held in trust without prior court approval. In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Owrutsky, 322 Md. 334 , 587 A.2d 511 (1991), an attorney took fees from two “estates before they were earned and before approval of the Orphans’ Court had been sought or obtained.” Id. at 341 , 587 A.2d at ⁶⁷⁶ 514. The Court determined that his actions in taking the fees without approval and proper accounting came “perilously close to misappropriation of funds for which, in the absence of extenuating circumstances, disbarment is ordinarily the appropriate sanction.” Id. at 355 , 587 A.2d at 521 .

The attorney, however, was suspended for a period of three years instead, based on the totality of the circumstances, including the fact that he had been a member of the Bar for nearly thirty years without a record of previous misconduct. Id. In the case at bar, respondent did not take the fees before they were improperly accounted for or earned. Respondent practiced in Maryland for twenty-six years before moving to New York and petitioner did not provide any evidence that respondent was disciplined on any other occasion.

From the record it is not apparent that respondent’s conduct was intentional. Furthermore, he returned the unapproved fees upon learning that taking them -without approval was inappropriate. In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Thompson, 376 Md. 500, 519 , 830 A.2d 474, 485 (2003), an attorney violated the rules of professional conduct when he failed to pay employee withholding taxes and “by improperly handling the ... estate, i.e., improperly distributing the assets, not paying inheritance taxes before distributing the assets, suing the heirs, distributing less than the heirs were entitled to under the will, and then, to add insult to injury, retaining the $16,000.00 commission.” (Emphasis added). The attorney had received a check for his commission, which he deposited into his personal account without approval from the Orphans’ Court.

We imposed an indefinite suspension with the right to reapply after one year. In the case sub judice, the only confirmed allegation against respondent is that he paid himself fees, which he had earned, without prior court approval. Attorney Grievance Commission v. Seiden, 373 Md. 409 , 818 A.2d 1108 (2003), is also illustrative. In that case, an attorney managing an estate for a difficult client took his fee from the proceeds of a settlement without submitting a fee petition to the Orphans’ Court.

We imposed an indefinite suspension with the right to reapply within thirty days. Id. at ⁶⁷⁷ 425, 818 A.2d at 1117 . In arriving at our decision we took into consideration a number of mitigating factors: it was the attorney’s first disciplinary proceeding in twenty-four years of practice, there was no evidence of intentional misappropriation or dishonesty, the attorney was remorseful for his conduct, he was cooperative throughout the proceedings, and the reason he had not filed the fee petition was due to his ill health. M; see, also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sperling, 380 Md. 180 , 844 A.2d 397 (2004) (attorney’s negligent management of a trust account resulted in a $42,415.91 shortfall.

The Court imposed an indefinite suspension with the right to reapply for admission after ninety days.); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Culver, 371 Md. 265 , 808 A.2d 1251 (2002) (attorney collected $3,500.00 from his escrow account for services rendered to clients who challenged the fees and the attorney failed to have a written contingency agreement. The Court imposed an indefinite suspension with the right to reapply after thirty days). As demonstrated in the cases cited supra, the appropriate sanction for respondent’s misconduct in Maryland is an indefinite suspension and not disbarment. D. Comity Because our decision today affects the weight given to the decisions of other states, we now address the role of comity 11 ⁶⁷⁸ in the context of attorney discipline. 12 The Supreme Court of ⁶⁷⁹ Florida has provided a very persuasive explanation of the “reciprocal” discipline doctrine.

In reviewing that state’s policy, the court stated: “Here we note that to hold that Florida is not obligated to recognize and enforce the New York judgment of disbarment does not mean that it cannot do so if it elects. This brings us to an interpretation of Rule 11.02(6) and the determination of what effect this court intended to give foreign judgments of disbarment or other discipline when it adopted the rule. “In considering the question of the effect to be given disciplinary judgments of a sister state, this court could have adopted the extreme position under which no recognition would be given such a judgment. The rational for rejecting this position is well explained in Selling v. Radford, 1916, 243 U.S. 46, 49 , 37 S.Ct. 377 , 61 L.Ed. 585 . Alternatively, the court could have adopted the opposite extreme under which such a judgment would be given automatic and complete effect by imposing the same discipline in Florida as imposed in a sister state. “In our view adoption of either of these extremes would amount to an abdication of this court’s responsibility imposed by the Florida constitution.

On the one hand, to ignore acts of professional misconduct merely because they occurred outside this state would be to ignore our duty to protect the people of this state from one who has been held by another state to be an unfit practitioner. On the other hand, to accept the second extreme would constitute an abdication of the responsibility imposed on this court to determine for itself, in proceedings conducted by it, or ⁶⁸⁰ under its direction, the fitness of those permitted to practice in this state. To give automatic and unquestioning effect to the judgment of a foreign tribunal would be to fail to exercise the discretion vested in this court by our state constitution. “By adopting Rule 11.02(6) we took a reasonable position between the two extremes above mentioned. By the plainest language the rule makes such a foreign judgment of guilt conclusive proof of such misconduct in a disciplinary proceeding in this state.

Proof of guilt of the acts of misconduct adjudicated in the sister state is accomplished by simply proving the entry of the foreign judgment. This eliminates any necessity to retry the bare issue of guilt and makes unnecessary the production in Florida of testimony and evidence on this issue. The rule nether [sic] prescribes nor proscribes professional behavior. It relates solely to the question of proof of guilt.” Florida Bar v. Wilkes, 179 So.2d 193, 196-97 (Fla.1965); see also Florida Bar v. Mogil, 763 So.2d 303 (Fla.2000).

Florida’s current “reciprocal” discipline rule provides that the other jurisdiction’s findings are conclusive proof of misconduct. Fla. Bar R. 3-4.6. This rule only addresses the weight of the other state’s determination that misconduct has occurred and not the sanction to be imposed by the Supreme Court of Florida.

Other states also recognize that in “reciprocal” discipline cases, while accepting another jurisdictions findings of misconduct, the “ultimate responsibility for determining what sanction should be imposed” rests on the state in which the attorney is facing “reciprocal” discipline. Idaho State Bar v. Everard, 142 Idaho 109 , 124 P.3d 985 (2005); In re Witte, 99 Ill.2d 301, 310 , 458 N.E.2d 484, 488 , 76 Ill.Dec. 84, 88 (1983) (“[W]e regard a sister State’s sanction as persuasive, but not binding, when we seek the appropriate penalty to impose in Illinois.”); In re Rickabaugh, 661 N.W.2d 130, 133 (Iowa 2003) (“Determining a revocation in Nebraska is the same as a revocation in Iowa does not end our inquiry. We still must address Rickabaugh’s claim that the disbarment imposed in Nebraska is more severe than the sanction he would have ⁶⁸¹ received in Iowa for the same conduct.”); In re Kersey, 444 Mass. 65, 70 , 825 N.E.2d 994, 998 (2005) (“On a matter of reciprocal discipline, ‘we may impose whatever level of discipline is warranted by the facts even if that discipline exceeds, equals, or falls short of the discipline imposed in another jurisdiction.’ ”). The Supreme Court of Connecticut has interpreted its “reciprocal” discipline rule, stating that “ ‘commensurate action’ under [the “reciprocal” discipline rule] does not mean ‘identical action.’ The trial court had inherent judicial power, derived from judicial responsibility for the administration of justice, to exercise sound discretion to determine what sanction to impose in light of the entire record before it.” In re Weissman, 203 Conn. 380, 384 , 524 A.2d 1141, 1143 (1987) (a “reciprocal” discipline case from the District Court for the District of Connecticut).

This “commensurate” language is very similar to the language of Maryland Rule 16-773(f), which states that the Court “may immediately impose corresponding discipline.” As explained supra, the use of the word corresponding does not necessarily mean identical. One of the meanings of “correspond” is to be “equivalent in function,” another is “having an obvious similarity, although not agreeing in every detail.” 13 The Supreme Court of Missouri has made it clear that the court “makes its own independent judgment as to the fitness of the members of its bar.” In re Storment, 873 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Mo.1994) (en banc) (finding that disbarment was the appropriate sanction for an attorney who had been suspended in Illinois). The Supreme Court of Nebraska has recognized that “[t]his court has, on occasion, sanctioned attorneys who had already been disciplined by the state in which the ethical violation occurred. See, State ex rel.

NSBA v. Gallner, 263 Neb. 135 , 638 N.W.2d 819 (2002) (following imposition of 6-month suspension in Iowa, formal charges in Nebraska based on same conduct resulted in 1-year suspen ⁶⁸² sion); State ex rel. NSBA v. Frederiksen, 262 Neb. 562 , 635 N.W.2d 427 (2001) (following issuance of public reprimand in Iowa, formal charges in Nebraska based on same conduct resulted in 3-year suspension). Such does not offend the principles of full faith and credit. Kentucky Bar Ass’n v. Signer, 533 S.W.2d 534 (Ky.1976), succinctly analyzes such notion.” State ex rel.

Counsel for Discipline of the Nebraska Supreme Court v. Rokahr, 267 Neb. 436 444 , 675 N.W.2d 117, 124 (2004). That court has also stated that “[t]he propriety of a sanction must be considered with reference to the sanctions imposed by this court in prior cases presenting similar circumstances.” State ex rel. NSBA v. Gallner, 263 Neb. 135, 139 , 638 N.W.2d 819, 823 (2002); see also In re Lichtenberg, 117 N.M. 325, 327 , 871 P.2d 981, 983 (1994) (in New Mexico, the Court reviews its prior cases in determining the appropriate sanction). In New York, an appellate court refused to impose “reciprocal” discipline, suspending for one year an attorney who had been disbarred in Maryland for unauthorized practice of law.

In re Alsafty, 5 A.D.3d 976 , 774 N.Y.S.2d 583 (2004). Oregon takes the least deferential approach in “reciprocal” discipline cases. In the Supreme Court of Oregon’s view: “ ‘In determining an appropriate sanction, ... this court focuses on the accused’s misconduct under the Oregon disciplinary rules. We do so because our choice of a sanction vindicates the judicial authority of this jurisdiction, not of the one in which the earlier discipline occurred.’” In re Coggins, 338 Or. 480, 485 , 111 P.3d 1119, 1121 (2005) (en banc).

In at least one jurisdiction where the rule states that the court shall impose identical sanctions, courts have still found that substantially different sanctions are warranted based upon their own treatment of the type of offenses charged. In Colorado an attorney was disbarred although the original jurisdiction, Arizona, had only suspended him for six months. People v. Apker, 67 P.3d 23, 25 (Colo.2003). The Arizona court had found that the attorney had stolen client funds.

Id. He was disbarred in Colorado because “[t]he knowing conversion of client property almost invariably results in disbarment ⁶⁸³ under Colorado law.” Id. As a result, the disciplinary board determined that a substantially different sanction was necessary from that imposed in Arizona. Id.

See also People v. Costa, 56 P.3d 130 (Colo.2002). We are mindful of the deference to be granted other states in their decisions regarding similar conduct. We give that deference where it is due: to the other jurisdiction’s factual findings. In terms of sanctions in “reciprocal” cases, we agree with those jurisdictions that reserve the right to impose a sanction which is consistent with others imposed in cases originating in their jurisdictions.

This policy is sound in that it ensures that every member of the Maryland Bar is held to the same standards regardless of where their misconduct takes place.

III

Conclusion Maryland Rule 16-773 governs discipline cases in which a foreign state has already acted to discipline the attorney for the same misconduct. Under that rule this Court may also impose a sanction upon a Maryland attorney who has already been disciplined in another jurisdiction for the same misconduct. This rule,, however, does not mandate that the same sanction must be imposed. In these types of case, this Court gives great deference to the other jurisdiction’s factual findings.

In addition, we are duty-bound to examine the other jurisdiction’s sanction and determine whether that sanction is consistent with our disciplinary precedent. Where Maryland attorneys are given a substantially different sanction for similar conduct in cases originating in this State, to that imposed in the originating state, we may not follow the original jurisdiction’s finding as to the sanction imposed. This result supports our policy of providing consistency in sanctioning for similar conduct for all members of the Maryland Bar. It furthers our goal to protect the public by ensuring that every Maryland attorney is held to consistent standards of conduct.

Indefinite suspension with the right to reapply after eighteen months is the appropriate sanction in this State. ⁶⁸⁴ IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED, FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND AGAINST H. ALLEN WHITEHEAD. BELL, C.J., files a dissenting opinion joined by RAKER and WILNER, JJ. BELL, Chief Judge, dissenting joined by RAKER and WILNER, JJ. The majority’s reasoning for refusing to impose reciprocal discipline in this case is threefold: the respondent was disbarred in the District of Columbia for one act of misappropriation, not two, and thus only that first act will be considered by this Court; the imposition of reciprocal discipline under Maryland Rule 16-773 1 is purely discretionary; and the respondent ⁶⁸⁵ has demonstrated extenuating circumstances under Rule 16-773(e)(4), which warrant a sanction less than disbarment.

All of these conclusions are incorrect, and the Court’s analysis is based upon a faulty interpretation of Rule 16-773. I. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals disbarred H. Allen Whitehead, the respondent, pursuant to Rule XI, § 12 of the Rules Governing the Admission to the Bar of the District ⁶⁸⁶ of Columbia, 2 which provides for disbarment by consent. The ground on which the respondent was disbarred was stated in the respondent’s affidavit accompanying the petition for disbarment — he admitted: “In the Matter of Reginald Grayson, Intvp. No. 195-94, wherein I was appointed as Conservator, I took fees (which were later reimbursed) prior to Court approval.” To be sure, in his affidavit, the respondent made no mention of, and certainly did not admit to, misappropriating $600,000 of estate funds, which, Bar Counsel alleged, he used for a real estate investment; instead, as we have seen, he only admitted taking legal fees without Court consent.

It is, thus, arguable, as the majority concludes, that it was only on that basis that the respondent was disbarred. 3 ⁶⁸⁷ That the respondent’s admission in the District of Columbia attorney discipline case was limited to the fee payment, and did not include the self-dealing alleged, is, in truth, immaterial to the proper analysis under Rule 16-773. Applying the proper analysis demonstrates that disbarment is the only appropriate sanction. Moreover, in this Court the respondent’s status is not simply that of one who has consented to disbarment; rather, on the basis of that consent 4 — from the admission it con ⁶⁸⁸ tained — he has been found by the hearing court to have violated Rule 8.4(a), (b), (c) and (d). Either subsection (b) or (c) constitutes a finding of intentional misappropriation of estate funds.

That finding, in turn, is supported by the respondent’s admission that he took fees from the estate, as to which he was conservator, without court permission. In re Reginald Grayson, Jr., No. 195-94, Superior Court of the District of Columbia. In other cases, in which the hearing court has found a violation of Rule 8.4(b) or (c), where there has been an inappropriate handling of monies or in which a trust account has been out of balance, we have refused to allow a respondent to be heard to say, and certainly not to succeed in the argument, that there was no misappropriation found or that it was not intentional. Attorney Griev.

Comm’n v. Cafferty, 376 Md. 700, 723 , 831 A.2d 1042, 1056-7 (2003); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Sabghir, 350 Md. 67, 68 , 710 A.2d 926, 926 (1998); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Gittens, 346 Md. 316, 325 , 697 A.2d 83, 88 (1997); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Willcher, 340 Md. 217, 221-222 , 665 A.2d 1059, 1061 (1995); Attorney Griev.

Comm’n v. Sparrow, 314 Md. 421, 425 , 550 A.2d 1150, 1152 (1989). There is, consequently, another basis for imposing the sanction the District of Columbia court imposed. That basis, moreover, is consistent with the majority’s desire and apparent determination, to attain, and to maintain, internal consistency in attorney discipline cases. As we have so often stated, disbarment is the inexorable result of a finding of misappropriation, absent compelling extenuating circumstances.

Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Bakas, 323 Md. 395, 403 , 593 A.2d 1087, 1091 (1991); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Spery, 371 Md. 560, 568 , 810 A.2d 487, 491-92 (2002); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. ⁶⁸⁹ Sullivan, 369 Md. 650, 655-56 , 801 A.2d 1077, 1080 (2002); Attorney Griev.

Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 410 , 773 A.2d 463, 483 (2001). That the respondent did not appreciate, or was not told, that disbarment need not be the sanction for the premature taking of a fee is neither a compelling nor extenuating circumstance.

II

A definition of “reciprocal” is “corresponding; equivalent.” (Blacks Law Dictionary, 7th Edition, 2000). “Corresponding” means “to be analogous or similar; to agree in amount, position, etc.; to be in harmony or agreement.” (Oxford Concise Dictionary, 9th edition, 1995). As such, “reciprocal” is an appropriate word to use in describing our practice under Rule 16-773, at least it was, until this Court’s decision in Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Weiss, 389 Md. 531, 546 , 886 A.2d 606, 614-15 (2005). The purpose of Rule 16-773 is to ensure that two jurisdictions with the same interest in regulating the legal profession and, in the process and necessarily, protecting the public, ordinarily will impose the same (corresponding, equivalent) discipline upon a violating attorney for the same misconduct.

One explanation for the use of the word “corresponding” is that there are some instances in which a particular form of sanction which exists in one jurisdiction has no exact equivalent in another jurisdiction; therefore, the reciprocating jurisdiction must replicate the sanction as